The Nyāya-Sūtras of Gautama

Volume IV

Mahāmahopādhyāya
GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ

This is a reprint of the English Translation of the *Nyāya Sūtras* of Gautama by Mm. Dr. Ganganatha Jha, the versatile Sanskrit scholar who will ever be remembered for his dedicated and selfless pioneer work and immense contribution in the field.

The work was first published serially in the *Indian Thought* (Vols. IV-XI), a quarterly journal devoted to Sanskrit learning, over a period of eight years from 1912 to 1919.

Dr. Jha's translation covers a large field and includes, besides the original *Sūtras* of Gautama, the *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana and the *Vārtika* of Uddyotakara in full as well as relevant notes from Vācaspatimiśra's *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā*, Udayana's *Tātparyapariśuddhi* and Raghūttama's *Bhāṣyacandra*. The work naturally became enormous in bulk and it is not surprising that it took for its completion so many years and so much energy of the author and as many as 1800 pages in print.

This reprint of the great work is issued in response to the increasing demand of the scholars.

ISBN : 0-89581-754-3

Rs. 500

(FOR FOUR VOLUMES)

THE NYĀYA-SŪṬRAS OF GAUṬAMA

© MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
Head Office : Bungalow Road, Delhi 110 007
Branches : Chowk, Varanasi 221 001
Ashok Rajpath, Patna 800 004
6 Appar Swamy Koil Street, Mylapore,
Madras 600 004

First published : in *Indian Thought*, 1912-1919
Reprint : Delhi, 1984

ISBN : 0–89581–754–3

Printed in India by Shantilal Jain, at Shri Jainendra Press, A-45, Phase I, Naraina, New Delhi 1100 28 and published by Narendra Prakash Jain for Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 110 007.

CONTENTS

Discourse IV.

Daily Lesson I.

Section (1).

[*Sūtras* 1—2].

General Examination of Activity and Defect.

Bhāṣya on Su. (1).

[P. 194, L. 1 to L. 4.]

After *Mind* it is the turn of *Activity* to be examined.* All that has been said in course of the Examination of the *Body* as the receptacle of Merit and Demerit may be regarded as constituting the Examination of *Activity*;—this is what is asserted in the following *Sūṭra* (1).

---

* The Third Discourse has dealt with the first six of the twelve 'objects of cognition' mentioned in Sū. 1-1-9; these six—Soul, Body, Sense-organs, Things perceived, Apprehension and Mind—being the *causes* of the remaining six—Activity, Defect, Re-birth, Fruition, Pain and Release; these are the *effects* of the former six. [This is what constitutes the connection between Discourses III and IV]. In the First Daily Lesson we have the examination of the six 'objects'; and in the Second we have the Examination of the Highest Cognition, the Right Knowledge, (that leads directly to Release).—*Parishuḍḍhi.*

Varḍhamāna adds—Another connection between the end of Aḍhyāya III and the beginning of Aḍhyāya IV, consists in the fact that among the Objects mentioned in Sū. 1-1-9, it is 'Activity' whose *mention* follows that of 'Mind'; hence it is only natural that the 'examination' also of *Activity* should follow that of *Mind*.

Varḍhamāna raises a further question—According to the rule laid down by the *Bhāṣya*, the 'examination' of a subject must be preceded by its 'mention' and 'definition'; and as 'Right Knowledge' has nowhere been *mentioned*, there can be no justification for its *examination* in the second Daily Lesson of Adh. IV. The answer is that 'Right Cognition' has been actually mentioned in Sū. 1-1-1, where it is *mentioned* as leading to the Highest Good of Man; and further, to justify an 'examination' it is not necessary to directly *mention* a subject; for we find the *Sūṭras* examining several subjects that are connected only remotely with the subjects *mentioned*. Another question that arises is—since Right Knowledge is the precursor of Release, it should have been dealt with beforehand. The answer to this is that a full account of Right Knowledge demands a previous account of the *objects* of that knowledge; it is for this reason that Right Knowledge has been dealt with *after* all other subjects have been dealt with.

As Activity has been defined—(Suṭra 1).

so has it been examined.*

***Vārṭika* on Sū. (1).**

[P. 450, L. 3 to L. 13.]

After Mind it is the turn of Activity to be examined. Hence says the *Sūṭra— As Activity etc.* The meaning of the *Sūṭra* is that *Activity is to be regarded as examined in the manner in which it has been defined.*

Q. "What is it that has been examined in regard to Activity?"†

Answer—All that has been investigated in connection with Merit and Demerit constitutes investigation into *Activity.* 'Activity' is of two kinds—that in the form of cause and that in the form of effect; to the former kind belongs 'the operation of Speech, Apprehension and Body'; and to the latter kind belong what are called 'Merit and Demerit,' as described under Su. 1-1-2; of 'Activity' of the former kind, twenty different forms have been described above; 'Activity'

---

* Activity has been defined under Sū. 1-1-17 as the 'Operation of Speech, Apprehension and Body'; and this may be regarded as its 'examination' also.

These words—*so has it been examined*—are, according to the *Bhāṣya*, supplied to complete the Sūṭra. Vishvanāṭha has taken exception to this :—"It is not right to supply these words to the Sūṭra; for if this is done then the word '*ṭaṭhā*,' 'so,' required as the necessary correlation to '*yaṭhā*,' 'as,' of the Sūṭra (1), having already been thus supplied, there would be no syntactical connection between Sūṭras (1) and (2). Hence the right way to construe is to take both Sūṭras together, the meaning being—'just as Activity is as has been defined, so is Defect also as it has been defined."

This construction is perhaps better; but there is no point in the criticism of the Bhāṣya-interpretation; for there is nothing wrong in construing the single '*yaṭhā*' of Sū. (1) with two '*ṭaṭhā's*'—one supplied by the *Bhāṣya* and the other occurring in Sū. (2).

† "All that have been examined are the Soul and five other Objects of Cognition; and nothing has as yet been examined in connection with *Activity?*"—*Ṭāṭparya*.

in the form of *effect*, (*a*) subsists in a single substance (Soul), since Prosperity (the effect of Merit) belongs to each individual Soul separately,—(*b*) it is permanent (relatively, and not evanescent, like Apprehension, Pleasure, Pain, &c.), because its time of fruition is fixed,—(*c*) as subsisting in the Soul, it is a subordinate quality and not eternal, as is shown by the fact that there is *death*,—as has been asserted in the Bhāṣya (P. 191-192), where it is said that there is death upon the exhaustion of the Karmic residuum which has already borne its fruit, and where the cause of Birth also has been described (as consisting in the appearance of another Karmic residuum);—then again in Sū. 3-2-60, we read—'its birth follows from the continuance of the effects of previous acts,'—which indicates the causes of Birth-Rebirth and Release,—the meaning being that when this cause is present there is *birth and rebirth*, and when it ceases there is *Release*; all this has been described [which shows that Activity subsists in the Soul].

Bhāṣya on Sū. (2).

[P. 194, L. 4 to L. 9.]

It might be urged that after 'Activity,' there should follow the Examination of 'Defects,; hence the *Sūtra* adds—

So also have the Defects—(Sūtra 2)

been examined. (A) Inasmuch as they subsist in the same substratum as *Apprehension*, Defects are regarded as the qualities of the Soul;—(B) inasmuch as they are the source of Activity, and as they have the power of bringing about re-birth, they are regarded as the cause of *Metempsychosis*, '*Samsāra*';—and since *metempsychosis* (series of births and deaths) is beginningless, Defects are regarded as operating* in a continuous series.† *Wrong Knowledge* ceases when Right

---

* The right reading '*pravartante*' is supplied by Puri Ms. B.

† Defects are due to the contemplation of desirable and undesirable things; hence like Apprehension they must be qualities of the Soul; being qualities of the Soul they must proceed on lines similar to Activity, which is the product of the Soul's quality, Effort. Hence the examination of 'Defects' becomes included in that of 'Activity.'—*Tātparya*.

Knowledge is attained; and on the cessation of *Wrong Knowledge*, the whole series of *Affections and Aversions* drop off; whereupon follows *Final Release*;—and from this it is clear that Defects (i.e. Wrong Knowledge, Affection &c.) are liable to Appearance and Disappearance;—all this in connection with Defects has already been explained (under *Sūṭras* 1-1-2 and 3-1-25).

Vārṭika on Sū. (2).

[P. 450, L. 4 to P. 451, L. 3.]

It might be urged that after 'Activity,' Defects should be described; hence the Sūṭra says—*So also have the Defects* —'been described.' *Subsisting in the same substratum as Apprehension, Defects must be regarded as qualities of the Soul*;—Metempsychosis being without beginning, Defects function

Vār. P. 451. in a beginningless series;—since Defects cease upon the *cessation of Wrong Knowledge*, which follows from Right Knowledge, they are regarded as liable to production and destruction;—and they are regarded as *qualities*, because while being products, they are perceptible by means of the inner organ (Mind)*, and not perceptible by the Visual Organ.

End of Section (1).

Section (2).†

[Sūṭras 3—9.]

Defects divided into three Groups

Bhāṣya on Sū. (3).

[P. 194, L. 9 to P. 195, L. 2.]

Question:—It has been said in Sū. 1-1-18 that—'Defects have inciting (causing activity) as their distinguishing

* '*Indriyāntaram manaḥ*'—says the *Tāṭparya*.

† Varḍhamāna remarks—'Sūṭra 2 having dealt with Defects, it would appear reasonable to regard Sūṭra 3 *et seq* as continuing the same section. So that the proper arrangement would be to put Sū. (1) alone under Section I, dealing with 'Activity,' and Sūṭras 2 to 9 under Section II dealing with Defects. But

feature'; now the feelings of Pride, Jealousy, Envy, Suspicion, Selfishness and the like are all characterised by the said distinguishing feature; under the circumstances, why are not these enumerated by name?

The answer to this is supplied by the following *Sūṭra*.

Sūṭra (3).

THERE ARE THREE GROUPS OF DEFECTS;—[ALL BEING INCLUDED UNDER] DESIRE, HATRED AND ILLUSION, WHICH ARE DISTINCT FROM ONE ANOTHER (Sū. 3).

Of Defects there are three groups, three types: (I) The *Desire-type*—under which are included Love (for the other sex), Selfishness, Longing for acquiring, in a lawful manner, what belongs to another, Hankering (for Rebirth) and Greed (desire for obtaining, in an unlawful manner, what belongs to another);—(II) *The Hatred-type* under which are included Anger, Jealousy, Envy, Malice, and Resentment; —(III) *The Illusion-type* under which are included Error, Suspicion, Pride, and Negligence. Thus since all defects are included under one or the other of these three groups, they are not enumerated separately.

Objection—"Since all have the same distinguishing feature (of *causing activity*), it is not right to divide them under three groups."

Answer—The division into three groups is certainly right, since 'Desire' 'Hatred' and 'Illusion' *are distinct from one another* [though all are *causes of activity*, yet each has a distinctive character of its own]; e.g. 'Desire' is characterised by *attachment*, 'Hatred' is characterised by *aversion* (intolerance), and 'Illusion' is characterised by *wrong notion*; this fact is realised by every man in his own experience: every conscious person knows when Love appears, when he has the feeling 'the quality of Love has appeared in my Soul;' he also recognises the absence of Love, when he has the feeling 'the quality of Love is

---

to this arrangement there would be the objection that only one Sūṭra, the first, would form a 'Section' which is not right; as a 'Section' must consist of several *Sūṭras*. Hence the best explanation is that under Section I we have the treatment of 'Defects' only in a general way, and that too, as a side-issue, as something connected with Activity; while under Section II we have the detailed treatment of 'Defects.'

not present in my Soul;' and similarly with the other two. As for the feelings of Pride and the rest, these are all found to be included under one or other of the three groups; and hence they have not been enumerated separately.

Vārṭika on Sū. (3).

[P. 451, L. 3 to P. 453, L. 11].

"It has been said that 'Defects have inciting for their distinguishing feature;' and since Pride &c also incite people to activity,—and as such have the same characteristic as the feelings of Desire, Hatred and Illusion—these also should be separately enumerated."

They are not separately enumerated, because they are already included. "Wherein are they included?" They have been included in the definition itself that 'Defects have inciting for their distinguishing feature.' Of the Defects thus included—*there are three groups &c. &c.*—says the *Sūṭra*. There are three groups, three types, of Defects:—*I—The Desire-type including Love, Selfishness, Longing, Hankering and Greed; II—the Hatred-type including Anger, Jealousy, Envy, Malice and Resentment; III—the Illusion-type, including Error, Suspicion, Pride and Negligence.*

Question:—"Are the terms 'Love,' 'Selfishness,' and the rest, synonymous, or have they different significations?"—What do you mean?—"If they are synonymous, then it is not right to say that there are three *groups*; for things spoken of by a number of synonyms do not form a group; e.g. such terms as 'Inḍra,' 'Shakra' and 'Puranḍara' cannot be used as forming a *group*. If, on the other hand, the terms have diverse significations, it behoves you to explain this diversity."

Our answer to the above is that the feelings spoken of by the words are different. E.g. I. 'Love' is desire for women;

the yearning that men have for women is called 'Love;' as is shown by the common saying—'unless a man is *in love* he does not bedeck himself;'—'Selfishness' is the desire not to give up a thing, even though it is inexhaustible; even though the thing is such as cannot become exhausted, either by giving or enjoying, if one has the feeling not to give that up, that feeling is what is called 'Selfishness;' e.g. the solicitude that one evinces when he wishes that people may not drink out of the royal well (which is large and inexhaustible);—'*Longing*' is desire to possess what does not belong to oneself; when a thing does not belong to oneself, and yet he desires to have it, this is called 'Longing;'—that desire which leads to rebirth is 'Hankering;' the great wish that one has for being born again is called 'Hankering;'*—the desire for unlawful possession of what belongs to another is called 'Greed'; when one desires, to take possession in an unlawful manner, of what belongs to another, he is called 'Greedy';—among all these 'Desire' is the common element, under the generic term 'Desire' all these special feelings are included. II. The feeling that distorts the body and the receptacles of the sense-organs is called 'Anger'; when on the appearance of the feeling, the body and the organs become distorted, it is called 'Anger';—Jealousy is the feeling that one has of preventing another person to have possession of what belongs to both; when there is a certain thing which belongs equally to two men and is not taken up entirely by either, the feeling that one of them has of preventing the other from wishing to

Vār. P. 452.

* The special connotation attributed to the word '*Tṛiṣṇa*' here and in the Bhāṣya is interesting. This word in its Pali form '*ṭanhā*' conveys the meaning here mentioned, in Buddhist lilterature. The Sanskrit form is rarely found to be used in this restricted sense. Has the Bhāṣya borrowed the usage from Buḍḍhist literature?

have it, is called 'Jealousy';—Envy is intolerance of another's good qualities; the feeling of 'unbearableness' that one has on hearing the good qualities of others described is called 'Envy';—'Malice' is the wish to do harm to others; when one, being himself unable to do harm to another person, yet wishes to do him harm, this feeling is called 'Malice';—'Resentment' is intolerance of harm done to one;—in all these the common element is 'Hatred,' under which generic term therefore they are all included. III. 'Error' is wrong cognition, the cognition of a thing as what it is not;—'Suspicion' is doubt in the form 'what may this be?'*;—'Pride' consists in the feeling of self-importance that one has, based either upon qualities that actually exist in him, or those that, though not present, are assumed—the feeling that is expressed in some such form as 'Oh! how great am I';—'Negligence' consists in failure to do what one could do when a man is fully capable to do his duty and yet fails to do it, it is called his 'negligence';—in all these the common element is 'illusion,' under which generic term therefore they are all included. It is for this reason that all 'defects' being included under the three groups, they have not been enumerated separately.

"How do you know that all this is so?"

We learn it from actual popular usage: As a matter of fact the several terms are used in the distinct senses described above, and not in the sense of mere *desire*; for instance, when a beggar desires alms, people do not say that 'he *loves* it.'

"Well, in that case, inasmuch as all have the same distinguishing feature (of *causing activity*), there can be no ground for the threefold division;

Vār. P. 444.

* Read कि स्विदिति

Desire, Hatred and Illusion must be one and the same,—since they are all possessed of the same characteristic,—just like the various forms of 'Desire'."

It is not true that there is no ground for the threefold division; *because 'Desire,' 'Hatred' and 'Illusion' are distinct from one another.* Though they all possess the common characteristic (of causing activity), yet each is endowed with a differentia which serves as the basis for their being subdivided into three groups; just as even though 'Love' and the others are all 'desire,' yet they can be differentiated from one another. Further, the mere possession of a common character does not make several things one and the same; if that were so, then there would be no 'Commonality' at all [for 'Commonality' implies '*diversity* and *multiplicity*']; if 'Desire,' 'Hatred' and 'Illusion' were all one and the same, there could be so no such assertion as 'this character is common to them,' for nothing can be 'common' to a single thing.

Question:—"What is the differentia that serves as the basis of sub-division?"

Answer:—'*Desire' is characterised by attachment*; the attachment that people have for things is called 'Desire';—'*Hatred' is characterised by aversion*; the aversion or the feeling of intolerance that one has towards Pain and what causes pain is called 'Hatred';—*Illusion is characterised by wrong notion*; that is, the notion of a thing as *not* possessed of a certain character, when as a matter of fact it *is* possessed of that character. These distinguishing features of 'Desire,' 'Hatred' and 'Illusion' are known to all men.

Sūtra (4).

[*Objection*]—"WHAT IS ASSERTED IS NOT RIGHT; BECAUSE ALL THREE HAVE ONE AND THE SAME THING FOR THEIR ANTITHESIS." (Su. 4).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (4).

[P. 125, Ll. 4—5.]

" Desire and the rest cannot be regarded as distinct from one another;—Why?—*Because they have one and the same thing for their antithesis*; all three have one and the same thing for their antithesis—viz: that which is known under the names '*tattvajñānam*', 'knowledge of truth', '*samyaṅmatiḥ*', 'right knowledge', '*āryaprajñā*', 'truthful cognition', '*sambodhaḥ*,' 'right apprehension.' "

Vārtika on Sū. (4).

[P. 453, L. 13 to L. 15.]

" Desire, Hatred and Illusion must be one and the same,—because they have one and the same thing for their antithesis,—like Disjunction. Just as all Disjunctions, having for their antithesis the single thing 'Conjunction', are regarded as one, so Desire and the rest, having for their antithesis the single thing 'Right Knowledge,' must be regarded as one."

Sūtra (5).

[*Answer*]—THE REASON PUT FORWARD IS NOT VALID, AS THERE IS NO INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE.

Su. (5).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (47).

[P. 195, Ll, 7—8.]

The Dark Colour and several such properties of Clay have the same antithesis in the form of 'fire-contact', and there are other qualities of it, which, being brought about by baking, have one and the same source;—and yet all these qualities are distinct from one another.*

Vārtika on Sū. (5).

[P. 453, L. 17 to P. 454, L. 2.]

The reason is not valid &c. &c.—says the *Sūtra*. The colour and other properties (of Clay), which are all des-

* The *Vārtika* and *Tātparya* construe the clause *Sati chārthāntarābhāve* with the next *Sūtra*. But it is much simpler to take it as translated.

troyed by the same fire-contact, and as such have one and the same thing for their antithesis; and yet they are not all one and the same thing. Hence what is put forward as the Reason (in Su. 4, i.e. *the fact of their having one and the same thing for their antithesis*) is not invariably concomitant (with what is desired to be proved, i.e. *being one and the same*).

This same argument also demolishes the reasoning that "Desire, &c., must be one, because they have the same source, like Sound." For the Colour and other qualities (of the baked Jar) have the same source (fire-contact), and yet they are not one and the same.

Sūṭra (6).

OF THESE ILLUSION IS THE WORSER EVIL; AS FOR ONE WHO IS NOT UNDER ILLUSION THE OTHERS DO NOT APPEAR. (Su. 6).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (6).

[P. 159, L. 10 to L. 16.]

Illusion is an evil; it is spoken of as the 'worser evil'; by taking the three two at a time.* "Why is Illusion the 'worser evil?" *Because for one who is not under illusion the other do not appear*,—i. e. unless one is affected by Illusion, Desire and Hatred do not appear; and when a man has become influenced by Illusion, one or the other (of the other two) appear in accordance with the man's impressions;† when the man's impressions in regard to a thing are attractive (such as create attachment), they produce in him *Desire* (for that thing); while when his notions are repulsive (such as create aversion), they produce *Hatred*. Both these notions are nothing other than 'Illu-

* Because the term '*pāpīyān*' is in the comparative degree, it follows that what is meant is that, as between Illusion and Desire, and Illusion and Hatred, Illusion is the 'worser evil.'

† What is spoken of '*Saṅkalpa*,' 'Notions' is the remembrance, under Illusion, of a certain thing as bringing pleasure, and that of another thing, as bringing pain—*Ṭāṭparya*.

sion,' which consists of *wrong notion.* Thus it is that Desire and Hatred have their source in Illusion. When Illusion is destroyed by Right Knowledge, both Desire and Hatred cease to appear; this is what accounts for their having one and the same thing for their antithesis. It is with a view to these facts that it has been explained under Sū. 1. 1. 2 that, *after True Knowledge 'there is a cessation of each member of the following series—Pain, Birth, Activity, Defect, and Wrong Notion,—the cessation of that which follows bringing the annihilation of that which precedes it, and this ultimately leads to Final Release.'*

Vārṭika on Sū. (6).

[P. 454, L. 4 to L. 11.]

Each of the three being distinct,* *among them Illusion is the worser evil* &c. &c.—says the Sūṭra, Instead of saying that 'Illusion is the *worst* evil' the *Sūṭra* says 'worser evil,' as the comparison meant to be instituted is between the three, taken two at a time; the meaning being that—'between Desire and Illusion, Illusion is the worser of the two, and between Hatred and Illusion, Illusion is the worser of the two.' Why so? Because unless a man is under illusion the other two do not appear; it is only the man under illusion that becomes angry; only the man under illusion falls in love; and it is only the man having the proneness to Illusion that is deluded.† When True Knowledge has put an end to Illusion, Desire and the rest also cease; this is what accounts for these having one and the same thing for their antithesis; that is, it is because on the destruction of Illusion by True Knowledge, Desire and Hatred cease to appear that these have the same thing for their antithesis,—and not because they are one and the same. It is only on the basis of these facts that it can be established that among

* We have taken this clause of the Bhāṣya along with the Bhāṣya on Sū. 5.

† This apparently tautological sentence has been justified by the *Ṭāṭparya* by saying that the term '*mūḍhaḥ*' means *the man who has the tendency to illusion.*

Pain and the rest, the cessation of the succeeding brings about the annihilation of the preceding.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (7).

[P. 195, L. 16 to L. 19.]

Objection :—" If what is said in Sū. 6 is true, then there arises the following difficulty :—

Sūṭra (7).

INASMUCH AS (BETWEEN ILLUSION AND THE OTHER TWO) THERE IS THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT, IT FOLLOWS THAT 'ILLUSION' IS SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE 'DEFECTS.'" (Sū. 7).

" The effect is always different from the cause; hence if Illusion is the cause of the Defects (Desire and Hatred), it cannot itself be a 'Defect.'"

Vārṭika on Sū. (7).

[P. 454, L. 11 to L. 14.]

" If what is said *is true*, then there arises the difficulty that—*inasmuch as &c. &c.*—says the *Sūṭra*. [The reasoning being stated thus]—Illusion cannot be a Defect,—because it is the cause of defects,—like Colour &c."

Sūṭra (8).

[*Answer*]—THAT CANNOT BE; AS ILLUSION IS INCLUDED UNDER THE DEFINITION OF 'DEFECTS.'—(Sū. 8).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (8).

[P. 196, L. 1.]

Defects having been defined as *those that have causing activity for their distinguishing feature*—Illusion becomes included, by this definition, under 'Defect.'

Vārṭika on Sū. (8).

[P. 454, Ll. 16—18.]

That cannot be &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. Whether a thing does or does not belong to a certain class is determined, *not* by the *relation of cause and effect*, but by its character-

istic features being the same as those of that class; and since the characteristic feature of 'Defect' is present in Illusion, this must be regarded as a 'Defect.'

Sūṭra (9).

FURTHER, SINCE IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE FOR THINGS BELONGING TO THE SAME CLASS TO BEAR AMONG THEMSELVES THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT, THE OBJECTION (IN SŪ. 7) HAS NO FORCE. SŪ. (9).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (9).

[P. 196, Ll 4—5.]

Among substances, as well as qualities, belonging to the same class, it is found that they bear to one another various kinds of causal relation.

Vārṭika on Sū. (9).

[P. 455, L. 2 to L. 7.]

Further, since it is quite possible &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. Even among things belonging to the same class we find several kinds of causal relation subsisting. E. g. One Apprehension is the cause of another Apprehension, and yet it belongs to the same class 'Apprehension'; the *Shuttle*, and such other substances are the cause of another Substance (Cloth), and yet they belong to the class 'Substance'; similarly with such qualities as propulsion, striking, contact with conjuncts and Faculty.

Thus have *Defects* been examined.

End of Section (2).

SECTION (3).

[Sūṭras 10—13.]

Examination of 'Rebirth.'

Bhāṣya on Sū. (10).

[P. 196, L. 6 to L. 15.]

After 'Defects' comes 'Rebirth.'* In regard to this the following objection is raised:—"There can be no such thing as *Rebirth*, as the Soul is eternal; and no eternal thing is ever found to be born or to die; so that the Soul being eternal, there is no possibility of *Birth and Death*; and yet it is only these two that constitute 'Rebirth† ?"

On this point we have the following statement of the established conclusion:—

Sutra (10).

REBIRTH IS POSSIBLE ONLY BECAUSE THE SOUL IS ETERNAL. (Sū. 10),

As a matter of fact it is the *eternal* Soul that 'departs' (*praiṭi*),—i.e. abandons the former body, dies,—and having

---

* The doubt in regard to 'Rebirth' is as to its belonging to the Soul, or to Apprehension, or to the Body;—says the *Ṭāṭparya*. To this form of Doubt, the objection is raised in Varḍhamāna's '*Prakāsha*' that, it having been already determined under Sū. 1-1-19 that Rebirth is of the Soul, there can be no room for such a doubt. The answer given is that from the definition provided under Sū. 1-1-19, 'Rebirth' appears to consist in death and birth'; hence the further question naturally arises—'How can death and birth belong to the *Soul*, which, being eternal, cannot die or be born?' And the most fitting occasion for dealing with this question is that when the 'examination' of 'Rebirth' is taken up. Varḍhamāna also suggests another answer as offered by 'others':—The *Pūrvapakṣin* imposes upon the *Naiyāyika* the view that 'Rebirth' consists of 'destruction and production' and then raises the doubt and the objection against the view that 'Rebirth' belongs to the Soul; and instead of urging the objection in this form, the *Purvapakṣin* (in the *Bhāṣya*) starts off with the Naiyāyika view that Rebirth is something belonging to the Soul, and then goes to say that such Rebirth is not possible; as it is not possible for any such thing to belong to the Soul.

† Thus 'Rebirth,' is impossible under the theory of the *Naiyāyika*; though it is quite compatible with the theory of the Bauḍḍha, according to whom all these are evanescent, undergoing destruction every moment.

'*departed*' (*prēṭya*), i.e. having abandoned the former body, 'comes' (*bhavaṭi*)—i.e. is born, takes up another body; and it is these two (*departing—coming*) that have been spoken of as 'Rebirth,' '*Prēṭyabhāva*,' under the Sūtra—'Rebirth consists in being born again' (Sū. 1-1-19); so that what is meant (by 'Rebirth belonging to the Soul') is that *it abandons the previous body and takes up another*;* and this is possible only when the Soul is eternal. On the other hand, he, for whom 'Rebirth' consists of the 'birth of one entity and destruction of another entity,' would be faced with the absurdity that one entity would be deprived of the effects of his deeds, while another would be saddled with the effects of acts not done by him.† And further, under the theory that there are causes bringing about destruction (of the Being in the body), the teachings of the sages would be entirely useless [as the Being to whom the teachings are imparted cannot live long enough to profit by them].‡

Vārṭika on Sū. (10).

[P. 455, L. 8 to P. 456, L. 1.]

After defects comes '*Rebirth*'; and in regard to this the following objection is raised :—"There can be no such thing as *Rebirth*, because the Soul is eternal; being eternal, the Soul cannot be born, nor can it die; and yet it is these two that constitute 'Rebirth'—which implies that the Entity, after having died, is born again."

---

*The sentence '*pūrvasharīram* . . . *prēṭyabhāva*' is not found in Puri Ms. B; but the context requires it.

† The entity that does the act, is destroyed immediately afterwards; the entity that is subsequently born, at the time when the result of the said act appears, is a totally different being; so that while the latter is saddled with the effects of the acts not done by him, the former becomes deprived of the effects of those act done by himself. Under the view that the eternal Soul is re-born, it is the same Soul that does the act and experiences its effects.

‡ According to the Naiyāyika, on the other hand, the real Being, Soul, being everlasting, persists from life to life; and its birth and death consist respectively, in its becoming connected, and disconnected, with a Body, a set of Sense-organs, Intellection and Sensation.

On this point we have the following statement of the established conclusion—Rebirth is possible etc. etc.—says the *Sūtra.* It is only when the Soul is eternal that it can die and be born again. "What is the meaning of its *dying*?" It means that it becomes disconnected with the previously-produced Body, Sense-organs, Intellection and Sensation. "What of its *being born*?" It means that it becomes connected with a newly-produced Body, Sense-organs, Intellection and Sensation, forming a single aggregate. The 'birth' and 'death' of the Soul cannot mean that It is *produced* and *destroyed*; for it is eternal; that the Soul is eternal has been already proved under Sū. 3-1-19.

On the other hand, the philosopher for whom the 'birth and death' of the Soul consist of *production and destruction*, is faced by the absurd contingency that *one entity would be deprived of the effects of his deeds, while another would be saddled with the effects of acts not done by him*;—as we have already pointed out in course of our explanation of Su. 3-1-4.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (11).

[P. 196, L. 15 to P. 197, L. 2.]

Question.—"In what manner does the *production* of things come about?"*

Section (11).

(*Answer*]—THE (PRODUCTION) OF PERCEPTIBLE † THINGS IS FROM PERCEPTIBLE THINGS; AS IS CLEARLY PROVED BY PERCEPTION. (Su. 11.)

* It is not easy to perceive the connection of this question with 'Rebirth,' the subject-matter of the Section. The 'production' questioned about now, is the coming into existence of material objects; and the only connection possible would be that, the *Bhāṣya* having declared that 'Rebirth' does not consist of 'destruction and production,' it becomes necessary to determine the exact nature of 'production,' and then to show that it is not possible for the non-material substance Soul; and hence in the term '*prētyabhāva*' 'Rebirth,' '*bhāva*' 'birth' cannot mean 'production.'

Vishvanātha takes it as introduced for the purpose of bringing forward the various theories in regard to the 'production' of the Body.

†The term '*vyakta*' stands, according to the *Vārtika*, for that which is endowed with the conditions of perceptibility, i.e. anything endowed with such perceptible qualities as Colour and the rest. Hence the word '*vyaktāt*' takes in the Atoms also, which are endowed with the qualities of Colour &c.

The question being—"in what manner, and from what sort of material cause is the perceptible thing, such as the Body, produced?"—the answer is that, '*from perceptible things*,' known as 'material substances'—i.e. from Earth and the other material substances, in their extremely subtle eternal forms—is produced the '*perceptible thing*,' *i.e.*, the ordinarily known Substances (Earth &c. in their gross form), which appear in the form of the Body, the Sense-organs, the Objects and their appurtenances. The term '*vyakṭa*,' 'perceptible,' stands for what is cognisable by means of the Sense-organs; and by reason of similarity to this 'perceptible' thing, its cause also is called '*vyakṭa*,' 'perceptible.'—"What is the similarity?"—The similarity (between the perceptible thing and its cause) consists in the presence of Colour &c. Hence the meaning of the Sūtra is that—'out of the eternal substances, Earth &c., which are endowed with the qualities of Colour &c., are produced the Body and such other things, which are endowed with the qualities of Colour &c.'

[That this is so] *is clearly proved by Perception.* We actually see that out of such substances as Clay and the like which are endowed with the qualities of Colour and the rest, are produced objects of the same kind (*i.e.*, possessed of the qualities of Colour &c.);—and from this fact (perceived in connection with visible Objects) we infer the same in connection with invisible things also; that is, in the case of the Clay &c., we find that the presence of Colour and other qualities is common to the material cause as well as its product; and from this we deduce the same in regard to the causal nature of the eternal super-sensuous things (Atoms) also.

Vārṭika on Sū. (11).

Question:—"In what manner does the *production* of things come about? From what sort of cause are the perceptible things, Earth &c., (in their gross form), the Body, the Sense-organs &c. produced?"

Answer—*The production of perceptible things &c. &c.*—says the *Sūṭra.* "What is the *perceptible* thing?" It is that substance which is equipped with the condiṭions of perceptibility; and on the ground of similarity to this, the cause

of Earth &c., in the form of Atoms, is also called 'perceptible.' "What is the similarity?" The similarity consists in the presence of the qualities of Colour &c., and it is by reason of this similarity of 'Atoms' (to Earth &c.), in the shape of the presence of the qualities of Colour &c., that Atoms also are called 'perceptible.' [The meaning of the *Sūṭra* thus is that] out of the Atoms possessed of Colour and other qualities are produced the perceptible things in the shape of the Jar and such (inanimate) objects, and also the Bull and such (animate) objects.

"What is the proof of this?"

That the production of objects possessed of Colour &c. is as described above *is clearly proved by perception.*

"The proof put forward is not right; as the premiss is not invariably true; it is not true that things endowed with Colour &c, are produced out of only such things as are endowed with Colour &c., for we find that such things as the Jar, the Bull &c., *which are endowed with Colour &c.*, are produced out of *Conjunction* (of the component parts of these things), *which is without Colour etc.*"

This objection has no force; as it shows that the objector has not understood the meaning of the *Sūṭra*; the *Sūṭra* does not mean that things possessed of Colour &c., are always produced *only* from things possessed of Colour &c.; what the *Sūṭra* means is that such 'perceptible' things as the Bull and the like are preceded by such causal factors as are endowed with Colour &c. In this sense the premiss put forward is not untrue; for no causal factors devoid of Colour &c., are ever found to bring about such products as are endowed with Colour &c.

Sūṭra (12).

[*Objection*]—"WHAT IS ASSERTED IS NOT TRUE; AS THE JAR IS NOT PRODUCED OUT OF THE JAR."—(Sū. 12).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (12).

[P. 197, Ll. 4—5.]

"This also is a perceptible fact that the 'perceptible' Jar is never found to be produced out of the 'perceptible' Jar; hence, as we do not see the 'perceptible' thing being produced out of the 'perceptible' thing, it follows that the cause (of the production) of the 'perceptible' (Body &c.) is not a 'perceptible' thing."

Vārṭika on Sū. (12).

[P. 456, L. 17 to P. 457, L. 1.]

"*What is asserted is not true &c. &c.*"—says the Sūṭra.

Vār. P. 457. This criticism is based upon the notion that things are produced out of only such things as are homogeneous to them.

Sūṭra (13).

[*Answer*]—INASMUCH AS THE JAR IS ACTUALLY PRODUCED OUT OF A 'PERCEPTIBLE' SUBSTANCE, THE OBJECTION HAS NO FORCE. (Sū (13).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (14).

[P. 197, Ll. 7—10.]

We do not say that everything is the cause of everything; what we do say is that whatever 'perceptible' thing is produced, it is produced out of a similar (*i.e.*, *perceptible*) thing; and the substance Clay, which is called 'potsherd,' out of which the Jar is produced, is 'perceptible.' One who would deny such a patent fact could never be argued with by any person.

The truth of the matter is as we have described.

Vārṭika on Sū. (13).

[P. 457, L. 1 to L. 9.]

The above objection (in Sū. 12) has no force; as it shows that the objector has not understood the meaning of the *Sūṭra*. *We do not say that everything is the cause of everything*; the objection that the Jar is not produced out of the

Jar can be rightly urged only against that person who holds that everything is the cause of everything. In fact—*inasmuch as the Jar is actually produced out of a perceptible substance, the objection has no force*—says the *Sūṭra.* The 'perceptible' things, Jar and the like, when produced, are produced only out of such 'perceptible' things as the *potsherd* and the like; so that the way in which the Jar is produced does not militate against our view. [The reasoning being formulated thus]—the perceptible things, Body and the like, are preceded by such causal factors as are possessed of Colour &c.,—because they are such that any one of them can be perceived by the organ of vision and of touch,*—like the Jar, or like *Sound,*—this latter being an example *per contra.* Such is the truth upon the matter under consideration.

End of Section (3).

SECTION (4.)

[Sūṭras 14—18.]

Examination of the Theory that the Things of the World are produced out of the Void.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (14).

[P. 197, L. 10 to L. 14].

We now proceed to show up the doctrines of philosophers (of several schools)†—

* This fact has been put forward in Sū. 3-1-1, in proof of the presence of the Soul in the body. It is not easy to see what bearing it has upon the Body being produced out of perceptible substances.

The only possible explanation is that the premiss *ḍarshanasparshanābhyām ekārṭhagrahaṇāṭ* does not mean here the same thing that it does in Su. 3-1-1. The meaning that fits in with the present context is that—' because Body and such things are such that any one of them is perceived by both Visual and Tactile organs,—which is the case with the Jar, and which is not the case with Sound,—hence the Body must be regarded as preceded by such causal factors as are endowed with the qualities of Colour &c.

† The *Pariśuḍḍhi* calls Sections 4—11 '*Aupodghāṭika,*' 'Introductory,' or (more correctly) 'Supplementary,' to the Section putting forward the theory that 'perceptible things are produced out of perceptible things'.

Sūṭra (14).

"ENTITIES ARE PRODUCED OUT OF NEGATION; AS NO OBJECT COMES INTO EXISTENCE WITHOUT HAVING DESTROYED (ITS CAUSE)"—(Su. 14).

"One theory is that the *entity* is produced out of *negation*;—Why?—Because things are produced only after having destroyed (something); e.g. the sprout is produced only after the seed has been destroyed; and not till the seed is destroyed. If the '*destruction* of the seed' were not the cause of the sprout, then it would be possible for the sprout to come into existence even without destroying the seed."*

Vārṭika on Sū. (14).

[P. 457, L. 9 to L. 18.]

We now proceed to show up the doctrines of philosophers—out of which some are rejected, while others are accepted. Among these, the doctrine held by some people is that "entities are produced out of negation"; and in support of this they put forward the following arguments:—"No object comes into existence without being destroyed;" as a matter of fact, until the cause has been destroyed, no effect is produced; e.g., the sprout comes into existence only after the seed has been destroyed. And if the 'destruction of the seed' were not the cause of the sprout, then it would be possible for the sprout to appear without the seed being destroyed. But this is never found to happen. Hence the conclusion is that the 'cause of the sprout is the *destruction of the seed* [and Destruction is *negation*]."

It is interesting to note that the purely theistic doctrine of God having created the world has been put by Gautama among these 'doctrines.' held apparrently by other people. It is in view of this that the *Vārṭika* has remarked that the Author of the Sūṭra has put forward these various doctrines here—some of these for being criticised, and others are put up as accepted. The *Ṭāṭparya*, the *Parishuḍḍhi* and the *Prakāsha* however do not admit this view. (See below, Note on Sec. 5).

* Whenever an object is produced, its production is always preceded by the destruction of its material cause. Hence every object has for its cause this *Destruction*, and Destruction is a form of *negation*.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (15).

[P. 197, L. 14 to L. 18.]

The answer to the above is given in the following Sūṭra.

Sūṭra (15).

THE REASONING PUT FORWARD IS UNSOUND; AS IT INVOLVES SELF-CONTRADICTION.—(Sū. 15.)

The premiss—'because there is no production without destruction'—is unsound; as it involves self-contradiction. That which *destroys* (the cause) cannot be said to come into existence *after that destruction*; since it must have been already in existence [in order to be able to destroy the cause; that which is itself non-existent cannot destroy anything];—and that which comes into existence (*after destruction* of the cause) was not in existence before, and being non-existent, it could not destroy the cause [consequently the assertion that 'the thing comes into existence after destroying the cause' is self-contradictory].

Vārṭika on Sū. (15).

The assertion that—"an object comes into existence after having destroyed (the cause)"—involves a self-contradiction. That which does the *destroying* must be already in existence; that which does not exist cannot be the cause of destruction; and that which comes into existence could not have been in existence before; as that which is already in existence can never be produced. So that to say that a certain object *destroys* (the cause) and then *comes into existence* is to make a self-contradictory statement. "What *self-contradiction* is there?" By 'self-contradiction' we mean *incongruity*; i.e. if the thing destroys the cause, it cannot come into existence (after that destruction), and if it comes into existence (after destruction), it cannot do that destruction.

Vār. P. 458.

Sūṭra (16).

[*Not comprehending the purport of the Siḍḍhānṭin's argument, in Sū.* 15, *the Nihilist says*]—

"WHAT HAS BEEN URGED IS NOT RIGHT; FOR AS A MATTER OF FACT, WORDS DENOTING THE CASE-RELATIONS ARE APPLIED TO PAST AS WELL AS FUTURE THINGS." (Su. 16).

Bhāṣya on Su. (16).

[P. 197, L. 20 to P. 198, L. 3.]

[Says the Opponent]—"As a matter of fact words denoting the case-relations are used in regard to past as well as future things; e.g. 'the son shall be born,' [where the *future* son is in the *Nominative case*],—'he rejoices at the son to be born,' [where the *future* son is in the *Accusative Case*],—'he appoints the name of the son to be born' [where the *future* son is in the Genitive case],—'the Jar existed' [where the *past* Jar is in the Nominative *case*],—'he is sorry for the broken Jar' [where the *past* Jar is in the Accusative case],—'these potsherds are of the broken Jar' [where the *past* Jar is in the Genitive case],—'Sons, not being born, are a source of anxiety, to the old Father'* [where the future son is in the Nominative case];——we find several instances of such secondary (figurative) usage. 'What is the primary basis of this secondary usage?' Immediate sequence is the primary basis: and on this basis of 'immediate sequence,' what the expression 'comes into existence after having destroyed' means is that 'when *going to come into existence* the sprout destroys the seed;' and the Nominative character (of the Sprout, not yet born) is purely secondary (or figurative)."

Vārtika on Su. (16).

[P. 458, L. 6 to L. 13.]

"*What has been urged etc. etc.*—says the *Sūtra*. We find "that words denoting case-relations are applied to past as "well as future things. *E.g.*, in connection with *past* things "we find such expressions used as—'he is sorry for the "broken Jar,' 'these potsherds are of the broken Jar,' 'the "Jar existed;' and in connection with *future* things we find "such expressions as—'the son shall be born,' 'one rejoices at "the son to be born,' 'he appoints the name of the son to "be born,' 'sons, not being born, are a source of anxiety to

* The Vārtika reads ***** which gives better sense.

"the old father;'—we find several such instances of figura-"tive usage. The sense therefore of the expression 'the "sprout comes into existence after having destroyed the "seed' is that 'when going to come into existence, the "sprout destroys the seed.' 'What is the meaning of *des-"truction* in this case? On the strength of (by reason of) "immediate sequence 'destruction' means 'coming into exist-"ence *immediately after*;' that is, inasmuch as the sprout "comes into existence immediately after the seed has been "destroyed' [the meaning of 'destruction' is *immediate* "*sequence*]."

Sūṭra (17).

[*Answer*]—[EVEN SO] THE VIEW PUT FORTH CANNOT BE ACCEPTED; BECAUSE AS A MATTER OF FACT THERE IS NO PRODUCTION OUT OF THINGS DESTROYED.—(SŪ. 17).

Bhāṣya SŪ. (17).

[P. 198, L. 5.]

As a matter of fact, the Sprout is *not* produced out of the *destroyed* seed. Hence it is not true that "Entities are produced out of negation" (as alleged in Sū. 14).*

Vārṭika on Sū. (17).

[P. 458, L. 13 to P. 459, L. 7.]

The answer to the above arguments has already been given under Su. 15—viz: that the view put forth *involves self-contradiction*; as a matter of fact, there can be no destruction by a thing that has not come into existence; nor is it that whenever a thing is born it has the capability of destroying (its cause). Then as regards the allegation that

* If the 'destruction of the seed' were the cause of the birth of the sprout,—then, how is it that we find no sprout appearing when the seed is broken up into pieces by the hammer, and the disruptured component pieces do not form another composite? And how is it that the sprout appears only when the disruption of the seed is followed by a fresh composite formed out of its disjointed component pieces? These facts clearly show that the birth of the sprout does not arise out of the 'destruction' of the seed.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

"words denoting case-relations are applied to past and future things" (Su. 16),—we do not deny that there is such usage; all that we mean is that there can be no production out of a non-existent cause. That words denoting case-relations are used in connection with past, present and future things, we have ourselves pointed out in the course of our consideration of the general question of the validity of cognitions; where we have cited such examples as 'the tree stands' &c. &c. Further, as regards the assertion of the Opponent—"*by reason of immediate sequence 'destruction' means coming into existence immediately after*,"—this is not true; for the cause of the sprout does not consist in the 'destruction of the seed'; what happens is that the component particles of the seed, which (in the seed) are combined in a certain fashion,* have their former composition or combination destroyed, and another combination of them takes place; † and it is out of the latter combination that the sprout comes into existence;—and until the previous combination (of the particles) has been destroyed, it is not possible for another combination to come into existence; it is only in this sense that 'production' can mean *immediate sequence.* For these reasons it is only right that the *seed* should be the 'material cause' (of the sprout). With a view to point out this fact we have the *Sūtra*—'*there is no production out of things destroyed.*' The cause of the sprout is not the 'destruction of the seed,' but the component particles of the seed, through the abandoning of their previous composition. This is what the *Sūtra* means.

Vār. P. 459.

---

* '*Vyākṛitavyūhānām*' is the better reading; with '*vyāhatavyūhānām*' the clause means 'which have their combination destroyed.' The Bhāṣya on Sū. 18 reads '*vyūhatavyūhānām*.'

† The same particles that were originally arranged into the form of the *seed* come to be re-arranged in the form of the *sprout*; and so forth.

Sūṭra (18).

IN SO FAR AS 'SEQUENCE' IS MENTIONED,—THIS WE DO NOT DENY. (Su, 18).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (62).

[P. 198, L. 7 to L. 14.]

The fact that the 'coming into existence' (of the sprout) is perceived by the 'destruction' (of the seed) constitutes their 'sequence'; and in so far as this 'sequence has been put forward (by the Opponent) as the reason (probans) for the proposition that "Entities are produced out of negation;"—this 'sequence' we do not deny; all that we mean is that, when the composition of the particles becomes disturbed, the previous combination ceases and another combination takes its place; and it is out of this latter combination,—and not out of *negation*—that the next substance is produced.* What happens is that the component particles of the Seed have aroused within them a certain motion, by reason of some (unknown) cause,—whereupon they abandon their previous combination and take upon another; and it is from this latter combination that the sprout is produced; in fact we actually see that the 'particles of the seed' and their 'composition' constitute the causes of the production of the Sprout; and unless the previous combination has been *destroyed*, it is not possible for another combination to come into existence;—this is all that constitutes the 'sequence' between 'Destruction' and 'coming into existence';—but this cannot prove that "Entities are produced out of negation" (as alleged by the *Pūrvapakṣin*). And inasmuch as for the production of the sprout there is no other cause except the component particles of the seed, it is only right that the seed should be admitted as the cause of the Sprout.†

Vārtika on Sū. (18).

[P. 459, L. 9 to L. 13.]

At first there is *destruction* of the seed, then there comes the *production* of the Sprout,—this is what the *Sūṭra* means.

---

* This passage, in a somewhat altered form, has already appeared in the *Vārṭika* on Sū 17.

† Because, says the *Ṭāṭparya*, unless the seed is there, the component particles of the seed cannot be there.

If mere 'Negation' were the cause of the production of the Sprout, then anything would be produced out of anything and everything; for the factor of 'Negation' is the same in* all cases; when for instance, the paddy-seed is destroyed—there does not remain in it any capacity for persistence (or connection with anything); and if an effect were to be produced without any trace of connection (with its cause), then it could be brought into existence by the force of all things; as a matter of fact, however, every effect is found to be connected (with a cause). From all this it follows that mere *Negation* cannot be the cause of anything. Such is the meaning of the *Sūṭra*.†

End of Section (4).

Section (5).

[*Sūṭras* 19—21.]

Examination of the Theory that God is the Cause of the Universe. ‡

---

* There being no difference between the *total destruction* of the barley-seed and the *total destruction* of the paddy-seed;—both destructions being total, without any trace of the previously existing things.

†The *Ṭāṭparya* offers it own criticisms against the argument that—"since things are produced out of 'Negation,' the constituent cause of things is the Void,"—which argument also it reads in the *Pūrvapakṣa-Sūṭra* 14. For details the reader is referred to the *Ṭāṭparya*, p. 417.

‡In regard to this *Section* there is a difference among Commentators. According to the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārṭika* and Vishvanātha, it is meant to propound the Naiyāyika *Siḍḍhānta* that the Universe has been created by God; and in accordance with this view, Sū. 19 puts forward the final *Siḍḍhānṭa*, Sū. 20 puts forward an objection against the *Siḍḍhānṭa*, and Sū. 21 answers that objection from the standpoint of the *Siḍḍhānṭa*. It is this interpretation that we have adopted in the translation.

Bhāṣya on Su. (19).

[P. 198, L, 14 to L. 18.]

Another philosopher says—

Sūṭra (19).

GOD IS THE CAUSE; BECAUSE WE FIND FRUITLESSNESS IN THE ACTIONS OF MEN.

As a matter of fact, we find that Man, desiring a certain thing, does not always obtain the fruit of his desire; hence it is inferred that Man's acquisition of the fruits of his actions is dependent upon some other person; and that Person upon whom it is dependent is *God*; hence it follows that God is the Cause (of the World).*

In view, perhaps, of the fact that such an interpretation of the Section is inconsistent with the introductory assertion of the *Bhāṣya* (P. 197, L. 10)—'we now proceed to show up the doctrines of philosophers,'—the *Ṭāṭparya*, followed by the *Pariśuḍḍhi* and *Prakāśha*, has taken it as representing the criticism of the Veḍānta doctrine that "God is the *constituent* cause of the Universe." By this interpretation Sū. 19 represents the Veḍānta view, Sū. 20 shows the untenability of that view, and Sū. 21 puts forward the final *Nyāya-Siḍḍhānta* that God is the *creator*, the *efficient* cause, *not* the *constituent cause*, of the Universe.

There is also a wider issue involved in this Section. The Commentators are agreed that the Siddhānta view here put forward is that God is the Creator of the Universe. Now the question arises—How is it that this cardinal doctrine of the system has been inserted by Gauṭama as a side-issue? He has put it forward only among "certain philosophical doctrines;" and not as *the true doctrine*. Nor is it easy to reconcile the doctrine of God being the *Creator* with the view that there is no such thing as 'beginning of Creation'—as is often found re-iterated by the *Vārṭika* (e.g. on P. 445 and P. 466); if there is no begnning, God may be the *Controller*, the *Ruler*, He cannot be the *Creator*. From the *Bhāṣya* also (P. 301, L. 8) it seems that *God is held to be only* the *Seer*, *Knower*, *Omniscient*, *All-powerful*.

*According to the *Ṭāṭparya* this Sūtra presents the Vedānta view that God is the *constituent cause* of the world; the *Pariśuḍḍhi* remarks that though the *Sūṭra* has used the general term 'cause,' yet it is clear from the context that the constituent 'cause' is meant. *Varḍhamāna* remarks—'From this *Pūrvapakṣa Sūṭra* it is clear that the purpose of the Section is to refute the Vedanta-theory.' In support of this view is also the fact that the preceding section also has dealt with the question of the *constituent cause* of the world.

The Vedānta doctrine is thus stated by the *Ṭāṭparya*—"The phenomenal world may not have come out of the Void; it can certainly be produced out of

Vārṭika on Su. (19).

[P. 450, L. 13 to P. 460, L. 2.]

God is the Cause etc. etc.—says the *Sūṭra*. We find that even though man desires a certain thing, he does not obtain the fruit of his desire; from which fact we understand that Man's obtaining of the results of his act is dependent upon someone else; if Man, independently by himself, were capable of obtaining the results of his actions, then the action of no man could ever be fruitless; and no one would ever bring pain upon himself;—and both these are actually found to be the case;—hence it follows that God is the cause (of the Universe).

Vār. P. 460.

Sūṭra (20).

[*Objection* *]—" IT IS NOT SO; BECAUSE AS A MATTER OF FACT, NO FRUIT APPEARS WITHOUT MAN'S ACTION." (Sū 20).

Brahman, which becomes modified into the several names and forms [i.e. *objects* and their *qualities*, says Varḍhamāna], exactly in the same manner as the clay is modified into the Jar &c.; or (according to other Veḍantins) Brāhman, through the limitations cast by the beginningless Nescience, appears in the form of the several phenomenal substances, just as the face appears in several forms, through the limitations of the substances in which it becomes reflected. It is this *Brahman* that is meant by the term 'Īshvara,' in the *Sūṭra*; this term connoting the powers of reflection and action, both of which are present in Brahman alone; and not in *Negation*, or in *Primordial Matter*, or in *Atoms*. Man himself does possess these powers. But if Man were the ordainer of the World, and had the necessary properties of omniscience and omnipotence, then he could never undertake an action that would turn out to be futile, fruitless. And *inasmuch as we do find the actions of Men turning out fruitless, we conclude that God,*—i.e. *Brahman—is the Cause of the World.* Sū. (19).

* According to the *Bhāṣya* this Sūṭra is an objection urged by the Pūrvapakṣin, against the Nyāya doctrine stated in Sū. 19. According to the *Ṭāṭparya*, it is an objection urged by the *Siḍḍhānṭin Naiyāyika*, against the Vedānta doctrine stated in Sū. 19. In pursuance of this interpretation, the Ṭāṭparya introduces this Sū. 20 as follows:—It puts forth arguments against the Vedānta theory of things evolving or modifying out of Brahman, and concludes with the assertion that it is not right to hold that Brahman evolves or modifies into the endless phenomenal substances; and

Bhāṣya on Sū. (20).

[P. 199, Ll. 2—3.]

[*Objection*]:—"If the appearance of fruits (of actions) were dependent upon God (entirely), then such fruits could be accomplished even without the desire (and action) of man."

Vārṭika on Sū. (20).

[P. 460, L. 4 to L. 9.]

It is not so, etc. etc.—says the *Sūṭra*. If God were the cause of things, then there could be experiencing of pleasure and pain even without any act of Man; and the result of this would be that all activity of Men would disappear and there would be no possibility of Release; and the character of God being one and uniform, all His acts would be of one and the same kind. If, on the other hand, God brought about effects, with the help of (under the influence of) causes (other than Himself), then it would mean that He does not produce that whose help He requires; *e.g.*, the potter does not build the stick &c. (which he needs). If it were only under the influence of Men's acts that God was the cause of the Universe, then so far as those acts are concerned, God would not be the all-powerful God at all."

---

as such is the *constituent cause* of things; though it may be that Brahman or God is the *efficient* cause of things;—and then it goes on to say that in connection with the view that God is the *efficient* cause of things, it might be held that in creating the world, God is not influenced by any other force;—and it is with a view to guard against this view that we have Sū. 20, which shows that *God is influenced by the actions of men.*

It may be noted that the roundabout manner in which the *Ṭāṭparya* has got to fit in the Sūṭra to its own interpretation shows that it is, perhaps, not what the *Sūṭras* really mean; that is, the *Sūṭras* have no bearing upon the Vedānṭa theory at all.

Sūṭra (21).

[*Answer*]—INASMUCH AS IT IS INFLUENCED BY HIM, THERE IS NO FORCE IN THE REASON (PUT FORWARD).* (Sū. 21).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (21).

[P. 199, L. 5 to P. 210, L. 15.]

As a matter of fact, God helps the efforts of Man; *i.e.*, when Man is trying to obtain a particular fruit, it is God that accomplishes that fruit for him; when God does not accomplish it, Man's action becomes fruitless;—hence since things are thus influenced by God, what has been urged to the effect that—"because as a matter of fact no fruit appears without man's action"—is no reason at all.

Bhā. P. 200.

——"——

[The question now arises—What is *God*? The *Bhāṣya* proceeds to answer this question]—God is a distinct Soul endowed with certain qualities; for as a being of the same kind as 'Soul' He cannot be put under any other category; hence God is defined as a particular Soul endowed with such

*The *Ṭāṭparya*, in pursuance of its own interpretation, remarks :—'Having rejected the two theories—(1) that the World is evolved out of Brahman, and (2) that God, independent of all other forces, is the Creator of the world,—the author of the *Sūṭra* now puts forward his own final *Siḍḍhānta*.'

According to the *Bhāṣya*, this Sūṭra is only the Naiyāyika's answer to the objection urged in Sū. 21; the sense being that—'inasmuch as Man's efforts are influenced by God, what has been urged in Sū. 20, against the view that God is the efficient cause of the world, is not a valid reason.'

The *Nyāya-Siḍḍhānta* is this expounded by the *Tāṭparya* :—The World has the Atoms for its constituent cause; and its efficient cause is God as influenced by Men's acts; and these acts also have God for their efficient cause; nor is there any incongruity in this; since even though the carpenter is helped and influenced by the axe, yet the axe also is made by him. The reason put forward in Sū. 20 has no force against the view that the world is the work of God as helped by Men's acts, though it is an effective argument against the view that in creating the world, God does not require the help of anything outside Himself.

qualities as—(1) absence of demerit, wrong knowledge and negligence, and (2) presence of merit, knowledge and intuitiveness, and to Him also belongs, the eight-fold 'Power' —consisting of 'minuteness' and the rest—as the result of His Merit and Knowledge;—His 'Merit' follows the bent of His Volition;—He controls the activity of the residuum of of Merit and Demerit subsisting in each individual Soul, as also that of the Earth and other material substances; and He is Omnipotent in regard to His creation, not however, failing to be influenced by the results of acts, done by the beings He creates;—He has obtained * all

Bhā. P. 201.

the results of His deeds; [and continues to act for the sake of His created beings, because] just as the father acts for His children, so does God also act father-like for living beings. There is no other category except the category of 'Soul' to which God could belong; for (as in the case of Soul so) in the case of God, no other property, save *Buḍḍhi*, Cognition, can be pointed out as being indicative of His existence.† From scriptures also we learn that God is the 'Seer, the Cogniser and the Knower of all things.' If God were not discernible by the presence of Buḍḍhi and such other indicatives of the 'Soul,' then, being, as He is, beyond the reach of ordinary Perception, Inference and Words, how could His existence be described and proved by anyone? Lastly, if God acted irrespectively of the effects of acts done by the beings created by Him, then, this view would become open to all those objections that have been urged against the view that "the creation is not due to the acts of Souls" [*Vide*, end of I Daily Lesson, Aḍhyāya III].

Vārṭika on Sū. (21).

[P. 460, L. 11 to P. 471, L. 9.]

Inasmuch as it is influenced by Him etc. etc.—says the *Sūṭra*. We do not say that God is the cause of the world, independently of the actions of Men &c.; what we do assert is that *God helps the efforts of Man.*

* We have adopted the reading of the Puri Ms. B. आप्तकर्मफल instead of आप्तकल्प, which latter is the reading adopted by the *Tāṭparya*; this latter also explains आप्तकल्प as अवाप्तसकलकाम.

† Though God differs from other Souls in the point of His Cognition &c. being eternal, while those of others are evanescent, yet He must be classed under the same category; since, like other Souls, He also is indicated by Buḍḍhi &c.

"What is the meaning of *helping* in this case?"

What it means is that He instigates each act (of Man) in accordance with its true character, and in due consideration of the time of its fruition. The philosopher, who regards God as the cause of things, irrespectively of the acts of Men, becomes open to the objection that under his theory there remains no possibility of Final Release. Under the theory that God is dependent (upon the acts of Men) there is no such incongruity.

The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya*.

When the Author of the Sūṭra declares that things are *influenced by God*, he admits that God is the *efficient cause* (of things); that cause is called 'efficient' which helps the other two kinds of cause—the *constituent* and the *non-constituent*; *e.g.*, the shuttle &c. help the yarns (which are the *constituent* cause of the Cloth) as well as the yarn-combinations (which form the *non-constituent* cause of the Cloth).

"If God is the *efficient* cause of the World, then what is the direct *constituent* cause of the World?"

We have already explained that the *constituent* cause of the World consists of the Earth and other substances in their subtle form, known under the name of 'Atoms.'

Vār. P. 461.

It having been admitted that perceptible substances are the *constituent* cause of the World,—and there being a difference of opinion in regard to the *constituent* cause,—we have (in the *Bhāṣya*) a treatment of the subject of God; that is, people have held different views in regard to the *efficient* cause of the World,—some people holding 'Time' to be that cause, others 'God,' while others again put forward Primordial Matter; and among these diverse opinions which is the right one?

The right view is that *God* is the efficient cause of the World; for it is in support of this view that we find proofs coming forward unimpeded. "But the very existence is still unproved." If you mean by this that—" it is only after the existence of God has been proved that it could be proved that God is the *efficient*,* and not any other kind of Cause;—as a matter of fact, the very existence of God is still unproved, hence the enquiry stated is not proper,"—then our answer is that this is not right; because by this very enquiry the *existence* of God becomes established; that is, the *existence* of God is established by that same proof which establishes the fact of His being the *cause* (of the World); for the simple reason that that which does not exist can never be the cause of anything. "What is the reasoning that proves the fact of God being the cause?"

We state that reasoning as follows :—' Primordial Matter, Atoms and ' Karma ' † can act only when, prior to beginning, they are controlled by an intelligent (conscious) cause,—because they are themselves unconscious,—like the axe and such other implements ;—the axe &c., being unconscious, act only when they are controlled by the conscious carpenter, —and similarly Primordial Matter, Atoms and ' Karma,' being themselves unconscious, are found to act ;—hence it follows that these also are controlled by conscious agents.

Those who regard Primordial Matter to be the cause of the World have held that what controls the activity of Primordial Matter is the ' purpose of Man,' *i. e.*, Primordial Matter acts when urged to activity by the purpose of man ; this ' purpose of man ' is twofold : (1) the perception of Colour &c. and (2) the perception of difference between the Soul and the Attributes (of Matter) ; and neither of these

---

* निमित्तकारणभावस्य is the right reading.

† Some people ascribe the origin to the action of Primordial Matter ; others to Atoms, and others again to the ' *Karma,*' or the collective residue of the deeds of Men.

purposes can be accomplished without the action of Primordial Matter.

This doctrine cannot be accepted; as before the activity it is not possible; that is, until Primordial Matter acts and becomes modified into *Mahat* &c., there is neither 'perception of Colour &c.' nor 'perception of difference between the Soul and the Attributes of Matter'; so that these causes (of the activity of Primordial Matter) being absent, no activity of Primordial Matter would be possible. In answer to this it might be argued that—"the said causes are present (even before the action of Primordial Matter) for that which does not exist already can never come into existence, and that which exists can never cease to exist;"—but in that case, the theory would mean that what urges the activity of Primordial Matter is

Vār. P. 462. the 'purpose of Man,' *which is already in existence*; so that the activity of Primordial Matter could not be for the accomplishing of the 'purpose of Man'; in ordinary life when one already possesses a certain thing he does not act for the sake of obtaining that thing. Further, (under the theory as now explained), the activity of Primordial Matter would be unceasing, its cause being always there at hand. That is, the activity of Primordial Matter being for the 'purpose of Man,' inasmuch as the 'purpose of Man' would *ex hypothesi* be there in existence, the said activity should be always going on. If, even though present, the 'purpose of Man' did not urge the activity of Primordial Matter, then the said 'purpose' cannot be the cause of that *activity*; for that alone can be regarded as the *cause* of the activity of Primordial Matter during whose absence the said Matter does not act and during whose presence it does act. It might be urged that—"Even though present, the 'purpose of Man' fails to urge Primordial Matter into activity, on account of obstruction."

—But in that case, since the removal of the obstruction would be impossible, there would always be absence of activity; it would be impossible to remove the *obstruction* to the 'purpose of Man, for the simple reason that according to you that which exists cannot cease to exist; so that the obstruction being everlasting, there would always be absence of activity. Further, you (Sāṅkhyas) hold the view that Primordial Matter consists of the Attributes of *Saṭṭva*, *Rajas* and *Ṭamas* in the state of equilibrium; and it behoves you to explain why this equilibrium ceases; until the equilibrium has ceased, there can be no *disparity* (which is necessary for the activity of Matter). "The *disparity* is due to relation of mutual subserviency among the said Attributes being unsettled." * On this point also we put to you the following question—How is it that in (Primordial Maṭter) what has been equal [i.e. the Attributes comes to be more or less? For certainly there is neither addition of anything new, nor subtraction of anything that has been there [and under these two conditions alone can there be disparity where there has been equality]. Then again, Man perceives Sound and other things, not perceived before,—*Buḍḍhi* makes them perceived ; now do these things—Sound &c.—have any peculiarities produced in them (when they become perceived ? or do they not have any such peculiarities produced in them ?—If, when perceived, they have some peculiarities produced in them, then this (involving the assertion that peculiarities, not Present before, are produced) goes against your doctrine that "what has not been in existence already cannot be produced." If, on the other hand, the things are perceived without having any peculiarities produced in them, then also your 'self-contradiction' remains : this view of yours going against your doctrine that "the

* At one time *Saṭṭva* predominates over the other two; then *Rajas* predominates and then *Ṭamas*, and so on, this unsettled relation causes the disparity which leads to the activity in Matter.

purpose of man urges the activity of Primordial Matter,"* Thus it is found that the more the doctrine of Primordial Matter being the cause of the World is examined, the more opposed to reasoning it is found to be.

There are others who hold that the cause of the World consists of *Atoms as controlled by the 'Karma' of men.* To these philosophers we address the following remarks:—(A) If Atoms are active, such activity should be unceasing? "But they act under the influence of the peculiarities of time." What has been said in regard to

Vār. P. 463.

Atoms applies to Time also. That is to say, just as Atoms, being unconscious things, stand in need of a conscious controller, so does Time also; as *unconsciousness* is present there also. "But there can be activity in unconscious things also, as we find in the case of Milk; i.e. just as Milk, which is unconscious, is active, flows out, for the nourishment of the calf, similarly Atoms, though unconscious, would be active for the accomplishment of the purposes of man." This is not right; for what is put forward as the premiss is itself *still to be proved*; just as it is *still to be proved* that Atoms are active by themselves, so is it *still to be proved* that the unconscious Milk is active by itself. In fact if the Milk were active by itself, then it could flow out of the teats of the dead mother also;—it is however never found to flow out of dead bodies;—hence it follows that the Milk also is under the influence of a conscious agent; specially because the reason (for postulating such influence, viz: *unconsciousness*) is found present in the case of Milk also.† From all this we conclude that whenever an *unconscious*

* If the things are perceived, it means that the 'purpose of Man'—in the shape of the *Perception* of things—is accomplished; and if this is accomplished without the appearance of any fresh peculiarities in the things, then for what would the activity of Primordial Matter be necessary? So that the two doctrines are not compatible.

† The right reading is तत्रापि वर्तते.

thing is active, it is so only under the influence of a *conscious* agent. (B) The following is another reason:—It is only when the perceptible world, consisting of the elemental substances &c., is controlled by a conscious agent that it becomes the source of pleasure and pain,—because it is endowed with Colour and such other qualities,—like the shuttle &c?—Again, it is only when Merit and Demerit are controlled by a conscious agent that they bring about the experiences of man,—because they are instruments,—like the Axe &c. "The Soul itself shall be the controlling agent of Merit and Demerit; that same Soul to whom the Merit and Demerit belong shall be the conscious agent controlling them (and not any other Being in the shape of 'God')." That cannot be; for they (Merit and Demerit) cannot be there before the Soul has already become endowed with Body and Sense-organs,* until the aggregate of the Body and the Sense-organs has been produced for the Personality (the Soul), it remains incognitive and does not perceive Colour and such other objects of cognition; and there being no cognition, how could he attain any Merit and Demerit?

Vār. P. 446. Further, if the Personality were independent in its actions, it could not bring about suffering for itself; for certainly no one desires pain for himself; further, when one strikes his own limb, or cuts off his own head, he does so with the notion that the *maiming* (caused by the striking of the limbs) and the *dying* (caused by the cutting off of the head) are desirable for him [and this could not be so, if our Man were an independent agent]. If it be held that "the Atoms become active when controlled by Merit and Demerit,"—that cannot be right; because of their being unconscious things; no unconscious thing has ever by itself been found to be the controller of anything. Even granting (for the take of argument) that Merit and Demerit have

* 'कायकरण' of the Bibliotheca Indica Edition gives better sense than 'कार्यकरण' of the Benares edition.

the power of urging the Atoms to activity,—the view put forward cannot be accepted; as no Instrument by itself (independently of a conscious manipulation) has the power of accomplishing * any act; as a matter of fact, no Instrument by itself is ever found to accomplish an act. If (with a view to avoid the said difficulties) it be held that—"the action is brought about by Merit and Demerit, through the Atoms,"—this also cannot be accepted, for no such thing is ever found to happen; as a matter of fact we never find action being brought about by what is an 'objective' or an 'instrument' [and the Atoms and Merit and Demerit belong to these two categories]. "The Soul shall be the *doer* (the agent)." That we have already answered by pointing out that (prior to the appearance of the Body and the Sense-organs) the Soul is entirely incognitive [and as such cannot do anything]. "The (first) appearance of the Body &c. would be without cause." That also cannot be right; as no such thing has ever been seen. And there is no other explanation possible. Hence the only possible conclusion is that Atoms as well as 'Karma' become active only when controlled by conscious agents.

Objection:—"Not being imbued with action, the conscious Being cannot be the cause."

If you mean by this that—"the Potter and such active agents are always found to be such as are imbued with action;—God, on the other hand, is devoid of action,—hence He cannot be the cause (the creator, of the world),"—then, this cannot be accepted; for none of the alternatives possible under this view can be maintained: when it is said that "God is devoid of action," to what *action* does it refer? †

* क्रियानिर्वृत्ता is the right reading; as is clear from the following sentence.

† The Purvapākṣin takes his stand upon the position that *action* means *vibration*, which presupposes some sort of material body, and as God has no such body, it follows that he must be devoid of action. The Siddhantin's reply is that vibration is not the only form *of action*; as *knowing*, *thinking*, *willing* &c. also are actions; and these do not presuppose a material body.

Our actions are of two kinds—(1) that in the shape of *Throwing Upwards* and the like, and (2) that which is spoken of by means of verbs. If the assertion that 'God is devoid of action' refers to actions expressed by verbs, the fact stated as the 'reason' (that God is devoid of action) is *not true*; for God is held to be *self-sufficient* (independent); as a matter of fact, God is ever independent. "What is the meaning of *self-sufficiency*?" It means that He is not influenced by other agents and that He on His part influences other agents *; this we have already explained in course of our explanation of the 'case-relations'. If, on the other hand, the allegation that 'God is devoid of action' refers to such action as Throwing Upwards and the like, then, the premises put forward [' what is devoid of action cannot be the cause of anything, hence God, being devoid of action, cannot be the cause of the world'] is clearly 'inconclusive,; for as a matter of fact, we find both kinds of causes—*active*

Vār. P. 465.

as well as *inactive*; at times substance produces another substance after their action has ceased; e.g. when two things (atoms) are in motion and they come into contact, their action (motion) ceases, and it is only then that the two things produce other substances, through the said contact; this provides an example of the production of things by causes not in action. again, when several substances (yarns, e g.) come together and form an aggregate, a single substance (Cloth) is produced out of such conjunctions as are distinct from the specific causes, [*i.e.*, the conjunctions between each pair of yarns, which are the 'simple causes' of each of those 'pairs of Yarns']; while when a certain component part of an object is separated from it [when for instance, the corners of a square piece of wood are cut off], the previous object (the wooden square) ceases to exist, and the remaining component substances (parts of the wood-square) bring into existence a different object

* The sense requires the reading इतरकारकप्रयोजकत्व.

(in the shape of the rounded piece of wood);—and here also we have the production of an object without any action on the part of the causes. On the other hand, some substances produce others only when endowed with action; e g. when two things come into contact by the action of one of them (e.g. when a ball of clay is thrown at the clod of Earth lying on the ground), and the said action comes to end on account of that contact, the new substance (the enlarged clod of Earth) becomes produced simultaneously with the cessation of the said action of one of the two substances; and here we have an example of the production of a substance by causes endowed with action. Further, your argument involves self-contradiction also; since your philosophy does not admit of such action as *Throwing Upwards* and the like.

[The Opponent raises fresh objections against the idea of God being the Creator of the World]—"God cannot be the Cause (of the World), because none of the alternatives possible under this theory is admissible: E.g. if God is the Creator, does He create things (*a*) through something else? or (*b*) independently of anything outside Himself? "What does this mean?" (*a*) If He does it through the help of something else, then He cannot be the Creator of that by the help of which He creates other things; and so with other things also. The fact that 'God is not the creator of the thing upon whose help He depends' would also serve as an argument (against the idea of God being the Creator of the World). If it be held that God creates certain things independently of everything else,—then it should be possible for Him to create all things in the same manner. (*b*) And if God be held to create *all* things independently by Himself, then the action of men would become futile; and this would mean that there would be no Final Release for men; and all the objections, that have been urged (in Adh. III)

against the view that the Creator of things is not dependent upon the actions of men, would become applicable to the the view now put forward."

[Our *answer* to the above is as follows]—Inasmuch as we have never held the view that God creates things independently of all things outside of Himself, our theory is not open either to the objection that Merit and Demerit are futile, or to those objections that lie against the view that the Creation of the World is not dependent upon the actions of men. As regards the argument that—"God cannot be the Creator of that thing by whose help he creates other things,"—this is not quite true; it is not true in all cases that one does not create that by whose help he does something else; e.g. a man who is well-versed in several crafts makes the axe with the help of other implements, and with the help of that same axe he makes sticks and such other things, and with the help of this stick he again makes the Jar;—and yet by making these things one after the other, the man does not cease to be the 'maker.' Similarly with the help of Merit and Demerit, God makes the Body and its pleasures and pains,—and He also brings into existence Merit and Demerit with the help of Mind-Soul contact accompanied by pure and impure intentions (respectively)—and He also produces the pure and impure intentions through the remembrance (on the part of men) of past pleasures and pains, and with the help of things that brought about those pleasures and pains. "At the time that He creates a certain thing, He is not the maker of that which helps Him in that creation." If you mean by this that—"*at the particular time when* He brings into existence something made by Him, He cannot be the Creator of that with the help of which He brings that thing into existence,"—then our answer is that we do not say that God creates all things at one and the same time; what we say is that He creates things one after an-

Vān. P. 466.

other; and the said objection does not lie against the theory of God creating things one after another. "The thing that He creates in the beginning—the creation of that must be without the help of anything else." If you mean by this that—"if God creates the Body &c. through the help of Merit and Demerit, how does He create the first thing at the beginning of creation?"—then our answer is that since we do not admit of any 'beginning of creation' there is no room for the question; in fact we have already explained that the world is without beginning. It is thus also that Merit and Demerit come to be effective; that is to say, Merit and Demerit subsisting in the several living beings can be effective only if the world is without beginning and the Creator is dependent upon things outside of Himself.

[A fresh question is started]—"When God creates the world, for what purpose does He create it? In ordinary experience we find that when a man does something, he does it with a certain motive—such as 'I shall obtain such and such thing,' or 'I shall get rid of such and such a thing';—for God however there can be nothing to be got rid of, because He has no pain; nor can there be anything to be acquired, as He is all-powerful (and as such is already the master of all things)."

[There are two answers to this question]—(I) Some people have held that *it is for purposes of* amusement; some people explain that God creates the World for purposes of amusement. This view however is not right; for 'amusement' is that which brings happiness to those who, in the absence of that amusement, would not obtain happiness;—and certainly the Supreme Lord, having no pain, cannot be a seeker after happiness; as it is only persons in pain that seek for happiness.

(II) Others have explained that God creates the world for the purpose of showing His powers; these persons have held the view that it is with a view to make known the manifoldness of the world (created by Him) that God creates it. This view also is as unsound as the former one; there is nothing gained (by God) by making known His powers, nor is anything lost by not making them known.

Vār. P. 467.

" For what purpose then does God create the world?"

The most unobjectionable view is that it is by reason of His nature being so that God creates things; just as the Earth upholds things, because such is its very nature,—and similarly with other things,—exactly in the same manner God acts because such is His very nature; for as a matter of fact the very nature of God consists of *activity*. "If God's activity is due to His nature, He should act constantly, without cessation." If you mean by this that—"if the very nature of God consists of *activity*, then it is not possible for Him to be *active* and *inactive* by turns; for it is not possible for that whose very nature consists of *activity* to cease from activity; nor should it be possible to create things one after the other, because the nature of a thing is one and uniform [so that there cannot be activity and inactivity, and consequent creation and non-creation, one after the other]; it will not be possible for God to say at one time 'may this come off,' and at another time 'may this not come off;' for out of a cause which is of one uniform nature, we never find different kinds of products issuing,"—then our answer is that the objection does not lie against us, for we qualify God as *endowed with intelligence*; we have already explained that God's nature is endowed with intelligence, and what is dependent upon things outside itself can never be incessantly active; it cannot produce everything at one and the same time; in fact what alone

come into existence are the causes of which happen to come together, while that of which the causes do not come together does not come into existence; and certainly it is never possible for the causes of all things to come together at one and the same time; hence the contingency of all things being produced at the same time cannot arise. When God does become active, towards creating a certain thing He had to wait for (*a*) the time of fruition of Merit and Demerit to arrive, (*b*) the appearance of other (auxiliary) causes, (*c*) the proximity of beings related to the things to be created (*d*) the fruition of the Merit and Demerit belonging to the beings related to the thing to be created, and (*e*) the non-obstruction of the aforesaid conditions.

"The *Godliness*—Omnipotence—of God,—is it eternal or evanescent? If it is evanescent, you should point out the cause that produces it; in the case of the peron whose powers are evanescent, there is always a diversity of causes bringing about those powers—the power of being minute or large at will and so forth; and so in the case of all other beings. And (there being diverse causes of His Powers) there would be several Gods. 'What would be the harm if there were several Gods?' There would be this difficulty, that if two Gods, with conflicting motives, intended to act towards the producing of a single thing,—there would be no (effective) action at all. If it be held that one would surpass the other, then the one that surpasses would be the *God*, and not the other. If, on the other hand, the powers of God are eternal, then there would be no use for Merit (in His case), as His powers, (being eternal), could not be the result of His Merit."

Vār. P. 468.

Our answer is that the powers of God are *eternal*. Nor would this view be open to the objection that in that case His Merit would be useless; for the Merit that belongs to God does not produce powers in Him, what it does is to help

the aggregate Merit and Demerit subsisting in each individual Soul. [This answer has been given on the understanding that Merit does belong to God]; in reality Merit does not belong to God [all His purposes being accomplished by means of His Knowledge and Power, which are eternal]; so that the objection that has been urged has no application at all to our view.

"Inasmuch as we can have no definite conception of the nature of God, there would always be a doubt as to whether God is a 'substance' or He belongs to one of the other categories of 'quality' and the rest."

God is a *substance*,—because he is endowed with a *quality*, that of *Intelligence*,—like other substances. "If God is intelligent, He must be like other Souls (encased in a Body, and so forth)." No, He is not like other Souls, for the simple reason that He is endowed with distinct qualities; just as Earth &c. (though *substances*) are not regarded as *Souls*, because they are endowed with distinct qualities (which do not belong to Souls), in the same manner, since God differs from other Souls in His qualities, He cannot be like these other Souls.

"What is the difference in His qualities?"

In answer to this some people declare that the merit, knowledge, dispassion and power of God are of a superior order,—this superiority consisting in their *eternality*.

This however we do not understand; for there is no such proof of the eternality of God's Merit &c. as there is of His being endowed with intelligence; and one cannot accept that for which there is no proof.

The real superiority of God, which constitutes His difference from other Souls, consists in the eternality of His intelligence; the intelligence of God is eternal, as also the other common qualities of Number &c.,—God being endowed, like *Ākāsha*, with six qualities. "What is the proof of God's

intelligence being eternal?" The proof of this consists in the fact that Atoms are active only when controlled by an intelligent agent. "This fact only proves that God is possessed of intelligence; how does it follow that this intelligence is eternal?" That follows from the fact that God's intelligence is not restricted to only one thing at a time; such intelligences as are restricted to one thing at a time are found to appear only when the Body and such other (accessory) causes are present; God's intelligence, on the other hand, is not restricted to only one thing at a time; as is shown by the fact that at one and the same time

Vār P. 469.

it brings about several effects; *e. g.* we find several immovable things (trees) coming into existence at one and the same time; and this could not be possible if God's intelligence were restricted to only one thing at a time. The qualities present in God are only the following: Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction and Intelligence.

If, from the fact of God being an *intelligent* being, one were to deduce the fact of His having a body also,—the person who would make this deduction would have to admit those Body and other (attendant) things to be either eternal or non-eternal. If they are non-eternal, then the presence of Merit and Demerit also will have to be admitted (in God);* and if that were admitted, then, being under the influence of Merit and Demerit, God would not be 'God', the 'Supreme Lord', at all. If then you assume the Body &c. of God to be eternal, then you would be making an assumption contrary to what is directly perceptible [no Body being ever found to be ever-lasting]; and if you are prepared to admit what is apparently absurd, you might as well admit Intelligence (Cognition) itself to be eternal; and if you hold that in God there are several (evanescent) intelligences appear-

* For, as already proved, the Body &c. of each individual Soul is due to its Merit and Demerit, without which, therefore, there could be no body.

ing in a continuous series,—then in that case, it would not be possible for several trees &c. to come into existence at one and the same time. If (in answer to this) it be held that even though appearing in a series, those intelligences are operative upon all things * (So that it would be quite possible for several things to be produced simultaneously),—even so this would be assuming something quite contrary to well-known facts; and one who would make such an assumption might as well admit Intelligence itself to be eternal. Thus then it is found that Intelligence can be either *eternal* or *appearing in a continuous series*; and it has been shown that it is not right to hold that it forms a continuous series.

[The Opponent takes up the thread of the original discussion]—"If God be held to be different (from other Souls) simply by reason of His being endowed with qualities different from those found in other Souls,—then this would mean that such things as are possessed of the same qualities are identical; *e.g.* Time and Space."

Certainly not; what you say does not necessarily follow from our hypothesis; what we assert is simply that from the *difference in qualities* there follows *diversity* (*in the things*), and not that from *non-difference of qualities* there follows *identity* (of the things); *e.g.* we find that though several Jars are possessed of the same qualities, yet they are *many*; so that even though Time and Space may be possessed of the same qualities, yet they are regarded as different, by reason of the fact that they bring about diverse effects.

Further, unless God were endowed with intelligence, it would not be possible for the World to come into existence. And this intelligence or cognition of God is operative upon all things, bearing upon past, present and future things—

* The right reading is सन्तानवर्तिन्यः सर्वार्थाः

and is *direct* (intuitive)*; it is not *inferential*, nor *verbal* [nor *analogical*, nor *sense-perception*]; for neither Inference nor Scriptures bear upon that. God's cognitions being everlasting, there is no Faculty (Memory); *i.e.* inasmuch as God's cognition is eternal, there need be no Faculty or Memory for Him; and because His cognition is eternal, and there is no Faculty in Him, He has no *Recollection*; there being no Recollection He can have no *inferential* cognition. He has no pain, because He has no Demerit; and having no pain, He does not become disgusted with things; and for that same reason he has no *hatred*; Desire there is, but it is not tainted (by ignorance), and is unobstructed in regard to all things, just as is His Intelligence (or Cognition).

Vār. P. 470.

"Is God bound or released?"

He is not bound; because He has no pain; and not being *bound*, He cannot be *released*; as it is only one who has been in bondage that can be *released*; and there is no bondage for God; hence He cannot be *released*.

"Since God is not related to the other Souls, it can not be possible for Him to control them."

If you mean by this that—"the Merit and Demerit subsisting in the other things, (*i.e.* the other Souls), are not related to God, either directly or indirectly; and Merit and Demerit cannot be operative unless they are controlled (by God),"—our answer is that there is no force in this; as an unborn relation is always possible; some pepole have held that there is an unborn relation (of God) with the other Souls; and this 'unborn relation,' not having been denied in the Nyāya system, it may be taken for granted. The philosophers who have postulated the 'unborn relation' prove it by the following reasoning:—'God must be related to *Ākāsha*

* *Pratyakṣa* means *direct cognition*, not cognition *born* of the Senses; for God's cognition being eternal, cannot be *born* or *produced*.

and other all-pervading substances,—because He is in contact with corporeal substances,—like the Jar;—the Jar, being in contact with another Jar,* which is a corporeal substance becomes related to *Ākāsha* and other all-pervading substances,—and as God also is similarly connected with corporeal substances, He also should be related to *Ākāsha* and other all-pervading substances.' "This relation between God and Souls—is it all-pervading or not?" This question is meaningless, and as such, need not be answered at all; † all that we can say is that there *is* such a thing as the relation of God with other Souls; we do not go further to examine whether this relation does, or does not, pervade over God and the other Souls.

Those philosophers also who do not accept the presence of the 'unborn relation' (as between God and other Souls), —for them also, inasmuch as it is possible for God to be related to the atomic Mind, there would always be the said relationship (with other Souls); there is a Mind belonging to each individual Soul, and all these Minds are related to God; and thus then, it being possible for God to have this (indirect) relation, through relation (of Mind), with the other Souls,—it is by this relation that God controls all Souls;—just as action is produced in the hand by the Man's effort and the connection of the Soul with the hand, and the Hand, rendered thus active, becomes connected with the pincer or some such implement, and by means of these instruments he gets at the red-hot ball of iron (which the hand could not get at directly).

Vār. P. 471.

"What you have put forward may be accepted as an argument for God being regarded as the cause of the World at the beginning of Creation; but from this same argument

* सम्भिन्नत्वेन घटः is the right reading.

† अव्याकरणीयः प्रश्नः is the right reading.

it would seem that God cannot be the cause of the world at the present time."

The same argument holds good for the present time also; the same arguments hold good even now: (*a*) 'the Merit and Demerit of Souls dying must be controlled by an intelligent Agent;'—(*b*) 'the Earth and the other elemental substances down to Wind are operative in performing their respective functions of *upholding* (*wetting*, *burning* and *blowing*) only when controlled by an intelligent Agent,—because they are themselves unconscious,—like the Axe and such other instruments;'—(*c*) similarly we can make 'Grass and such things' the subject of the syllogism (proving that they are controlled by an intelligent Agent), and the premiss put forward in the form 'because they are the objects of visual and tactile perception.'—In the same manner, in regard to whatever object there may be a difference of opinion,—and it may be found to have the character of a 'product,'—we can make it the 'Subject,' and prove the same fact in regard to it by means of the example of the Axe and such other instruments. The same conclusion is proved by the Scriptures also; that God is the cause of the world we learn also from the Scriptures; *e.g.* [we may quote the following *Smriti*]—'The ordinary man, ignorant and not master of his own happiness and unhappiness, can go to Heaven or to Hell, only as propelled by God. When that Lord is awake, then alone is the world active; and when, with His mind composed, He goes to sleep, the entire world disappears.'*

* The *Tāṭparya* says this is '*Smriṭi*.' The discussion on the existence of God is continued at great length in the *Tāṭparya*—pp. 421—426.

Section (6).

(Sūṭras 22—24.)

Examination of the View that the World is the result of Chance.

Bhāṣya on Su. (22).

[P. 201, L. 6 to P. 202, L. 5.]

Another philosopher asserts as follows :—

Sutra (22).

" THE PRODUCTION OF ENTITIES MUST BE WITHOUT AN EFFICIENT CAUSE ; AS WE SEE SUCH THINGS AS THE SHARPNESS OF THE THORN AND THE LIKE." (Su. 22.)

" The Body and such other entities must be regarded as produced without an efficient cause ; *since we see such things as the sharpness of the thorn and the like* ; such things as the sharpness of the thorn, the variegated colour of the minerals found in mountainous regions, the smoothness of stones, are found to be produced without any efficient cause, and yet each of them has a constituent cause * ; the same must be the case with the production of the Body &c. also ".

---

* चोपादानं of the printed text gives no sense ; the right reading चोपादानवत्त्व, which is countenanced by the *Vārtika*, is found in the Puri Ms. B.

It is clear that what the *Pūrvapakṣin* denies in the present Sūṭra is the Nyāya-theory of God being the *efficient* cause of the world ; the Sūtra distinctly mentions the '*nimiṭṭa*', and the *Bhāṣya* makes it still clearer by saying that the things mentioned—the sharpness of the thorn &c.—*have a constituent cause*, and yet they have no efficient cause. Thus explained, the present section becomes connected naturally with the foregoing section dealing with God as the *efficient* cause of the world. In their anxiety to connect this section with what they consider the principal subject of the *Aḍhyāya*—the constituent cause of the world—the commentators have needlessly confused the issues involved. E.g., the *Parishuddhi* says —" The *Pūrvapakṣin* proceeds to criticise the *Siḍḍhānṭa* position (put forward under Sū. 4-1-11) that perceptible things are produced out of perceptible causes ; and for demolishing this view he begins with the demolition of the *efficient* cause—"; and Varḍhamāna adds that in reality the Pūrvapakṣin's standpoint is to deny all kinds of cause of the world. Vishvanāṭha also says—" If things are due to mere *chance*, then Atoms cannot be the constituent cause, nor God the *efficient* cause, of the world [hence the *Pūrvapakṣin* insists upon the *chance*-theory, and the *Siḍḍhānṭin* controverts it]."

Vartika on Su. (22).

[P. 471, L. 17 to P. 472, L. 6.]

Another philosopher (the Materialist) says—"*The production of entities etc. etc.*—says the Sūṭra. Just as such things as the sharpness of the thorn and the like are found to be produced without an efficient cause, and yet each of them has a constituent cause,—so must be the case with the production of the Body &c. also—says the *Bhāṣya*. This Sūṭra is meant to put forward an illustrative example. What is the actual argument (that the illustration is meant to substantiate)? [The reasoning is]—'The Body and such other particular products must be without an efficient cause,—because they have a particular shape—like the thorn and such other things."

[The *Vārṭika* offers its own answer to the above argument]—The reasoning cannot be accepted; because in the case of things of which we do not *perceive* an efficient cause, we can find out such cause by means of *Inference*; that is to say, when we cannot perceive by our senses the efficient cause of a certain thing, we have to seek for it by means of Inference. "Why so?" For the simple reason that the thing in question would be similar to things known to to have an efficient cause; as a matter of fact, we find that objects with shapes, such as the Jar and the rest, have efficient causes; the Body and the Thorn &c. also have shapes; hence it follows that these latter also have efficient causes. Further, this matter has been explained. "What has been explained?" It has been explained that—'the production of the Body is due to the influence of previous deeds' (Su. 3-2-60). And there is no object *with shape* as is admitted by both parties to be without cause (which could serve as the corroborative instance in the *Pūrvapakṣin's* syllogism).

Sutra (23).

[The Ekaḍēshin's answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa.*]

SINCE THE NON-CAUSE IS (SPOKEN OF AS) THE 'CAUSE,' THE SAID PRODUCTION OF ENTITIES IS NOT 'WITHOUT CAUSE.'

Bhāṣya on Sū. (23).

[P. 202, Ll. 7—8.]

[Some Naiyāyikas have offered this as an answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa* view expressed in Sū. 22]. It is alleged (in Sū. 22) that '*bhāvotpaṭṭi*', the 'production of entities', is '*animiṭṭaṭaḥ*'; [and since this latter term ends in an affix which has the sense of the Ablative, it can only mean that the 'production' proceeds from '*animiṭṭa*' 'non-cause']; and that from which a thing proceeds is its 'cause'; so that since (from what is said in Su. 22 it is clear that) the '*animiṭṭa*,' 'non-cause,' is the 'cause' of the 'production of entities', it follows that the said 'production' is not 'without cause' (as is alleged by the Pūrvapakṣin).

Vārṭika on Sū. (23).

[P. 472, L. 6 to L. 10.]

Some people offer, to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, the following answer—*Since the non-cause &c. &c.*—says the *Sūṭra*. The 'non-cause' '*animiṭṭa*,' itself would be the 'cause,'; for that from which a thing proceeds is its 'cause'; hence arising out of '*animiṭṭa*', the said 'production of entities' cannot be said to be 'without cause.'

Sutra (24).

'NIMIṬṬA' (CAUSE) AND 'ANIMIṬṬA' ('NON-CAUSE') BEING TWO DISTINCT THINGS, THE ANSWER (OFFERED IN SŪ. 23) IS NO ANSWER AT ALL. (SŪ. 24).

Bhāsya on Su. 24).

[P. 202, L. 10 to L. 13.]

'*Nimiṭṭa*', *Cause*, is one thing, and its negation (*animiṭṭa* ('non-cause') is another; and the *negation* cannot be the same as the *negatived*; e. g. when it is said

that 'the vessel is *without water*', this *denial of water* is not the same as *water*. [So that there is no point in saying, as the *Ekaḍeshin* has said in Su. 23, that the '*animiṭṭa*', 'non-cause,' is the '*nimiṭṭa*', 'cause', of production].

[The real answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa* put forward in Sū. 22 is that] the view therein put forward in no way differs from the view that 'the origination of the Body &c. is not due to the actions of men'; and being identical with this view, it must be taken as refuted by the refutation of that view, (under Sūtras 3·2. 60—72).

Varṭika on Sū. (24).

[P. 472, L. 10 to P. 473, L. 13.]

The answer offered in Su. 22 is not right; for '*nimiṭṭa*' *and* '*animiṭṭa*' *beng &c. &c.*—says the *Sūṭra*. '*Nimiṭṭa*' *is one thing and its negation is another*; *and the negation cannot be the same as the* '*negatived*'—says the *Bhāṣya*. '*Nimiṭṭa*' (being a positive term) affirms a thing, while '*Animiṭṭa*' is its *negation*; and certainly it is not right to identify 'affirmation' with 'negation'.

The view propounded in Sū. 22 in no way differs from the view that 'the origination of the Body &c. is not due to the actions of men'; and being identical with that view, it should be regarded as having been refuted by the refutation of that view (under Su. 3·2. 60—72).

[The *Varṭika* offers its own answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa*]—He, who asserts that "the production of the thorn and such things is without cause", should be asked the following question—Is it the production of the *Thorn* only that is without cause? or that of all things? If it is the production of the Thorn only that is held to be without cause, then on the strength of that as an example, it can be proved that all the rest has a cause. If, on the other hand, the view held is that all things

Var: P. 473.

are without cause, then there is self-contradiction; since you admit of the relation of the Teacher and the Taught; you hold all things to be without cause and yet you are expounding a certain doctrine (to some one), and this process involves a self-contradiction [the *expounder* is the active agent, the person to whom something is expounded is the objective; and these two conceptions involve the notion of cause]. In fact, the very use of a sentence involves a self-contradiction on your part; when you put forward the sentence—"the production of entities is without cause, as we see such things as the Sharpness of the thorn and the like" (Sū. 22)—you make use of something that serves as the *expounder* (of a doctrine); and then to say that 'there is no such thing as *cause*' involves a self-contradiction [since the *expounder* is a kind of *cause*). Further, 'the production of entities is without cause,' and 'the production of entities is due to a cause,'—both these are sentences (verbal expressions);—now if you do perceive the difference between the meaning of these two expressions —then this very fact sets aside the allegation that "the production of entities is without cause;" since the perception of the difference in the meanings arises from (and has for its *cause*) the difference in the two expressions. If, on the other hand, you do not comprehend the difference in the meanings due to the difference in the expressions, then there would be no point in making use of a particular expression,—any expression might be used to convey any meaning, (there being, *ex hypothesi*, no difference in the meanings of different expressions). Then again, one who holds the production of entities to be without cause strikes at the root of all practical usages of men. And in asserting that 'the production of entities is without cause,' if you include under it *all entities*, then you can have nothing

to serve as the corroborative instance (of your syllogism); if, on the other hand, you include under it only *a few* entities—such as the Body and the like—then, whatever might be cited as the corroborative instance, it would be wanting in one of the properties of the Probandum,—it would have the property of *being with shape*, and would not have the property of *being without cause* [according to both parties; and it is essential for the Instance to be one that is admitted *by both parties* to be on all fours with what is meant to be proved].

End of Section (6).

Section (7).

[*Sūṭras* 25—28.]

Examination of the view that All Things are evanescent.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (25).

[P. 202, L. 13 to L. 18.]

Other philosophers have held the following view:—

Sūṭra (25).

"ALL THINGS MUST BE EVANESCENT; BECAUSE THEY ARE LIABLE TO BE PRODUCED AND DESTROYED."* *Sū* (25).

---

* The causes, out of which the things of the world are produced,—do they consist of all evanescent things? or of all eternal things? or of some eternal and some evanescent things? This is what is going to be considered now. If the first two alternatives are true, then there can be no 'Rebirth,' such as the *Naiyāyika* postulates. Hence it becomes necessary to refute them; and the present section proceeds to refute the first of the three alternatives. The position controverted here is not the same as that in which all things are held to be momentary; because the Pūrvapakṣin here admits some sort of continuity of existence of things and as such differs from the thorough-going *Kṣaṇabhaṅgavādin* Nihilist—*Parishuḍḍhi*.

Varḍhamāna, in view of what he has said in connection with the preceding section, says—Though what has been proved in the foregoing section is that the things of the world have an *efficient* cause, yet what the present section takes up is the question of eternality or evanescence of all three kinds of cause, because in a general way what has been said in proof of the *efficient* cause is applicable

"What is the meaning of being 'evanescent'? That which exists only for some time is called 'evanescent.' That which is *liable to be produced* is *non-existent* while it is not produced, and that which is *liable to be destroyed* is *non-existent* when it has been destroyed; * and what this means is that all material things—such as the Body &c.—and all non-material things—Cognition and the rest—both kinds of things are found to be *liable to production and destruction*; from which it follows that they are all evanescent."

Vārṭika on Sū. (25).

[P. 473, L. 16 to P. 474, L. 5.]

"*All things are evanescent &c. &c.*—says the *Sūṭra*. *What is the meaning of being 'Evanescent'? That which exists for only some time is called 'evanescent;' that which is liable to be produced is non-existent while it is not produced, and that which is liable to be destroyed is non-existent after it has been destroyed; and what this means is that all material things—the Body &c. and all non-material things—Cognition and the rest—both kinds of things are found to be liable to production; from which it follows that they are all evanescent,*"—says the *Bhāṣya*.

---

to the *constituent* and *non-constituent* causes also. The precise Doubt or question to be dealt with in the present section is—whether or not *cognisability* is invariably concomitant with *evanescence*.

Vishvanaṭha says—If all things are evanescent, the Soul also should be evanescent; hence it becomes necessary to controvert that view.

* The printed text reads नाविनष्ट; the *Vārṭika* (Bib. Ind. edition) and the *Ṭāṭparya* read च विनष्ट; we have adopted the latter, as being more in keeping with the sense of the sentence as a whole. With the former reading the sentence would mean—'that which is liable to be destroyed is never not destroyed.' Though this will give some sort of sense, yet it would not be in keeping with the rest of the passage. The *Ṭāṭparya* construes the *Bhāṣya* to mean—'things are non-existent after destruction; hence liability to production and destruction proves that *things exist only for sometime, they are evanescent*.'

[The *Vārṭika* offers its own answer to the above arguments of the *Pūrvapakṣa*]—Inasmuch as the argument stated in the *Sūṭra* stands in need of a corroborative instance,*—and as it includes 'all things' under the Proposition itself [leaving nothing to serve as the required instance] it is vitiated by the absence of a corroborative instance; your proposition is that 'all things are evanescent,' and this makes a corroborative instance impossible; as everything is included under the Subject (*'all* things'), and what is itself to be proved cannot form the corroborative instance. Further, the *probans*—'because they are liable to be produced and destroyed'—is non-pervasive (*i.e.*, not present in the entire Subject); you make 'all things' the *subject*, and then predicate of them 'liability to be produced and destroyed;' but as a matter of fact this 'liability to be produced and destroyed' is not present in several such things as *Atoms*, *Ākāsha* (Time, Space &c.), some qualities of these, and in *Community* &c.; so that the *probans* is *non-pervasive*.

Vār. P. 474.

Sūṭra (26).

[The Ekaḍeshin's answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa*]—

WHAT IS ASSERTED CANNOT BE TRUE; AS THE 'EVANESCENCE' ITSELF IS ETERNAL. Sū. (26).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (26).

[P. 202, Ll. 20—21.]

If the *evanescence* of all things is everlasting (eternal), then, by reason of the *eternality* of that 'evanescence,' it cannot be true that '*all* things are evanescent;'—if, on the other hand, the said 'evanescence' is not ever-lasting, then while the 'evanescence' would be non-existent, all things would be *eternal*!

* This is how the *Ṭāṭparya* explains the term दृष्टान्तवैकल्य

Vārṭika on Sū. (26).

When the Opponent asserts that "all things are evanescent," he should be asked the following question—Is the 'evanescence' of all things everlasting? or evanescent? If the 'evanescence' is everlasting, then *all things* are *not* evanescent. If, on the other hand, the 'evanescence' is evanescent, then by reason of the absence (at times) of the 'evanescence,' all things would be eternal. For these reasons the Probans put forward is 'contradictory.'

Sūtra (27).

[The *Siḍḍhānṭin's* objection to the Ekaḍeshin's argument in Sū. 26.]

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE 'EVANESCENCE' IS NOT ETERNAL; LIKE THE DESTRUCTION OF FIRE AFTER HAVING DESTROYED THE THING BURNT BY IT. (Sū. 27.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (27).

[P. 203, Ll. 2—3.]

The said 'evanescence' is not eternal. "How so?" Just as Fire, after having destroyed the thing burnt by it becomes itself destroyed (extinguished), similarly the 'evanescence of all things,' after having destroyed all things, becomes itself destroyed. [So that there need be no incongruity in regarding the 'evanescence' as 'eternal.']

Vārṭika on Sū. (27).

[P. 474, Ll. 11—12.]

As a matter of fact &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. Just as Fire becomes destroyed after having destroyed the thing to be burnt, so does 'evanescence' also become destroyed, after having destroyed all things.

Sūṭra (28).

[The Final *Siḍḍhānṭa*.]

THE ETERNAL CANNOT BE RIGHTLY DENIED; BECAUSE THE DETERMINATION (AS TO A CERTAIN THING BEING ETERNAL OR EVANESCENT) MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHAT IS ACTUALLY PERCEIVED. (Sū. 28.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (26).

[P. 203, L. 5—9.]

The theory propounded (in Sū. 25) totally denies all 'eternality;' but the total denial of 'eternality' is not right.—Why?—*Because the determination must be in accordance with what is actually perceived.* That is, when a certain thing is rightly found to be 'liable to be produced and destroyed,' it should be regarded as 'evanescent', while what is not found to be so liable should be regarded as the reverse; and as a matter of fact, the said *liability to be produced and destroyed* is not perceived by any means of right knowledge, in such things as the elemental substances in their subtle forms, Ākāsha, Time, Space, Soul and Mind,—some qualities of these,—Community, Individuality and Inherence;—hence the conclusion is that all these are eternal.

Vārṭika on Sū. (28).

[P. 474, L. 13 to P. 475, L. 10].

The theory propounded in Sū. 25—that "all things are evanescent"—totally denies 'eternality'; but *the eternal cannot be rightly denied* &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. It is not right to totally deny 'eternality,' *because the determination must be in accordance with what is actually perceived*; it is only in cases where we actually (perceive what has been put forward as the reason) *i.e.*, 'liability to be produced and destroyed', that on the strength of that reason, *evanescence* can be admitted. If you regard things as *evanescent* without any reason, then the statement of the reason—'because they are liable to be produced and destroyed'—becomes stultified (futile). Further, one who speaks of 'non-eternality' (evanescence) must admit 'eternality' also, as the negative particle always signifies either *denial of what is possible, or exclusion, (contradistinction)*; as a matter of fact, the negative particle, when used, is used

Vār P. 475.

in the sense of *either* (*a*) *denying what is possible*, or (*b*) *excluding* (eliminating), and in either case it presupposes

the existence of what is the second term in the negative compound; so that (*a*) if the compound 'non-eternal' denotes *what is eternal*, then,—inasmuch as what is denied in one place is only what exists in another place, it follows that what is signified by the second term in the compound exists;—and (*b*) if the 'non-eternal' is that which is *other than eternal*, even so what is signified by the latter term in the compound becomes established; for unless the thing signified by the latter term exists, there can be no sense in a thing being *other than* that. And inasmuch as 'non-eternality' is an actuality—'non-eternality' being accepted (by us also) as a property of things*—there would be nothing wrong (even according to us) in the assertion that 'all things are non-eternal' (if by 'all' are meant all those things that are actually found to be *liable to be produced and destroyed*); further 'non-eternality' is a property, and as such, it cannot exist if the object to which it belongs is non-existent; and in this sense (since the very existence of the property of 'non-eternality' presupposes the existence of things), there need be nothing wrong in the allegation that 'all things are non eternal.' It being admitted (by both parties) that whatever is *liable to be produced and destroyed* is *non-eternal*, the Opponent might try to prove the 'non eternality' of all things on the ground of their being *existent beings*, the meaning of 'non-eternality' being either 'being suspected of being non eternal,' or 'being other than eternal';—but for such a person also non-eternality would be possible only when there would be in existence that which is denoted by the second term of that compound (*i.e.*, the *eternal* thing), and his very proposition would be faulty; and *hence his allegation* becomes *rejected*.

End of Section (7).

*दोषः अनित्यताया धर्मत्वेनाभ्युपगमात् । अनित्यत्वं is the right reading, as in the footnote.

Section (8).

[*Sūtras* 29—33.]

Examination of the Theory that All Things are Eternal.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (29).

[P. 203, L. 9 to L. 12.]

Here is another sweeping assertion :—

Sūṭra (29).—[*Pūrvapakṣa*].—" ALL THINGS MUST BE ETERNAL ; BECAUSE THE FIVE ELEMENTAL SUBSTANCES ARE ETERNAL."—(Sū. 29).

"All this, everything in the world, is an elemental substance ; and elemental substances are eternal, the total destruction of any elemental substance being impossible (according to the Naiyāyika himself) [hence everything must be eternal]."*

Vārṭika on Sū. (29).

[P. 475, L. 10 to L. 13.]

The following is another sweeping assertion :—" *All things are eternal* &c. &c.—says the Sūṭra. *Everything in this world is an elemental substance ; and all elemental substances are eternal,—the total destruction of any elemental substance being impossible,*—says the *Bhāṣya*. Hence it follows that all things are eternal."

Sūṭra (30).

[*Siddhānṭa*.]

WHAT HAS BEEN ASSERTED CANNOT BE RIGHT ; AS WE ACTUALLY PERCEIVE THE CAUSE OF PRODUCTION AND OF DESTRUCTION.—(Sū. 30).

---

* If all things are eternal, there can be no Re-birth, as Re-birth pre-supposes the destruction of the Body. Hence it is necessary to controvert this view.

Bhāṣya on Sū (30).

As a matter of fact, we actually perceive the cause of the production (of things), as well as the cause of (their) destruction; and this would be incompatible with the view that all things are eternal.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (30).

What has been asserted cannot be right &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. Of entities, we actually perceive the cause of production, as also the cause of destruction; neither of these would be possible if the entities were all eternal; for what is eternal is neither *produced* nor *destroyed*.

Sūṭra (31).

[*Objection*]—"INASMUCH AS ALL THINGS POSSESS THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ELEMENTAL SUBSTANCES, THE DENIAL (IN SŪ. 30) IS NOT RIGHT." (SŪ. 31.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (31).
[P. 203, Ll. 17—18.]

"The thing, of which you think you perceive the causes of production and destruction, is not found to be anything totally different from, and devoid of the characteristics of, Elemental Substances; and inasmuch as everything possesses the characteristics of Elemental Substances, it must be an Elemental Substance; so that the denial (in Sū. 30) is not right."†

---

* Things composed of elemental substances are not the same as the elemental substances themselves; the Bull and the Jar for instance are not the same as the subtle Atoms; for if they were so, they would be as imperceptible as the Atoms are. And since we actually perceive the cause of production and destruction of such things as the Bull and the Jar, these cannot be eternal, even though the elemental substances may be so.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

† Elemental substances are eternal;—the Bull and the Jar are not anything different from Elemental substances;—hence eternality cannot be denied of the Bull and the Jar.

Vārṭika on Sū. (31).

[P. 475, L. 1 to L. 18.]

Inasmuch as all things &c. &c.—says the Sūṭra. "That of which you think you perceive the causes of production and destruction, is not found to be devoid of the characteristics of Elemental Substances; and inasmuch as everything possesses the characteristics of elemental substances, all things must be eternal."

Vār. P. 476.

[The *Vārṭika* supplies its own answers to this argument of the *Pūrvapakṣa*]—(1) When the Opponent says that "all things are eternal," he admits that nothing is produced and nothing is destroyed; and since he admits this, all his activity, which is for the purpose of obtaining what is good and avoiding what is evil, would be futile. (2) Since 'all things' have been made the 'subject' (of the argument) there can be no corroborative instance. (3) The very use of the verbal expression is stultifying; *i.e.*, the verbal expression—"all things must be eternal, because the five elemental substances are eternal,"—is used only for the purpose of explaining things to the other party; now what does the *Pūrvapakṣin* do by means of this verbal expression? (*a*) Does he establish what is not known? Or (*b*) does he disestablish (set aside) what is already known? (*a*) If he establishes what is not known,—what sort of *establishing* is it that is brought about by the expression? If it is the *knowledge* of the (thing) that is brought about, then this goes against your view: you allege that '*all things* are eternal,' and yet you admit that the *knowledge* (which also is included in 'all things') is brought about (or produced). If, on the other hand, the verbal expression does not bring about the *knowledge*, then what is that 'establishing' which is brought about by the active instrumentality of the reasoning (that you have

propounded)? * Every active agent must accomplish something new; on one hand the very idea of the 'accomplishment of something new' is incompatible (with the Opponent's theory of all things being eternal); while on the other (if nothing new is accomplished) the 'active agent' loses its character; for if the thing is eternal, there is nothing to be brought about in it (by any active agent). (*b*) If the Opponent accepts the view that he intends (by his verbal expression) to disestablish what is already known,—this view also involves the *Disestablishment*, or setting aside, of what is *eternal* (which is absurd). If 'disestablishment' be held to mean *disappearance from view* (not *destruction*), then also it would have to be admitted that when a certain thing *disappears from view*, there is either something new *produced*, or some previously existing thing *destroyed*; so that in no way can you escape from 'self-contradiction;' *i.e.*, when it so happens that a certain thing, not perceived before, comes to be perceived,—there is always either the production of something new, or the destruction of something that existed before; and since you cannot but admit this, you cannot escape from self-contradiction.

Sūṭra (32).

[*Answer*]—WHAT HAS BEEN URGED CAN NOT BE RIGHT; FOR AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE CAUSE AND PRODUCTION ARE ACTUALLY PERCEIVED. (Sū. 32.)

---

* '*Sādhana*,' 'Means of accomplishment', is that which accomplishes something; and as such there must be something that is accomplished by it. The reading of the Bibliotheca Indica Edition gives no sense; that of the Benares edition is या प्रवर्तमानं साधनं करोति, which may be rendered to mean—'that which (for its accomplishment) renders the साधनम् active or operative.'

यां प्रवर्तमानं साधनं करोति appears to be the right reading, which has been adopted in the translation.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (32).
[P. 204, L. 1 to L. 16].

As a matter of fact (in the case of every ordinary thing, such as the Bull, the Jar and the like), the *cause* is actually perceived, as also the *production* of the thing possessing qualities analogous to the qualities of the cause; and neither of these can be possible in regard to an 'eternal' thing; nor is it possible to deny that there is such perception of the 'cause' and the 'production' (of the thing); nor again is it possible for a perception to be entirely devoid of a real objective basis; so that on the strength of this perception it is inferred that the product is *produced* (brought into existence) as possessing qualities analogous to those of its cause; and it is that product which forms the real objective basis for the said perception. This (the products having qualities similar to those of its cause) accounts for the fact that "all things possess the characteristics of Elemental Substances" (that has been urged by the Opponent in Sū. 31).*

Further, as a matter of fact, we find that the effort of the cognitive agent is put forth only when he is urged by a desire for the cause of the production (of what he wishes to obtain) and the destruction (of what he wishes to get rid of). [So that Man's effort also presupposes the *production* and *destruction* of things].

Thirdly, every composite substance is known to have that character; *i. e.*, it is a well-known fact that every composite substance has the character of being liable to production and destruction.

Fourthly, what has been urged by the Opponent is not applicable to Sound, Motion, Cognition and such things; as a matter of fact, the two reasons put forward—(*a*) "because the five Elemental Substances are eternal" (Sū. 29) and (*b*) "because everything is possessed of the characteristics

---

*The fact of the Bull and the Jar having the characteristics of Elemental Substances is due to their being the *products* of those substances, and *not* to their being the same as those substances. Hence the said fact cannot prove the eternality of the Bull and the Jar.

of Elemental Substances" (Sū. 31)—are not applicable to such things as Sound, Motion, Cognition, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, and Effort, [as not one of these is either an elemental substance, or possessed of the characteristics of elemental substances]; hence the reason (is '*anekānta*' (inconclusive; because non-pervasive).

[Says the Opponent]—"Like the cognition of things in a dream, the said perception (of the cause and of production) is wrong."

The same may be said of the perception of Elemental Substances also. What you mean is that—"The perception of the production and the cause of things is of the same character as the cognition of things in a dream"; but if that be so, then the same might be said also in regard to the perception of Elemental Substances; and the perception of Earth &c. also would have to be regarded as similar to the cognition of things in a dream [so that there would be no justification for regarding even the Elemental Substances as *eternal*].

The Opponent says]—"If there are no such things as the Earth &c. then the practical usages of men would come to an end."

The same would apply to the other case also; if there were no real objective basis for the perception of the production and the cause of things, then also all practical usages of men would come to an end.

Further, to argue that "the said perception (of production &c.) is as unreal as the cognition of things during dreams," is not a right argument at all [*i.e.*, it cannot prove any such conclusion as the Opponent desires to prove, *viz.* ordinary things like the Bull and the Jar are exactly like the Atoms of Elemental Substances];—(*a*) because Eternal Substances (Atoms) are beyond the reach of the senses (which the ordinary things of the world are *not*), and (*b*) because they are *not* objects *of production* and *destruction* (which the ordinary things of the world *are*).

* See the Vārtika below on the use of this term here.

Vārtika on Sū. (32).

[P. 476, L. 18 to P. 478. L. 12.]

It has been urged (in Sū. 31) that "everything is possessed of the characteristics of elemental substances, hence all things must be eternal"; but this is not right; as the fact put forward can be explained otherwise; the presence (in ordinary things) of the characteristics of Elemental Substances is capable of being explained otherwise (than on the basis of their *Eternality*) :—*It is due to the perception of production and of cause.* As a matter of fact, we perceive the production of things as possessing qualities analogous to those of its cause, and we also perceive the cause itself; both these would be impossible in regard to eternal things; of the eternal thing there is no *production*; nor is there any cause of the eternal thing. And yet both these actually exist (as vouched for by our perception). Hence the conclusion is that the product is actually *produced*, as possessing qualities analogous to those of its cause; and when it is produced as possessing qualities analogous to those of the cause, it is only natural that the *product* (ordinary things like the Bull and the Jar) should possess the characteristics of elemental substances (which substances are its cause). This argument has been already explained by us in detail when we pointed out that 'the production of perceptible things is from perceptible things, as is clearly proved by perception' (Sū. 4. 1. 11).

Further, the probans put forward (by the Opponent) —"*because* the elemental substances are eternal" (Sū. 29) is non-pervasive. "How so?" For the simple reason that it does not apply to Motion and such other things; as a matter of fact, Motion, Cognition, Sound &c. do not fall under the premiss 'because the five elemental substances are eternal'.*

---

* 'स्वर्गेन न व्याप्ता' is the right reading.

Further, the Opponent's argument becomes nullified by our perceiving the effort put forth by the cognitive agent; the effort of the cognitive agent is found to be put forth when he is urged by a desire for production and destruction; and this would not be possible if all things were eternal (and there were no production, nor destruction).

Further *the composite substance is known to have that property*;—we have already proved that the composite substance has the property of being liable to be produced and destroyed; and what is alleged by the Opponent is not right.

Objection—"How is it that though the Reason (of the Opponent) is only 'non-pervasive' (not present in the entire *subject*, the *Bhāṣya* calls it 'inconclusive', *anēkānṭa*'?"

Answer—What is meant by the reason being '*anēkānṭa*' is that the Subject subsists during both ends (during *existence* as well as during *non-existence*) of it; the Subject of the Proposition 'all things are eternal' is *All*,—and this 'all' includes things known as 'Elemental Substances' as well as those that are not known as such; and since this 'subject' (*All*) co-exists with 'both ends'—*Existence* as well as *Non-existence*—of the Reason ('possessing the characteristics of Elemental Substances'), it is not right to say that '*all things* possess the characteristics of Elemental Substances.'—It is in this sense that the reason has been called *anēkānta*' (having the subject not restricted either to its *Existence* only or to its *Non-existence* only). *

* This passage is obscure. We have adopted the interpretation of the *Tāṭparya*: It construes the sentence पक्षस्यान्तद्वये अवस्थानात् as हेतोः अन्तद्वये सत्त्वासत्त्वरूपे पक्षस्य अवस्थानात्; though it is difficult to reconcile this construction with the compounded form later on सत्त्वान्तद्वये अवस्थानात्. The meaning according to the *Tāṭparya* is that of the reason—'possessing the characteristics of elemental substances — there are two ends,' *existence* and *non-existence*; and the subject "All" is concomitant with both; since 'all' includes 'elemental substance,' which co-exist

Objection—" Like the cognition of things in a dream, the said perception (of the causes of production of things) is wrong."

If you mean by this that—" The idea that a certain thing is *produced* and *destroyed* is nôt true; the real production and destruction not being there, the notion that the thing has been produced, and that it is destroyed, is a mere misconception; just as during a dream though the things do not exist, yet there is a misconception of them ",—then our answer is that this is not true, there being nothing to prove that it is as you say; that is, you simply assert that when we conceive of such things as the Bull and the Jar as being 'produced' and 'destroyed,' there is no such thing in reality as 'production' or destruction,'—and you do not bring forward any proof of such non-existence (of production and destruction); and unless proofs have been adduced in support of a certain assertion, it cannot be accepted. And how things have a real existence apart from *sensations*, we shall explain later on. Further, if the notions of 'Production' and 'Destruction' be regarded as mere *misconception*, then the same might be said of the conception of Elemental Substances also—this conception also being like the conception of things during a dream.

---

with the *existence* of the reason, and 'non-elemental substances,' which co-exist with the *non-existence* of the reason; so that it is not right to say that 'all things possess the characteristics of elèmental substances.'

The more natural meaning of the words would appear to be that—'the *reason* subsists in both ends *of the subject*;' but the difficulty in this interpretation is that if the Reason subsists in all conditions of the Subject then it is quite valid; and if by 'two ends' are meant 'existence and non-existence,' then it would be true to say that the Reason co-exists with the existence and the non-existence of the subject 'all;' for as a matter of fact, 'possessing the characteristics of elemental substances,' which is the reason, is never co-existent with the *non-existence* of 'all things'. It is better on the whole therefore to accept the interpretation of the *Ṭāṭparya*.

"But if there were no such things as the Earth &c., then all practical usages of men would come to an end." If you mean by this that—"If the Earth and other Elemental Substances do not exist, then there would be an end to all practical usage which is based upon such substances,"—then our answer is that exactly the same may be said of the other case also: If the existence of Elemental Substances is admitted simply through fear of all usages coming to an end, then, for that same reason you should admit also the 'production' and 'destruction' of things; as no practical activity can be carried on unless there are 'productions' and 'destructions' of things.

Further,—(*a*) *because eternal substances are beyond the reach of the senses, and* (*b*) *because they are not objects of production and destruction*, &c. &c.—says the *Bhāṣya*. Everything eternal is super-sensuous, and not the object of production and destruction; hence it is not right to assert that the said perception (of production and destruction) is as unreal as the cognition in a dream.

Further, when you speak of the 'misconception of Production and Destruction' it behoves you to explain what is the real object of 'Production and Destruction;' and for one who holds *all things* to be eternal, there can be no objects of 'Production and Destruction;' and if you deny the existence of the *object*, you have to deny the existence also of a misconception relating to that object.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (33).
[P. 204, L. 16 to P. 205, L. 11.]

"What really happens", says another philosopher, "is that the Original Substance remaining constant, one property of it ceases and another property is produced;—and this is what forms the object (meaning) of the 'destruction' and 'production' of the thing; in fact when a thing is said to be 'produced,' it is something that has been already in existence (in the form of the original substance) even

before that 'production;' and similarly when a thing is said to be 'destroyed' it continues to exist (in the form of the Substance) even after that destruction [for all that has happened is that one *property* has disappeared and another has appeared]; and in this manner all things are eternal." *

[This doctrine is refuted in the following *Sūṭra.*]

Sūṭra (33).

THIS CANNOT BE ACCEPTED; FOR (UNDER THIS THEORY) THERE WOULD BE NO POSSIBILITY OF DIFFERENTIATION.—(Sū. 33).

There would be no possibility of any such differentiation as 'this is *birth,* and *that is cessation*;' as under the theory put forward what is born and what has ceased to exist are both *extant.* (A) [In regard to properties also] there could be no differentiation (as to Time), such as 'this property is born and that property has ceased', as both are equally *extant*;—(B) nor would there be any differentiation as to time,—such as 'at this time there are birth and cessation, and not at that time,' for *at all times* things would be equally *extant*; (C) nor could there be any differentiation as to *relationship,* such as 'there are birth and cessation of this property, and not of that,' for both properties would be equally *extant*; (D) nor again, could there be any such differentiation in regard to *Time,* as 'this, not yet come, is in the future, and that is past;' for under the theory all things are always *extant,* which means that they are always 'present' [and as such can never be spoken of as 'future' or 'past'].

None of these objections lie against the view (held by the *Naiyāyika*) that 'birth' (production) consists in the coming into existence (gaining its own nature) of what has not been in existence, and cessation (destruction) consists in the ceasing to exist (losing its own nature) of what has

* The *Ṭāṭparya* 'calls this doctrine *Soāyambhuvānāmmaṭam*;' does it mean the '*Shaiva*' system? The doctrine is thus summed up in the *Ṭāṭparya*—"The modification undergone by Substances is of three kinds: (1) modification of properties, (2) modification of condition, and (3) modification of age. *Eg.* (1) (the original subtance *Gold* in lump becomes modified into the ear-ring, and here we have the modification of the property (shape) of the gold; (2) when the ear-ring is broken up and made into the bracelet, we have the modification of conditions, *i.e.*, the ear-ring has renounced its *present* and reverted to the *past* condition, and the bracelet has removed its *future* and reverted to the *present* condition; and (3) in the beginning the bracelet is new, young, and in time it becomes *old*; so that here we have the modification of *age*. [The original gold remains constant all the time]."

been in existence For these reasons we conclude that it is not right to assert, as has been asserted by the Opponent (Text L. 1, P. 205), that—"a thing exists before it is born, and it exists also after it has been destroyed."

Vārṭika Sū. (33).

[P. 478, L. 12 to P. 479, L. 5.]

Other philosophers have offered another explanation of the doctrine that "all things are eternal". What this means, according to them, is that—'the original substance remaining constant, only its property ceases, and another property comes into existence; that which has ceased continues to exist even after cessation, and that which comes into existence has also been in existence before that coming into existence."

The answer to this is that, *this cannot be accepted etc. etc.* —says the *Sūṭra*. The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya*.

When you assert that—" that which has ceased continues to exist after cessation"—you should be asked the following question:—What is the meaning of the expression that *the thing has ceased*?* If you say that what it means is that 'it was perceived before and is not perceived now',—then we ask, to what is due the non-perception of what exists? If it were due to obstruction, then such obstruction should be perceived. In fact we have already explained (P. 476, L. 15 *et seq.*) that when a thing, not perceived before, comes to be perceived, it has to be admitted that a new peculiarity has been produced in it and a previous peculiarity has dropped off. If however you admit of this explanation, you contradict yourself [as for you there can be no production of anything new, or dropping off of anything]. Then again, as regards your assertion that—" that which comes into existence has existed before that coming into existence also,"—this cannot be

* किमुक्तम्भवति निवृत्तमिति is the right reading, found in the footnote.

right, as it involves a self-contradiction. To say that a thing comes into existence and then to say that 'it exists' is a contradiction in terms [that which already *exists* cannot *come into existence*]. If 'coming into existence' be explained as 'manifestation,' 'coming into view,' —even so, the objections urged before remain in force, and it further involves the admission (on your part) that the 'manifestation,' *which was not in existence before, has come into existence* [and this is incompatible with your doctrine].

End of Section (8).

Section (9).

[Sūtrās 34—36.]

The Refutation of the View that all is Diversity, there is no Unity.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (34).

[P. 205, L. 11 to P. 206, L. 4.]

The following is another sweeping assertion (of the (Bauḍḍhas) :—

Sūtra (34).

[*Pūrvapakṣa.*]

"ALL MUST BE REGARDED AS DIVERSE; BECAUSE THE SYMBOLS (NAMES) OF THINGS REFER TO DIVERSE ENTITIES."* (Sū. 34).

* It has been established up to this point that all things are aggregates of—'the Quality and the Qualified,' 'the negative and positive,' 'the intelligent and non-intelligent,' 'the eternal and non-eternal ;'—and it becomes necessary to refute the theory that there is no such thing as the 'aggregate whole.' This theory has been held in several forms—(1) the theory that there is no *unity* (refuted in Sū. 34—36), (2) 'all is mere Void' (Sū. 37—40), (3) 'there is *only one* thing,' or 'there are *only two* things,' and so forth, (Sū. 41—43). All these have to be refuted, because—(1) if there is no *unity*, no one thing, then of what could there be an *aggregate*? (2) if nothing exists, and all is Void, there can be no *aggregate* ; and (3) similarly there can be no 'aggregate' under the theory of absolute Monism.—*Pariśhuḍḍhi.*

The doctrine put forward under this Sūtra is thus explained in the *Tatparya* :—"All things must be diverse, distinct ; because there is no such thing as 'substance,' apart from colour &c., and colour &c., are distinct from one another ; nor is there any such thing as 'composite' apart from the components, and these latter are distinct from one another." Such is the view of the *Sautrāntikas* and the *Vaibhāṣikas.*

"All must be regarded as diverse; there is no *single entity.*—Why?—*Bhāvalakṣaṇapṛiṭhakṭvāṭ*—says the Sūtra; the '*lakṣaṇa*' or 'symbol' of the '*bhāva*,' 'entity,' is that which distinguishes it; *i. e.* its name; and the names refer to diverse entities; as a matter of fact, all 'names of things' denote combinations; *e g*, the name 'Jar' is applied to the combination of 'odour, taste, colour and touch,' (the qualities of the Jar), and also to the combination of the 'bottom, sides and neck' (the parts of the Jar) [and these are diverse, distinct from one another; and the Jar is nothing apart from these qualities and component parts]. The 'Jar' has been mentioned only by way of illustration [the same holds good in regard to the *names* of all things.]"

Vārtika on Sū. (34).

[P. 479, L. 5 to L. 12.]

The following is another sweeping assertion;—'*All must be regarded as diverse etc. etc.*';—the 'name' of a thing is the *word*; as it is by its name that the thing is distinguished; and all the 'names of things' refer to diverse entities; *e.g.*, the name 'Jar'; *i.e.* the name of a thing is applied to a diverse combination of components, as we find in the case of the word 'Jar'; similarly with other words. The argument may be formulated thus:—The word 'Jar' must refer to diverse things,—(*a*) because it is a single word,—like the word 'army;' or (*b*) because when we hear a word pronounced we have the cognition of several things,—*i.e.*, because the hearing of a word gives rise to the cognition of several things,—as we find in the case of the word 'army'."

Sūtra (35).

[*Siddhānta.*]

WHAT IS ALLEGED CANNOT BE ACCEPTED; BECAUSE (AS A MATTER OF FACT) SEVERAL (KINDS OF) THINGS GO TO MAKE A SINGLE ENTITY.—(Sū. 35.)

Vishvanatha states the doctrine thus—"Such things as the Jar and the like must be regarded as distinct, even from themselves; because the odour, taste, &c, of these things, as also their component parts, are distinct from one another; and the 'Jar' is nothing apart from these latter."

Bhāṣya on Sū. (35).
[P. 206, L. 4 to L. 8.]

The compound '*anēklākṣaṇaiḥ*' should be treated as one that has the middle word eliminated, and as standing for '*anēkuviḍhalakṣaṇaiḥ*,' 'several *kinds* of things.' As a matter of fact, it is the single entity (the composite substance, Jar) that comes into existence as related to Odour and other qualities, and to the Bottom and other components; in fact, the *Substance* is something different from *its Qualities*, and the *Composite* is something different from the Components; both these facts have been already explained by us (under Sū. 2-2-33 *et seq.*).

Vārṭika on Sū. (35).

[P. 479, L. 14 to P. 480, L. 8.]

What is alleged cannot be accepted etc. etc. The compound 'anēkalakṣanaiḥ' should be treated as one which has the middle word eliminated, and as standing for 'anēkavidhalakṣaṇaiḥ.' It is a single entity that is produced as related to Odour and other qualities, and to the Bottom and other components; and thus it being found that the names of things denote a single entity, the rest of the argument (in refutation of the *Pūrvapakṣa*), though not actually stated in the Sūtra, is understood to be implied. That the Substance possessed of Qualities is something different from the qualities, and that the composite is something different from the components, has already been explained by us.

As regards the argument put forward (in the *Vārṭika* on Sū. 34)—that "the word 'jar' must refer to diverse things, because it is a single word,"—this cannot be right; as there is no corroborative instance: (*a*) As a matter of fact, there is no word that refers to diverse things; specially because such words as 'army' and the like are not admitted (by all parties) to be applicable to diverse things. We have already shown above how words like 'army' refer to

Vār. P. 480. single entities;—(*b*) secondly, since 'all' (words) have been made the 'subject' of the argument, there can: be no corroborative instance;—(*c*) thirdly, the fact that has been put forward as the 'reason' ('being a word') must be explained otherwise (than on the basis of the assumption that "the word must denote diverse entities;") for as a matter of fact, Colour and other qualities are actually perceived as subsisting in a single entity, and this *single entity* is perceived to be the *composite* object;—(*d*) fourthly, inasmuch as the negative particle is known to denote either *denial of the possible* or *elimination*, the reason put forward is 'contradictory' also; *i. e.* the term '*anēka*' ('not-one', 'diverse') contains the negative particle; and the use of the negative particle is possible only as negativing things, in the sense of either '*denying what is possible*' or '*contradistinction*'; now in the case in question, if the negative denotes *the denying of what is possible*, then the assertion that 'things are *anēka*' means that they are *not-one*; and since this is, *ex-hypothesi*, the *denial* of *what is possible*, it follows that being 'denied' in one place, it exists elsewhere; so that the use of the term '*anēka*' implying the existence (somewhere) of the '*Ēka, One*,' your statement becomes self-contradictory. If, on the other hand, you hold the view that the negative particle (in '*anēka*') denotes 'contradistinction', then the term '*anēka*' means 'that which is other than one,' and this also involves the admission of the *one*; for unless the *one* exists, there can be no such thing as 'other than one.'

Bhasya on Sū. (36).
[P. 206, L. 8 to L. 20.]

Further,—

THE DENIAL CANNOT BE RIGHT, AS THE SYMBOLS (OF THINGS) ARE RESTRICTED IN THEIR APPLICATION. (Su. 36).

The denial—that "there is no single entity"—cannot be right;—why?—for the very simple reason that 'the symbols

of things are restricted in their application'; as a matter of fact, the 'symbol' of entities,—*i. e.* the word that forms their name, is restricted in its application to single entities; as is clear from such expressions as 'I am touching that *Jar* which I saw before,' 'I am seeing that which I touched before.' Then again, as a matter of fact, we never perceive any mere 'group of atoms' as such, and these 'groups of atoms' (as composing the Jar) being imperceptible (by reason of their extreme minuteness), that which is actually perceived must be a single entity (composed of those atoms).

(A) It has been subsequently urged by the Opponent that—"there can be no single entity, because all things are mere groups (of several things)";—but if there is no *single* thing, there can be no *group* of things. What the Opponent means is that—"there is no *single* entity, as the names of things apply only to groups";—but the fact is that if there is no *single* thing, there can be no 'group'; as the 'group' is nothing more than the conglomeration of several *single* things; so that the allegation—"There is no single entity &c."—involving a self-contradiction, is most incongruous. That is, that (single entity) of which the denial has been alleged, (by the Opponent, on the basis of the premiss), "because the names of things are applied to groups,"—becomes admitted by the Opponent when he asserts that "the names of things are applied to groups"; for the 'group' is only a collection of several *single* entities. (B) Further, in making the allegation—"because the names of things are applied to groups of things"—you admit the 'group,' and then in the proposition, "there is no single entity" you deny each component of that 'group' [for each such component can only be a *single entity*] [and when each component is denied, the *group* also becomes denied *ipso facto*]. Thus then, the Opponent's allegation being beset with a twofold 'self-contradiction' (A & B), it must be rejected as a frivolous assertion.

Vartika on Su. (36).

[P. 480, L. 10 to P. 481, L. 19.]

For the following reason also (the *Pūrvapakṣa* cannot be accepted :—*As the symbols of things etc. etc.*—says the *Sūṭra.* The theory that "there is no single entity" cannot be right; —why?—*because the symbols of things are restricted in their*

application. As a matter of fact, when the name 'jar' is uttered, it does not give rise to the idea of *several things*. "How do you know that it does not give rise to this idea?" (A) For the simple reason that the word takes the Singular termination; the word 'Jar' is in the Singular number; and a word in the Singular number could not apply to *several* things.—(B) Further, as a matter of fact, the direction (addressed by the older person to the younger) and its comprehension (by the younger person) both pertain to a *single entity*; *e.g.*, the direction 'bring the jar' refers to a *single* jar; and the person to whom this direction is addressed, on comprehending the meaning of the words, brings up a *single jar*; and the fact of the direction and its comprehension pertaining to the *single* object clearly indicates that the name 'jar' denotes a *single entity*.

Then again, you regard the *qualities of Colour* and the *components* (as denoted by the name of a thing); but as a matter of fact, these do not form the actual denotation of words, they come in merely by implication, this implication being due to the fact that they are inseparable from the thing (actually denoted by the word).

Further, if every thing were a mere 'group' of components, atoms),* there could be no end to its dismemberment; hence that point where the dismemberment ceases must be the *single entity*. That is to say, when the Opponent regards the Bull, the Jar and such things as mere 'groups of components,' he admits the 'group'; and under the Opponent's theory [by which all things are mere groups of
Vār. P. No. 481.
endless component atoms] it would not be possible to conceive of any thing (*e.g.*, the Jar) as having become 'smaller' and 'smaller' (by) dismemberment; as each dismembered piece would be capable of never-ending dismem-

* समूहे भेदस्य is the right reading, given by the *Tātparya*.

berments);—such a conception could be possible only if the object could be conceived of as so many component substances constituting the *Jar* [and such notion would be impossible if there were no such *single* entities as the 'Jar' and the like]; so that for the purposes of the said conception it has to be admitted that in the case of every object, there is a point which represents the smallest dimension to which it can be reduced (by dismemberment), and this smallest—sized thing would be indivisible; so that at that point all further dismemberment should cease; and that where no further dismemberment (into component particles) is possible must be a *single* entity.

Further, one who denies the *one* must deny the *many* also; as the *many* is only a collection of several *ones*. *You will perhaps take up the following position:—"(*a*) That which you regard as the *indivisible atom* is only a conglomeration of Colour and other qualities;" or (*b*) that "the four substances, Earth and the rest, combined together form the *Atom*."

(*a*) Now, under this theory,—which means that when Colour and other properties come together they constitute the *Atom*,—it has to be explained to what belongs the Colour that is found in the Atom; and similarly with the other qualities. (*b*) If, again, you allege that the *four substances* (Earth Water, Fire and Air) coming together constitute the Atom,—and it means that the quartette is a collection (of four substances)—then, it behoves you to explain of what things each one of the four substances singly—Earth, Water, Fire and Air—is the *collection*. If you postulate an endless series of collections, then you go against your scriptures, according to which the Atom is a collection of *eight* substances; as has been declared (in the *Bauddha Sūtra*)—"*Kāmāṣṭadravyakoṇurashabdaḥ*," "Verily the Atom consists of eight substances, and is without Sound." (?)

* The Author now tackles the theory of another party of Buddhists.

Thus (we conclude that) if there is no *single entity*, there cannot be *many* entities; so that the theory of the Opponent has got to be entirely rejected.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* has put forward the reason—"because the names of things apply to groups;" but this is nothing, involving as it does a twofold self-contradiction. "Why *twofold*?" (1) In the first place in the argument—"*There is no single entity* (Proposition), *because the names of things are applied to groups* (Probans),"—there is contradiction between the Proposition and the statement of the Probans; as unless there is a *single entity*, there can be no *group*;—(2) secondly, when you deny the *single entity* on the basis of the *group*, you deny the *group* itself. *Thus the Opponent's allegation being beset with a twofold contradiction, it must be rejected as a frivolous assertion.* The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya*.

End of Section (9).

Section (10).

[*Sūtras* 37—40.]

The Refutation of the Theory that All is Mere Void.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (37).

[P. 206, L. 20 to P. 207, L. 13.]

The following is another sweeping assertion:—

Sūtra (37).

"ALL THINGS MUST BE NON-ENTITIES, BECAUSE ALL THINGS ARE KNOWN TO BE MERE NEGATIONS OF ONE ANOTHER." (Sū. 37).

All things must be regarded as non-entities;—why?—*because all things are known to be mere negations of one another*. As a matter of fact, the Bull is 'non-existent in the form of 'Horse,' and the Bull is only 'not-horse; similarly the Horse is 'non-existent' in the form the 'Bull,' and the Horse is only 'not-bull;' thus we find that the names of things ('Bull,' 'Horse' &c.) are concomitant (co-substrate)

with the notion of 'non-existence' as also with *negation*; from which it follows that all things are *non-existent* or non-entities." *

[The *Bhāṣya* offers its own answer to the Nihilistic doctrine put forward in the *Sūtra*]—The assertion put forward cannot be right; because there is contradiction between (A) the two terms of the Proposition and (B) between the Proposition and the Statement of the Probans:

[(A) The term 'all' signifies *several things without exception*, while the term 'non-entity' signifies the *negation of existence*; of these two the former is something possessed of a definite character, while the latter is totally devoid of any character; now how can that which is spoken of as possessed of definite character, *i.e.*, 'all,' be a mere 'non-entity,' which is devoid of any character? Certainly the 'non-entity,' which is totally devoid of any character, cannot be predicated either as 'several' or as 'without exception' [which are the two factors in the denotation of the term 'all.']

"But it is just all this that is non-entity; what *you* (Logician) call the 'all' is what is really only non-entity."

Even so the 'contradiction' does not cease; for the conception of 'several things' and 'without exception' cannot

---

* This Nihilism is thus expounded in the *Tātparya*:—"All things—Pramāṇa and the rest—are actually found to be cognised as 'non-existent' and also spoken of in negative terms; hence it follows that the names of those things are concomitant with these (the notion of non-existence and negation); hence Pramāṇa and the rest must be regarded as non-existent, as nonentities, just like the Cloth that has either not come into existence or has been destroyed. Further are these things—Pramāṇa &c.—eternal or evanescent? If they are eternal, they must be non-entities, being without any capacity or power; as we have already explained how no sequence being possible among things that are eternal, no eternal thing can ever bring about a product. If, on the other hand, the things are evanescent, then, since they would be liable to destruction, they would be as *non-existent* at the first as at the second moment. Further, if things are *existent*, they should not be liable to destruction, and as such they could not be destroyed at any point of time; for the blue Colour, being brought about by its causes, can never be turned into yellow by even thousands of painters. In fact evanescent things can not but be regarded as liable to destruction. From all this we conclude that all things are mere *Void*, *Blank*; and it is only through assumed *existence* that they appear as *existing*. The reasoning may be formulated thus:—"All names of things apply to non-existent things,—because they are concomitant with notions of *non-existence* and *negation*,—like the unproduced and the destroyed Cloth."

possibly arise in regard to what is mere non-entity;* and yet it is just this conception that is expressed by the term 'all;' hence it follows that this 'all' cannot be a *non-entity*.

(B) There is contradiction also between the Proposition and the Statement of the Probans: the Proposition is in the form 'all things are non-entities,' and it denies the existence (of all things); and the statement of the Probans is 'because all things are known to be mere negations of one another,'—which admits that there is 'mutual negation' among 'things; and then on the basis thereof—the fact of there being mutual negation having been established,—it is asserted that 'all things are non-entities';—now if 'all things are nonentities,' then it is not possible for 'things' to be the 'negation of one another;' and if 'things' are 'negations of one another,' then 'all things' cannot be 'non-entities.'

Vārṭika on Sū. (37).

[P. 482, L. 1 to P. 843, L. 2.]

Another sweeping assertion is—"*All things must be non-entities*, &c. &c. All things are non-entities;—why?—because all things are known to be mere negations of one another. That is, inasmuch as the names of things are concomitant with the notion of 'non-existence,' and with 'negation,' all things must be 'non-entities,'—just like the unproduced and destroyed Cloth. As a matter of fact, all names of things are concomitant with 'non-existence,' and also with 'negation,'—just like the destroyed Cloth; as in the expression 'the Cloth does not exist.'—'But in what way is the Cloth non-existent; and when is it non-existent?'—It does not exist, *in the form of the dish and such other things*; and it does not exist when it has been destroyed. Similarly the word 'Jar,' being concomitant with the notion of 'non-existence,' clearly indicates the absolute non-existence of

* The right reading is अभावे प्रत्ययेन (as in the Puri Ms). Construe thus: अनेकमपरोपरमेति प्रत्ययेन अभावे न भवितुं शक्यम् ।

the Jar; in the same manner, all names of things being found to be concomitant with 'non-existence,' it follows that all things are *non-existent*."

In the above there is contradiction, (*a*) between the two terms of the Proposition, and also (*b*) between the Proposition and the Statement of the Probans. By two things being '*samānādhikaraṇa*,' or 'concomitant,' it is meant that the words expressing them end with affixes having the same meaning; *i.e.*, affixes with the same signification are used with them; and when you make use of this expression ('*sāmānādhikarṇya*' in your Statement of Probans), you admit the *existence* of things and also the existence of words that form the names of those things; so that your Statement of the Probans (wherein the expression '*samānādhikaraṇa*' is used) becomes contradictory * (to your Proposition). Further, your Proposition is in the form—"that which you regard as *all* must be a non-entity;" but as a matter of fact, the notion of 'that' can never arise in regard to a mere *non-entity*; nor can the notion of 'entity' arise in regard to it. Further the term 'non-entity' denotes the *negation of entity*; and the use of the negative particle is not possible unless what is denoted by the term compounded with it actually exists, as the negative particle can only mean either 'denial of what is possible' or 'contradistinction,' as we have explained before, as is found to be in the case of such compound words as 'not-one,' 'non-eternal' and the like. In the same manner we can also find contradistinction between the term 'all' and the term 'non-entity.' The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya*.

Further, if all things are mere *non-entities*, it behoves you to explain the exact nature (and signification) of the affixes; if everything is a non-entity, you should explain

* For विरे: read विरुद्ध as in the Benares Edition.

what is the character of the affix; if the affix also is a non-entity, then the assertion, that "*sāmānaḍhikaraṇya* consists in the affixes having the same meaning," involves a contradiction in terms. You talk of 'concomitance with the notion of non-existence and with negation,' and yet you deny the same when you make the sweeping assertion that "all things are non-entities;" and certainly that which is a *non-entity* can never be the substratum of anything; the 'substratum' is that wherein something subsists, and certainly nothing subsists in a *non-entity*.

Var: P. 483.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (38).

[P. 207, L. 13 to P. 208, L. 17.]

The following is the answer (to Nihilism) offered by the *Sūṭra*—

Sūṭrā (38).

WHAT HAS BEEN ALLEGED IS NOT RIGHT, BECAUSE THINGS ARE, BY VIRTUE OF THEIR VERY NATURE, ACTUAL ENTITIES.

(*A*) All things cannot be non-entities;—Why?—Because by virtue of their very nature things are actual entities, (really existing). The proposition laid down is that *by their very nature things exist.* "What is the *nature* of things?" 'Existence,' 'being an entity,' and so forth constitute the nature or character common to Substances, Qualities and Actions;—'having action' and so forth are the 'character' peculiar to Substances;—the qualities ending with Touch belong to Earth;—so on and so forth there are endless characters peculiar to the several things of the world;—in Community, Individuality and Inherence also we find specific characters. All this distinction among things, which is recognised in actual experience, would not be possible [if all things were mere non-entities], as a non-entity is without any character;—and yet such distinction among things does exist;—from which it follows that all things are not mere non-entities.

(*B*) [Another interpretation of the Sūṭra]—Or, the words of the Sūṭra may be taken to mean that—*what has been asserted cannot be right; because each thing is recognised as having*

a distinct individuality of its own; that is to say, when the word 'Bull' is used, what is apprehended is a particular substance qualified by (belonging to) a particular community, and not a mere non-entity. If all things were non-entities, the Bull would have been recognised as a 'non-entity,' and the word 'Bull' would have denoted a *non-entity.* "But how do you know that the word 'Bull' does not signify a non-entity?"* We know it from the fact that whenever the word 'Bull' is used, it brings about the notion of a particular substance, and not that of a non-entity. For these reasons what has been asserted by the Opponent cannot be right.

(*C*) Or, the words of the *Sūṭra* '*na svabhāvasiḍḍhēḥ, etc.*' may be explained to mean as follows:—When you assert (Bhā. P. 207, L.) that "the Bull is non-existent *in the form of the Horse,*" why do not you say that "the Bull is non-existent *in the form of the bull*"? † That you do not say so indicates that *in the form of the Bull* the Bull *is existent*; this is what is meant by the expression '*Svabhāvasiḍḍhi,*' 'existence in its own form.' [If you really mean that things are non-existent], why cannot you say that the Horse is not-Horse, or that the Bull is not-Bull? Since you do not say so, it follows that *in its own form,* the substance *exists.*

‡ As a matter of fact, whenever there is denial of non-difference—'difference' consisting, in this case, of the absence of conjunction and such other relations, and 'non-difference' consisting of identity,—even really existing things come to be spoken of as co-substrate (concomitant) with the notion of 'non-existence,' as we find in the case of the expression 'the jujube fruit *is not* in the cup';§—so that in the case in question, in the expressions 'the Bull is non-existent in the form of the Horse,' 'the Bull is not-Horse', what is denied is the non-difference between the Bull and the Horse,—the meaning

---

* The right reading is कस्मान्न गोशब्देन चाभाव उच्यते, as found in Puri Ms. B.

† असन् गौरश्वात्मनेति कस्मान्नोच्यते is the better reading, as found in Puri Ms. B.

‡ This, according to the *Vārṭika*, explains how we have the negation expressed in the statement, 'the Bull is not-horse.'

§ This is an obscure passage; the obscurity being due to wrong readings. From what follows in the next sentence it is clear that the passage should read as follows—अव्यतिरेकप्रतिषेधभावेन—असंयोगादिसम्बन्धो व्यतिरेकोऽव्यतिरेकोऽभेदात्मकसम्बन्धः—असत्प्रत्ययसामानाधिकरण्यम् । यथा न सन्ति कुण्डे बदराणीति ।

being that, 'there is no identity between the Bull and the Horse'; and this identity being denied, there comes about the co-substrateness or concomitance of the notion of 'non-existence' with the thing, 'Bull'; hence the expression 'the *Bull is non-existent*, in the form of the Horse'; just as in the sentence 'the jujube fruit *is not* in the cup', the conjunction of the fruit with the cup being denied, we have the co-substrateness of the notion of 'non-existence' with the fruit, which is a real entity. [All this shows that 'concomitance with the notion of *non-existence*,' upon which the Opponent bases his arguments, in Bhāṣya, p. 207, L. 1-2, is not incompatible with *real entities*].

Vārṭika on (38).

[P. 483, L. 2 to P. 484, L. 6.]

The answer given in the *Sūṭra* is as follows:—*What has been alleged, etc., etc.,* (Sū. 38). What we mean is that all things exist in their own respective characters; and this serves to point out the absurdity in the position put forward in the preceding *Sūṭra*. "How so?" When in *Sūṭrā* 37 you say that "things are known to be mere negations of one another," you assert the things to be mere *negations, non-entities*; and saying this you regard things to be, by their very nature, *non-entities*. Further, the statement "things are mere negations of one another" is open to the objection that it contains a needless, superfluous, qualifying term; in order to express the idea that all things are non-entities, all that need have been said is that 'things do not exist', and it is not right to say that 'one thing is not another' [and this is exactly what your words mean]. Then again 'another' ('*iṭara*') is a positive term, and when all things are non-existent, there is nothing that could be *affirmed* and spoken of by means of the word 'another'; what you have done is to admit the fact of a certain thing being spoken of by means of the word 'another,' and then to negative one thing in regard to that *another*; and in doing this you have admitted the fact of certain things having the character of *entities*.

"What is the *own character* of things?"—asks the Opponent.

[Our answer is as follows]—'*Existence*' '*being an Entity*' *and so forth constitute the character common to Substances, Qualities and Actions; having action and so forth are the character peculiar (to substances); the qualities ending with Touch belong to Earth; and so on and so forth there are endless characters peculiar to the several things of the World*—(Bhāṣya). Among Community, Individuality and Inherence there are endless sub-divisions, some general and others special. *All this distinction among things, which is recognised in actual experience, would not be possible, if all things were mere non-entities; as a non-entity is without any character;—and yet such distinctions among things does exist; from which it follows that all things are not mere non-entities.*—(Bhāṣya).

(*b*) Or, the phrase *svabhāvasiddhēḥ* (of the Sūtra) may be explained as follows:—When the word 'Bull', is used it does not bring about the idea of a *non-entity*; what it expresses is a certain substance belonging to a particular community. If all things were mere non-entities, then the word 'bull', on being used, would express a *non-entity*. From this it follows that all things are not mere non-entities.

(*c*) Or, the phrase '*svabhāvasiddhēḥ*' may be taken to mean as follows:—You assert that 'the Bull is
Vār: P. 484.
non-existent *in the form of the horse*', 'the Bull is not' Horse'; but why do not you say that 'the Bull is not-Bull'*? Since you do not say so, it follows that the Bull does *exist* (in the form of the *Bull*).† "The assertion that 'the Bull is not-Bull' would be self-contra-

* The reading of the Bibliotheca Indica Edition is simpler.

† गोरस्तीति, the right reading, is given in the footnote.

dictory." If it is only through fear of self-contradiction that you do not assert that 'the Bull is not-Bull'; then, my friend, the *existence* of things becomes established.

"How then do we have the negation 'the Bull is not-Horse'?"

As a matter of fact, whenever there is denial of non-difference, even really existing things come to be spoken of as co-substrate with the notion of non-existence; as we find in the case of the expression 'the jujube fruit is not in the cup', (Bhāṣya)—where what is negatived is the connection between the fruit and the cup, and yet neither the fruit nor the cup is a non-entity.

Sūṭra (39).

[*Objection.*]—"THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS THE CHARACTER (OR INDIVIDUALITY) OF THINGS; FOR WHAT IS SO REGARDED HAS ONLY A RELATIVE EXISTENCE."* (Sū. 39).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (39).

[P. 209, L. 2 to L. 4.]

"'*Relative*' is that which is due to the *relativity* of things: *e. g.*, a thing is spoken of as 'long' in relation to what is 'short,' and short' in relation to what is 'long;' and neither of the two has an absolute existence of its own—Why so?—Because such is the force of relativity. Hence we conclude that there is no such thing as the character or individuality of things."†

Vārṭika on Sū. (39).

[P. 484, L. L. 8-9]

"What is asserted cannot be accepted; as the *character* of things is purely relative; and nothing has an absolute

---

* Satish Chandra Vidyābhūṣana reads in this Sūṭra a reference to the *Māḍhyamikā-Sūṭra.*

† All things are relative: the *blue* is blue in relation to, in comparison with, the *yellow*, the *father* is so in relation to the *son*, and so forth, with all things.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

existence of its own; as we find in the case of such things as the *Long* and the *Short*, the *Prior* and the *Posterior*."

Sūṭra (40).

[*Answer*]—WHAT IS PUT FORWARD CANNOT BE RIGHT, AS IT INVOLVES A SELF-CONTRADICTION (Sū. 40).

Bhāṣya on Sū (40).

[P. 209, L. 6 to L. 15].

If a thing is 'long' only relatively to the 'short,' then the 'short' should be *non-relative*; for to what would the 'short' be relative? (Similarly) if a thing is 'short' only relatively to the 'long,' then the 'long' should be *non-relative*; for to what would the 'long' be relative? And if the two depended upon each other, then the negation of one would imply the negation of the other, so that there would be negation of both. Hence it is not right to assert that the character of the 'short' is to be determined only relatively to the 'long.'*

Further, if there is no such thing as the 'character' (or individuality) of things, [and all is merely relative], why do we not have the relative notions of 'length' and 'shortness' in regard to two equal Atoms, or to any two objects of equal size? For, taken relatively or non-relatively, the two things remain the same; the two things taken relatively remain precisely the same two things, even when not taken relatively; the presence or absence of relativity does not alter the things themselves [so that under the *Pūrvapakṣa* theory, there can be no reason why the notions of 'length' and 'shortness' should not arise in regard to the two Atoms]; but if the character of things were purely relative, then the presence of *relativity* (of one thing or the other) would surely make a difference in the nature of things "What then is the effect of *relativity* on things)?" What *relativity* does is that when we perceive two things, it becomes possible for

---

* The whole of this passage is read better in Puri Ms. B. यदि ह्रस्वापेक्षाकृतं दीर्घं ह्रस्वमनापेक्षिकम् किमिदानीमपेक्ष्य......दीर्घमनापेक्षिकम्। किमिदानीमपेक्ष्य दीर्घमिति गृह्यते। एवमितरेतराश्रययोरेकाभावेऽन्यतराभावादुभयाभाव इति दीर्घापेक्षाव्यवस्थाऽनुपपन्ना।

us to perceive the preponderance of one over the other;* that is, when one sees two things and notices a preponderance in one of them, he regards it as 'long,' and that which he finds deficient, he regards as 'short;' this is what is done by relativity.

Vārṭika on Sū (40).

[P. 484, L. 11 to P. 485, L. 16].

'*What is put forward cannot be right* &c. &c. If the 'long' is only relative to the 'short,' then the 'short' should be non-relative; if the 'short' is only relative to the 'long,' then the 'long' should be non-relative. If both are relative to each other, then that in relation to which the other is produced should become non-relative; so that the negation of one should mean the negation of both. *Taken relatively or non-relatively, the two things remain the same; the two things taken relatively remain precisely the same two things, even when not taken relatively*, (Bhāṣya); and it does not make any difference in one or the other. "How then does there arise any apprehension of preponderance (superiority)? If the two things, taken relatively and non-relatively, remain the same, then there should be no such conceptions as 'long' and 'short.'' Certainly such conceptions should not be impossible; when two things are perceived, a certain preponderance in one or the other is always perceived; as a matter of fact, in regard to the two things we have two definite notions, one in regard to each; in one we perceive a certain preponderance (and hence regard it as 'long'), while in another we perceive 'shortness' (due to a certain deficiency); then we come to ponder over the two conceptions, and this pondering gives rise to the notion 'this is *longer* than that, that is *shorter* than this;' this notion does not arise from the coming into existence of any new thing.

Vār. P. 485.

*E. g. When we perceive the bamboo relatively to the sugar-cane, this relativity leads us to the judgment that the former is 'longer' than the latter, or that the latter is 'shorter' than the former.

Further, if there were no such thing as the 'character' of things, their 'relativity' also would be impossible. In fact, if the distinctions into 'long' and 'short' and the like were due solely to the differences of *relativity*, without any regard to the 'character' of things,—then, the said notions (of 'long' &c.) would be possible in regard to even things taken relatively to everything. As a matter of fact however, *relativity* has nothing to do with the notions of 'Colour,' 'Taste,' 'Odour' and 'Touch;' and when God perceives two minute atoms, He does not conceive of one atom as 'long' or 'short' &c., in relation to another. From all this it follows that the conceptions are not all brought about by *relativity*.

[Having explained the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārṭika* proceeds to offer its own criticism of the *Pūrvapakṣa*]—The assertion that "all things are non-entities" is absolutely wrong. "Why is it wrong?" Well, in the first place, it involves the absurdity of explaining and not explaining the nature of the Means of Cognition: the man who asserts that all things are non-entities should be asked to explain the nature of the Means of Cognition; if he explains it, he contradicts himself; while if he does not explain it, then he cannot prove anything, as for him there is no 'means of Cognition or 'proof.' *Secondly*, "all things are non-entities" is a sentence; and if the person making this assertion comprehends its meaning, then, as before, there is self-contradiction; while if he does not comprehend it, then the mere uttering of letters is absolutely futile. *Thirdly*, of the sentence 'all things are non-entities' if the Pūrvapakṣa perceives the speaker and the person spoken to, he contradicts himself. *Fourthly*, 'all things are non-entities' and 'all things are entities,'—these are two distinct sentences; and if the Opponent perceives the difference in their meaning, he contradicts himself; while if he does not perceive it, the use of different words is futile.

Thus we find that the more we examine this theory of all things being non-entities, the more unamenable to reason it is found to be.

End of Section (10).

Section (11).

[Sūtras 41—43.]

Examination of certain sweeping assertions in regard to the exact number of things.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (41).

[P. 209, L. 15 to P. 211, L. 3.]

The following are the sweeping assertions in regard to the exact number of things:—(I) "All things are *one*, all being equally existent"; (II) "All things are *two*, being divided into *eternal* and *non-eternal*"; (III) "All things are *three*, *cogniser*, *cognition* and *cognised*"; (IV) "All things are *four*, *cogniser*, *means of cognition*, *cognised* and *cognition*; and so on there are other assertions on the point. It is the examination of these views that proceeds now.*

*These views are criticised, because they limit all things within one particular number:—According to (I) there is only one thing, according to (II) there are two things, and so forth.

The *Pariśuddhi* remarks—The question arises—why should the II, III and other views be criticised—when they are not incompatible with the Nyāya view of things being the conglomeration or composite of several component particles? But the fact of the matter is that those theories limit things within one definite number only: e. g., 'There are only two things', and *two* only,—then, inasmuch as those two would be everlasting, there would be no explanation of the fact that they bring about their effects only *occasionally*; under this theory the appearance of effects should be unceasing. Similarly with the other views.

The *Tātparya* offers the following explanations of the two views mentioned in the *Bhāṣya*:—

(I) The entire phenomenon of the world is nothing apart from the *Light* of Consciousness; everything is an emanation from this Light. There is no difference among cognitions, nor between the cognised object and its cognition; as everything is a manifestation of Consciousness, which is cognition. (II) 'Eternal' and 'non-eternal', being contradictory terms, must include all things; there can be nothing that is not either 'eternal' or 'non-eternal'.

Sūṭra (41).

ANY ABSOLUTE LIMITATION OF THE NUMBER (OF THINGS) CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED, EITHER IN THE EVENT OF THE MEANS (OF PROVING IT) BEING AVAILABLE, OR IN THAT OF ITS BEING NOT AVAILABLE. (Sū. 41.)

If the *means* of proving the desired conclusion is (available, and) something different from the conclusion *to be proved*, then no limitation of number can be proved; as the said Means will always, *ex-hypothesi*, be something outside that limited number (which, being included in the 'conclusion to be proved') could not include the *means* of proving (that same conclusion). If, on the other hand, there is no difference between the Means and the Conclusion to be proved by it, then also the limitation of number cannot be proved, as there is, *ex-hypothesi*, no real *means* of proving, and in the absence of such means nothing can be proved.

Vārṭika on Sū. (41).

[P. 485, L. 17 to P. 486, L. 6.]

The following are the views propounding an absolute limitation of the number of things: "*All things are one, all being equally existent* &c. &c. &c." says the *Bhāṣya*. The following *Sūṭra* is meant to refute all these views: *Any absolute limitation of number* &c., &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. It is not possible to establish any of the views seeking to limit the number of things; because the means (of
Vār. P. 486.
proving a proposition) must be something different from that which forms the subject-matter of the Proposition itself; *i.e.*, having stated the Proposition in the form 'all things are one', if the person puts forward a proof in support of it, which is something different from what

The "other assertions" referred to in the *Bhāṣya* are—(1) that of the *Sāṅkhya*, that Soul and Primordial Matter are the only two entities; (2) that of the Bauḍḍha, that the only entities are the five *skandhas* of Colour, Name, Impression, Sensation and Cognition; and (3) that of the *Pāshupata*, that the only entities are the *Pashu* (living beings), their bondage, the removal of this bondage, and the Lord.

forms the subject of that Proposition, then the said limitation of the number of things to *one* only does not become established; for the *means* and the *subject of the Proposition* (being different from one another) would constitute *two* things. Similarly with the view that "there are only two things" and so forth [for the means of proving this also would be different from the *two things* that form the subject-matter of the proposition; thus making *three* things]. If, on the other hand, there is no means of proving, apart from the subject of the Proposition,—then also the limitation of number cannot be proved; as in this case there would be no *means of proving*; for *what is to be proved* cannot itself be the *means of proving*.

Sūṭra (42).

Objection—"WHAT HAS BEEN URGED IS NOT TRUE; AS THE MEANS (OF PROVING) IS ONLY A PART (OF WHAT IS TO BE PROVED)." (Sū. 42).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (42).

[P. 211, Ll. 56.]

"It is not true that the limitation of number cannot be proved;—why?—because the means is a part (of what is proved by it); it is only a part (of the subject-matter of the Proposition which is the Means of proving that Proposition; so that the Means need not be anything different. Similarly with the views that *there are only two things*, and so forth."

Vārṭika on Sū. (41).

[P. 486, L. 7 to L. 10.]

"*What is urged is not* true &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. As a matter of fact, the Means is only a part of the Proposition to be proved,—this is what the *Sūṭra* means. The means is only a part of what is to be proved. Such being the case, the Means of proving our conclusion does not come to be anything different from the limited number sought to be proved by it; nor is the proving without its means."

Sūtra (43).

[*Answer*]—THE REASON PUT FORWARD IS NO REASON AT ALL; AS (ACCORDING TO THE PŪRVAPAKṢA) THINGS CAN HAVE NO 'PARTS'.—(Sū. 43).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (43).

[P. 212, L. 2 to L. 8.]

The reason put forward (in Sū. 42) is "as the means of proving is only a part of what is to be proved;" but this is not a valid reason;—why?—because the Opponent has laid down the sweeping assertion that "all things are *one* only," without any exception at all; and then (in the reason put forward) he speaks of a certain thing (the Means of Proving) as being 'one' (part of the subject of the proposition); but there is nothing (apart from that 'one') which, in the Proposition, takes in, *all things*, that could be the 'part' and the necessary 'means of proving.'* Similarly with the other views limiting the number of things to 'two' &c.

If all these sweeping assertions in regard to the limitation of the number of things proceed on the basis of the denial of the indefinite number of diversities among things due to their distinctive properties, they militate against well-known facts ascertained from Perception, Inference and Verbal Cognition; and as such they have to be rejected as wrong doctrines. If, on the other hand, they proceed on the basis of the admission of the said diversities, then they renounce their absolutism; as the inclusion of things (under any one head) is due to the presence of common properties, and the exclusion (or diversity) of things is due only to the presence of distinct properties [so that the admission of the diversity of things involves the admission of an indefinite number of diversities, and the renouncing of all limitation of the number].

*If there were such a thing as the *part* of what is to be proved, then this would mean that there is no absolute limitation of the number of things to *one* only. When it is stated that "all things are one,' nothing is left out; so that there is nothing that is not included in the Proposition which could be the proof of that proposition.

All the above sweeping assertions (from Sū. 14 to Sū. 43) have been examined with a view to get at the discernment of True Knowledge.

Vārṭika on Sū. (43).

[P. 486, L. 12 to P. 487, L. 7.]

The reason put forward is no reason at all, &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. That the Means is a part of what is to be proved is no reason at all; because the subject-matter of the Proposition is without parts. When the proposition is put forward in the form 'all things are one,' nothing is left out, all things, without exception, being made the 'subject;' so that 'all things,'—which can have no parts—being the 'subject,' there is nothing that could form the Reason or 'Middle Term;' and what is *to be proved* cannot form the Reason; specially as the operation of a thing upon itself is something incongruous; hence that which has itself *got to be proved* cannot be the *Proof*; the 'object' can never be its own 'instrument.'

If all these sweeping assertions in regard to the limitation of the number of things proceed on the basis of the denial of the indefinite number of diversities among things due to their distinctive properties, they have to rejected as wrong doctrines, because they militate against well-known facts ascertained from Perception, Inference and Verbal Cognition; as a matter of fact, the diversity among such things as the Bull and the Jar is directly perceived;—diversity is proved by Inference also; since what is inferred is always something different from the means of that inference;—diversity is shown in verbal cognitions also; the speaker is the person who knows the thing spoken of, while the person spoken to is one who does not know the thing [and these two persons must be different].

Vār. P. 487.

If, on the other hand, the said sweeping assertions proceed on the basis of the admission of the said diversities, then they renounce their absolutism. If it be held that—"there is non-difference among things by reason of their possessing common properties and there is difference by reason of their possessing distinctive properties,"—then, this does not militate against the *Siddhānta* doctrine. In fact, unless there is diversity among things, there can be no room for commonality; so that when the Opponent speaks of 'commonality,' he must admit the 'diversity' also; and when he denies 'diversity,' he must deny the 'commonality' also; for the 'commonality' cannot subsist except on the basis of 'diversity.'

End of Section 11.

Section (12).

[Sūṭrās 44—54.]

On Fruition—the Tenth Object of Cognition.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (44).

[P. 212, L. 8 to L. 12.]

After *Rebirth*, comes *Fruition*; and with regard to this—

THERE ARISES A DOUBT SINCE THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE RESULT (OF ACTS) IS FOUND TO APPEAR IMMEDIATELY AS WELL AS AFTER SOME TIME. (Sū. 44.)

When a man cooks rice or milks the cow, the results, in the shape of the Rice and the Milk respectively, appear immediately; whereas when he ploughs the field and sows the seeds, the result in the shape of the Harvest, accrues to him after some time;—now the *Agnihoṭra* is an act, the performance whereof is laid down in the text 'one desiring heaven should perform the *Agnihoṭra*'; and in regard to the fruition of this act, there arises a doubt (as to whether or not any

results follow it, and if they do, when they follow, and so forth).*

Vārṭika on Sū. (44).

[P. 487, L. 8 to L. 15.]

Fruition has been mentioned after *Rebirth*; and in regard to this *there arises a doubt, etc., etc.*—says the *Sūṭra*. Certain acts have their fruition appearing immediately; *e g.*, the actions of *cooking* and *milking*; the results of these, in the form of Rice and Milk, appear immediately after the acts. Other acts again have their fruition after some time; *e. g.*, the actions of *ploughing* and *sowing*; the results of these appear after some time, not immediately after the acts, in the form of the harvest. The *Agnihotra* laid down in the text 'the *Agnihotra* should be performed' and such other sacrifices are also *acts*; and in regard to these there arises the doubt—Is the fruition of these immediate, consisting of the *heat* (emitted by the sacrificial fire) or some such thing?—or is their fruition such as appears at some other time?

Sūṭra (45).

[*Siddhānta.*]—THE FRUITION IS NOT IMMEDIATE; BECAUSE IT IS SUCH AS CAN BE EXPERIENCED ONLY AT A LATER TIME.†

---

* Says the *Parishuddhi*—It is not possible that there should be any such doubt regarding *Fruition* in general, as to whether it appears immediately after the act, or after the lapse of some time; for so far as the acts of cooking, etc., are concerned, it is already ascertained that their fruition is immediate; and in regard to the act of *Agnihoṭra*, etc., also, it is already known that its fruition comes only after the lapse of some time. But what gives rise to the doubt is the very fact of the *Agnihoṭra*, etc., being *actions*, involving the effort of an intelligent agent; and inasmuch as it is found that the activities of intelligent beings are of both kinds—some having their fruition immediately and others after the lapse of time, there is nothing to show for certain to which of the two classes the action of Agnihoṭra belongs.

† This *Sūṭra* is not found in the *Nyāyasūchīnibandha;* and the Tātparya calls it 'Bhāṣya'. Vishvanātha treats it as 'Sutra', and it is found in the Puri 'Sūtra' Ms. as also in Sūtra Mss. C. and D.

The *Siddhānṭa* embodied in the Sūṭra is in answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa* that it is not necessary to assume any invisible superphysical results for *Agnihotra*, etc., since we find them bringing about the immediate result in the shape of Fame, etc.—*Vishvanātha.*

(Sū. 45).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (45).

[P. 213, Ll. 1-2.]

'Heaven' is the result mentioned in the scriptures; and the attainment of Heaven accrues only to another body, which comes after the present body has been destroyed; and in the case of actions done with a view to the acquiring of landed property also we find that the result does not appear immediately after the actions have been done. *

Vārṭika on Sū (45).

[P. 487, L. 17 to P. 488, L. 5.]

The fruition is not immediate etc., etc.—says the *Sūṭra*.

Vār: P. 488. Heaven is the result mentioned in the scriptures; and an action enjoined in the Veda can never be fruitless; nor is the performer of the *Agnihotra* ever found to undertake its performance simply with a desire for obtaining heat from the fire; from all this it follows that from the contact of the Mind with the Soul,—which follows after the performance of the sacrificial acts, and which is aided by the presence of pure intentions,—there appears in the Soul *Dharma*, Merit; and this Merit, having its potency untrammelled, when aided by suitable conditions of time, etc., brings about the result (in the form of Heaven); and it is only when the present body has fallen off, and the Soul becomes equipped with another body, that the said result appears, and not immediately after the performance of the act.

Sūṭra (46).

[*Objection.*]—"THE FRUITION CANNOT APPEAR AT ANOTHER TIME; AS THE CAUSE THEREOF WILL HAVE CEASED TO EXIST."

---

* Puri Ms. B. reads ग्रामादिकानाम which would mean that—'in the case of the actions done by men still in the meshes of ignorance.' But in view of what follows later on in the *Bhāṣya*, P. 214, L. 16, the reading of the printed text is better.

Sū. (46.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (46)

[P. 213, Ll. 4-5.]

"The actual action (the sacrificial performance) having ceased to exist, the result of that action could not come about, in the absence of its cause (in the shape of the action); for as a matter of fact, no effect is ever found to be produced out of a cause that has ceased to exist."

Vārṭika on Sū. (46.)

"*The fruition, etc., etc.*—says the *Sūṭra.* What is declared is that the result of the sacrificial act appears in another body, long after the sacrificial oblation has ceased to exist, and also after the present body has been destroyed; —but this is not right; as nothing can be produced out of a cause that has ceased to exist."

Sūṭra (47).

[*Answer.*]—PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE FRUITION THERE WOULD BE SOMETHING (IN THE SHAPE OF AN INTERMEDIARY), JUST AS THERE IS IN THE CASE OF THE FRUIT OF TREES.

Sū. (47).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (47).

[P. 213, L. 7 to L. 13.]

The man who desires fruits renders such services to the tree as pouring water at its root, and so forth; and it is only after the actual act of watering has ceased to exist that the earth-particles (under the tree's roots become lumped together by the particles of water, and becoming heated with the heat underground, they produce a juicy substance; this juicy substance, as modified by the heat, comes into contact with the tree and, in a peculiarly modified form enters into it and produces the leaf etc., and the fruit;—in this manner the action of *watering* is fruitful, and yet the result does not quite follow from a cause that has entirely ceased to exist.

In the same manner actions produce (in the Soul) a faculty in the shape of *Ḍharma-Aḍharma*, Merit-Demerit; and this faculty, after being produced, comes to be helped by other causes and thus brings about the result at a later time. This is what we have already explained under Sū. 3-2-60, where it has been shown that 'the body comes into existence on account of the continuity of the results of previous deeds.'

Vārṭika on Sū. (47.)

[P. 488, L. 10 to L. 18.]

Prior to the actual accomplishment, etc., etc.—says the *Sūṭra*. We do not say that the effect is produced from a cause that has ceased to exist; what we do say is that by the action in the shape of the offering of the Agnihotra libations Ḍharma, Merit, is produced in the manner described, and from this Merit follows the result. Just as the man desiring fruits does the acts of watering the roots of the tree and so forth, but the fruit cannot be produced out of the act of watering that has ceased to exist; and what actually happens is that the act of watering having been done, it comes to be influenced by the 'Karma' or destiny of the man who would eat the fruits of the tree, and affects the particles of earth which being thus lumped together become heated with the heat underground and produce a juicy substance; this juicy substance directly permeates the tree till its fruits appear; and it is thus that the leaves and fruits are brought about. Such being the case, it is clear that the accomplishment of the fruit does not follow from the watering that has ceased to exist, nor is the watering useless.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (48).

[P. 213, L. 13 to P. 214, L. 2].

Pūrvapakṣa.

Says the Opponent—

" PRIOR TO ITS ACCOMPLISHMENT, THE ACCOMPLISHED FRUITION (RESULT) CANNOT BE EITHER (A) NON-EXISTENT,

(B) OR EXISTENT, (C) OR EXISTENT-NON-EXISTENT; BECAUSE 'EXISTENT' AND 'NON-EXISTENT' ARE TOTALLY DISSIMILIAR."* (Sū. 48).

(*a*) A thing that is liable to be accomplished (produced) could not be *non-existent*, before its production; because of the restriction in regard to the material cause of things; that is, as a matter of fact, for the bringing about of a certain product (the Jar, e.g.) it is only one particular material (Clay) that is brought in; and it is not that any and every material is brought in for the making of all things; there could not be this limitation or restriction (in the form that one product is produced out of only one material substance, and not from all substances), if the product were absolutely *non-existent* (before its production).†"

(*b*) "Nor could the thing be *existent* (prior to its production); because if the thing already exists, before it is brought about, there could not (need not) be a further 'production' of that same thing."

(*c*) "Nor could the thing be both *existent and non-existent*; *because 'existent' and 'non-existent' are totally dissimilar*: the term 'existent' *affirms* a thing, while the term 'non-existent' *denies* it; and it is this mutually contradictory character that is spoken of as 'dissimilarity' (in the Sūṭra); and because of this fact their being contradictories, no co-existence of them is possible."

---

*The question going to be discussed now is whether the Fruition or Result of Acts is something that, prior to its being brought about, was—(1) already existent, or (2) non-existent, or (3) both existent and non-existent, or (4) neither existent nor non-existent. The Purvapakṣa propounded in the Sūṭra is that no one of these alternatives is possible, hence there can be no such thing as the 'fruition' of actions.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

The fourth of these alternatives is found in the *Vārṭika*, not in the *Sūṭra* or in the *Bhāṣya*. In this *Sūṭra* also Dr. Satish Chandra Viḍyābhūṣana finds a reference to the *Māḍhyamikā-Sūṭras*.

† The very fact that it is only out of Clay that the Jar is produced, clearly shows that the Jar already exists in the Clay. *Cf.* *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 9—'*Upāḍānagrahaṇāṭ*.'

Vārṭika on Sū. (48).

[P. 488, L. 19 to P. 489, L. 9.]

"Prior to its accomplishment, the Result *cannot be* &c. &c.

(A) *A thing that is liable to be produced could not be non-existent before its production, because of the restriction in regard to the material cause of things;* the *non-existence* (of the product, prior to its production) being common to all things, there could be no explanation of the restriction that certain products are produced out of certain causes only (and not out of all)."

(B) "Nor could the product be *existent*, prior to its production; for the production of what is already existent, would be an absurdity; it is a contradiction in terms to speak of a thing as 'existent' and yet as 'produced.'"

(C) "Nor could the product be *both existent and non-existent*; as 'existence' and 'non-existence' are totally dissimilar; 'existence' affirms a thing, while 'non-existence' denies it; and there can be no co-existence between *affirmation* and *denial*; hence the product could not be *both existent and non-existent*."

(D) "Nor, lastly, could the product be *neither existent nor non-existent*; for the exact nature of such a product could never be determined; it is impossible to indicate the precise character of such a product (as is neither existent nor non-existent)."

Bhāṣya on Sū. (49).

[P. 214, L. 2.]

Siḍḍhānṭa.

The truth of the matter is that prior to being produced, the thing to be produced was *non-existent*.—"How so?"—

Sūṭra (49).

BECAUSE WE PERCEIVE THE PRODUCTION AS WELL AS DESTRUCTION (OF THINGS).* (Sū. 49.)

* If a thing is existent, even prior to being produced, it means that it is eternal; and if it is eternal, there can be production or destruction of it.

Vārṭika on Sū. (49).

[P. 489, L. 9 to P. 490, L. 17.]

Prior to being produced, the thing to be produced is non-existent,—this is the truth, i.e., the true view. "How so?"—*Because we perceive the production as well as the destruction of things*—says the *Sūṭra*. We find that a thing, not perceived before, comes to be perceived afterwards; and this can be possible only in the event of a thing being produced which was *non-existent* (before being produced); we find also the 'destruction' of the thing, when we cease to perceive the thing that was perceived before. All this could not be possible for him who regards all things as eternal; according to the theory that prior to being produced, the thing is *existent* there can be neither 'production' nor 'destruction'; and he who denies the 'production' and 'destruction' of things will have to renounce all worldly activity. Because, when a man undertakes an activity, for what purpose does he do it? "Well, he does it with such motives as 'I shall obtain this,—I shall get rid of that." True, it is with such motives that the man undertakes activities; but for the person who holds things to be existent (even before they are produced) there can be nothing to be either *obtained* or *got rid of*.

Vār: P. 490.

Further, for such a person there would be no use in putting forward the Proposition and the other factors of the inferential reasoning; as he denies the 'production' and 'destruction' of things; and if there is nothing that is either produced or destroyed, then there can be no useful purpose served by the putting forward of the several factors of the inferential reasoning [as these are put forward either for the *production* of, or bringing about, right cognition, or the destruction of wrong cognition]. If it be held that—"it is for the purpose of bringing about the conviction that all things are

existent (even prior to production) (that the factors of the inferential reasoning are put forward),"—then (our answer is that), since (under the Opponent's theory) the said conviction would be already *existent*, there would be no use in the putting forward of the inferential factors; for when a man already possesses a thing, he does not have recourse to the causes calculated to bring about that thing. "The putting forward of the inferential factors would be for the purpose of removing ignorance (*i.e.*, doubts and wrong notions)." This also stands on the same footing; and unless there is something new *produced* in the man, his ignorance does not cease. If again it be held that—"the bringing in of causes is for the purpose of *manifesting* (the effect),"—then we ask, what is this 'manifestation' that is brought about by the cause? If it is an 'effect,' then the allegation involves a self-contradiction (on the part of the *Pūrvapakṣin*). If again, the 'manifestation' be held to be some *property of the effect*,—even so the 'self-contradiction' does not cease. If, thirdly, 'manifestation' means *perception* (apprehension) —then too, since your assertion means that 'such *manifestation*, *i.e.*, apprehension, in regard to the effect, is *produced*,' you do not escape from 'self-contradiction.' If, fourthly, it be held that—"the *manifestation* of a thing means that it has existed till then *in the form of the cause* and it now appears *in the form of the product*,"—even so the 'self-contradiction' remains; for according to this explanation 'the appearance in the form of the product' is something that was *non-existent* before. If, fifthly, the 'manifestation' be held to be only a particular phase of the cause itself,—even then, it would mean that this 'phase of the cause,' *which was non-existent*, comes into existence, *is produced*; and this would involve 'self-contradiction' on your part. If, in order to meet this difficulty, it be held that the said phase of the cause also has been already *existent*,—then the

bringing in of the cause can serve no purpose. If, sixthly, the 'manifestation' be explained as 'the augmentation (expansion) of the signs (indicatives) of the cause,'—then our answer is that the expression 'augmentation of indicatives' can have no meaning, if there is no *coming into existence* of something that did not exist before; so that in this case also the bringing in of the cause would serve no purpose; and further, this explanation also would mean that 'the augmentation of indicatives,' was *non-existent* before and comes into existence afterwards; so that thus also you do not escape from 'self-contradiction.' Thus it is found that in whatever manner 'manifestation' is explained, in every case it militates against the notion that the product is existent (even before its production).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (50).

[P. 214, L. 4 to L. 8.]

It has been alleged (in the Bhāṣya on Sū. 48) by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that—"Prior to its production, the Product is not non-existent, because of the restriction in regard to the material cause of things;"—[the answer to that is as follows]—

Sūtra (50).

THAT THE PRODUCT IS NON-EXISTENT IS CLEARLY PROVED BY THAT VERY CONCEPTION. (Sū. 50).

The conception (of restriction in regard to the material cause, which the Opponent has cited) is in the form 'this thing, and not all things, is capable of producing this effect;' and this conception clearly proves that prior to being produced, every effect is known as capable of being produced by a particular cause; and that this conception is correct is shown by the fact that the production of the effect is actually in accordance with that conception; and in fact it is only on the basis of this conception that we can explain the restriction in regard to the cause of the thing. If, on the other hand, the product is already existent, prior to being produced, then there can be no such thing as its '*production*' [so

that there could be no conception at all in regard to its being produced out of only a particular material cause].*

Vārṭika on Sū. (50 .

[P. 490, P. 17 to P. to P. 494, L. 4.]

It has been alleged that—"prior to its production the product is not non-existent, because there is restriction in regard to the material cause of things;" and the answer to this is that that the product is non-existent &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra.* As a matter of fact, the restriction in regard to the material cause of things is due, not to the fact of the thing being

Vâr. P. 491. already *existent*, but to its potentiality; the idea (involved in the said restriction) being that—'this effect is *capable* of being produced out of this cause, and it is *not capable* of being produced out of another'; and it is only when a man has conceived of the thing in this fashion (as something *capable of being brought into existence*) that he brings in, for the production of that thing, such a cause as is capable of producing it; and no one brings in *all causes* for the production of *all things*; and this for the simple reason that all things are never found to be produced out of all things.

Further, what the *Pūrvapakṣin* admits is that there is a certain restriction in regard to certain things being the causes of certain effects,—and he admits this on the basis of the restriction that is found in regard to the actual production of things and also of that which is found in regard to the products (as pertaining to certain causes); but while admitting all this, he has got to explain the exact signification of the terms 'cause' and 'effect;' what is it that is

* The very conception that a thing is produced only out of a certain cause proves that before being produced that thing must be non-existent. The weaver takes up the yarns with the idea—'the Cloth *shall be produced* out of this' and not that 'the Cloth *is* here already;' for in the latter case, why should he put forth any effort to bring into existence the Cloth *which already exists*?

meant by 'cause?' and what is it that is meant by 'effect?' "Well, that which does or brings about a thing is the *cause*, while that which is done or brought about is the *effect*." But if it is the 'manifestation' (of the thing) that is *brought about* [for the thing itself being already *existent*, could not be brought about], then this becomes open to the objections already pointed out above "But even in connection with *existent* things we find the root '*karoti*,' 'to do,' being used; *e.g.* in such expressions as '*keshān kuru*' 'do the hair,' '*pristhān kuru*,' 'do the flour'." But these examples do not serve your purpose; for in the case of the *doing of hair*, that which is *done*, or *brought about*, is a peculiar dressing of the already existing hair, and this *peculiar dressing* is something that is not already existent; similarly in the case of the *doing of the flour*, what is done is the *removal of dirt* out of the existent flour, and this *removal of dirt* is something not already existent; so that there is not a single thing which we ever find as being the object for the bringing about of which a cause operates. Hence the view put forward cannot be right.

The Opponent might urge—"if it is the non-existent thing that is brought about, then, why is it that the *horn of the ass* is not brought about?" But who says that the ass' horn is not brought about? If there *is* such a thing as the 'ass' horn' (and it is only such a thing that could be spoken as 'ass' horn,') it is certainly *brought about*. "But why does the Ass not become the cause of the horn? [why does not the horn grow out of the ass' body?]" We do not know why it does not grow out of it; that it does not do so we only conclude from the fact that we have never seen a horn being produced by the Ass. This also explains the case of the 'hare's horn.' The 'hare's horn' is not brought about, not because it is non-existent, but because there is no cause that could bring it about. In fact, the 'non-existence'

of a thing cannot be treated as a reason for its being brought about; what is meant is that since what is already *existent* cannot be produced, it is the *non-existent* thing that is produced. Further, when you make the assertion that—"the Ass' horn is not produced *because it is non-existent*,"—you go against your own doctrine: according to you the ass' horn cannot be *non-existent*; and according to you, whether a thing is *existent* or *non-existent*, it is produced if its cause is present! And it is thus that for the person who holds the view that all effects are existent (even before they are produced) all worldly usage comes to an end: For him nothing *new*—(that which is not already existent)—can ever be produced, and nothing old—(that which has been existent)—can ever be destroyed.'

Question.—"What is the proof for the view that the effect (prior to production) is *non-existent*?"

Answer.—Proof there can not be, either for the *existence* or the *non-existence* of things; there is Inference only when there is no difference of opinion in regard to the thing in question.* "Whereupon then is there the quarrel (if there is agreement in regard to the thing itself)?" The quarrel is in regard to the properties (exact nature) of that thing in regard to which both parties are agreed. So that in the case in question, the *yarns* being the things admitted and agreed upon by both parties, it is in regard to these (the exact nature of these, in

---

* This sentence, according to the Ṭatparya, should be construed as न सत्वे नासत्वे (प्रमाणमस्ति) धर्मिणि अविप्रतिपत्तेरेव अनुमानमस्ति. The idea underlying the question of the Opponent is that if the *thing*, which would be the subject of any Inference that the *Siḍḍhānṭin* might put forward, is *non-existent*, it cannot form the 'subject' of any Inference at all; so that every Inference in regard to it would be *Ashrayāsiḍḍha*, Baseless.

The answer anticipates this difficulty and means that no Inferential reasoning is possible in support of either *existence* or *non-existence*; for an inferential reasoning is possible only if the 'subject' is admitted by both parties; and so long as there is no agreement in regard to the *thing* itself, there can be no inferential reasoning put forward by either party.

relation to the *Cloth*) that several theories are propounded: (*a*) One party asserts that the Cloth is only *i. e.* non-different from) the yarn; (*b*) others hold that the Cloth is the yarns arranged in a certain form; (*c*) a third party alleges that it is the yarns alone that appear in the form of the product (cloth); (*d*) according to others, one character (of the yarns) disappears and another appears; * (*e*) while according to a fifth party the *Cloth* is only the yarns endowed with a peculiar potency. (*a*) Among these several theories,—in answer to the first, all that is necessary is to prove that the Cloth is different from the mere yarns; and this has been already done (in Adh. II). (*b*) As regards those who hold that the *Cloth* is only the yarns arranged in a particular form, against them we have the following argument:— Prior to the time that the Cloth is actually perceived (as a finished product), the yarns were devoid of that particular form,—because they are the cause of the Cloth,—like the Loom, etc. [This shows that the *Cloth* is something different from the *yarns*]. (*c*) and (*d*) This same argument also disposes of the view that the yarns themselves appear in the form of the product; as also the view that there is disappearance of one character and appearance of another. (*e*) The person who asserts that the Cloth is only the yarns endowed with a peculiar potency (admits that prior to the causal operation bringing about the Cloth, the yarns have existed as endowed with another potency and hence) does not militate against anything; and hence we do not put forward any argument against this view. In fact, what is asserted in the statement that 'the Cloth is the yarns endowed with a peculiar potency' is exactly the same that has been asserted by the *Siddhāntin* in the statement—'That the product is non-existent is clearly proved by that very conception' (Sū. 50). Under every one

* **धर्मान्तराविर्भाव** is the right reading.

of the (first four) theories mentioned, it is impossible to have the notion of the 'Cloth' without the production of something that did not exist before; and as such the 'self-contradiction' involved in them cannot be escaped.

[The *Pūrvapakṣin* puts forward an argument in support of the theory that the Product is existent even prior to its production]—"What really happens (in the case of the Cloth) is that the yarns serve the purpose of manifesting that (Cloth) which already exists; and it is for this reason that they are brought in by the person who wants the Cloth; just as the spade (is brought in by the person who wants the water hidden underground, which is manifested, or brought into view, by the spade)."

But this 'manifestation' of the existent thing must be something that was *non-existent* before; and just as the *non-existent* 'manifestation' is brought into existence so may also the *non-existent* product be brought into existence. All this has been fully explained before.

Further, the *Pūrvapakṣin* has put forward (in *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 48) the reason—"because of the restriction in regard to the material cause of things."—But the 'material cause' is a *cause*; and if the product is already existent, we do not see what purpose could be served by any *cause*; this objection, which we have urged before, remains still in force. Then, as regards the corroborative instance of the 'spade, etc.,' that you have cited,—the fact is that the spade is brought in, not for the purpose of the water, but for the purpose of removing the incrustation (over the water); and this 'removal of the incrustation' is a sort of disjunction and comes into existence after having been *non-existent*; so that your corroborative instance is not what it is meant to be. If the Opponent does not admit that there is disjunction (in the case of the digging out of water),—then, not admitting 'conjunction,' he should be

asked to explain how the notion of 'disjunction' comes in (when one is digging the earth). He might explain that the notion of 'disjunction' is due to mere *non-contact* (between the buckets of earth dug out and the pit). But this 'non-contact' —(*a*) is it merely *absence of contact?* or (*b*) something *other than contact*? "What do you mean?" (*a*) If 'non-contact' is only *absence of contact*, then you have to explain whence this *absence* comes about. If there is a cause that brings about the contrary of the 'contact',— then it is just this that is called 'Disjunction'; so that it is not true that there is no such thing as Disjunction; for we have already explained that what is denied in one place exists in another place.* Further, there are two kinds of 'non-contact' (1)—in which there is no touching at all, and (2) in which there is a going asunder of what were touching before; and this latter is what is called 'Disjunction,' and it is this disjunction that is brought about by means of the *spade* &c. (*b*) If on the other hand, 'non-contact' be held to be *something other than contact*,—this also will be of two kinds; and hence this view also will be open to the aforesaid objections. If (in view of the above difficulties) the Opponent holds 'Disjunction' to consist in the two things being produced in separate places [and 'Conjunction' to consist in the two things being produced close to each other, neither 'Conjunction' nor 'Disjunction' being regarded as quality],—then our answer is that, in view of the qualified expression being in the form, 'these two things have been produced in separate places,—'Disjunction' cannot consist merely in the two things being produced in separate places; in fact, the

* 'Contact' or 'Conjunction', being a quality, can be destroyed either by the destruction of the substance to which it belongs, or by the appearance of a contrary quality; in the case in question we do not find any *destruction* either of the encrusting layers of earth, or of the water; so that there must be the appearance of some quality contrary to contact; and it is just such a quality that is called 'Disjunction.'—*Tātparya*.

qualification 'produced' is applied to the thing that is produced;—the qualification 'separate' is applied on the basis of things occupying different points in space;—the qualification 'disjoined' is applied by virtue of the things being disconnected;—all these several distinct causes or bases of the notions of diversity are inferred from the diversity in the notions themselves; and the three terms, 'separated', 'produced' and 'disjoined,' are not synonymous terms. [So that the notion of things being 'disjoined' cannot be due to their being produced in separate places, as held by the Opponent]. Further, (in course of our refutation of the momentary character of things) we have already refuted the view that the two things (on being disjoined) are *produced* in separate places; *hence* for this reason also 'Disjunction' cannot consist merely in the two things being produced in separate places.

"As a matter of fact," says the Opponent, "Disjunction itself is only momentary, hence it is not possible for any cognition of Disjunction to appear."* It is not so; for the time during which the cognition of Disjunction appears is that which is taken up (1) by the manifestation of the 'community' (to which the particular Disjunction belongs) and (2) by the destruction of conjunction; that is, when the Disjunction is produced by its cause, first it manifests (renders perceptible) the Community (to which it belongs),† and after this Community has been rendered perceptible, it brings about the cognition of the Disjunction itself,—then it destroys the previous conjunction,—and after

Vār P. 494.

*The cognition of Disjunction could be possible only if it continued to exist long enough to allow of the functioning of either Perception or some other means of cognition. Since however it exists only for one moment, no such functioning is possible; and hence no cognition.

† This, says the *Tātparya*, is according to the view that the specific cognition of every particular thing must be preceded by the cognition of the community to which it belongs.

the destruction of this conjunction, when there comes into existence another conjunction of the things concerned [as, when the two rams striking against each other, repeatedly], the Disjunction is itself destroyed. Thus then, inasmuch as Disjunction is found to exist for several moments, it is not right to say that it is destroyed as soon as it comes into existence.

From all this is follows that it is the (previously) *non-existent* thing that is produced (by causes).

Sūṭra (51).

[*Objection*]—"THE RECEPTACLES BEING DIFFERENT [IN THE CASE OF THE FRUITION OF ACTS], IT IS NOT RIGHT TO ARGUE THAT IT IS LIKE THE FRUITION OF TREES."—(Sū. 51).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (51).

[P. 214, L.L. 10-11.]

"[In the case of the fruition of trees] it is found that the services rendered, in the shape of the watering of the roots and so forth, as well as the *fruition*, both are in the tree itself,—both have the same tree for their receptacle; [in the case of the fruition of actions] on the other hand, the action occurs in the present body, while the fruition appears in the next body; so that there being a difference in the receptacles, what has been urged (in Sū. 47 does not prove anything at all (in regard to the sacrificial acts being the cause of fruition, in the shape of Heaven &c.)."

Vārṭika on Sū. (51).

[P. 494, Ll. 6-8.]

The receptacles being different &c. &c.—The action of watering the roots and the fruition, in the shape of leaves and fruits, both appear in the tree; while the acts (of sacrifice &c.) are done in the present body, and their fruition

(in the shape of Heaven) appears in the next body; so that there being a difference in the receptacles, the instance of the 'fruition of trees' is not applicable at all."

Sūṭra (52).

[*Answer*].—INASMUCH AS HAPPINESS SUBSISTS IN THE SOUL, THE OBJECTION HAS NO FORCE AT ALL. (SŪ. 52).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (52).

[P. 214, Ll. 13-14.]

Happiness, being perceptible to the Soul, subsists in the Soul; *action* also,—in the form known as '*Ḍharma*,' 'Merit' —subsists in the Soul,—as *Ḍharma* is a quality of the Soul; thus then, there is no possibility of *receptacles being different*.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (52).

[P. 494, Ll. 10-11].

Inasmuch as Happiness &c. &c. What the *Sūṭra* means is that it is not true that there is difference in the receptacles;—the act subsisting in the same substratum as the fruition of the act.

Sūṭra (53).

[*Objection*]—"WHAT HAS BEEN JUST SAID IS NOT TRUE; AS [THE OBTAINING OF] SON, WIFE, CATTLE, CLOTHING, GOLD, FOOD AND SUCH THINGS ARE MENTIONED AS THE FRUIT (OF ACTS)." (SŪ. 53).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (53).

[P. 214, Ll. 16-17.]

"As a matter of fact, what is mentioned as the 'fruit' is the obtaining of such things as the son &c., and *not* 'Happiness'; we have such assertions as—"one who desires landed property should perform *this* sacrifice,' 'one who desires a son should perform *that* sacrifice' 'and so forth. So that the assertion (under Sū. 52) that 'Happiness' is the fruit of actions is not true."

---

*'Heaven', which is the result of sacrificial acts, is only a form of *Happiness*; and Happiness subsists in the Soul, not in the Body; and the Soul remains the same through the several lives.

Vārṭika on Sū. (53).

[P. 494, L.L. 14-15].

"*What has been just said is not true*, &c. &c.—What is mentioned as the 'fruit' is the *Son* and such things; and certainly the *Son* does not subsist in the Soul."

Sūṭra (54).

Answer.—INASMUCH AS THE REAL FRUITION RESULTS FROM CONNECTION WITH THE THINGS MENTIONED, IT IS ONLY INDIRECTLY (FIGURATIVELY) THAT THESE LATTER ARE SPOKEN OF AS THE 'FRUIT'.—(Sū. 54).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (54).

[P. 215, Ll. 2-3.]

As a matter of fact the real fruition, in the shape of Happiness, results from connection with the son, wife, &c., and it is for this reason that these latter are regarded, or spoken of, only indirectly, as 'fruit'; just as food is (indirectly) spoken of as 'Life,' in such statements as 'Food is life itself.'

Vārṭika on Sū. (54).

[P. 494, L. 17 to P. 495, L. 2.]

Inasmuch as the real fruition &c. &c.—As a matter of fact, from the connection of such things as the Son and like follows Happiness, which is the real 'fruition'; and the it is only by reason of being the cause of Happiness that the Son and others come to be spoken of as 'fruit.' Just as by reason of Life being sustained by Food, food comes to be spoken of as 'life'. That such usage is merely figurative or indirect we infer from the fact that in reality Food is *not Life*, and yet people make use of such expressions [which can be explained only on the basis of the assumption that the language is figurative].

Vār. P. 495.

End of Section (12).

Section (13).

[Sūṭras 55—58.]

Examination of the nature of Pain.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (55).

[P. 215, L. 4 to P. 216 L. 4].

After 'Fruition' (in Sū. 1-1-9) is *mentioned* 'Pain'; and this has been *defined* (in Sū. 1-1-21) as 'that which is connected with annoyance is *Pain*'. But now the question is raised—"Does the Siḍḍhānṭin mean to totally deny such a thing as 'Pleasure,' which is felt by every personality? or does he mean something else?"*

---

* *Question*—"What is it that has to be *examined* in the present section? No one denies that there is such a thing as Pain; nor is there any doubt as to its being a thing to be got rid of; it might be useful to examine whether it is eternal or not; but it has already been established, in course of our refutation of the doctrine that all things are eternal; what causes pain is also well known to be such things as the serpent, the thorn and so forth; Activity has been fully examined, as also its Effects, in the form of Birth &c.; and how the cessation of the cause leads to the cessation of its effects has been shown under Sū. 1-1-2. What then has remained uninvestigated, for the sake of which the present section has been taken up?"

Answer—Pain has been defined as that which is connected with annoyance; by 'annoyance' here is meant the *feeling of annoyance*; and this according to the Siddhānta, includes, not only Pain and its causes, but *Pleasure* also. If this is duly realised, then there is no room for the question put by the *Pūrvapakṣin*; but he has put the question in view of the primary meaning of the term 'annoyance,' which is restricted to *Pain only*.—*Parishuḍḍhi.*

The sense of the *Pūrvapakṣa* has been thus expounded in the *Ṭāṭparya*:—"We admit that *Pain is that which is connected with annoyance*; but that which is experienced by every personality' as *Pleasure*, that certainly could not be regarded as *Pain*; as this would be contrary to experience. As regards the Body and the sense-organs &c,—if they are to be regarded as Pain because they are the Source of Pain, they may be regarded as 'Pleasure' also, as being the source of Pleasure. In fact the timidity involved in the idea of regarding everything as pain is likely to strike at the root of all worldly usage. As a matter of fact, when a man eats meat, he removes all the bones and hence does not suffer the pain that might be due to the bones; similarly a wise man will enjoy Pleasure only, taking care to avoid all that may be likely to bring pain."...It is in view of all this that the *Pūrvapakṣin* has put the question.

Our answer is that the meaning of the *Siḍḍhānṭin* is something different. "Why so?" It is not possible to totally deny Pleasure, to whose existence testimony is borne by all men. The teaching (of the *Siḍḍhānṭa*) that Pleasure should be looked upon as 'Pain' is meant for the removal of all pain for the person who has become disgusted with the sufferings caused by the experiences undergone during a series of births, and deaths, and is anxious to get rid of all similar experiences.* "But by what method (is this advice effective)?" The bodies of all livings beings, all the regions where people are born, all rebirth, (all conditions of life), every one of these is beset with 'annoyance,' being—inseparable from Pain; and it is in view of this fact that the sages have tendered the advice contained in the Sūṭra 'Pain is that which is connected with annoyance' (Sū. 1-1-21); and the meaning of this is that all the aforesaid things should be looked upon as 'Pain'.† Reasons for this view are put forward in the following *Sūṭra.*

Sūṭra (55).

THE BIRTH OF THE BODY &c. IS ONLY PAIN; BECAUSE IT IS BESET WITH ANNOYANCES. (Sū. 55.)

The term '*janma*' (in the *Sūṭra*) stands for *that which is produced*, *i. e.* the Body, the Sense-organs and so forth; and the '*uṭpaṭṭi*' of '*janma*' is the coming into existence of the Body &c in their various forms. The 'several annoyances' are—the *least*, the *medium*, and the *greatest*; the *greatest* 'annoyance' is of those in hell; the *medium* is that of the lower animals; and the *least* is that of human beings; of the divine beings, as of those who have got rid of all attachment, it is *still less*. When a person perceives that every condition of life is beset with annoyance, he becomes confirmed in his idea that Pleasure and its causes, in the shape of the Body, the sense-organs and cognitions, are all regarded as 'Pain'; and when he has come to look upon all these as

---

* The *Ṭāṭparya* explains the expression '*uṭpaṭṭisṭhānāni*' as *the regions for the acquiring of things, which brings pleasure and pain.*

†If it were possible to obtain pleasure *unmixed with pain,* no intelligent person would ever seek to get rid of it: as a matter of fact however, no such unalloyed pleasure is ever met with; hence what the *Siḍḍhānṭa* means is, not the total denial of all Pleasure, but that all Pleasure should be looked upon as Pain.' *Ṭāṭparya.*

'pain', he loses all attachment to all things of the world; and after he has harboured this dis-attachment, all his longings for worldly things come to an end; and his longings having come to an end, he becomes freed from all suffering, just as when one understands that by the contact of poison, milk becomes poison, he no longer seeks to obtain milk, and not obtaining it, does not suffer the pangs of death.

Vārtika on Sū. (55).

[P. 495, L 3 to L. 16.]

After 'Fruition' is mentioned 'Pain,' and this has been defined as 'that which is connected with annoyance is pain'; now is it meant to deny Pleasure which is felt by all men? Or is the meaning something else? *The answer is that the meaning is different;—why?—because it is not possible to totally deny Pleasure to whose existence testimony is borne by all men.* The present teaching, that all things should be looked upon as 'Pain,' is for the benefit of that person who has become disgusted with the sufferings caused by the experiences of long-continued series of births and deaths; the motive of the teaching being to make the person look upon all things as 'pain', and looking upon them as such to become disattached from them, and having become disattached, to become released. "In what manner is he to look upon all things as *Pain*?" It has been declared by the sages that—'all bodies of living beings, all rebirth, and every condition of life, being intermingled with Pain, is Pain.' The said contemplation of all things as Pain has been taught; the following *Sūtra* provides reasons for the same: *The birth of the Body &c., &c.*—says the *Sūtra*. '*Janma*' here stands for *that which is produced*,—*i.e.*, the Body, the Sense-organs and Cognitions; 'birth' stands for the coming into existence of the Body &c; the '*utpatti*', 'birth, of '*Janma*' 'things produced,' is what is meant by 'the birth of the Body, *&c.*' The 'annoyance' is of various kinds—least, medium and greatest. The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya*.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (56).

[P. 216, L. 4 to L. 9.]

The teaching that all things should be looked upon as 'Pain' is not meant to be a denial of Pleasure;—Why?

IT IS NOT SO; BECAUSE PLEASURE ALSO IS ACCOMPLISHED DURING INTERVALS.* (Sū. 56.)

By the teaching that all things should be looked upon as 'Pain,' it is not meant that there is no such thing as 'Pleasure' at all;—Why? *Because Pleasure also is accomplished during intervals*; that is, as a matter of fact, in the intervals of 'annoyances,' Pleasure is actually accomplished and experienced by all living beings; and hence it cannot be denied entirely.

Vārṭika on Sū. (56).

[P. 495, L. 16 to L. 20.]

It is with the view explained above that we have the teaching that all things should be looked upon as 'Pain'; and it does not mean that there is no such thing as 'Pleasure' It cannot mean so; *because Pleasure also &c. &c.—says the Sūṭra.*

Inasmuch as in the intervals of annoyances, we actually perceive Pleasure being accomplished (we cannot possibly deny the existence of Pleasure).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (57).

[P. 216, L. 9 to L. 19.]

Further,—

THERE IS NO DENIAL [OF PLEASURE]; BECAUSE [ALL THAT IS MEANT IS THAT] INASMUCH AS THE MAN EXPERIENCING PLEASURE IS OPPRESSED WITH THE FRAILTY OF LONGING, THERE IS NO CESSATION OF ANNOYANCE FOR HIM. (Sū. 57.)

The 'non-denial' (in the Sūṭra) is meant to be that of *Pleasure*—by the teaching that it should be looked upon as 'Pain'; that such is the meaning of the *Sūṭra* is clear from

---

*सुखस्याप्यन्तरा is the reading of the *Nyāyasūchīnibandha*, of the Sūṭra-Mss. C. and D. as also in Vishvanatha's *Vriṭṭi*. The Puri Sūtra Mss. reads as here.

the context. '*Longing*'—is wish, the eager desire for acquiring a thing; and the 'frailty of this longing' is as follows:—when the man experiences pleasure from a certain thing, he desires that thing,—and sometimes the desire is not fulfilled, or if fulfilled, it is fulfilled only in part, or is fulfilled in such form as is beset with obstacles;—and from this 'frailty of longing' there arise various kinds of mental suffering; so that *the man experiencing pleasure, being oppressed with the frailty of longing, there is no cessation of annoyance for him*;—and it is because there is no cessation of annoyance that it has been taught that Pleasure should be looked upon as 'Pain'. It is for this reason that Birth is 'pain,' and not because there is no pleasure at all. This is the idea that has been expressed in the following verses:—

(1) 'For the man who desires a desirable thing, as soon as that desire is fulfilled, another desire quickly besets him.'

(2) 'Even though a man obtains the entire sea-girt Earth, along with all cows and horses, that seeker after wealth does not become satisfied with that wealth; what pleasure, then, can there be for one who desires wealth?'

Vārtika on Sū. (57).

[P. 495, L. 20 to P. 496, L. 9.]

For the following reason also, *there can be no denial of Pleasure* &c. &c.,—says the Sūtra. Inasmuch as when a man goes through his experiences and finds out that such and such a thing brings pleasure, and such others bring pain, he tries to acquire those that bring pleasure and to get rid of those that bring pain; and when he tries to obtain the things that bring pleasure, there come upon him several kinds of mental sufferings; and it is on account of the experiencing of these sufferings that all this is called 'Pain',—and not because there is no such thing as 'Pleasure.' It is exactly this idea that has been expressed by the sage in the following verse:—

Vār: P. 496.

'*For the man who desires a desirable thing, as soon as that desire is fulfilled, another desire quickly besets him*';—and so forth.

Sūtra (58).

ALSO BECAUSE THERE ARE SEVERAL KINDS OF PAIN WHICH PEOPLE WRONGLY REGARD AS PLEASURE;—(Sū. 58).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (58).

[P. 217, L. 1 to L. 13.]

'*we have the instruction that Pleasure should be regarded as Pain*' [these words complete the sentence of the *Sūtra*].

The ordinary man, addicted to pleasure, regards Pleasure as the highest end of man, and feels that there is nothing better than Pleasure; and hence when Pleasure has been attained, he feels happy and contented, feeling that all he had to attain had been attained; and under the influence of illusion, he becomes attached to the Pleasure, as also to the things that bring about its accomplishment; becoming so attached, he makes an attempt to obtain the pleasure; and while he is trying for it, there come down upon him several kinds of Pain, in the form of birth, old age, disease, death, the contact of disagreeable things, separation from agreeable things, the non-fulfilment of desires and so forth; and yet all these several kinds of Pain he regards as 'Pleasure.' In fact Pain is a necessary factor in Pleasure; without suffering some pain no pleasure can be obtained; hence as leading to Pleasure, this Pain is regarded by the man as Pleasure; and such a man, having his mind obsessed by this notion of 'Pleasure', never escapes from metempsychosis, which consists of a running series of births and deaths. And it is as an antidote of this notion of Pleasure that we have the teaching that all this should be looked upon as 'Pain.'

Birth has been called 'pain,' because of its being beset with 'pain', and not because there is no such thing as Pleasure.

Objection:—"If that is so, then why is it not said simply (in Sū. 55) that 'Birth is Pain'? When this simple expression might have been used, the fact of the Sūtra having used the expression 'Birth is *only* pain' shows that the idea meant to be conveyed is that *there is no pleasure at all.*"

Answer:—What the emphatic term '*ēva*' 'only,' implies is that what is laid down is conducive to the cessation of Birth. "How [does the particle serve the purpose of indicating the cessation of Birth]?" What it means is that Birth is pain, not by its own nature, but by reason of its being beset with Pain; and so with Pleasure also [which is 'Pain' because it is intermingled with Pain, and not because there is no such thing as *Pleasure*]. This is what is meant by the words of the *Sūṭra* (55),—and not that in Birth there is *only Pain* (and *no Pleasure* at all).

Vārṭika on Sū. (58).

[P. 496, L. 11 to P. 497, L. 3].

Also because there are &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. When a person makes an effort to obtain Pleasure, and suffers pain in the process, he regards that Pain as Pleasure, by reason of its forming an accessory to Pleasure; and thus he betakes himself to it again and again; so that he does not escape from the series of births and rebirths. And it is with a view to counteract this notion of 'Pleasure' that we have the teaching that 'all is Pain.' "If that is so, then, why is it not said simply that *Birth is Pain*? When this was all that should have been said, the fact that the *Sūṭra* has used the words 'Birth is *only Pain*,' shows that the idea desired to be conveyed is that there is *no Pleasure* at all."

Vār: P. 497. What is really meant is that even though there is Pleasure in the intervals of Pain, such Pleasure also is only Pain,—because it is beset with Pain, and not because there is no such thing as Pleasure at all; and the emphasising particle '*ēva*,' 'only,' is meant to indicate the means of putting an end to Birth; what the emphasis indicates is the putting an end to Birth; the sense being that when one contemplates that 'all is Pain,' he does not betake himself to things that bring Pain; and not betaking himself to those, he becomes released.

End of Section (13).

Section (14).

[Sūtras 59—68.]

Examination of the Nature of Final Release.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (59).

[P 217, L. 14 to P. 218, L 3.]

After 'Pain,' 'Release' [has been *mentioned* and *defined*]. This Release is thus denied (by the Opponent)—

Sūtra (59).

Pūrvapakṣa.

"SINCE THERE IS CONCATENATION (*a*) OF DEBTS, (*b*) OF ABERRATIONS AND (*c*) OF ACTIVITY,—THERE CAN BE NO RELEASE."—(Sū. 59).

"(*a*) *On account of the concatenation of debts there can be no Release.* The 'debts' are thus described (in the *Shaṭapatha*, *Brāhmaṇa*, 1-7-2-1)—'When the Brāhmaṇa is born, he is born under three debts: from the debt owing to the Riṣis he becomes freed by leading the life of the Religious Student, from the debt owing to the Gods he is freed by the performance of sacrifices, and from the debt owing to the Fathers he is freed by begetting children;'—the 'concatenation of these debts consists in the connection (presence) of acts connected with the debts; that it is necessary throughout one's life to perform these acts (towards the clearing of the debts) is thus mentioned (in the Veda)—'The sacrifices known as the *Agnihoṭra* and the *Ḍarshapūrṇamāsa* should go on till old age or death,—it is only by either old age or death that one becomes freed from the necessity of performing the said sacrifices'.—So that the concatenation of these debts persisting (till the man's old age or death), there is no time left for the performance of acts conducive to Release; hence it follows that there can be no Release."

"(*b*) *On account of the concatenation of Aberrations, there can be no Release.* The man dies beset with aberrations [viz. Ignorance, Egoism, Affection, Hatred and Yearning for Life], and he is born beset with aberrations; and he is never found to be absolutely free from the concatenation of these aberrations [From which it follows that he can never be free from Births and Deaths; *i.e.*, there can be no Release]."

" (c) *On account of the concatenation of Activity there can be no Release.* From birth till death, man is never found to be absolutely free from the 'operating of Speech, Mind and Body.' From this it follows that the assertion made (in Sū. 1-1-2) to the effect that—' there is a cessation of each member of the following series—Pain, Birth, Activity, Defect and Wrong Notion,—the cessation of that which follows bringing the annihilation of that which precedes it, and this ultimately leads to Release,'—is not true."

Vārṭika on Sū. (59).

[P. 497, L. 4 to L. 11]

After the mention of 'Pain' comes 'Release;' and this is thus denied by the following Sūtra :—'*Since there is concatenation &c., &c.*' (a) *Since there is concatenation of Debts there can be no Release*; 'concatenation' means the necessity of having to act up to them continuously; the man is never freed from this concatenation of Debts, from birth till death. (b) *Since there is concatenation of Aberrations there can be no Release*; the man is born beset with aberrations and he dies beset with aberrations. (c) *Since there is concatenation of Activity there can be no Release*; since there is no time at which the man does not do some act or the other."

Bhāṣya on Sū. (60).

[P. 218, L. 3 to P. 221, L. 8.]

Siḍḍhānṭa.

Our answer to the above is as follows:—(A) Our answer to the argument, that "since there is concatenation of Debts &c., &c.,"—is that the term 'Debt' (in the texts quoted) stands for *what is like debt.*

Sūṭra (60).

INASMUCH AS THE WORD CANNOT BE TAKEN IN ITS PRIMARY SIGNIFICATION, THE STATEMENT MUST BE TAKEN AS A DESCRIPTION BY MEANS OF A WORD USED IN ITS SECONDARY (FIGURATIVE) SIGNIFICATION; SPECIALLY AS IT IS ONLY THUS THAT THE SENSE OF CONDEMNATION AND COMMENDATION IS OBTAINED. (Sū. 60).

The word '*riṇaiḥ*,' (in the passage quoted from the *Shaṭapaṭha Brāhmaṇa*) is not used in its primary sense of *debt*; the word 'debt' can be used in its primary senso only in a case where one gives to another something that has to be repaid and another receives such a thing; and this condition is not present in the case spoken of in the passage quoted; hence it follows that—*inasmuch the word 'debts' cannot be taken in its primary signification, the statement must be taken as a description by means of a word used in its secondary (figurative) signification*; the sense being that what are described are '*like debts*.' Such figurative descriptions are very common; e.g., when the 'young student' is described as 'Fire;' just as the word 'Fire' elsewhere used in one (the primary) sense, is applied to the young student in another (figurative) sense,—so in the case in question, the word 'debt,' elsewhere found used in the primary sense, is used in the passage quoted in a different sense. "But why should there be a description by means of a word in the figurative sense?" *Because it is only thus that the sense of condemnation and commendation is obtained*;—the meaning of the passage being that 'if a person fails to perform the acts referred to, he is *condemned* in the same manner as the debtor, not repaying his debts; and if he does perform the acts, he is *commended* in the same manner as the debtor, repaying his debts;' this is what is meant by the figurative description of the acts *as* '*debts*.'

The word '*jāyamānaḥ*,' 'when he is born,' is also used figuratively; as otherwise (if the word were taken in its literal sense), the man would not be entitled to the performance of the acts mentioned; what the phrase, 'when the Brāhmaṇa is born' means is 'when the Brāhmaṇa enters the state of the Householder,'—this is what is meant by the man 'being born;' (that such must be the sense is clear from the fact that) it is only when the Brāhmaṇa enters the state of the Householder that he becomes entitled to the performance of the act mentioned; on merely being *born from his mother's womb* (which is the primary meaning of 'being born') the Brāhmaṇa is not entitled to the performance of those acts; as a matter of fact, when the child is just born from his mother's womb he is not in a position to perform any acts; for only such persons are entitled to the performance of an act as (*a*) are *desirous* of acquiring the results following

from that act and (*b*) are *capable* of performing it. (*a*) That to be entitled to the performance of an act it is necessary to have the desire, for results calculated to follow from that act is shown by the fact that the injunctions of the acts always speak of the presence of such desire; e.g., in the injunction '*one desiring heaven* should offer the *Agnihotra* libations;' and (*b*) that to be so entitled one must be *capable* of performing the act is shown by the fact that it is only a person who is capable of doing an act that can do it; since it is only a capable man that can do an act it follows that it is only a capable man that is entitled to the performance of that act; as a matter of fact, it is only the *capable* man, and none other, who actually undertakes the performance of an act. If the word 'born' were taken in its primary sense (of *coming out* of the mother's womb), then both these conditions would be absent in the child just born; at the time that the child is just born out of the mother's womb, there is not present in it either the desire for the results following from any act, or the capability to perform it. An assertion made in the Veda in no way differs from an assertion made in ordinary parlance,—both being the work (utterance) of intelligent persons; and in ordinary parlance no one, even the most foolish, would ever address, to the new-born child, such injunctions as 'Study the Veda,' 'perform sacrifices,' 'lead the life of the Religious Student,' and so forth; how then could a wise Sage, who says only what is true and faultless, and who is prompted to teach pupils, ever address such injunctions (to the new-born child)? No dancer ever dances before blind men; no singer sings to deaf persons. Then again, it is only the person who comprehends what is taught that can be the recipient of the teaching; *i. e.*, he alone who comprehends what is taught, can have the teaching addressed to him; and certainly this condition is not present in the new-born infant. Further,

Bhā. P. 219.

the Brāhmaṇa-passage itself (quoted by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) speaks of acts that clearly indicate the state of the Householder; as a matter of fact, the action that the passage speaks of is such as requires the presence of the *wife*; and as such is clearly indicative of the state of the Householder. From all this it follows that what is meant by the term 'born' is *one who has entered the state of the Householder.*

Further, the assertion (in the text quoted) in regard to old age and death (being the limit of the performance of the *Agnihoṭra &c.*) can be explained on the basis of the assumption that the acts continue to be performed till the ceasing of the man's desire. That is till the man's desire for the results (accruing from the act) does not cease—does not come to end—he should continue to perform the act;—it is in this sense that the assertion in regard to 'old age and death' would be applicable to the man. Further, what the passage—'by old age is the man freed &c.'—means is that when the man reaches the last quarter of his life, he enters the state of the Renunciate and thus becomes freed from the obligation of performing the sacrificial act'; the term 'old age' standing for the last quarter of man's life, when he enters, the state of the Renunciate; it is in connection with the last quarter of man's life that Renunciation has been enjoined. If the term 'old age' meant absolutely *decrepit senility*, then the assertion—'by old age is man freed &c.' would have no sense at all;* it could not be taken to mean that 'when the man is disabled (by decrepitude), he becomes freed from the obligation &c.;' as for the man who is himself unable to perform a sacrificial act, the Veda permits external aid; e.g. (a) 'or the pupil might offer the libations, his services having been secured by the teaching of the Veda,' (6) 'or the milk offerer might offer the libations, his services having been secured by presents of wealth.' Such being the case, the passage can either be taken as 'descriptive' of what has been enjoined in another text, or some other meaning (that of direct injunction of the acts for the new-born infant) may be arbitrarily assigned to it. And there can be no doubt that the most reasonable course is to take it as containing a 'description' of what has been enjoined elsewhere,† the most natural meaning of the passage being that 'when the Householder undertakes the perform-

*Because when the man has reached the state of senility, or has died, he actually becomes freed from all obligations.

†The passage itself does not contain a single injunctive word. Even so there might have been some justification for regarding it as an injunction if we had found no other Vedic text containing the necessary injunction of the Agnihotra &c. As a matter of fact however, there are hundreds of such texts. There can therefore be no justification for assuming the passage in question to be injunctive. —*Tātparya.*

ance of the sacrificial acts, he is as much under compulsion as a debtor.' Then again, what form the direct objective of man's effort are the means of accomplishing the desired result, and not the result itself; and when the said means have been duly accomplished they lead to the accomplishment of the Result; so that what has been enjoined previously (in some other passage) is the *coming into existence* of the means leading to the Result; and the same is also spoken of subsequently (in passages occurring later than the passage in question); so that it must be the person connected with the said means that is referred to by the term '*jāyamāna*,' 'being born.' *

"But," says the Opponent, "there being no direct injunction (of Renunciation)—[the passage in question cannot be regarded as referring to the state of the Renunciate]."

This, however, is not right; as there is no direct injunction of the negation of it either [so that the fact cannot be urged one way or the other].

"The Brāhmaṇa-text directly enjoins the state of the Householder; if there were other states also [such as that of the Renunciate], the Brāhmaṇa would have directly enjoined these also; so that, inasmuch as there is no direct injunction of these other states, we conclude that there *is* no other state."

There is no force in this, we reply; as of the negation of such other states also there is no direct injunction; we find no such direct injunction of the negation of other states

---

*This anticipates the following argument of the Opponent—"The new-born infant may not have the capacity of *discerning the result*, and of knowing and attempting to obtain, the means leading to that result. But it certainly has the capacity of bringing upon itself the results of acts: if the child does an act, however unconsciously of its being the means of a particular result, the *merit* or demerit accruing from that act will certainly accrue to the soul of the infant. So that there can be nothing incongruous in the acts being enjoined for the new-born child."

The sense of the reply is thus explained in the *Tātparya*:—The direct objective of man's effort cannot be the *Result*; what the man tries to obtain, in the first instance, is the means that leads to that *Result*; and certainly the new-born child can have no idea of what is the means leading to a Result. Hence no injunction could have any effect upon it. For this reason the only right course is to take the word 'born' in the figurative sense, as explained above.

as—'there are no other states, that of the Householder being the only one state;' hence, inasmuch as we do not meet with any direct injunction of the negation (of the state of the Renunciate), the argument put forward can have no force at all. Then again, the direct injunction (of the state of the Householder) in the passage in question is based upon the fact that it is that particular state that forms the subject-matter of the context; just as we find in the case of the various sciences. In the case of the sciences it is found that the fact that each science directly lays down certain things only is due to those things alone being connected with its own subject-matter,—and not to there being no other things at all; similarly the fact that the passage lays down things connected with the state of the Householder only is due to this state forming its subject-matter, and *not* to there being no other states.

Then again, we find *verses* and *prose-texts* speaking of Final Release; as a matter of fact, we find several Ṛik verses and Brāhmaṇa-texts speaking of Final Release (along with the means of attaining it, and the four states, specially that of the Renunciate, fall under these) As instances of verses, we have the following:—(a) 'The sages, blessed with children and desiring wealth, fell into death (and rebirth) by performing actions; other sages, who were endowed with wisdom transcending beyond actions, attained immortality,';—(*b*) 'neither by action, nor by progeny, nor by wealth,—but by renunciation, only—did they attain immortality; that immortality which shines beyond Heaven, hidden in the cave (beyond ordinary cognitions, which the renunciates alone enter)' (*Taittiriya Āraṇyaka*, 10-10-3);—(*c*) 'I know that Great Person, effulgent like the Sun, lying beyond Illusion, by knowing Him alone does man transcend death, there is no other path for going beyond' (*Vājasaneyi Samhitā*, 31-18); and as prose-texts we have the following :—(*a*) 'there are three stages of Dharma—Sacrifices, Study, and Charity; the first of these constitutes Austerity; the second is the Religious Student residing in the house of the Teacher; and the third is the same person putting himself under severe penance while residing in the Teacher's house; all these lead man to pure regions: it is only one who is firm in Brahman (i.e. the Renunciate) who reaches immortality' (*Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*, 2-23-1);—(*b*) 'It is with a view to attain this region that Renunciates take to

renunciation' (*Bṛihaḍāraṇyaka Upaniṣaḍ*, 4-4-22); (*c*) 'They say that man is made up of desires; as he desires so does he put forth efforts, and as he puts forth efforts so does he act; and as he acts so does he become,'—having in this way described the process of metempsychosis determined by the performance of acts, the texts go on to lay down the real teaching thus—'when the man with desires becomes free from desires, he becomes without desires, beyond desires, having all his desires fulfilled, his desires centred in the Self,—then his life-breaths do not go out, they become absorbed here and now, being Brahman he attains Brahman itself.' (*Bṛihaḍāraṇyaka Upaniṣaḍ*, 4-4-5 and 6).

Thus then we find that the assertion that—"Since there is concatenation of debts, there can be no Release"—is not right. There is yet another text—'the four paths leading to the gods' (*Ṭaiṭṭirīyasamhiṭā*,5-7-23)—which speaks of the four states; and hence also it is not right to say that there is only one state (that of the Householder) laid down in the Veda [and that the state of the Renunciate is nowhere enjoined].

Vārṭika on Sū. 60.

[P. 497, L. 11 to P. 500, L. 5]

Our answer to the argument—"because there is concatenation of Debts"—is as follows:—*Inasmuch as the word* &c. &c., —says the *Sūṭra*. In the passage quoted the word 'debt' is not used in its primary sense; as in the matter spoken of there is no receiving and repaying of something to be given back; it is only in a case where one person gives something that he expects to be paid back, and another person receives such a thing,—that the word 'debt' is applicable in its primary sense; in all other cases it is used in a figurative sense. It is for this reason that the passage should *be taken as a* Vār: P. 498. *description by means of a word used in a figurative sense*; just as we have in the expression the young student is '*fire*'; the word 'Fire' primarily applies to that particular form of Light which is capable of burning things; and being primarily applicable to such Light, it comes to be applied to the young boy on the basis of a certain

similarity between the *boy* and the said *light*; and the boy comes to be spoken of as 'fire'; in this expression the term 'fire,' being in apposition to the term 'boy,' does not express the idea that the boy is capable of burning things; all that it means is that the boy is endowed with the properties of tawny colour, vigour and so forth, which are found in Fire also; and since the word is applied to the Boy on the basis of the presence of the said *qualities* (*guṇas*), such usage is regarded as 'figurative' (*based upon guṇas*). Exactly the same is the case with the word 'debt' in the passage quoted. In fact the statement "man is born in debt" is a figurative one; the figure involved being 'simile' with some of its factors eliminated: "What is the exact signification of the simile?" It connotes *absence of freedom*, the sense being —just as the debtor is under compulsion, so the man, when born, undertakes the performance of acts under compulsion.'

The term '*jāyamānaḥ*,' 'when born,' also is a figurative one; it cannot be taken in its primary sense: at the time that the child has just *come out of the mother's womb* (this being the primary meaning of 'being born'), it is a mere lump of blood, hands, feet and mouth; and in this condition it is impossible for it to perform the acts of study and the rest. Hence what the term means is 'on becoming a householder.' "But what is the similarity between the Householder and the new-born child (on the basis of which similarity we could have the figurative expression)?" The similarity consists in *connection with action*; it is on account of the Householder becoming connected with the actions of *Agnihotra* and the rest that he is said to be 'born'; just as the new-born child, coming out of the mother's womb, becomes connected with the body (and its functions), in the same manner the Householder, becoming connected with the Agnihotra and other actions,—and thus bearing similarity to the child,— comes to be spoken of as 'being born.' "But why (should

we have recourse to this explanation)?" For the simple reason that it is only one capable of doing an act, and desirous of obtaining the results accruing from the act, that is entitled to the performance of that act; the only man that can undertake the performance of an act is one who is capable of doing it, and who is desirous of obtaining its results. The child just born out of the mother's womb has neither the capability to do the acts mentioned, nor has he the desire for their results; while both these conditions are present in the Householder. Hence it follows that in the passage under consideration it is the Householder that is spoken of as 'being born.'

Further, says the *Bhāṣya*, *the assertion in regard to 'old age and death' can be explained on the basis of the assumption that the acts continue to be performed till the ceasing of the man's desire.* The injunction in the passage, in regard to the Brāhmaṇa performing the acts till 'old age' is capable of another explanation: What the mention of 'old age and death' means is that the acts are to be performed till the man's desire for their results ceases; that is, when there is cessation of his desire,—when his desire has ceased—then alone he should give up the *Agnihoṭra*. The term 'old age' stands for the last quarter of the man's life; if it meant that the act should be performed *as long as the man lives*, then there would be no sense in the statement that 'the man becomes freed from old age &c. &c.,' specially as for the man who is himself unable to perform the act, the bringing in of external aid has been permitted; which means that so long as the man does have desire for the results following from the acts, he may have the offerings made through another person; and when there is no desire, there is Renunciation. "But on what ground is it said that the Agnihotra offerings are to be made only so long as the man has desires

Vār: P. 499.

for its results?" It is done on the ground that in connection with the injunction of actions the Veda always mentions the *presence of desire*; in the case of every action we find the presence of desire mentioned in connection with its injunction; e.g. 'one *desiring heaven* should perform &c. &c.'

Further, the person to whom a teaching is addressed must be one who comprehends the teaching; it is only the person that understands a teaching to whom the teaching is imparted; no singer sings to a deaf audience; and no dancer dances before blind men; and since the new-born child cannot comprehend a teaching, no teaching can be addressed to it.

The Vedic utterance does not differ from ordinary utterances. No ordinary man, however foolish he may be, could ever address to the new-born child such words as 'study,' 'perform sacrifices,' 'lead the life of the Religious Student;' how then could a sage, who always says what is true and faultless, address such injunctions (to the new-born child)?

Such being the case, the passage can either be taken as a 'description' of what has been enjoined in another text, or some other meaning may be arbitrarily assigned to it; and there can be no doubt that the most reasonable course is to take it as containing a 'description' of what has been enjoined elsewhere (Bhāṣya). If the passage were taken to mean something that is contrary to all evidence, this could be done only arbitrarily; the assumption of all meaning contrary to reason is possible only in a whimsical fashion; and this would exactly be the case if the passage were taken to mean that 'the new-born child is beset with debts.'

Vār: P. 500.

On the other hand, if a passage is taken to mean something that is in accordance with evidence, it is taken as a 'description;' and we have an instance of this where we take the term 'being born' as meaning 'when the man enters the state of the *Householder*.' "But how do you know that it

is the *Householder* that is specifically meant?" For the simple reason that that is the state conducive to the performance of sacrifices; our reason lies in the fact that the performer of the sacrifice is a part and parcel of the sacrifice. Further, the effort of the actor is always turned directly to the *means* of accomplishing the act, and not to its *Result*; for instance, the cook directs his efforts directly to the collection of fuel, which is the means of accomplishing the act of cooking,—and not to the *Cooking* itself, nor to the getting together of clods of earth and such other things as are *not** conducive to the fulfilment of the act of Cooking.

The rest is clear in the *Bhaṣya*.

Question.—"How do you know that the passage in question is meant for the person who has the desire for results accruing from the acts?"

Answer.—The direct injunction in the passage is based upon the fact that it is that particular state (of man) that forms the subject-matter of the context; just as we find in the case of the various sciences.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (61).

[P. 221, L. 8 to L. 17]

As a matter of fact, the passage speaking of 'the *Agnihoṭra* and the *Ḍarshapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice continuing till old age and death' must refer to the man that desires the results (following from that act). "Why?"

Sūṭra (61).

INASMUCH AS THERE IS TRANSPORTATION (OF THE FIRES) INTO THE SOUL, THE DENIAL (OF RELEASE) CANNOT BE RIGHT. (Sū. 61.)

It is laid down in the Veda that—'Having offered the *Prājāpaṭya* sacrifice, having offered the libation of all his belongings, and having transported the Fires into his Soul,

*The sense demands the reading— लोष्टादिष्वसाधनेषु

the Brāhmaṇa should go out as a Renunciate';—and from this we learn that the 'transportation of the Fires' (which means the end of the *Agnihoṭra*) is only for the man who has risen above all desires for children, wealth and fame, and when his desire for the results (of the *Agnihoṭra*) also have entirely ceased. To this same end we have the following Brāhmana-passage (*Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, 4·5):—' Yājñavalkya, when going to undertake another austerity, said to Maitrēyī as follows: Oh, dear one, I am going to wander away from this place, I shall therefore make up an understanding between you and Kātyāyanī; you have already had your instructions, O *Maiṭreyi*.! Immortality extends only so far;—having said this Yājñavalkya went away a renunciate'.

Vārṭika on Sū. (61).

[P. 50?, Ll. 9—10.]

Inasmuch as etc., etc.—says the *Sūṭra*. Inasmuch as the transportation of the Fires is laid down as to be done only after the desires have ceased [it follows that the passage speaking of *Agnihoṭra* etc. refers only to such men as have a desire for the results accruing from those acts].

Sūṭra (62).

INASMUCH AS THE 'COLLECTING OF SACRIFICIAL VESSELS' COULD NOT BE POSSIBLE IN THEIR CASE, THE RESULTS MENTIONED CANNOT PERTAIN TO OTHERS (THAN HOUSE-HOLDERS).

(Sū. 62).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (62).

[P. 221, L. 19 to P. 222, L. 13.]

If the performance of the acts till 'old age and death' were taken as referring to *all men* (Householders as well as Renunciates), then the after-death rites ending with the 'collecting of the sacrificial vessels' would also have to be performed for *all men*; and in that case there would be no point in the describing of the 'rising above desires,' which we meet with in such passages as the following—' The ancient Brāhmaṇas, great teachers and learned, do not desire off-spring, their idea being—what shall we do with offspring,

Bhā. P. 222.

we for whom the Self is the whole world?—it is these Brahmaṇas that, having risen above desire for sons, desire for wealth and desire for fame, live upon alms.' *Bṛihaḍāraṇyaka—Upaniṣad*, 3·5·1). Because for one who has 'risen above desires' (including also the desire for results accruing from the *Agnihoṭra etc.*,), there can be no possibility of those rites that end with the 'collecting of sacrificial vessels.' Specially because Results do not supply sufficient motive to all men to the same extent.

Further, since we find *four stages* of life laid down in the *Iṭihāsas*, the *Purāṇas* and the *Dharmashāstra* scriptures, it is not right to hold (as the Pūrvapakṣin does) that there is only one state (that of the Householder). It will not be right to regard the said scriptures as having no authority; for the authoritative character of these is vouched for by authoritative texts; as a matter of fact, the authoritative character of *Iṭihasas* and *Parāṇas* is vouched for by *Brāhmaṇa-texts*, which are entirely authoritative: *e.g.*, 'The *Aṭharvāṇgirasas* declared the *Iṭihāsas* and *Purāṇas*; and these Iṭihasas and Purāṇas constitute the fifth of the Vedas.' (*Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* 3·4·2). For these reasons it is not right to say that the said *Iṭihāsas* and *Purāṇas* are not authoritative. As regards the *Dharmashāstra* scriptures, if these had no authority, there would be an end to all business among living beings, which would put the whole world into confusion. Secondly, inasmuch as the 'seers' and 'speakers' are the same, there is no reason why these scriptures should not be authoritative; as a matter of fact, the 'seers' and 'speakers' of the *Iṭihāsas*, *Purāṇas* and *Dharmashāstra* scriptures are the same as those of the *Manṭra* and *Brāhmaṇa* texts (of the Veda). Thirdly, inasmuch as there is a (restriction in regard to their subject-matter (the said scriptures must be authoritative); as a matter of fact, the authority of each scripture bears upon its own special subject-matter; and the subject-matter of the *Manṭra* and *Brāhmaṇa* texts is different from that of the *Iṭihāsas*, the *Purāṇas* and the *Dharmashasṭra* scriptures; *e.g.*, 'sacrificial performance' forms the subject-matter of the *Manṭra* and *Brāhmaṇa* texts, the 'doings of of men' that of *Iṭihashas* and *Puraṇas*, and the 'regulation of men's business' that of the *Dharmashāsṭra* scriptures. So that, since no single one of these control all the said subjects, every one of them must be regarded as authoritative

in regard its own special subject; just as every one of the sense-organs is an authoritative means of the cognition of its own special object of perception.

Vārtika on Sū. (62).
[P. 500, L. 12-15.]

Inasmuch as the collecting, &c., &c.—says the *Sūtra*; that is so say, it is not possible for the rites ending with the 'collecting of the sacrificial vessels' to be performed for those who, upon the cessation of all desires, have become renunciates. If the passage (quoted by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) applied to all men without distinction, the rites ending with the 'collecting of sacrificial vessels' would have to be performed for all men.

The rest is clear in the *Bhaṣya*.

Bhaṣya on Sū. (63).
[P. 222, L. 13 to L. 18]

As regards the second argument propounded by the *Pūrvapakṣin* (in Sū. 59) viz: "since there is no cessation of concatenation of the aberrations (there can be no Release),"—our answer is as follows:—

Sūtra (63).

RELEASE IS POSSIBLE; INASMUCH AS (WE FIND THAT) THERE ARE NO ABERRATIONS IN THE CASE OF THE MAN IN DEEP SLEEP, WHO DREAMS NO DREAMS. (Sū. 63.)

As a matter of fact, we find that when a man is in deep sleep and dreams no dreams, there is an end (for the time being) of all connection with attachment, as also of all connection with pleasure and pain. Exactly in the same way there could be an end of all these at Release also. In fact people who have realised the real nature of Brahman actually describe the condition of the 'released' Soul as similar to that of *deep sleep*.*

* The only difference being that while during deep sleep, the tendency of aberrations is present—[by virtue of which the man becomes beset with them on waking]—at Release there is no such tendency left; [so that there is no chance of the *Released* man being re-beset with aberrations]—*Tātparya*.

Vārṭika on Sū. (63).

[P. 500, L. 15 to P. 501, L. 1.]

Our answer to the argument, based upon the fact that there is no cessation of the series of aberrations, is as follows :—*Release is possible etc. etc.*—says the *Sūṭra*. Just as in the case of the man in deep sleep, dreaming no dreams, there is an end of the 'concatenation of aberrations,' as also of all connection with things bringing about pleasure or pain,—exactly in the same manner there would be an end of these for the *released* man. In fact people have described the condition of 'deep sleep' as that of the *yogin* who has attained Release.

Vār. P. 501.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (64).

[P. 222, 18 to P. 223, L. 2.]

As regards the third argument—viz., "because there is concatenation of Activity,"—our answer is as follows :—

Sūṭra (64).

FOR THE MAN WHOSE ABERRATIONS HAVE BEEN DESTROYED, ACTIVITY DOES NOT LEAD TO RECRUDESCENCE. (Sū. 64).

When Love, Hatred and Ignorance (which are the aberrations) have been destroyed, *Activity does not lead to recrudescence* ;—'Recrudescence' stands for re-birth at the end of the previous birth; and since this rebirth is always brought about by Desire,—when all Desire has been destroyed,* there is no further birth after the previous one has come to an end; and this is what is meant by 'non-recrudescence'; and this is *Release*.

"But this would mean that actions are fruitless."

Certainly not; for our doctrine does not deny the experiencing of the fruition of one's acts. All that we say is that the previous birth having come to an end, there is no further birth, and we do not say that there is no experiencing of the fruits of one's acts; (our view being that) the fruition of *all* one's acts comes about in the last birth (preceding Release) [so that there is no fruition left to be experienced].

*The reading तस्यास्तृष्णाकारिते does not fit in with तस्याम्. In the *Vārṭika* we find the expression तस्य तृष्णाकारितस्य; so that we prefer to read the *Bhāṣya* also as तस्य तृष्णाकारितस्य ; and to take तस्यां as referring to तृष्णा.

Vārṭika on Sū. (64).

[P. 501, L. 1 to L. 10.]

In answer to the argument, "because there is concatenation of Activity,"—the Sūṭra says:—*for the man whose aberrations etc. etc.* If the aberrations are not there, Activity, even though present, is not conducive to recrudescence; which means that it does not become the cause of (it does not bring about) Merit or Demerit. 'Recrudescence' means rebirth after the end of the previous birth; and this is brought about by *Desire*; as has been explained under Sū. 3-1-25, where it has been shown that 'there is no birth for one who is free from attachments.' It might be urged that "this would mean that actions are fruitless;" but it is not so; because the experiencing of the fruition of actions is not denied; we do not say that the man is *released*, while the Actions are still there (whose fruits have not been experienced); what we mean is that during the last birth of the man all his 'actions are exhausted by fruition.'

Sūṭra (65).

[*Objection*]—"WHAT HAS BEEN JUST ALLEGED IS NOT POSSIBLE; AS THE CONCATENATION OF ABERRATIONS IS INNATE (IN MAN)." (Sū. 65).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (65).

[Says the *Pūrvapakṣin*]—"Cessation of the concatenation of aberrations is not possible;—why?—*because the concatenation of aberrations is innate in man*; as a matter of fact, the concatenation of aberrations is without beginning; and what is beginningless can never be destroyed."

(*Vārṭika* on (Sū. 65).

[P. 501, Ll. 12—14.]

"*What has been alleged &c. &c.* Cessation of the contenation of aberrations is not possible;—why?—*because the concatenation of aberrations is innate in man*; as a matter of

fact, the concatenation of aberrations is without beginning, having been set up naturally by itself; and as such it can never be got rid of.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (66).

[P. 223, L. 5, L. 9.]

To the above objection some people (Ēkaḍēshi—Logicians) make the following reply:

Sūṭra (66).

(A) 'JUST AS THERE IS EVANESCENCE OF THE NEGATION OF THINGS PRIOR TO THEIR COMING INTO EXISTENCE,—SO THERE CAN BE EVANESCENCE OF INNATE THINGS ALSO.' (Sū. 66.)

'The negation or absence of things, prior to their coming into existence, has had no beginning; and yet it is set aside by the *existence* of the things when they are produced:—and in the same manner the *concatenation of aberrations* also, though without beginning, may be liable to be set aside.'

Vārṭika on Sū. (66).

[P. 501, L. 14 to P. 502, L. 2.]

Some people offer the following answer to the objection urged in Sū. 65:—*Just as there is evanescence &c. &c.* Just as before a thing has been produced, its negation is beginningless, and is yet set aside by the *existence* of that thing,—in the same manner the 'concatenation of aberrations' in the man who has not acquired the right knowledge of things, is beginningless, yet it can be destroyed by his right knowledge (whenever this is acquired).'

Vār. P. 502.

Sūṭra (67).

(B) 'OR IT MAY BE LIKE THE EVANESCENCE OF THE DARK COLOUR OF THE ATOM.' Sū. (67).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (67).

[P. 223, Ll. 11-12.]

Others again offer the following answer to the objection (urged in Sū. 65):—

'The dark colour of the Atom (of Earth) is beginningless, and yet it is destroyed by contact with fire; similarly the concatenation of aberrations, [though beginningless, could be destroyed].'

Vārṭika on Sū. (67).

[P. 502, Ll. 4-5.]

'*It may be etc. etc.* Just as the dark colour of the Atom is beginningless, and yet evanescent,—so also would be the concatenation of aberrations.'

Bhāṣya on Sū. (68).

[P. 223, L. 12 to P. 224, L. 6.]

(A) As a matter of fact, 'eternality' and 'evanescence' are properties of existent things; so they can be predicated directly of positive entities only; to negative entities they can be attributed only indirectly (or figuratively). [So that it is not right to cite the case of the *negation of things*, as the *Ēkadēshin* has done in Sū. 65]. (B) Then, as regards the 'dark colour of the Atom' (cited by the second *Ēkadēshin* in Sū. 66), there is nothing to prove that it is *without beginning*,* and hence it is not right to put that forward as an instance. Nor is there anything to prove that a thing *not liable to production* is *evanescent*.

The real answer to the argument of the *Pūrvapakṣin* (put forward in Sū. 65) is as follows:—

Sūṭra (68).

WHAT HAS BEEN ALLEGED BY THE OPPONENT CANNOT BE RIGHT; ALSO BECAUSE (A) DESIRE AND THE REST HAVE THEIR SOURCE IN MISAPPREHENSION.† (Sū. 68).

---

* On the other hand, we have the following argument to prove that the dark colour of the Atom is *not without beginning*:—'The dark colour of the Atom is a *product*, because it is a Colour of the Earth, just like its red colour.'—*Ṭāṭparya*.

† On the exact meaning of the term '*saṅkalpa*' in the present context, the *Ṭāṭparya* says:—Though it is the *wish for a cognised thing* that is generally called '*saṅkalpa*,' yet here we have to take it as refering to the *cognition* that is the precursor of the *wish*; hence it should be taken here as standing for *wrong cognition, misapprehension*.

The particle '*cha*,' 'also,' has a cumulative force, including the following two reasons also—(b) *because Desire and the rest are due to action*, and (c) *because Desire and the rest are due to one another*.

(a) As a matter of fact, Desire, Hatred and Illusion proceed from such wrong cognitions as (respectively) the actual *delighters*, *annoyers* and *deluders* of men. (b) Action also is what brings about the bodies of living beings, and gives rise to Desire, Hatred and Illusion, within well-defined limits; that it is so we gather from the fact that there is a limitation in regard to these; *e.g.*, a certain animal-body is found to abound in Desire, while another abounds in Illusion. (c) Lastly, the appearance of Desire &c. is due to one another; that is, it is the man under illusion who desires things; it is the man under illusion who is moved by hatred; the man under the influence of desire falls into illusion; and the man under the influence of hatred falls into illusion.

All misapprehensions cease to appear as soon as True Knowledge appears; and inasmuch as on the cessation of the cause, the effect cannot appear, there is absolute non-appearance of Desire &c. (on the disappearance of
Bhā : P. 224. Misapprehensions, which are the source of Desire &c.).

Further, the assertion that "the concatenation of aberrations is beginningless" has no point at all. As *all things* related to the Soul,—*e.g.*, the Body, the Sense-organs &c. &c.—are such as proceed in a beginningless series, and there is not a single individual of this series that is produced without another individual having gone before it; with the sole exception of *True Knowledge* (which is produced *once* and *once* only for a Soul); but our doctrine (that Desire &c. are destroyed) does not imply the assumption that 'things not liable to be produced are liable to destruction' [as the *individual* Desire &c. whose destruction we postulate are not *without beginning*; the beginninglessness of the *series* does not imply the *beginninglessness* of each individual constituting the series; *e.g.*, *one series of Bodies* for each Soul is beginningless, yet each individual Body has a beginning.] As soon as *misapprehensions* have been destroyed by *True Knowledge*, 'Action' also, which is what brings about the

Body of each living body, ceases to be productive of Desire &c., though it continues to bring about the experiencing of pleasure and pain.

Vārṭika on Sū. (68).

[P. 502, L. 5 to P. 503, L. 12.]

As a matter of fact, *Eternality* and *Evanescence* are properties of existent things, as we have pointed out in course of our consideration of the exact nature of 'Eternality' and 'Evanescence;' they can, therefore, be predicated of negative entities only indirectly. "What is the basis of this indirect or secondary application?" It is this: the 'eternal' thing is *without cause*, and *without cause* also is the *prior negation* of things; and again the 'evanescent' thing is that which, having come into existence, ceases to exist; this is exactly what the prior negation of things does;—so there are these two similarities (between Prior Negation and Eternal things, and between Prior Negation and Evanescent things; and it is on the basis of these similarities that 'Eternality' and 'Evanescence' may be attributed to Prior Negation].* As regards the assertion that the dark colour of the Atom is beginningless,—this is not right; as there is nothing to prove that it is so; nor is there anything to prove that things not liable to production are evanescent.

The real answer therefore to the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument is that—*What has been alleged* &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. The particle *cha* has the cumulative force, including the following two arguments also—*because Desire &c. are due to Action*, and *because Desire &c. are due to one another*. '*Saṅkalpa*' is the wish that one has for the things he has cognised, as has been already explained before. The meaning is that

* The reading न च प्रागभावाभावे सति is corrupt. The sense of the passage is as translated above; which requires some such words as तथा च प्रागभाव इति।

Desire and the rest are produced from misapprehensions, which are the delighters, annoyers and deluders of men. Action also, which brings about the Body of living beings, produces Desire &c. through the said misapprehensions; some living beingsare found to abound in desire; *e.g.*, Pigeons &c; others abound in hatred (anger), as Snakes; others again abound in illusion, as the Python.

"If Action brings about Desire &c., these should always be there; so that there could be no Release."

Not so; because the necessary causal conditions would be wanting. Action brings about Desire &c. only through misapprehension; and never independently by itself.

"In that case, on the same grounds, Pleasure &c. could not have Action for their cause."

Not so; because as regards these it is independent. In the bringing about of Pleasure &c. Action does not stand in need of misapprehension; it brings them about only by the aid of their own specific causes. This case is analogous to the following: The action of *Throwing Upwards* produces the Faculty (Momentum) through *impulsion*, while it brings about conjunction and disjunction independently by itself.

The fact of Desire &c. being due to one another is perceived in ordinary experience; *e.g.*, the man under the influence of Love falls into Illusion;—under love's influence he comes to harbour hatred,—under the influence of Hatred he falls into Illusion; and falls into love,—and the man under Illusion is a victim to Hatred and Love.

Lastly, as regards the assertion that "the concatenation of aberrations is beginningless,"—this can have no point; as this case does not differ from others: Just as the concatenation of aberrations is beginningless, so also are all things related to the Soul; all which proceed in beginningless series; and there is nothing that is produced without another like it

having gone before. But with all this our doctrine does not involve the assumption that things not liable to production are liable to destruction.* *True Knowledge* is the only thing which, having no like precusor, is produced alone by itself; no other thing connected with the Soul is so produced.

End of Section (14).

End of I Daily Lesson of Adhyāya IV.

Aḍhyāya IV.

Daily Lesson II.

Section (1.)

[*Sūṭras* 1—3.]

Dealing with the Appearance of True Knowledge.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (1).

[P. 224, L. 8 to P. 225, L. 20.]

† *Question*—"Now, Sir, does *True Knowledge* appear in connection with each one of the several things that there are? Or only in connection with some of them?—What difference does that make?—Well, as a matter of fact, it would not be possible for it to appear in connection with each of the things; for the simple reason that the number of things to be known is endless. Nor again could the True Knowledge be held to appear only in connection with some of the things; for in connection with those few things with reference to which True Knowledge would not appear, the man's Illusion would not cease; so that there would still be a residue of Illusion left behind; nor could the

* The passage न किञ्चिदनुत्पत्तिधर्मकं प्रतिज्ञायते gives no sense. The right reading is न किञ्चिदनुत्पत्तिधर्मकं व्ययधर्मकं प्रतिज्ञायते In the footnote we find a mis-reading of 'व्ययधर्मक'

† The *Tāṭparya* introduces this Daily Lesson thus: *Doubt, Instruments of and Objects of Cognition* have been only examined;—*Motive* and the rest also have been examined by implication under *Sūṭra* 2-1-7. So that all the sixteen cate-

Illusion in regard to one thing be removed by True Knowledge in regard to another thing."

Answer—'Illusion' consists in *wrong notion, misapprehension*,—not in mere *absence of True Knowledge*; and what is to be sought after is the *True Knowledge* of that thing the wrong notion of which becomes the active seed of metempsychosis.*

Question: –What is that *wrong notion* [which leads to metempsychosis]?"

Answer:—The notion of what is *not-Soul* as 'Soul,'—appearing in such forms as 'I am'; this is the *notion of 'I'* (Egoism, *Ahaṅkāra*), Illusion';† When one looks upon the

---

gories have been examined. It has been declared in *Sū*. 1-1-1 that the 'true knowledge' of these categories is the means of attaining the highest good; it has also been explained that it is the 'true knowledge' or *cognition of objects* that leads directly to the attainment of the highest good; that of the others helps only indirectly. What we proceed to examine now is whether from among the Soul and the other objects of cognition, is it the true knowledge of only a few, or that of all, that brings about the highest good.

On this the *Parishuḍḍhi*—In the *first* Daily Lesson of this Adhyāya, six *objects of cognition* have been examined; and we now proceed to examine 'True Knowledge,' which pertains to them. The questions for determination are —(a) what is True Knowledge? (b) To what things does it pertain? (c) How is it maintained? (d) How does it improve? First of all we procced to consider —to what does True Knowledge pertain and how does it appear?

The *Nyāyanibanḍhaprakāsha* raises the objection, (i) that it is not right to proceed with the *examination* of 'True Knowledge' before having defined it; and (ii) that there is no sameness of subject-matter between the two Daily Lessons, and hence there is no reason why they should form part of the same *Aḍhyāya*. The answers provided by it are as follows:—(i) the definition of 'True Knowledge' has been provided, by implication, in *Sūṭra* 1-1-2; and (ii) the real subject of the *Aḍhyāya* is the Examination of 'objects of cognition' in the form of 'Effects;' and 'True Knowledge' also is an *effect*.

* It is the Soul and such things connected with the Soul, which, when wrongly known, lead to birth and death; hence it is the wrong notion of these things that has to be got rid of, as it is the True Knowledge of these that leads to the cessation of metempsychosis. The different views are—(1) True Knowledge consists of realisation of Brahman, says the Vedāntin; (2) according to the Sāṅkhya it consists in discrimination between Matter and Spirit; (3) the Nyāya view is that it consists in the recognising of the Soul as eternal, as distinguished from the non-eternal things, Body, Sense-organs &c. &c.

†The *Ṭāṭparya*, after having criticised the other views, sums up the Nyāya view thus:—It is because the notion of 'I' consists in regarding as *Soul*, the Body

not-Soul as 'I am,' this is the conception that is called the notion of I' (Egoism, *Ahaṅkāra*).

Question :—"What are those things in regard to which people have the notion of 'I'?"

Answer :—They are—the Body, the Sense-organs, the Mind, Feelings and Cognitions.

Question :—"In what way does the *notion of 'I'* in regard to these become the seed of metempsychosis?"

Answer :—When a man looks upon the Body &c. as 'this is I,' he regards their destruction as *his own* destruction; so that he becomes imbued with a longing for the non-destruction of those, and thus becomes equipped with them over and over again; and thus becoming equipped with them, all his efforts tend to bring for him births and deaths; so that not being freed from these, he is never *released*. On the other hand, the man who looks upon Pain, Receptacle of Pain (Body), and Pleasure intermingled with Pain,—on all these things as 'Pain,'— he is the man who knows the real nature of 'Pain'; and when this 'Pain' has been duly recognised (in its true nature), it is not embraced by the man (as something desirable), and so comes to be dropped; just like poisoned food. This man comes to look upon 'Defects' and 'Action' also as sources of pain; and until the Defects have been removed, there is no possibility of cessation of the continuity of Pains; hence the man renounces the 'defects'; and when the 'defects' have been renounced, Activity does not lead to 'Rebirth,'—as has already being explained ('under Sū. 4-1-64).

Thus the man comes to the conclusion that Rebirth,' 'Fruition,' and 'Pain' are *things to be known*, and that 'Action' and 'Defects' are *things to be abandoned*, 'Final Release' is a *thing to be attained*, and True Knowledge is the *means of attaining it*. Thus when the man attends to, repeatedly looks upon and ponders over, the 'objects of cognition' as grouped under the aforesaid four categories,

&c, which are *not-Soul*, that people have such hopes as 'may I not cease to be, may I continue to live.' Such ideas come to only such men as regard the Body &c. as their 'Soul', and never to one who knows the real character of the Soul, as different from Body &c. This latter man looks upon his Body as the snake does upon its cast-off slough; and so does not feel attached to it, and does not fear separation from it.

[(1) things mistaken as 'Soul,' *viz.* Body *etc*; (2) things to be known, *viz.* 'Rebirth' &c.; (3) things to be renounced, *viz*: Defects and Action; and (4) things to be attained, *viz*: 'Release']—there comes to him right perception,—*i. e.* the cognition of things in their real character, *i.e.* *True Knowledge.*

It is with a view to the above that we have the following *Sūṭra*:

Sūṭra (1).

FROM THE TRUE KNOWLEDGE OF THE 'CAUSES OF DEFECTS' FOLLOWS THE CESSATION OF THE NOTION OF 'I.'—(Sū. 1).

The 'objects of cognition' beginning from 'Body' and ending with 'Pain' [*i. e.* Body, Sense-organs, Objects of Perception, Apprehension, Mind, Activity, Defects, Rebirth, Fruition and Pain] are called the 'cause of Defects,' because these are what form the subjects of *wrong notions*;—hence when the 'True Knowledge' of these comes about, it sets aside the notion of 'I' in regard to them; for the True Knowledge of the said things (which are not the *Soul*, which alone can be rightly spoken of as 'I') is incompatible with the notion of 'I' in regard to those same things. Thus when True Knowledge has been attained, '*there is a cessation of each member of the following series—Pain, Birth, Activity, Defect and Wrong Notion,—the cessation of that which follows bringing about the annihilation of that which precedes it; and this ultimately leads to Final Release.*' (Sū. 1-1-2.)

Thus we find that this brief statement of the main doctrine of philosophy is only a re-assertion (of what has been stated already under Sū. 1-1-2), and it is not meant to put forward any new doctrine.

Vārṭika on Sū. (1).

[P. 504, L. 1 to P. 505, L. 9.]

Question—"When True Knowledge appears, does it appear in connection with each and every thing, or only in regard to certain particular things? In regard to each and every thing it is not possible for True Knowledge to appear:—why?—because the number of things to be known is endless. On the other hand, the person, who holds that only certain particular things form the objects of True Knowledge, should

be met with the following detailed argument: It is clear that the *Siddhāntin* means to exclude things other than the Soul and the other 'objects of cognition'; that is, the Sūtra (1-1-9), which speaks of the Soul and other things, does not mention *all things*; if it did so, then the specific mention of the 'Soul' &c., would be meaningless; it is clear therefore that it speaks of only a few particular 'objects of cognition', —just those in regard to which *True Knowledge* puts an end to metempsychosis, and in regard to which *Illusion* leads to the continuation of metempsychosis; it is just these few 'objects of cognition' that have got to be known. Such being the position of the *Siddhāntin*, the following question arises in connection with it:—

"Does True Knowledge appear in connection with each and every one of the several things, or only in connection with some of them? It could not appear in connection with each and every thing; as the number of 'Soul' and other things is endless.—'What is the meaning of these being *endless*?' —The meaning is that in regard to the number of these things we are not cognisant of any limit If, on the other hand, it be held that True Knowledge appears only in connection with a few things,—then there would be no end of the Illusion pertaining to those other things in connection with which True Knowledge has not appeared; and where there is Illusion, there are Attachment and Hatred; and these latter constitute Bondage; so that under this theory there would be no possibility of Release. If you hold that—'the true knowledge of one thing will remove the Illusion in regard to another,—then in that case Release would be possible for each and every living being; for there is no such living being as does not know the truth in regard to a single thing."

Vār: P. 506.

Our answer to the above is as follows: There is no force in the above; as it shows that the Opponent has not under-

stood the real meaning of Illusion : 'Illusion' does not consist in the mere *non-appearance (absence) of True Knowledge*; Illusion is *wrong notion*; hence what is meant is that it is necessary to know the true nature of those things the wrong notion of which becomes the source of metempsychosis.

Question :—"What is that *wrong notion*?"

Answer :—The notion of 'Soul' in regard to what is *not-Soul*. The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya*.

From the true knowledge etc., etc.—says the *Sūṭra*. The Objects of Cognition—from 'Body' down to 'Pain'—are the 'cause of Defects;' as it is only in regard to these that there is *wrong notion*; and when True Knowledge appears in regard to these, it removes the notion of 'I' in reference to them; as 'true knowledge' of them is not compatible with the notion of 'I' in regard to them. All this has been explained under Sū. 1-1-2.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (2).

[P. 232, L. 20 to P. 226, L. 4.]

The order in which the true knowledge is to be attained is as follows.*

Sūṭra (2).

COLOUR AND OTHER OBJECTS, WHEN THEY FORM THE SUBJECTS OF WRONG NOTION, BECOME THE CAUSE OF DEFECTS. (Sū. 2).†

Such objects of Sense-perception as form the objects of desire are spoken of here as 'Colour and other objects;' when these are wrongly conceived, they set going Attachment Hatred and Illusion. Hence it is these objects that the man

---

* Puri Ms. B. reads प्रसंख्यानानुपूर्वी, which gives better sense.

'It has been declared that one should set aside the notion of 'I' in regard to the Body etc., which are not-Soul. Now the Sūṭra proceeds to describe with which of these latter the process should begin; and since the process is much easier in regard to external objects, the Sūṭra begins with these. '*Prasaṅkhyāna*' means true knowledge resulting from contemplation.—*Tāṭparya*.

† '*Saṅkalpa* is explained by the *Tāṭparya* as meaning 'wrong notion.' Vishvanāṭha specifies it further as the notion that 'these are good and desirable things'.

should seek to know (and understand in their true character) first of all. When the man knows the true character of these, his wrong notions in regard to Colour etc. disappear. When these have disappeared, then he should seek to know the things related to the Soul, such as the Body and the rest. When the knowledge of these has been attained, the notion of 'I' in regard to things related to the Soul ceases forthwith. Thus, the man, acting with his mind wholly unattached, either to external objects or to objects related to the Soul, comes to be called 'released'.

Vārṭika on Sū. (2).

[P. 505, L. 11 to P. 506, L. 5.]

Colour and other objects etc., etc.—says the Sūṭra. The objects of desire, which form the objects of sense-perception, are what are spoken of here as 'Colour and other objects.' When these objects are conceived of wrongly, they set up Attachment etc. "What is the *wrong conception* of these?" It consists in their being looked upon as the exclusive possession of one's self—expressed in such words as 'these are *mine* only.' These should be looked upon as 'common' to others, belonging, in common, to such others as gods, thieves, fire and relatives. When the man looks upon things in this manner, his Illusion in regard to them ceases. After this has ceased, the man should seek to rightly know the Body and such other things as are related to the Soul. "What would be the right knowledge of the Body etc?" It would be the knowledge that these are not the Soul, they are something totally different from the Soul. The man,

Vār: P. 506. who proceeds with his mind thus dissociated from things external as well as those related to the Soul, comes to be spoken of as 'released.' This is the condition that has been described in the passage—'While still living, the wise person becomes released from joy and sorrow.'

Bhāṣya on Sū. (3).

[P. 226, L. 3 to L. 13.]

The author next proceeds to instruct us as to the propriety of our ignoring certain aspects of things and pondering over certain others; and the next Sūtra has got nothing to do with either the proving or the disproving of things (as some people have supposed).

" What is this instruction ? "

Sūtra (3).

REGARD FOR THE OBJECT AS A WHOLE BECOMES THE CAUSE OF DEFECTS. SŪ. (3).

The regard or admiration for the object as a whole brings about defects. For instance (in connection with sexual love), for the Male, the conceiving of the Female as such, becomes a source of bondage, and for the Female the conceiving of the Male as such becomes a source of bondage. And there are two aspects in which the object (Male or Female) can be conceived of :—(1) the aspect of organs, and (2) the figurative or poetical aspect.*

The 'aspect of organs' pertains to the teeth and the lips, the eyes and the nose, one by one; and the 'figurative aspect' pertains to the teeth or the lips, being 'so and so beautiful.' All this three-fold aspect intensifies Desire and its attendant Defects; all which have to be avoided. The avoidance of the said object of love is to be done by conceiving of it in the terms of its limbs,—e. g. by conceiving of the Female as only made up of hairs, bristles, flesh, blood, bone, tendons, arteries, phlegm, bile, ordure and so forth. This is what is called the 'disagreeable aspect' (of the thing). When one ponders over this aspect of the thing, his desire and attachment for it cease.

Thus then we find that there being two aspects (agreeable and disagreeable) of each object, there is one aspect (the agreeable) which should be ignored, while the other (the disagreeable) should be pondered over. This is what is

---

* In translating 'pariṣkāra' as 'bondage' we have followed the Vārṭika, which says—*pariṣkāro banḍhanam*.

taught here. Just as in the case of the poisoned food, while the food-aspect is meant to be acquired, the poison-aspect is to be avoided.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (3).

[P. 506, L. 2 to L. 14]

The author next proceeds to instruct us as to the propriety of our ignoring certain aspects of things and pondering over certain others; and the next Sūṭra has got nothing to do with either the proving or the disproving of things; what is meant is that in regard to the object as it exists, a certain aspect has to be pondered over and another to be ignored and discarded.

Regard for the object as a whole &c., &c.— says the *Sūṭra*. Regard for the object as a whole brings about the Defects. The Female, in the aspect of a mere composite-object, should be pondered over; and in the aspect of 'Female' she should be ignored; she constitutes a bondage for the Male. The term '*pariṣkāra*' means 'bondage;' similarly for the Female the Male-aspect of the Male is a source of bondage. Of the Female-aspect (or the Male-aspect) also there are two aspects—the 'organ-aspect' and the 'figurative aspect.' The conceiving of the 'organ-aspect' is in the form—'teeth and lips,' in which the conception of the teeth is *as teeth*, and so forth. The 'figurative aspect' is in the form 'this is so and so'; in which the thing is described figuratively. All this constitutes Illusion, which leads to Attachment &c., and hence should be discarded. This does not mean that the *object as a composite whole* should be denied;—because it has been proved by proofs that things are composite in their character.

End of Section (1).

* The *Parishuddhi* remarks :—As a matter of fact, for one who seeks after Release, all things of the World, in all their aspects, are equally to be avoided, and are equally evil,—yet the author speaks of the two 'aspects' in regard to the ordinary Man of the World, who becomes desirous of Release only after having gone through a life of enjoyment.

Section (2).

[Sūtra 4—17].

Dealing with Components and Composites.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (4).

[P. 226, L. 14 to P. 227, L. 3.]

Now the Idealist, with a view to deny the Object, proceeds to deal with (and demolish) the 'Composite.' *

Sūṭra (4).

Pūrvapakṣa.

"APPREHENSION AND NON-APPREHENSION BEING TWO-FOLD, THERE ARISES DOUBT." (Sū. 4.)

"Since there is apprehension of existent as well as non-existent things, Apprehension is of two kinds; and since there is non-apprehension of existent as well as non-existent things, non-apprehension also is of two kinds. † So that if we apprehend the Composite, there is doubt, since Apprehension is of both kinds;—on the other hand, if we do not apprehend the Composite, then also there is doubt, since non-apprehension also is of both kinds. Thus then, whether the Composite is apprehended, or not apprehended,—in either case it does not become free from doubt."

---

* Says the *Tāṭparya*.—The Idealist proceeds to deal with the Composite for the purpose of demolishing it. The conceptions spoken of under the preceding Sūṭra are possible only when there is an object composed of several component parts. But since there is no such object, how can there be any such conceptions? It is with this view that the Idealist Pūrvapakṣa proceeds to demolish the *composite*; and this we shall follow with the denial of the Atom. So that the Composite and the Component Atom being both demolished, Idea would be the only thing left.

On this the *Parishuḍḍhi*—Some people have tried to get rid of the entire fabric of Instruction expounded under the preceding Sūtra, by denying the *Composite*, in the absence whereof none of the 'conceptions' described above are possible.

† There is apprehension of the existent thing when we see water in the tank; there is also apprehension of the non-existent thing when we perceive water in the mirage. There is non-apprehension of the existent thing when we do not perceive long-buried treasure; and there is non-apprehension of the non-existent thing when we do not perceive the absent Jar. So that whether we apprehend the Composite whole or not, there is doubt as to its existence or non-existence.—*Tāṭparya.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (4).

[P. 506, L. 15 to P. 507, L. 3.]

Now the Idealist, with a view to deny the Object, proceeds to deal with the Composite—(Bhāṣya). ["*Apprehension and non-apprehension &c., &c.*—says the Sūtra.] Since there is apprehension of existent as well as non-existent things, Apprehension is of two kinds; and since there is non-apprehension of existent as well as non-existent things, Non-apprehension also is of two kinds. So that whether the Composite is apprehended, or not apprehended, in either case it remains doubtful."

Vār. P. 507.

[The *Vārṭika* offers its own answer to the above].—

The answer to the above has already been given; as a matter of fact, the twofoldness of Apprehension and Non-apprehension cannot be a ground for Doubt; as we have found (under Sū. 1-1-23) that in the enumerating of the causes of Doubt, 'Apprehension and Non-apprehension' have been qualified by other terms prefixed to them.

Sūṭra (5).

Siddhānṭa.

THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT (IN REGARD TO THE COMPOSITE), AS ITS EXISTENCE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY REASONS ALREADY EXPLAINED BEFORE.—(Sū. 5).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (5).

[P. 227, Ll. 5—6.]

No doubt is possible (in regard to the Composite);—why? because the reasons already explained before (under Sū. 2-1-33 *et seq.*) have not been refuted; so that it remains established that there is such a thing as the *Composite* arising out of, and distinct from, the *Components*.

Vārṭika on Sū. (5).

[P. 507, L. 5 to L. 7.]

There can be no doubt &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. It is not right to have a doubt in regard to the Composite; for the simple reason that the reasons already propounded in its support have not be refuted; that is, the reasons that have been put forward to show that the *Composite* is something distinct from the Components are such as cannot be refuted.

Sūṭra (6).

[*Objection.*]—"IN THAT CASE, (WE MIGHT AS WELL SAY THAT), SINCE THE EXISTENCE (OF ANY SUCH THING AS THE COMPOSITE) IS IMPOSSIBLE, THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT (AS TO WHETHER IT EXISTS OR NOT)."* (Sū. 6).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (6).

[P. 227, L. 3.]

"No doubt is possible. That is, there *is* no such thing as the Composite. This is further explained (in the next Sūṭra).

Vārṭika on Sū. (6.)

[P. 507, Ll. 9-10.]

[The *Vārṭika* simply repeats the *Sūṭra and Bhāṣya.*]

Sūṭra (7).

[*Objection continued.*]—"INASMUCH AS THE COMPONENTS CANNOT RESIDE EITHER IN THE WHOLE OR IN A PART (OF THE COMPOSITE), IT FOLLOWS THAT THERE IS NO COMPOSITE."† (Sū. 7).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (7).

[P. 227, Ll. 10-12.]

"As a matter of fact, each single *component* cannot reside in the entire *Composite*; (1) because both are not of the same dimension, and (2) because, in that case, there would be no

---

* This Sūṭra is not found in the Puri Sū. Ms. The *Nyāyasuch'nibandha* has omitted नापि.

† Sūṭras 7 and 8 are not in Vishvanātha, nor in any Sū. Ms. They are found in the *Nyāyasūchinibandha*; and Vishvanātha also says that they have been regarded as Sūṭra. From the Bhāṣya—'*ṭad vibhajate*' also it would appear that they are '*Sūṭra*.'

connection between the *Composite* and the other *components*. Nor can the *component* reside in only a part of the *Composite*; for the simple reason that the *Composite* has no 'parts' apart from the *Components*."

"If (in order to escape from this difficulty) it be held that it is the *Composite* that subsists in the *Components* (and not the *Components* in the *Composite*),—[then our answer is as given in the following *Sūṭra*]."

Vārṭika on Sū. (7).

[P. 507, L. 12 to P. 508, L. 5.]

"*Inasmuch as* &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. (A) Do the Components reside in the Composite? (B) or, the Composite in the Components?

"(A) If the Components reside in the Composite, do they subsist in the entire Composite or only in a part of it? It is not possible for the Components to reside in the entire Composite; because there is a difference of size between the Component and the Composite,—the Component being of smaller and the Composite of larger size; and it is not possible for the thing of smaller size to fill up the whole of the thing of larger size; and further, since a single Component

Vār. P. 508.

would reside in the entire Composite, this latter would consist of a single substance (and not of several component parts), and certainly there is no object known to us which consists of a single substance and which subsists in a substratum which is indestructible [*i.e.*, the hypothesis would mean that every Composite object, as composed of only one Component, is eternal, which is absurd].* Nor is it possible for the Component to reside in a part of the Composite; *for the simple reason that the Composite* has no 'parts' apart from the Components themselves; and further,

* The reading of the passage appears to be corrupt. We have adopted the reading एकद्रव्यश्चावयवी प्राप्नोति एकावयववृत्तित्वात्. That this is what is meant is clear from the *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 8 and the note by *Tāṭparya* thereupon (see below).

even in that part of the Composite, does the component reside in the whole of that part of or only in a part of it? and so on, the objection may be stated at each step."

"(B) If, on the other hand, it is the Composite that resides in the components—[then that is open to the objection pointed out in the following *Sūtra*]."

Sūtra (8).

[*Objection continued.*]—"INASMUCH AS IT IS NOT POSSIBLE (FOR THE COMPOSITE) TO RESIDE IN THEM,—THERE CAN BE NO COMPOSITE." (Sū. 8).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (8).

[P. 227, L. 14-16.]

"(a) The *entire* Composite cannot reside in each one of the Components,—because they are of different sizes; and further, because in this manner the (Composite) object would consist of a single component substance [and as such it would have to be regarded as eternal, which is absurd]. (b) Nor can the Composite subsist *in parts* in all the components; as it has no other parts (except those same components)."

"From all this it follows that it is not right to entertain any doubts (as to whether the Composite exists or not); the conclusion doubtless is that there does not exist any such thing as the *Composite*."

Vārtika on Sū. (8.)

[P. 508, L. 7 to L. 14].

Inasmuch as it is &c. &c—says the *Sūtra*. The Composite cannot subsist in its entirety in each one of the Components; because they are of different sizes; and also because, if it did, then the Composite would be a substance consisting of a single component; as subsisting in a single component, the Composite would consist of that single component substance; and as such a composite would be produced out of a single substance, it would be produced constantly at all

times. Further, being composed of a single substance the Diad would reside in a single Atom; and hence as there could be no disruption of its constituents the thing would be eternal. And yet we have no instance of any such thing as is produced and is eternal. If, on the other hand, the Composite subsists only in parts in the components, then it means that the Composite has component parts other than those of which it is composed,—which other parts alone would reside in the latter components."

Sūṭra (9).

[*Objection continued.*]—"AND SINCE THE COMPOSITE CANNOT RESIDE APART FROM THE COMPONENTS (THERE CAN BE NO SUCH THING AS THE COMPOSITE.*" (Sū. 9).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (9).

[The correct reading of the *Bhāṣya* on this *Sūṭra* is found in Puri Ms. B—अवयव्यभाव इति वर्तते । न चावयव्यवयवेभ्यो वर्तते, अग्रहणात् नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च । तस्मान्नास्त्यवयवीति]

"*There can be no such thing as the 'Composite'*—these words have to be brought in from the preceding *Sūṭra*. The Composite cannot reside apart from the components,—(1) because it is not so perceived, and (2) because in that case it would be eternal. For these reasons it follows that there is no such thing as the Composite."

Vārṭika on Sū. (9).

[P. 508, U. 16-18.]

"*And since the Composite cannot etc. etc.*—says the *Sūṭra*. The Composite cannot reside elsewhere than in the component; (1) because it is not so perceived, and (2) because it would, in that case, be eternal. If it existed apart from the components, it would have been so perceived; and it would also be eternal; as every substance which is without a sub-

* Vishvanāṭha notices three interpretations of this Sūṭra:—(1) As in the *Bhāṣya*. (2) the Composite could not subsist apart from the components; as in that case it would be non-existent;—(3) For reasons given in the preceding Sūṭra, the Composite could have no existence even apart from the components; hence it does not exist at all.

stratum is eternal [and the object existing apart from its constituent parts must be one without substratum; the constituent part being the only possible substratum of things]."

Sūtra (10).

[*Objection continued.*]—" LASTLY, THE COMPOSITE CANNOT BE THE SAME AS THE COMPONENTS."* (Sū. 10).

[*Bhāṣya* on Sū. (10).

[The printed text entirely omits the words of the *Bhāṣya* on this *Sūtra*. They are found thus in Puri Ms. B :—न चावयवानां धर्मोऽवयवी । कस्मात् । धर्मस्यास्य धर्मिभिरवयवैः पूर्ववत् सम्बन्धानुपपत्तेः । पृथक् चावयवेभ्यो धर्मिभ्यः धर्मस्याग्रहणादिति समानम् ।]

"The Composite cannot be regarded as a mere qualification of the Components;—why?—because, as shown above, there can be no connection of the said qualification with the *qualified* components; and apart from the *qualified* components, the qualification is never perceived; this last argument being the same as that urged before (in the preceding *Sūtra*.)"

Vārtika on Sū. (10).

[P. 509, L. 2 to L. 8.]

"*Lastly the Composite etc. etc.*—says the *Sūtra*. The Composite cannot be a mere qualification of the Components;—why?—because, as already shown before no relationship is possible between the Composite,—the *qualification*;—and the Components—the *qualified*. Further, the *qualification*, Composite, is not perceived apart from the *qualified*, Components; for if it did, then it would be eternal,—as we have just shown. Then again, if the Composite subsists in part only in the Components, then the Composite comes to be a mere conglomeration of the components. If the Composite subsisted in part in one component, then the perception of that single

* This Sūtra is directed against those persons who have held the following view:—"The Composite is only a qualification of the Components, and it is neither absolutely different from them, nor absolutely non-different; it is *both* different and non-different from them."

component should bring about the perception of that part only of the Composite; so that the Composite would be perceived in place of that part only; but as a matter of fact, the perception of a single yarn does not lead to the perception of the Cloth. From all this follows the doubtless conclusion that there can be no such thing as the *Composite.*"

Sūtra (11).

[*Answer.*—From the standpoint of the *Siddhānta.*]—INASMUCH AS THERE IS NO DIVERSITY IN WHAT IS ONE ONLY, TERMS CONNOTING DIVERSITY CANNOT BE APPLIED TO IT; SO THAT THERE IS NO ROOM FOR THE QUESTION PUT BY THE PŪRVAPAKṢIN† Sū. (11).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (11).

[P. 226, L. to L. 9.]

There is no room for the question—"Does the Composite reside in the Components in its entirety, or only in parts?"—[as put by the Purvapakṣin under Sū. 7 *et. seq.*].—Why?—Because *inasmuch as there is is no diversity in what is one only, terms connoting diversity cannot be applied to it.* As a matter of fact, the term '*Kṛitsna*', 'entire', connotes *all members of a group consisting of several individuals*, and the term '*ēkadēsha*,' 'a part,' connotes a few individuals out of

*A *composite* is so called only because it subsists in *components*; hence if only parts of the former subsisted in the components, then these parts would be real 'composites;' and as the former composite would subsist in the components, only in parts, and not in its entirety, it would not be entitled to the name 'Composite'. And as the Composite would be perceived only as subsisting in the components,—and it would be only its parts that would so subsist—the composite would be perceived in every such component in which its part subsists.' That is, part of the Cloth subsisting in yarn, the perception of this yarn should the lead to the perception of the Cloth.—*Tatparya.*

†The *Vartika* remarks that there are two parts of the *Pūrvapakṣa*:—(1) Do the components subsist in the Composite? and (2) If the Composite subsists in the components, does it do so in its entirety or in parts? The (1) is ignored by the *Sūtrakāra* for the simple reason that no Logician acknowledges the subsistence of the component (cause) in the composite Effect.

Hence it is only the (2) that is answered by the *Siddhāntin* in this *Sūtra.*

several; so that both these terms, 'entire' and 'in part' are connotative of *diversity*; and as such they cannot be applied to the *Composite* which, being a single entity, is devoid of diversity.

Vārtika on Sū. (11).

[P. 509, L. 8 to L. 17]

The suggestion that the Components reside in the Composite cannot be accepted; as no such view is admitted by us; (according to us) it is not the Cause that subsists in the Effect, but the Effect that subsists in the cause. Then as regards the question—"If the Composite subsists in the components, does it do so in its entirety or in parts?"—our answer is as follows:—

Inasmuch as etc. etc.—says the *Sūtra*. The term 'entire,' as well as the term 'in parts,' are both connotative of diversity, and as such they are inapplicable to what is one only; the term 'entire' connotes *all* of several individuals, and the term 'in parts' connotes a few of several; and such terms are not applicable to the thing in question. So that neither the term 'entire' nor the term 'in parts,' is applicable to the *Composite* (which is *one* only).

Bhāṣya on *Sūtra* (12).

P. 228, L. 9. to P. 229, L. 3].

Further, the Pūrvapakṣin has argued that—"the Composite cannot reside in parts in the Components, because it has no other 'parts' (apart from the components)";—but this is not right reasoning.

Sūtra (12).

EVEN IF THERE WERE OTHER PARTS (OF THE COMPOSITE), * IT COULD NOT SUBSIST (IN THE COMPONENTS); HENCE THE REASONING IS NOT RIGHT. (Sū. 12.)

---

* The printed text reads अवयवान्तराभावे; as also Vishvanātha, Puri Bhā. Ms; Puri Sū. Ms.; and Sū. Ms. C. But Sū. Ms. D, the *Nyāyasūchinbandha* and the *Tātparya* read अवयवान्तरभावे. Mss. of the *Vārtika* contain both. In view however of the explanation given in the *Bhāṣya*, अवयवान्तरभावे should be accepted as the right reading.

[In support of the proposition that the Composite cannot subsist in the components, or in its parts] the Opponent has propounded the reason "because the Composite has no other parts"; but * even if 'parts' of the Composite were actually other than its Component, the meaning (of the Composite subsisting *in part* in the Components) would be that one part or component subsists in another part or component,—and not that the Composite subsists in them. If the Composite be accepted as being something different (from the Components), then,—even though it had 'parts' other than its components, it would not mean the subsisting of the Composite; and hence it would not mean that it is *in parts* that the Composite subsists in the components;—so that there can be no force in the reasoning—"because it has no parts apart from the Components (the Composite subsists in parts in the Components)."

Question:—"What is the meaning then of the *subsisting* (of the Composite in the Components)?"

Answer:—What it means is that there is *co-existence* (juxtaposition), consisting in the relation of container and contained, between the one (Composite) and the many (Components).

"What is the meaning of the relation of container and contained?"

It means that when between two things it is found that one can have no existence apart from the other, the latter is called the 'container'; and as a matter of fact, the Product can have no existence apart from its constituent cause; but this is not the case with the constituents (which may exist apart from the product). [So that what is meant by the Composite subsisting in the Components is that it cannot exist apart from these latter].

"But how can this be so in the case of eternal things (which have no cause)?"

In their case we infer it from what we perceive in the case of non-eternal things. What you mean to ask is—"how can there be the relation of container and contained in the case of eternal things?"—and our answer is that when

---

* भूतत्व does not give good sense. Puri Ms. B. reads अवयवान्तरभूत which gives better sense.

we perceive in the case of non-eternal things—substances and qualities—the relation of container and contained, we infer from this that similar relation exists in the case of eternal things also.

From all that has gone before (under Sutras 4-12) it follows that what has been prohibited (under Sū 8)—for the benefit of the person seeking after highest good—is the *having of regard for objects as a whole*; and it does not mean that there is no such thing as the *Composite*; just as in regard to Colour &c. what has been prohibited is the *wrong notion* of them; and the existence of Colour &c. themselves has not been denied.

Vārṭika on Sū. (12).

[P. 510, L. 2 to P. 512, L. 13.]

Even if there were etc. etc.—says the *Sūṭra*. "*Because there is no other part,*"—this is what you have put forward as your reason. Now if you admit of a part other than the Composite, even so it would mean that the part subsists in the part and not that the Composite subsists in the component; so that there is no force in the reasoning that—"the Composite cannot subsist in part in the component, because it has no other parts."

Then again, he who holds that one thing subsists in many, cannot be rightly taxed (with a request to explain whether the Composite subsists in the components in its entirety or only in parts); for, as we have already pointed out this question itself involves self-contradiction in both ways.

"If it is neither in its entirety nor in parts that the Composite subsists in the Component, then, in what manner does it subsist in them?"

The subsistence (of the Composite) in the components is in the form of the relation of container and contained; *i. e.*, the relation of *Inherence*. "How does that relation come about?" When one thing is unable to exist apart from another, it is said to *inhere* in this latter; *e. g.* the

Product is unable to exist apart from its constituent cause; while the reverse holds good in regard to the constituent causes; *i. e.*, the causes do not exist only in the Product. "How can there be the relation of container and contained in the case of eternal things?" That such a relation is present in the case of eternal things is inferred from our perceiving it in the case of non-eternal things; *i. e.*, in the case of non-eternal things * it is found that they subsist in the thing wherein they are perceived, similarly eternal things also subsist in that thing in which they are perceived; the circumstances being exactly alike in the two cases.

"But no different colour can be pointed out." You mean by this as follows:—"If the Composite is something different from the Components, then it behoves you to point out a colour of the Composite which would be different from the colour of the Components; just as, for instance, as you assert that the yarns that are *not* of variegated colour go to make up the Cloth of variegated colour. †" This however is not right; firstly because a thing can be regarded as the substratum of only that colour which is actually perceived in it; so that the colour of the Composite is exactly that which is perceived in it; the same being true of the Component also (of which also the colour must be that which is perceived in it);—and secondly, because your question involves the admitting of the relation of cause and effect ‡ (between the Composite and the Component), and as such

---

*यथाऽनित्यानि यत्रोप &c. as found in the Benares edition.

† पटं चित्रमारभन्ते is the right reading.

The *Tātparya* calls the citing of the instance of the variegated cloth as put forward in joke. The Naiyāyikas hold that several yarns, of which not a single one is of variegated colour, go to make the cloth of variegated colour. But this cannot be right; as no *one* colour can be called *variegated*,—the latter term implying diversity. Hence the jocular taunt is quite apt.—*Tātparya*.

‡ The right reading, in view of what follows, is कार्यकारणभावाभ्युपगमात्.

lands you in self-contradiction; when you say—"please point out the colour of the Composite,"—you admit the 'Composite' and the 'Component'; and by admitting these (which bear to each other the relation of cause and effect) you stultify yourself; and since this was the sole bone of contention between us, this admission proves that you have renounced the position you had taken up. Even admitting what you have said in regard to the variegated colour, we assert that the colour of the Cloth is the variegated one.* "But this would mean diversity." Your meaning is as follows:—"When one admits the colour of Cloth to be *variegated*, he admits the presence of several colours in the cloth; and certainly no single substance can have more than one colour; nor can there be one colour in several things." But this is not right; because the term 'variegated' connotes singleness as well as multiplicity; as a matter of fact, the term variegated connotes *one* as well as *many*: we have the expression '*chitram rūpam*' 'the variegated colour' (singular), as well '*chitrāṇi rūpāṇi*, 'variegated colours' (plural). "This is not true; for the term is never found applied to a single colour; as a matter of fact, we have never found the term 'variegated' used in reference to a single colour." This reasoning is not right; as it involves the renouncing of the position taken up; † one who does not admit *one* colour to be 'variegated' has to renounce the notion of *several* colours being 'variegated;' for '*several* variegated colours' is nothing more than the collection of a number of *single* 'variegated' colours. If it be held that several *non-variegated* colours go to make up the *variegated* colour,—even so 'self contradiction' does

Vār. P. 511.

* We assert this for the purpose of meeting your jocular taunt. That the colour of the Cloth is variegated is vouched for by actual perception, and it needs no other proof.—*Tātparya.*

† The right reading is [illegible]

not cease; to assert that the *non-variegated* becomes the 'variegated' is as self-contradictory as the assertion that 'non-white is white.' If you accept the view that—"the *non-variegated* colours of the yarns coming together, produce, in the Cloth, the *variegated* colour,"—then there is nothing in this that goes against our tenets. "But (if the cloth is of variegated colour, then) the other *face* of the cloth should be regarded as of variegated colour; that is, in the case where one face of the cloth is of variegated colour, while the other is not so, just as when we see the cloth we have the notion of 'variegated colour' in reference to one face, so we should have, *in reference to the other face* also, the notion that 'this is a cloth of variegated colour'." But you yourself say that '*only one face* of the cloth is of variegated colour,' and in this case it is not the *cloth* that is of variegated colour; as the *one face* is not the *Cloth*. "Why cannot we have the notion of *variegated colour* in regard to the said cloth (of which only one face is of that colour)? As a matter of fact, the Cloth made up of one face of *variegated* and another of *non-variegated* colour is certainly *a Cloth of variegated colour*; so that it stands to reason that just as we have the notion of *variegated* in reference to one face of the cloth, so we should have in reference to the other face also." Certainly no such contingency is possible; one variegated colour cannot be productive of another; how can the variegated colour on one side ever produce another (variegated) colour in the whole Object (Cloth)? All that can be said is that the two colours of the two parts (the two faces of the cloth) produce a new colour in the whole (Cloth); this is proved by our actually perceiving the whole (Cloth) to be so; and if the whole had no colour, it could not be perceived; the perception of the whole could not be due to the colour of the parts; for if this could be

Vār. P. 512.

possible, we could have perception* of Wind also; if the perception of one thing were due to the colour of something else, then it would be possible for us to perceive Wind also (which is colourless, through the colour in Fire)! And, certainly there is no perception of Wind. Hence it has to be admitted that it is through its own colour that the Composite whole is perceived; and the perception of colour in the whole Cloth made up of its two faces arises from our combining the perceptions of the two colours of its two faces; but this does not make the *whole* Cloth colourless.

From all this it follows that what the Sūṭra means is to prohibit all regard for the *Composite* whole, along with its accompaniments, and it is not meant to deny the Composite; just as what has been prohibited is the wrong notion that we have in regard to Colour &c., and Colour &c. themselves are not denied. This fact has been expressed by the sage in the following verse :—

'The objects of sense-perception, if not duly discriminated, lead to evil, so that all persons acting through the sense-organs would become contaminated by evil.'

Bhāṣya on Sū. (13).
[P. 229, L. 3 to L. 7.]

Under Sū. 2-1-34 the *Siddhānṭin* has put forward, in proof of the existence of the Composite, the argument that—'if there were no Composite, there would be non-apprehension of all things'; and even though he has been answered by this, the *Pūrvāpakṣin* re-asserts his contention [having been reminded of the previous arguments by the reference to them in Sū. 4-2-5] :—

Sūṭra (13).

"THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS WOULD BE POSSIBLE; JUST LIKE THE PERCEPTION OF THE MASS OF HAIRS BY THE PERSON OF DIM VISION (Sū. 13).

"As a matter of fact, we find that the man whose vision is dimmed does not perceive each single hair; and yet

* In the present context 'perception' stands for *seeing*.

he does perceive the mass of hair; similarly though each single Atom may not be perceived, yet it would be quite possible to perceive a mass of atoms. Thus the perception that we have of things (and which the Siddhāntin has put forward as inexplicable except by the assuming of the *composite* as apart from the component atoms) really pertains to the *masses of Atoms* (and not to any such thing as the Composite)."

Vārṭika on Sū. (13).

Though already answered by what has been said under *Sūṭra* 2-1-34, the Opponent comes forward with the following:—"*The perception of things etc. etc.*—says the *Sūṭra*. Though each hair singly is not perceived by the man whose vision is dimmed yet he perceives the mass of hair; similarly though each atom singly may not be perceived, yet it would be possible to perceive the mass of atoms; so that the perception that we have is to be taken as pertaining to *masses of atoms*."

Sūṭra (14).

THE EFFICIENCY (DISTINCTNESS) AND DULNESS (INDISTINCTNESS) OF THE PERCEPTION IS DUE TO THE EFFICIENCY AND DULNESS OF THE SENSE-ORGANS; BUT THESE NEVER GO BEYOND THE RANGE OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OBJECTS; AND THEY CANNOT OPERATE UPON WHAT IS NOT THEIR OBJECT. (Su. 14).

Bhāṣya or Su. (14).
[P. 229, L. 10 to L. 24].

This efficiency and dulness of the Sense-organs are in reference only to their respective objects; and it is from this that there follows the distinctness and indistinctness of the perceptions. That is, however efficient the Visual Organ may become, it can never apprehend *Odour*, which is not the special object of visual perception; and however dull it may become, it cannot fail to apprehend its own object. Now (turning to the case cited by the Opponent) there may be some person who, having his vision dimmed, does not perceive the hair singly; while there may be another who perceives

the mass of hair; and yet both (the single hair and the mass of hair) are perceived by the person whose vision is not dimmed. [But in all cases the man's eyes apprehend the Hair, either singly or in mass, which is an object perceptible with that organ]. Atoms, on the other hand, are beyond the reach of sense-organs; they never become objects of perception with the organs; they are never apprehended by any sense-organ;—under the circumstances, if the *Mass of Atoms* were perceived, (with sense-organs) it would mean that the organs have operated upon something which is not their object at all; for (according to the Opponent) there is no other object except Atoms (and Atoms are absolutely imperceptible). So that what the Opponent asserts (in Sū. 13) comes to mean that when the Atoms, being massed, become perceived, they renounce their inperceptibility,—and when, being disjoined, they fail to be perceived, they cease to be objects of perception by the sense-organs. All this would be entirely absurd, except on the supposition that a new object is produced (when the Atoms become massed). From all this it follows that what forms the object of perception is an object quite distinct (from the component Atoms).

It might be urged that "what forms the object of perception is merely the mass (of the Atoms themselves)." But this would not be right; for 'Mass' is only of the nature of *conjunction, combination*; and the *conjunction* of things that are themselves imperceptible can never be perceived; hence the explanation propounded would be highly improper. As a matter of fact, the 'Mass' is only *the conjunction or combination of several things*; and when we perceive a conjunction—as that 'this thing is in conjunction with that thing,'—it is only the conjunction of things that are themselves perceptible, and never that of things beyond the reach of sense-organs;—hence the explanation put forward cannot be right. Further, in the case of things perceptible by the sense-organs, if they fail to be perceived, there is always found some thing, in the shape of an obstruction, that serves to prevent the perception [and we do not find any such thing as should prevent our perceiving of the Atoms, if they were perceptible]. It follows from all this that the non-perception of single Atoms can not be due to the inefficiency of the sense-organs; just as the non-apprehension of Odour &c. by the Eye cannot be due to the inefficiency of that organ.

Vārṭika on Sū. (14).

[P. 513, L. 3 to P. 514, L. 2]

The efficiency and dulness &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. As a matter of fact, however efficient the Sense-organ may become, it never goes beyond its object; *e.g.*, however, efficient the Eye may become, it can never apprehend Taste. Similarly however inefficient the Sense-organ may become, it can never totally fail to apprehend its object. In fact it is only in regard to the special objects of the organs themselves that the perceptions become distinct or indistinct in accordance with the efficiency or dulness of the organs concerned: A perception is called 'distinct,' when there is apprehension of the Community to which the thing belongs, of its specialities and of the thing itself as endowed with those; and it is called 'indistinct' when there is apprehension of the Community only. The man with dimmed vision fails to perceive the single hair, but succeeds in perceiving the mass of hair; while for the man whose vision is not dimmed, both (the single hair as well as the mass of hair) become objects of perception by the Eye. The Atoms on the other hand are beyond the reach of the senses, and never become perceptible by the Eye; so that it would be most absurd to hold that when massed, the Atoms are perceived by the Sense organs, and when not massed, they are not so perceptible; for unless some peculiarity is produced in the Atoms, they cannot become perceptible. From all this it follows that there is such a thing as the Composite (composed of Atoms) which forms the object of perception.

"What forms the object of perception is only the mass or group; it is the massed or grouped atoms that become objects of perception."

This cannot be; the mass is only of the nature of Conjunction; when we come to examine the mass, it is nothing more than the Conjunction (Combination) of Atoms; and the Conjunction is perceived only as subsisting in things that are perceived,—the perception of Conjunction always appearing in the form '*this* is in conjunction with *that*' [where both *this* and *that* are perceived]. It is only when a thing is ordinarily perceptible that where it fails to be perceived, we always find some cause, in the shape of obstruction, of that non-perception. The Atoms however are never found to have the character of being perceptible; and hence their non perception (which is a fact) could not be due to the presence of any obstruction &c.

Vār: P. 514.

Sūtra (15).

THE DIFFICULTIES IN CONNECTION WITH COMPOSITES AND COMPONENTS WOULD CONTINUE TILL THE TOTAL NEGATION OF ALL THINGS. (Sū. 15).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (15).
[P. 230, L. 2 to L. 5.]

The Opponent has pointed out difficulties in the way in which the Composite may subsist in its components, and has, on that ground, denied the existence of the Composite. But the components (the pieces that go to make up the Jar, *e.g.*) also have their own component parts; and the said difficulties would be applicable to the way in which the Component may subsist in its own component parts; so that, these difficulties should either lead us to deny the existence of all things, or they would lead us on and on to the mere Atom, which has no component parts;—and either of these contingencies would mean that there does not exist anything that could be the object of perception, (the Atoms being imperceptible);—and in the absence of all objects of perception, there could be no perception;—and yet the denial of the subsistence of the Composite in its Components is supposed to be based upon facts of ordinary perception. Thus, when this denial (of the subsistence of the Composite &c.) ultimately leads to the denial of its very basis (in the form of Perception), it must

be regarded as striking at its own very root. [Hence the fact urged by the Siddhāntin under Sū. 2-1-34, remains, that if there is no Composite there can be no perception at all.]

Vārṭika on Sū. (15).

[P. 514, L. 4 to L. 12.]

The difficulties &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. On the strength of difficulties in regard to the subsistence of the Composite in its Components, the Opponent has denied the existence of the Composite; but as a matter of fact, these same difficulties would be found in the subsisting of the Components in their own component parts; and these difficulties would end either with the denial of all things, or at the Atom, which has no further parts (and as such would not have the said difficulties). "How so?" Well, it has been urged that the Composite, subsisting in its Components, could subsist in each Component either in its entirety on in parts; now the same might be said in regard to the Component subsisting in its own component parts,—to these latter subsisting in theirs; and so on and on, we would have to go on, either till we reached the indivisible Atom, or till we denied the existence of all things (on the strength of those difficulties). Under either of these contingencies there would be no object of perception; and yet the very argument of the Opponent—"Does the Composite subsist in its entirety or in parts?"—is meant to be based upon perceptible things. Thus, striking at its very basis, the argument demolishes itself.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (16).

[P. 230, L. 5 to L. 12.]

But as a matter of fact,—

THE TOTAL DENIAL OF ALL THINGS CANNOT BE RIGHT; FOR THE ATOM REMAINS (Sū. 16).

As a matter of fact however, the (Opponent's) denial of things based upon the difficulties in connection with the subsistence of components and their parts, would cease at the

Atom; it cannot lead to the total denial of all things. Because the Atom has no component parts; and difficulties based upon the dividing of things into their component parts must end at the thing than which there is nothing smaller. For instance, when we proceed to divide a clod of earth, into parts, we get at smaller and smaller particles; and this division must come to an end at that piece than which there could be no smaller piece, and which is (on that account) the smallest piece possible; and it is that very thing than which there is nothing smaller which we call 'Atom'.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (16).

[P. 514, L. 14 to L. 19.]

The total denial &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. As a matter of fact, the total denial of all things would not be possible; as the Atom would still be there. The division of things could continue only till we reach the Atom; for the name 'atom' applies to that at which the process of division ends and than which there is nothing smaller. When a clod of earth comes to be divided into smaller and smaller pieces, that point at which the division ceases, and than which there is nothing smaller, is what we call 'Atom.'

Sūṭra (17).

OR [THE ATOM MAY BE DEFINED AS] THAT WHICH IS BEYOND THE DIAD.—(Sū. 17).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (17).
[P. 230, Ll. 14—15.]

As according to the Pūrvapakṣa (*a*) there would be no end to the division of things into their component particles,

* It is only for the sake of argument that the two contingencies have been put forward in the preceding Sūṭra. It is now shown that the denial of the Composite can lead only to the postulating of the Atom; and as this is imperceptible, the Pūrvapakṣa view would do away with all Perception, as urged by the *Siḍḍhānṭin*, under Sū. 2-1-34.

and (*b*) all things would come to consist of equally innumerable component substances,—there could be no such thing as the *Diad*.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (17).

[P. 514, L. 19 to P. 515, L. 16.]

In case the division is not regarded as ending with the Atom, then, since *the Atom is that which is beyond the Diad*,—and since (according to the Opponent) there would be no end to the division of things into their component parts,—the Diad would become something immeasurable. As a matter of fact, the magnitude of the Diad is ascertained by means of number, size and gravity. And (if there is endless dismemberment of things) then no such conceptions would be possible as that 'in this Diad there is so much gravity,' 'so many Atoms on combining become the Diad.' "Why?" Because the very large object as well as the Diad would both, *ex hypothesi*, consist of an endless number of particles; so that just as the large object made up of a large number of atoms becomes immeasurable through any definite number, dimension or gravity,—so exactly the same would be the case with the Diad also, for the simple reason that in the latter also there would be an equally endless dismemberment of parts. It might be held that the division of objects (into their component parts) proceeds only so far as its disappearance. But this also cannot be right; because, inasmuch as no amount of division can put an end to the divided object, it cannot be right to assert that the division proceeds till the disappearance of the thing. As a matter of fact, the 'division' always rests upon the *divided* thing; hence it is a contradiction in terms

Vār. P. 515.

* The term '*ṭruṭi*', literally, 'dismemberment,' has come to mean the Diad. The point is that unless some end is postulated in the process of division, all things would consist of equally innumerable particles; which would mean that the mountain is of the same size as the grain of sand.

to say that 'the divided object has ceased to exist' and 'the division is there.' Further, he who regards the Atom to be something whose component parts can be further analysed, has to admit that the Atom is made up of component parts; and if it is made up of parts, the meaning of the term 'atom' should be explained;—what is the exact meaning of the word 'atom'? Then again, are the component parts of the atom of the same division as the Atom, or of a different dimension? If they are of the same dimension as the atom, then it would be impossible to explain which of the two is the *com osite* and which the *component*; for we never find things, which are of the same Dimension, ever bearing the relation of 'composite' and 'component.' If, on the other hand, the components of the Atom are of a different dimension —that cannot be right; as that would mean the denial of the Atom; that is, the hypothesis would mean that the Atom is a product (produced out of the smaller particles); and this would be tantamount to the denial of the 'Atom' as such (which by its very nature, must be indivisible, and an eternal constituent cause of things).

End of Section (2).

Section (3).

[Sūṭras 18—25.]

Regarding the Atom being without parts.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (18).

[P. 230, L. 15 to P. 231, L. 4.]

The Nihilist, holding the view that "all things are non-existent," urges the following argument* :—

* The theory of the whole world emanating from the Void has been disposed of under Sūṭras 4-1-14 to 17. The hypothesis taken up now is that all is mere *Void.* And in course of the refutation of this hypothesis, the Author proceeds to show that there do exist certain things that are devoid of parts ;— this subject being a natural sequence to the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing section that there is such a thing as the *Composite*, composed of Component parts.

Sūṭra (18).

[*Objection.*]—"THERE CAN BE NO SUCH THING (AS THE INDIVISIBLE ATOM), AS IT IS SURELY PERMEATED BY ĀKĀSHA." (Sū. 18.)

"*There can be no such thing* as the impartite eternal Atom;—Why?—*Because it is surely permeated by Ākāsha*; both inside and outside the Atom must be surrounded by Ākāsha, *permeated* by it; and being so permeated, it must be made up of parts; and being made up of parts, it must be non-eternal."*

Vārṭika on Sū. (18).

[P. 515, L. 17 to L. 20.]

The Nihilist, holding the view that "all things are non-existent," urges the following argument:—"*There can be no such* &c. &c.—says the Sūṭra. As a matter of fact, the Atom must be permeated by *Ākāsha*; and being so permeated, it must be non-eternal; just like the Jar."

Sūṭra (19).

"OR ELSE, ĀKĀSHA WOULD BE NOT ALL-PERVADING." (Sū. 19.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (19).

[P. 231, L. 6.]

"If it is not admitted (that the Atom is permeated by *Ākāsha*), then it would mean that there is no *Ākāsha* inside the Atom; so that *Ākāsha* would cease to be *all pervading*."

Vishvanāṭha introduces the section with the following remarks:—The present section is introduced with a view to establish the existence of the *impartite* Atom, in answer to the view that the world being a *Void* there can be no such thing as the Atom, on which the whole argument of the Siḍḍhānta in the foregoing section is based.

* The real point of this objection, as the *Ṭāṭparya* points out, is that if the Atom is made up of parts, its existence will be open to the same difficulties as those that have been shown to beset any ordinary Composite; so that the inevitable conclusion could be that the Atom is as non-existent as an ordinary thing,—and that *nothing is existent, all is Void.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (19).

[P. 516, Ll. 4—5.]

"*Or else* &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. If there is no *Akāsha* inside the Atom, then *Akāsha* ceases to be all-pervading; not being present within the Atom."

Sūṭra (20).

[*Answer.*]—INASMUCH AS THE TERMS 'INSIDE' AND 'OUTSIDE' ARE DENOTATIVE OF OTHER CONSTITUENT CAUSES OF THE PRODUCT,—THEY CANNOT APPLY TO THE CASE OF THE ATOM, WHICH IS NOT A 'PRODUCT.' (Sū. 20).

Bhāṣya on (Sū. 20).

[P. 231, L 9 to L. 12.]

When one uses the term 'inside' (in regard to an object), it stands for that constituent (part) of it which is hidden (from view) by other constituents; and the term 'outside' is applied to that constituent (part) which hides the others; and which itself is not hidden (from view). And [since both these terms are applied to parts or *constituent causes*], these can apply only to such objects as are *products*; they can never apply to the Atom, because it is not a *product*; the Atom not being a *product*, the terms 'inside' and 'outside' cannot apply to it; and the object to which these terms are really applicable is only a *product* (*composed*) *of the Atom*, and not the Atom itself; because the Atom is the name of that than which there is nothing smaller.

Vārṭika on *Sū*. (20).

[P. 516, L. 5 to P. 517, L. 13.]

When the Opponent argues that "the Atom must be non-eternal, because it is permeated by *Akāsha*,"—he should be asked to explain the meaning of 'permeation', what is really meant when it is said that the Atom is *permeated* by Ākāsha?

(*a*) If 'permeation' only means the relationship of *Akāsha* to the Atom, then what is urged does not go against our doctrine; for the mere relationship of *Akāsha* cannot make

the Atom either *eternal* or *non-eternal*. (*b*) If again, the Opponent were to put forward mere *relationship* as the ground for *non-eternality* (of the Atom), in that case the mention of '*Ākāsha*' would be pointless, as *non-eternality* would be established by mere relationship (not relationship to any particular substance); *e.g.* when the mere fact *being a product* is sufficient to prove the non-eternality of a certain thing, it is not right to put forward (as the ground of that non-eternality) the fact of being *produced by Ḍēvadaṭṭa*. (*c*) As for mere 'conjunction' (which may be regarded as meant by 'permeation'), this is referred to (by the Opponent) later on, under Sū. 4-2-24, as something that has already accomplished its purpose; and under the circumstances [if the 'permeation in Sū. 18, also meant only *Conjunction*] there would be a needless repetition of the same (under Sū. 4-2-24). Hence this cannot be the meaning of 'permeation.' (*d*) If then 'permeation' meant the relationship of the inside of the Atom,—that also would not be right; as the Atom is not a *product*; the terms,' inside' and 'outside' denote only the different constituents (causes) of a Product; and the Atom is not a *product*; consequently there can be no 'inside' or 'outside' (of the Atom). (*e*) If the 'permeation by *Ākāsha*' means the relation of Ākāsha with the component parts of the Atom, this also would be exactly like the last explanation; the Atom, not being a *product* cannot have any component parts. (*f*) If again 'permeation' be taken to mean the dismemberment of the component parts of the Atom,—this also may be taken as already rejected by the fact that the Atom is not a product; as a matter of fact, it is only the component parts of a product that can be dismembered; while the atom is not a product; and hence there can be no 'dismemberment of component parts' in its case. Even admitting that there *are* component parts in the

Vār : P..517. Atom,—the *Akāsha* cannot be the cause of their dismemberment; for the dismemberment of things is really brought about by Action (Motion); and there is nothing to prove that it is brought about by *Akāsha* also; in fact if one admits *Akāsha* to be the cause of the dismemberment of things, he would have to admit that no object ever remains intact; for the cause of dismemberment, in the shape of Ākāsha, being present (always and everywhere), no object could ever remain intact. "But even though present, *Akāsha* would stand in need of other causes (in actually bringing about dismemberment)." In that case, there can be nothing to prove that the *Akāsha* also, as apart from these other causes, has the power to bring about the dismemberment. (*g*) If lastly it be held that what is meant by the Atom being 'permeated' is that it is *hollow in side*,—that also cannot be right; for that thing alone is called 'hollow' which having its constituent parts intact in all parts, has no constituent parts in its interior; and as the Atom has no constituent parts, how could its 'per meation' mean 'hollowness'? There can be no other explanation possible (of 'permeation).' Hence the assertion—"because it is permeated by Ākāsha"—must be regarded as absolutely meaningless.

Then as regards what has been put forward under Sū. 19,—that "*Akāsha* would cease to be all-pervading, if it were not connected with the inside of the Atom,"—this also is not right; as it clearly 'shows that the Opponent does not know what is meant by 'all-pervading'; when a thing is called 'all-pervading,' it does not mean that 'it must be connected with what does not exist'; what it means is that it is connected with every object *that has a body* (that is corporeal),—this is what is meant by *all-pervadingness*. And

as there is no such thing as the 'interior' of the Atom, absence of connection with such an 'interior' cannot make the *Akāsha* cease to be *all-pervading.*

Sūṭra (21).

IT IS BY REASON OF THE PERVASION OF SOUND AND OF CONJUNCTIONS, THAT ĀKĀSHA IS REGARDED TO BE ALL-PERVADING.* (Sū. 21).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (21).

[P. 231, L. 14 to L. 16.]

As a matter of fact, Sounds, that are produced anywhere, are found to pervade in *Akāsha*, and subsist in it;—similarly the conjunctions that take place,—with Minds, with Atoms, and with their products,—are also found to pervade in *Akāsha*; not a single corporeal object is ever found to be disjoined with *Akāsha*. From these two facts it follows that Ākāsha cannot but be *all-pervading.*

Vārṭika on Sū. 21.

[P. 517, L. 15 to L. 18.]

It is by reason etc. etc.—says the *Sūṭra*. Inasmuch as the conjunctions with all corporeal objects pervade in *Akāsha* —and as Sounds also, whenever produced by the presence of their causes, subsist in Ākāsha,—and all these have *Akāsha* for their substratum,—it follows that *Akāsha is all-pervading.*

Sūṭra (22).

'ABSENCE OF TRANSFIGURATIONS,' 'UNOBSTRUCTIVENESS' AND 'ALL-PERVASIVENESS' ARE THE PROPERTIES OF AKĀSHA.† (Sū. 22.)

* The *Ṭāṭparya* expounds the compound in both ways—(1) Pervasion of Sound and of Conjunctions, and (2) 'Pervasion of the Conjunctions of Sounds.' The *Bhāṣya* has adopted the former.

The Vārṭika reads the *Sūṭra* as सर्वसंयोग &c.

† This *Sūṭra* anticipates the following objection :—"If Akāsha is really all-pervading, as asserted under the foregoing *Sūṭra*, then it should offer obstruction to things moving in it, and it should undergo changes in its shape by such objects; as we find in the case of water; as no such phenomena are found to take place, Akāsha cannot be all-pervading.

The sense of the reply is that this reasoning would be all right, if Ākāsha also, like Water, were made up of parts, and tangible.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (22).

[P. 231, L. 18 to P. 232, L. 5.]

There is no *transfiguration* (or displacement) caused in *Ākāsha* by things moving in it or striking against it; as there is in Water by the piece of wood passing through it;—and what is the reason for this?;—the reason for this lies in the fact that *Ākāsha* is not made up of parts. Secondly, *Ākāsha* offers no obstruction to things moving in it or striking against it; that it does not counteract that quality of the thing which causes its motion;—and why is this so?—It is because *Ākāsha* is not tangible. It is only under contrary conditions, *i. e.* in the case, of such objects as are made up of parts and are tangible,—that we find obstruction; and certainly you can not attribute it to a substance where these conditions are not present.

Further, the character of 'product' must be denied to the Atom, because it would mean that the component parts of the Atom are smaller than the Atom; if the Atom were made up of parts, these parts should be smaller than the Atom;—why?—because it is always found that there is a difference of size between the Cause and its Product; it is for this reason that the parts of the Atom would have to be smaller than the Atom; as the Atom that is made up of component parts must be a Product.* It is for this reason that we deny the fact of the Atom being a Product.

Lastly, the *non-eternality* of products is due to the dismemberment of its constituent cause, and not to '*permeation by Ākāsha*' (as held by the Opponent, in Sū. 4-2-18): *e.g.* when the clod of earth is destroyed, it is so by reason of the dismemberment of its component parts, and not by the entering into it of *Ākāsha*.

Vārṭika on Sū. (22).

[P. 518, L. 2 to L. 11.]

Absence of Transfiguration etc. etc.—says the *Sūṭra*. A moving or active object does not transfigure (or displace) *Ākāsha*; nor does *Ākāsha* obstruct the active qualities of the

---

* The right reading for स्युकार्यंतत् is स्यु:कार्यंतत्

moving and active object.—And why?—Simply because *Ākāsha* is intangible. It is only a tangible substance that is displaced by, or obstructs, things; and *Ākāsha* does not possess that property (of tangibility); hence it is *unobstructive*. *You cannot attribute what you find in tangible and partite things to what is the reverse of it.*

We have already pointed out that if the Atom were further divisible, it would no longer be the *Atom*.—Why?—Because the name 'Atom' applies to that at which the process of division ends, and than which there is nothing smaller.

Further, if the Atom were liable to destruction, such destruction could be due either to the destruction of its constituent (cause), or to the dismemberment of its constituents. As a matter of fact, neither of these is possible in the case of the Atom, because it is not a product, as we have already explained. For these reasons we conclude that it is not right to assert that "the Atom must be non-eternal, because it is permeated by Ākāsha" (Sū. 4-2-18).

Sūṭrā (23).

[The *Nihilist*]—"BUT THE ATOM MUST BE MADE UP OF COMPONENT PARTS; BECAUSE IT IS ONLY CORPOREAL OBJECTS THAT HAVE A SHAPE." (Sū 23).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (23).

[P. 232, Ll. 7-9.]

"As a matter of fact, shape belongs to only such things as are limited and tangible,—such shapes as triangular, rectangular, square, and globular; and this 'shape' is only a particular arrangement of component parts;—Atoms also are endowed with the globular *shape*;—hence these must be made up of component parts."*

*The *Vārṭika* and Vishvanāṭha construe the Suṭra as propounding two reasons:—'The Atom must be made up of components,—(*a*) because it is corporeal, and (*b*) because it has shape.'

Vārṭika on Sū. (23).
[P. 518, L. 13 to L. 16.]

But the Atom etc. etc.—says the *Sūṭra*. (*A*) Atoms must be made up of component parts, because they are corporeal; (*B*) because they have a shape, Atoms must be made up of parts; every object with shape, *e.g.* the Jar and such things, are found to be made up of parts;—the Atoms have shape;—therefore they must be made up of component parts."

Sūṭra (24).

"ALSO BECAUSE THEY ARE CAPABLE OF CONJUNCTION [ATOMS MUST BE MADE UP OF COMPONENT PARTS]." (Sū. 24).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (24).
[P. 232, L. 11 to L. 21].

"When an Atom comes between two other Atoms and becomes conjoined to them, it brings about separation between them; and from this separation it is inferred that the intervening Atom is conjoined, in its fore-part, with the Atom lying behind it, and, in its aft-part, with the Atom appearing in front of it; and these fore and aft parts are the 'component parts' of the Atom. Similarly when the Atom becomes conjoined in all its parts, it must be regarded as having component parts all over."

Vārṭika on Sū. (24).
[P. 518, L. 19 to P. 519, L. 5.]

"*Also because etc. etc.*—says the *Sūṭra*. What the *Sūṭra* means is that the Atom must be made up of component parts, because it is capable of conjunction. 'What is asserted in this *Sūṭra* has already been said under the preceding Sūtra, where the fact of the Atom having a shape has been put forward; and it is only a particular form of conjunction that has been spoken of by means of the term *shape*.' What is said under the present Sūtra is not what has been already said before; what has been spoken of as 'shape' is a particular form of conjunction *among the component parts* of the Atom; while what is spoken of as 'conjunction' is mere conjunction in general; so that the objection does not lie against us. [The difference between

Vār. P. 5-19.

the terms 'corporeality', 'shape' and 'conjunction' is as follows]—(*a*) the 'corporeality' belongs to only such objects as are limited in extension and it consists in the six kinds of dimension,—small, large, long, short, extremely small, and extremely short;—(*b*) 'Shape' is that particular kind of conjunction which is also called '*prachaya*', 'collocation;—and (*c*) 'Conjunction' is 'approach preceded by non-approach.'

Bhāṣya on Sū. (25).

[P. 232, L. 14 to P. 233, L. 6.]

[The *Bhāṣya* answers the arguments of the Nihilist, as follows]—

(A) As regards the argument—"*The Atom must be made up of component parts, because it is only corporeal objects that have a shape*" (Sū. 23),—this has been answered by us already. "What is the answer that has been given?" The answer given was—(*a*) that there can be nothing smaller than that at which the process of division comes to an end (P. 230, L. 9);—and (*b*) that the Atom cannot be regarded as a product, as, if it were so, then the parts of the Atom would be smaller still (P. 231, L. 22). (B) As regards the argument—"*also because they are capable of conjunction*" (Sū. 24), which means that "the Atom can bring about separation only if it is tangible, and conjunction not pervading over the whole of its substratum, it must be divisible into parts",—this also we have answered by pointing out that it is true that the Atom is tangible, but the separation caused by the intervening Atom is due to its being an obstacle in the way of the coming together of the two Atoms,—and not to its being made up of component parts. "But the Atom being tangible and causing separation, inasmuch as the conjunction of the Atom does not pervade over the whole of its substratum, the Atom must be divisible into parts, and it would appear as if it were made up of component parts." This also we have answered by pointing out (above)—(*a*) that the process of division must end at a thing than which there is nothing smaller, and (*b*) that the Atom cannot be regarded as a product, as that would mean that its parts are still smaller.

As regards the arguments—"(a) *Because it is only corporeal objects that have a shape* (Sū. 24), and (b) *because Atoms are capable of conjunction* (Sū. 24), Atoms must be regarded as being made up of component parts",—these arguments

CANNOT SET ASIDE (THE FACT OF ATOMS BEING IMPARTITE), BECAUSE THEY LEAD TO AN INFINITE REGRESS, AND INFINITE REGRESS CANNOT BE RIGHT (Sūtra 25).

The arguments put forward mean that everything that is corporeal, and everything that is conjunct,—all these are made up of parts; and as such these arguments lead to *an infinite regress*; and infinite regress cannot be right; if *infinite regress* were right, then alone could the said arguments have any force. Consequently these cannot set aside the fact of Atoms being impartite.

Further, as a matter of fact, it is possible for the division of an object to completely destroy that object; hence it is not possible to carry on the process of division till the disappearance of the object.

If there were an *infinite regress* (such as is involved in the Opponent's arguments), it would mean that in every object there are endless component substances; so that (a) there should be no conception either of diverse dimensions, or of gravity,—and (b) after the dismemberment of the component parts of the Atom, the Composite and the Component would have to be regarded as of equal dimension.

Vārtika on Sū. (25).

[P. 519, L. 5 to P. 524, L. 2.]

The arguments cannot set aside, etc., etc.—says the *Sūtra*. *Firstly*, as regards the argument—"because they are corporeal, Atoms must be made up of component parts,"—this is not conclusive; the component parts of the Atom, for instance, would be corporeal and yet without parts; so that the premiss of the argument is not true. (With a view to avoid this difficulty) it might be held that "there will be component parts of the Atom also;"—but in this manner, the Diad would be immeasurable, either by gravity, or by number, or by dimension,—as we have already explained (under Sū. 4-2-17.)

"But the corporeal object would go on being divided until it reaches the end." In that case that which is left at the end would have to be regarded as *without parts*. "That which is left at the end is division itself." That cannot be; for there can be no 'division' without *something to be divided*. In fact only the following alternatives are possible:—(*a*) the division ends with the Atom; (2) the division ends with the disappearance (of the thing divided); and (3) the division is endless. (1) Now if division be held to end with the Atom, then your reasoning involves self-contradiction; for in reality the Atom is with shape and is yet not made up of parts. "What is the *self-contradiction* in this?" [When you say that the division ends with the Atom] you admit the Atom to *be without parts* and to have a shape, and yet you assert that it is *made up of parts*; and this assertion of yours is contrary to your former admission. (2) and (3) If, on the other hand, the division be held to be either without end, or to end with the disappearance of the thing,—even so (1) there would be self-contradiction, (2) there would be the incongruity of the Diad being immeasurable (if there were no end to the division), and (3) the division would be without a substratum (if the division went on till the disappearance of the thing).

Further, in your Proposition 'the *Atom* is *made up of parts*,' the two terms are mutually contradictory. "How so?" The expression 'made up of parts' means that the thing has been produced out of, and subsists in, a homogeneous substance,—the component part being the homogeneous substance in which it subsists; so that when it is said that the Atom is made up of parts, it means that the Atom is a particular kind of product; and to call it the 'atom,' and then to say that it is a particular kind of product, involves a self-contradiction in terms. [For the very name 'atom'

connotes that which is the *final constitutent cause* of things, which, as such, can never be a *product*]. If you hold that what is generally called the 'Atom' is preceded by (produced out of) just one (smaller) Atom;—then this would mean that the Atom is *not made up of parts*; according to this view there would be no *component parts* in the Atom; all that it would mean would be that being preceded by (produced out of) Atoms, the Atom is a *product*. And this assertion would be untenable, as there could be no instance to substantiate such a proposition; there is no instance available to show that there is any thing produced out of a single constituent cause. Further, in the event of the Atom being produced out of a single constituent cause, there would be no need of causal appurtenances or factors; so that there would be no such thing as the 'previous non-existence' of the Atom [as the 'previous non-existence' of a thing is that point at which all its causal factors are present and all that remains is the actually coming into existence of the thing; so that in a case where there are no causal appurtenances, there can be no 'previous non-existence'];—and there can be '*producing*' (or 'coming into existence') of that of which there is no 'previous non-existence.' "But in the case of Sound it is admitted that there is *previous non-existence*, even though it is preceded (produced) by a single sound." This also is not true; in the case of Sound there is not only one cause; what really happens is that one Sound is produced by another Sound, only as aided by several factors in the shape of the particular receptacle and so forth.

Var. P. 520.

Even admitting that the Atom is produced out of a single Atom,—what would be the meaning of its being *made up of parts*? Which (Atom) would be the *composite*, and which the *component part*? "That atom which is the cause would be

the *component part.*" In that case, since the *cause-atom* would not be existing at the time that the *product-atom* exists, you would have to explain what the meaning would be of *being with parts.**

Then again, when the Opponent argues—"because the Atoms are corporeal, they must be made up of parts,"—he should be asked the following alternative question:—What is that 'body,' '*mūrṭi*,' by virtue of which the Atom is called 'corporeal,' '*mūrṭimān*'? If there is such a 'body,' is it something different, or non-different, from the Atom itself? If the 'body' consists of a particular Colour &c.,—then, in accordance with your tenets, there is nothing that could be 'corporeal' by virtue of such a 'body'; for according to you there is no proof for the existence of any Atom apart from Colour &c.; you hold that the Atom consists of Colour &c. in their minutest form; and what is itself only Colour &c. cannot be regarded as 'corporeal' by virtue of the same Colour &c. And if the 'body' is not different from the Atom, then we do not see what could be the meaning of the possessive affix, '*maṭup*' (in '*mūrṭimān*,' 'corporeal'). "But even in the case of non-different things, we find the possessive affix used: when, for instance, we speak of the army as being '*hasṭimaṭī*,' 'equipped with elephants'." Our answer to this is that we have never found the possessive affix used in the case of non-different things; (as regards the example cited) we have already shown above (in *aḍhyāya* II) how the 'army' is something different (from the elephant &c. constituting it).† Thus then, if the Atom is not something different (from Colour &c.,), and there is no 'body' (of the Atom), the statement 'atoms are made up of parts

---

* When the *part* is not present, how can the product, whole, be said to be *with parts*?

† सेना ऽर्थान्तरम् is wrong; the right reading is सेना ऽर्थान्तरं

because they are corporeal,' comes to mean that 'Colour &c. are endowed with Colour &c., because these are possessed of Colour &c.'! This same reasoning also disposes of the argument that "the cloth must be made up of parts, because it is corporeal" for the 'cloth' also you do not admit to be anything different from Colour &c.; nor do you admit its *corporeality;* and yet you assert that 'the cloth is made up of parts because it is corporeal,'; and if by this statement you admit the cloth to be something different, then you stultify yourself; while if you do not admit it, then your desired conclusion is not proved; for the right corroborative instance is that which is endowed with both qualities (the probans and the probandum), while in the case of the cloth, 'being made up of parts' cannot mean 'corporeality.'*

Var. P. 521.

What has been said above also serves to dispose of the Opponent's argument—"Atoms must be made up of parts because they are capable of conjunction" (Sū. 4·2·24). For if 'Conjunction' is admitted (as something different from Atoms), then there is self-contradiction (on the part of the Nihilist); while if it is not so admitted, then the "premiss ('because they are capable of conjunction') means 'because they are atoms'! If it be held that 'capability of conjunction' means being endowed with a peculiar configuration,—then such a probans would be what is not admitted (by both parties); for 'being endowed with a peculiar configuration' means exactly what is meant by 'being made up of parts.'' If by 'configuration' you mean that particular dimension of things which is not all-pervading,—in that case 'being endowed with configuration' would mean the same as 'being corporeal'; so that there would be no point in putting forward both the premisses—'because they are corporeal' and

* This is an obscure passage: we have put upon it the best construction possible. But the sense is not quite clear.

'because they are endowed with a peculiar configuration.' *It has also been pointed out*, (says the Bhāṣya) *that the process of division must end at a thing than which nothing is smaller, and that the Atom cannot be regarded as a product, as that would mean that its parts are still smaller.*

Another way in which the Opponent puts his argument is as follows:—"*Because the Atom is capable of conjunction*, that Atom, which, appearing between two other atoms, becomes connected with both, must have parts. This same idea is expressed in the following verse:—'Since there is simultaneous connection with six atoms, the Atom must have six parts; if all six occupied the same point in space [*i. e.* subsisted in the same substratum] * the aggregate would still remain a mere Atom.' That is to say, inasmuch as (in the Triad) the Atom becomes simultaneously connected with six Atoms, it must have six parts, because the several connections must be in different parts of it; if all the connections were in the same part, then the aggregate formed of the six Atoms could still be a mere Atom."

[Our answer to the above is as follows]—If what you speak of is in reference to each pair of Atoms (that are in contact with a central atom), then the conjunctions certainly do not appear in the same substratum † [That is, one conjunction, that of the first Atom with the central atom, appears in the *first atom*, while that of the second atom with the central Atom, appears in the *second Atom*, so that they do not appear in the same substratum, and yet this does not prove that the Atoms have parts]. If, on the other hand, what is said is in reference to that central Atom with which the other Atoms are connected, then, inasmuch as

---

* The *Tātparya* explains "ḍēsha' in this context as equivalent to *ādhāra*," 'substratrum.'

† The reading allowing to the *Tātparya* is सर्वेभिन्नदेशता

the several conjunctions of the latter would subsist in the single central Atom, there would be nothing objectionable in the statement that the conjunctions (of the single Atom) with the several Atoms appear in the same substratum. Then, as regards the assertion (in the second part of the verse) that "the conjoined Atoms would occupy the same point in space (*i. e.* subsist in the same substratum)",—this is not right; because we do not hold any such view: [according to our view], there is no such thing as 'substratum' for the Atom; how then could they be said to subsist in the same substratum? * Further, as a matter of fact, there is no object in nature that subsists in precisely the same substratum as another thing; so that the example cited in support of the Opponent's reasoning must be *untrue* (unknown). "But the Cause and its Product do subsist in the same substratum; *e. g.* when the Jar comes to be connected with a piece of Cloth, it becomes connected also with the yarns (constituting that cloth), and also with the parts of those yarns. [So that instances are not wanting in support of the allegation that several 'atoms subsist in the same substratum']." This is answered by the simple fact that we do not admit of any such thing; what happens (in the case cited) is that the conjunctions subsist in the same substratum, and not the Cause in its Product. †

Vār. P. 522.

* What subsists in a substratum can never be the Atom; as the Atom does not subsist in anything; so that in the case in question what would subsist in the same substratum would be the *Conjunctions*, not the *Atoms*.

† What we are denying is the fact that two things cannot subsist in the same substratum,—*i. e.* they cannot inhere in the same substratum; we do not deny the conjunctions subsisting in the same substratum; and it is only if several atoms subsisted in the same substratum, by *inherence*, that they would remain a mere *atom*; and there would be no enlargement in their dimension; *e g.* the several qualities of Colour, Odour, and Taste inhering in the same object do not enlarge its dimension threefold; and the reason for this lies in the fact that these qualities are immaterial, incorporeal, and as such can inhere in the same substratum. In the case of corporeal substances, on the other hand, no such co-inherence in the same substratum is

[This has been said after admitting, for the sake argument, the hypothesis of the Opponent.] As a matter of of fact however, Conjunctions also cannot subsist in the same substratum as the conjunction subsists between each separate couple of things *. So that the allegation—"all six subsisting in the same substratum,"—is not true, either as referring to the co-subsistence of the *substances* (Atom), or as referring to the co-subsistence of the *conjunctions*.

Another argument propounded by the Nihilist is—"that in which there is diversity of space-points (as there is in the Atom, which combines with several Atoms on its several space-points) cannot be regarded as *one* [Hence that which is regarded as *one* Atom must be regarded as consisting of several parts]." But who says that there is 'diversity of space-points'? What are regarded as the 'several space-points' are only so many contacts with space; and when we speak of 'diversity of space-points' in regard to the Atom, we do so on the basis of the assumption that there are such imaginary contacts with space; in reality there is no 'diversity of space-points' in the Atom; nor is there any diversity in the Atom itself; the only fact that remains is that the Atom is in contact with space; and this is not incompatible with our theory. "In that case, as there would be no points of space in the Atom, there should be no shadow, nor screening." But shadow and screening are due, not to presence of space-points, but to corporeal-

possible; so that if the conjunction of these does lead to the enlargement of dimensions, there is nothing incongruous in this. Thus it is not true that the conjunctions of one Atom with several Atoms would not lead to an enlargement of the atomic dimension; for what would prevent such enlargement would be their *co-inherence* in the same substratum, and not *conjunction* with them.—*Tātparya.*

* That is, when the fruit is in the basket, they form the substratum of the conjunction between the fruit and basket; while of the conjunction between a part of the fruit and a part of the basket, the substratum consists of these *parts*, and not of the Fruit and Basket themselves.

ity and tangibility; it is only a corporeal and tangible object that screens another object. "What is the meaning of this *screening*?" What it means is that the Object being itself connected (with something) prevents the connection (with that same thing) of another object. *Shadow* also is due to the screening of the atoms of light; i.e., the corporeal Atom screens the atom of Light; and there is 'Shadow' where this screening takes place. In fact 'Shadow' is the name applied to such substances, qualities and actions as are connected with a smaller amount of Light (than the adjacent things); and when those same substances have all light completely turned away from them, they come to be called 'Darkness.' Thus, as the phenomena of 'shadow' and 'screening' are capable of being otherwise explained, they cannot serve as valid reasons (in support of the proposition that Atoms are made up of parts).

Var. P. 523.

What has been said above also disposes of the following reasons (that have been put forward in support of the contention that Atoms are made up of parts) :—(*a*) 'Because they have action,' (*b*) 'because they are tangible,' (*c*) 'because they are productive of substances,' (*d*) 'because they are the substratum of that faculty which is the cause of motion,'* (*e*) 'because they are endowed with priority and posteriority,' and so forth. "In what way are these disposed of?" The argument—"Atoms must be made up of parts because they are corporeal"—has been found to be beset with defects in the Proposition, and also with defects in the premises; and these same defects—which fall under one or other of the fallacies of 'Contradiction,' 'Untruth,' 'Inconclusiveness' &c. may be pointed out in every one of the above-mentioned reasonings propounded by the Opponent. The *rest is clear in the Bhāṣya.*

* संस्काराश्रयत्वात् gives better sense.

There are some people who seek to prove that "Atoms are not-eternal" on the ground of their *having activity*, and so forth. These people can only mean that this character of "having activity' is either the 'discloser' or the 'producer' (of *non-eternality*). Now if the presence of *action* were the 'producer' of *non-eternality*, then anything that happens to be without action would have to be regarded as *eternal*. If what is meant by 'action' is *being born*, then the allegation of the Opponent comes to mean that "Atoms are non-eternal, because they are born"; and as a matter of fact, this character of *being born* is not accepted by all parties in regard to Atoms. If, on the other hand, the character of 'having activity' is meant to be only the *discloser* (of *non-eternality*), then, in that case, something else will have to be pointed out as being the *cause* of the 'non-eternality' of Atoms; for it is not in the nature of the *discloser* that it should bring into existence the thing that it discloses; what the discloser does is only to disclose, or bring to view, what has been brought into existence by something else; *e. g.* the Lamp does not bring into existence a thing that did not exist before and then illumine it. If the Nihilist means by 'action' in this connection, such actions as those of 'Throwing Upwards' and the rest, that are postulated by other philosophers,—then he stultifies himself. This same reasoning applies to the case of the Jar and such things that have been cited (by the Opponent) as corroborative instances. Further, when a certain thing is spoken of as 'having activity,' what is meant is that *activity is inherent in it*. If the Nihilist admits this, he stultifies himself; if he does not admit it, then his argument amounts to the allegation that "the atom is non-eternal, *because it is the atom*." [As for the Nihilist, the Atom is not something distinct from its Colour, Action &c.]. Then again, the possessive affix is used only in connection with something that differs from the thing that possesses it; so that the

use of this affix (in the term '*Kriyavaṭṭvāṭ,*' 'having action') involves 'self-contradiction' on the part of the Nihilist; while if the thing (Action) is not held to be something different (from the Atom), then he can have no instance in corroboration of his allegation.

In the manner shown above, other allegations of the Opponent also may be disposed of in detail and refuted.

It may be argued by the Nihilist that he puts forward the aforesaid reasons only as they are admitted by other philosophers (so that the urging of them cannot involve self-contradiction on his part). But, in that case, if he admits them as cognised by means of the Instruments of Right Cognition,—then why should be call them 'admitted *by others*'? While if they are not so cognised, then, why should he seek

Var. P. 524.

to propound, for the convincing of others, a fact which he has not himself rightly apprehended?

End of Section (3).

Section (4).

[Sūṭra 26—37.]

Refutation of the Denial of the External World.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (26).

[P. 233, L. 6 to L. 13.]

[The Bauḍḍha Idealist says]—"You take your stand upon Cognitions, and then go on to assert that the objects of these Cognitions exist; but all these Cognitions are wrong notions. If these were right notions, then alone could the proper examination of Cognitions enable us to form an idea of and comprehend the real character of their objects.*

* The foregoing two sections have proved that all ordinary things are made up of component parts, and that the Atom is not so made up,—we are now led on to discuss the question as to whether or not external objects exist. It is only when external things exist that there can be any occasion for considering whether or not they are composites.

Sūṭra (26).

[*Pūrvapakṣa*]—" AS A MATTER OF FACT HOWEVER, WHEN WE COME TO ANALYSE THINGS BY OUR REASON, WE FAIL TO APPREHEND THEIR REAL CHARACTER; AND THIS NON-APPREHENSION MUST BE LIKE THE NON-APPREHENSION OF THE 'CLOTH' AFTER THE YARNS HAVE BEEN ABSTRACTED."* Sūṭra 26).

" When we come to analyse each yarn in the Cloth,—as 'this is a yarn,' 'this is another yarn,' and so forth,—we fail to perceive in it anything else besides the yarns, which could be the real object of the notion of 'Cloth;' and since we do not perceive things as they are ordinarily conceived of, it follows that no such things (as the Cloth) exist; so that the *Cloth* being non-existent, if there is a notion of 'Cloth,' it must be a wrong notion, similarly with all things."†

Vārṭika on Sū. (26).

[P. 524, L. 3 to L. 15.]

" On the basis of Cognitions you regard things as existent; but the cognitions are all wrong; if they were right, then a careful scrutiny of them would have enabled us to apprehend the real nature of things. *As a matter of fact however, etc. etc.*—says the *Sūṭra.* The objects of cognition,—the Jar, the Cow and so forth—do not exist in reality;—why ?—because when we come to examine them by our reason, we fail to apprehend them as distinct from one another. *E.g.* when we come to analyse our notion of the 'Cloth,' we find that it is made up of the several notions of 'yarns'; and there is no such thing as the *Cloth*, which could form the object of the notion of 'Cloth'; similarly when we come to

---

* Cf. *Bauḍḍhakārikā*—बुद्ध्या विविच्यमानानां स्वभावो नावधार्यते ।
अतो निरभिलप्यास्ते निस्स्वभावाश्च कीर्तिताः ॥

Satish Ch. Vidyabhūsaṇa finds in this Sūṭra an echo of the *Māḍhyamika sūṭras.*

† There is no Cloth apart from the yarns; there is no yarn apart from its parts; and so on up to Atoms; of Atoms also we cannot perceive the real character. Hence from Atom upwards, no object exists.

analyse our notion of the yarns, we find it to be made up of the notions of the parts of the yarns; and so with the parts of these parts, till we reach the Atoms; and when we come to analyse the Atoms themselves, we reach a point where nothing remains. Thus all things being non-existent, it follows that the notions of such things as the 'Jar,' as also of such things as the 'Cow,' are *wrong*."

Sūṭra (27).

[*Siddhānṭa*]—THE REASON PROPOUNDED IS INVALID; AS IT INVOLVES SELF-CONTRADICTION. (Sū. 27).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (27).

[P. 233, L. 15 to L. 17.]

If an 'analysis' of things by reason is possible, then it is not true that the real nature of things is not apprehended; *if*, on the other hand, the real nature of things is not apprehended, then there can be no analysis or scrutiny of things by reason. So that to allege, that "there is analysis of things by reason *—and the real nature of things is not apprehended," involves a contradiction in terms. We have explained all this under Sū. 4-2-15, where it has been pointed out that—'the difficulties in connection with Composites and Components would continue till the total negation of things.'†

Vārṭika on Sū. (27).

[P. 524, L. 17 to P. 525, L. 7.]

The reason propounded is invalid etc. etc.—says the *Sūṭra*. It is not right to say that when we analyse things by reason, all things are found to be non-existent.—Why?—Because it

* The right reading is भावानां बुद्धया विवेचनंच याथात्म्यानुपलब्धिश्चेति as found in Puri B.

† When the real nature of a thing is not comprehended, how can there be analysis of it by reason? [As regards the analysis of things put forward by the Opponent under the preceding Sūṭra] the process of analysing must end at a certain point; if it did not, then the Diad would become immeasurable, &c. &c. &c. as pointed out before.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

involves self-contradiction. "What self-contradiction is there?" The 'self-contradiction' consists in incompatibility; that is, if there can be analysis of things by reason, then things cannot be non-existent; and if things are non-existent, then there can be no analysis of things by reason.

Var. P. 525.

When the Opponent asserts that all things are non-existent, he should be asked his proofs for this. If he does adduce proofs, then he stultifies himself;* while if he does not adduce proofs, then, in the absence of proofs, his purpose (of establishing his proposition) fails to be accomplished. If the purpose of establishing a proposition could be accomplished without proof, why could not the proposition that 'all things are existent' be regarded as established? In fact, the flaws that we have indicated in the view put forward under Sū. 4-1-37—*viz.* "all must be non-entities, because all things are known to be mere negations of one another,"—are found also in the present doctrine of the Idealist.

Sūtra (28).

THE NON-APPREHENSION (OF THE WHOLE) APART (FROM ITS PARTS) IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT IT SUBSISTS IN THESE. (Sū. 28.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (28).

[P. 234, L. 2 to L. 5.]

As a matter of fact, the Product subsists, is contained, in its Causes; it is for this reason that it is not apprehended apart from these latter; there is separate apprehension only when the contrary happens to be the case; that is, two things are separately apprehended only when one is not contained in the other.

---

* 'Proof' being included under 'all things,' the adducing of the proof would mean the abandoning of the position that nothing can be known, everything is non-existent.

Then again, the analysis of things by reason does lead to the distinct apprehension of things,—as is found in the case of Atoms, which are imperceptible; that is that which is perceived by the senses, when it comes to be analysed, is surely recognised as different (from the *imperceptible* Atoms).*

Vārṭika on Sū. (29).

[P. 525, L. 7 to L 12.]

It has been argued by the Opponent that—" if the Cloth and such things were something distinct (from their component parts), then the analysis of the yarns could lead us to the apprehension of the cloth";—our answer to this is as follows:—*the non-apprehension is due &c. &c.*—says the *Sūṭra.* As a matter of fact, the product is contained in the cause; hence it is not apprehended apart from the latter; there is separate apprehension only when the contrary happens to be the case; that is, when between two things, there exists neither the relation of cause and effect, nor that of the container and contained, then alone we apprehend the one apart from the other.

Sūṭra (29).

IN REALITY THINGS ARE COGNISED BY MEANS OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF RIGHT COGNITION.† (Sū. 29).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (29).

[P. 234, L. 7, L. 11.]

When things are analysed by reason, what sort of apprehension of the real nature of things we have, and how we have it,—and also what sort of apprehension we do not have, and how we do not have it,—all this is known through what we can

*In the case of ordinarily perceptible composites and components—where both are perceptible, *e. g.* the cloth and the yarns,—it may be difficult to apprehend the composite as distinct from its parts. But when it comes to the composite thing, whose components are atoms, the distinct apprehension becomes quite easy; the composite being perceptible while the component is not perceptible.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

†This Sūṭra is meant to show that even in the case of ordinary things, where the composite and its components are both perceptible, we do have the distinct apprehension of things in their real character.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

cognise by means of the instruments of right cognition. In fact the very 'analysis of things by reason' consists of what is cognised by means of the instruments of right cognition; as it is only such cognitions that pervade through all scriptures and all actions, as also all activities of living beings. It is only when one comes to examine things by his reason that he comes to determine that a certain thing exists and another thing does not exist And such an examination or analysis does not warrant the conclusion that nothing exists. *

(*Vārṭika* on Sū. 29).

[P. 525, Ll. 14-15.]

In reality things are cognised &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra.* What exists and in what manner it exists,—as also what does not exist, and in what manner it is non-existent—all this is ascertained through what we cognise by means of the instruments of right cognition. The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya.*

Sūṭra (30).

BY REASON OF THE POSSIBILITY AND IMPOSSIBILITY OF PROOFS [*the Pūrvapakṣa allegation becomes untenable*].

(Sū. 30).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (30).

[P. 234, Ll. 13-16.].

Under the circumstances, the allegation "nothing exists" is untenable—Why?—*By reason of the possibility and impossibility of proofs.* That is, if proof is available in support of the allegation that "nothing exists," then the allegation becomes self-condemned:—if, on the other hand, no proof is available in support of the allegation, how can it be established? If it can be established without proofs, then why cannot the assertion "all things exist" be regarded as established?

* The *Tāṭparya* construes this last sentence with the following Sūṭra. It appears better to construe it with the foregoing *Bhāṣya.* The connection of the next *Sūṭra* follows from its very construction.

Vārṭika on Sū. (30).

[The *Vārṭika* has nothing to say on this Sūṭra.]

Sūṭras (31) and (32).

[*The Idealist objects to what has been said in Sū.* 30.]—

"THE NOTION OF REALITY IN REGARD TO THE 'INSTRUMENTS OF RIGHT COGNITION' AND 'OBJECTS COGNISED' (BY MEANS THEREOF) IS SIMILAR TO THE NOTION OF THE REALITY OF DREAMS AND THE OBJECTS DREAMT OF; (Sū. 31) —OR, IT MAY BE LIKENED TO THE NOTIONS OF REALITY IN REGARD TO MAGICAL PHENOMENA, IMAGINARY CITIES IN THE AIR, AND THE MIRAGE." (Sū. 32).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (31) and (32).

[P. 234, Ll. 18-19.]

"In Dreams, no objects are existent, and yet we have the notion of reality in regard to them; similarly neither 'Instruments of Cognition' nor 'Objects of Cognition' are really existent, yet we have the notion of reality in regard to 'Instruments of Cognition' and 'objects cognised' by means thereof. [And it is not so in Dreams only, in the waking condition also, we have several such notions of reality in regard to things not really existent; *e.g.* magical phenomena &c. &c.]."

Vārtika on Sū. (31) and (32).

[P. 525, Ll. 18-20.]

"*The notion of reality* &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. In dreams, no objects exist, and yet we have the notion of things dreamt of being really existent; similarly neither 'Instruments of Cognition' nor 'Objects of Cognition' really exist, and yet we have the notion of these being real."

Sūṭra (33).

[*Answer.*]—SINCE THERE IS NO REASON (IN SUPPORT OF IT), THE PROPOSITION (OF THE OPPONENT) CANNOT BE REGARDED AS ESTABLISHED. (Sū. 33).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (33).

[P. 235, L. 1 to L. 11.]

As a matter of fact, there is no reason in support of the view that "the notion of 'Instruments' and 'Objects' of Cognition are like the notion of reality in regard to things dreamt of, and it is not like the cognition of things during the waking state";—and since there is no such reason, the Proposition cannot be regarded as established. In fact there is no reason to show that what are cognised during dreams are non-existent things. "Inasmuch as things dreamt of are not perceived when the man wakes up, (they must be regarded as *non-existent*)." [According to this reasoning of yours] inasmuch as we do apprehend the things cognised during the waking state, the existence of these cannot be denied; if, from the fact of our not apprehending, on waking, the things cognised in dreams, you infer that these things are not existent,—then it follows that the things that we do apprehend when awake, are *existent*, because they *are* apprehended; so that the reason you put forward (in proof of the unreality of things dreamt of) is found to have the power of proving a conclusion contrary to your tenets. It is only when the existence of things can be inferred from their apprehension, that you can infer their non-existence from their non-apprehension.* And if under both circumstances (of dream as well as of waking) things were equally non-existent, then non-apprehension could have no power at all (of proving anything); when, for example, there is non-perception of Colour when the lamp is absent, what justifies our attributing the non-perception of Colour to the absence of the Lamp is the fact that the Colour is existent,† (and would have been perceived if the lamp were there).

---

*The right reading is उपलम्भात् सद्भावे सति अनुपलम्भादभावः सिध्यति as found in Puri B., and countenanced by the *Vārṭika*.

†We can attribute the non-perception of colour to the absence of lamp, only if we know that colour is existent, and would have been perceived if the lamp were there. If all things were always—during dreams as well as during the waking state—non-existent, then their non-perception could not prove anything at all; as in that case we could have no such notion as that 'if it existed, it would have been perceived'.

Further, you have to show cause for the diversity that is found in dream-cognitions: *e.g.* one dream is beset with dread, another with joy, and yet another is devoid of both; while at times one does not dream of anything at all. According to the theory under which the dream-cognitions are due to real causes, the said diversity can be explained as being due to the diversity in those causes.*

Vārtika on Sū. (33).

[P. 526, L. 4 to P. 527, L. 11.]

What has been alleged by the Opponent cannot be accepted; as there are no proofs in support of it; no proofs have been adduced by the Opponent in support of his allegation that—"the notion of reality in regard to things is like the notion that we have in dreams." "Apprehension itself constitutes the proof; that is, what proves the fact that the things apprehended during the waking state are non-existent apart from Consciousness is the phenomenon of Apprehension itself,—the apprehension during dreams serving as the corroborative instance."† This proof is ineffective: because the instance cited is as unproved as the Probandum itself [that objects dreamt of have no existence is as open to doubt as that objects perceived during waking have no existence]. What is the proof of your allegation that "the things that are apprehended during dreams have no existence apart from consciousness"? "The proof lies in the fact that they are not perceived when we wake up." If you mean by this that—"because the things are not perceived by us when awake, they must be non-existent,"—this can have no force; as you have introduced a qualifying term ('when

---

*This explanation cannot be available for the Idealist, for whom there is no real object at all.

† The argument being thus formulated—"Things perceived during the waking state have no existence,—because we have apprehension of them,—just as we have of things dreamt of."

awake'), which implies that those that *are* perceived by us when awake do exist; either this is the implication of the qualifying term, or the qualified phrase, "because they are not perceived by us *when awake*," has no meaning. Further, if you regard the thing perceived by us when awake as *non-existent*, what is your reason for believing that the *Mind exists*?

Secondly, the fact of *non-apprehension during the waking state*, which you put forward as the reason for your allegation, has no validity at all; because non-apprehension is found to have the power (of indicating something) only under circumstances contrary to what you allege; that is, as a matter of fact, the *non-apprehension of a thing* can prove its *non-existence* only if its *apprehension* be taken as proved by its *existence*; so that 'non-apprehension' can serve as an efficient reason only under circumstances contrary to your assertion.

[The Idealist states his position with reasons]—"There are no objects apart from Consciousness, because they are capable of being apprehended, like Sensation and the rest. Sensation and the rest, being capable of apprehension, have no existence apart from Mind; similarly Objects also."

[The *Vārṭika* answers the Idealist's argument as follows]—

As a matter of fact, 'Sensation' is Pleasure and Pain, and 'Consciousness' is Cognition; and since *Cognition* is something different from *Pleasure and Pain*, the instance you have cited in corroboration of your reasoning is not applicable at all. That Pleasure and Pain are different from Cognition is proved by the fact that while the former are 'objects apprehended,' the latter is 'apprehension' itself, and certainly *Apprehension* is something different from the *apprehended object*. Even if Cognition were non-different from Sensation, yet there could be no instance to show that 'Apprehension' and 'Apprehended

Vār. P. 527.

Object' are one and the same; the *action* and its *objective* can never be one and the same. If you persist in regarding the two as one, without heeding what is vouched for by real experience,—still such a conception would be contrary to your doctrine that there are *four forms of Consciousness*. If the *fourfoldness* is not admitted, and mere Cognition or Idea be insisted upon as the only thing perceived,—then the person holding such views should be asked to explain the ordinarily perceived diversity of Cognitions. There being no eternal or external cause for the diversity of Cognitions, whence does there arise diversity in Cognition? If he admits that the diversity in Cognitions is like the diversity in dreams,—he should be forced to admit that in Cognitions the diversity is due to the impressions of real entities seen and experienced during life [the diversity in dreams being due to these]. If he should persist in believing that in dreams the diversity is due to mere fancy * (not necessarily of real entities), he should be met with the fact that there is always some distinction between the *fancy* and the *fancied* object; the *fancied object* is not the same as the *fancy* [So that if the diversity in dreams is due to fancy, this fancy must pertain to some real entity].

Sūṭra (34).

LIKE REMEMBRANCE AND DESIRE, THE COGNITION OF OBJECTS IN DREAMS ALSO—

Bhāṣya on Sū. (34).

[P. 235, L. 14 to P. 236, L. 7.]

has for its object something that has been previously apprehended [this has to be added to complete the Sūṭra]. Just as Remembrance and Desire have for their objects previously apprehended things, and are incapable of lending support to the denial of the reality of such things,—so in dreams also the cognition of things has for its object things that have

* The right reading is स्वप्नेऽपि भावनावशात् विज्ञानभेदं

been previously apprehended; hence these also do not justify the notion that no such things exist. Thus in reality the Dream-cognition is always one that has its object previously perceived in the waking state; and when the sleeping man who has seen a dream wakes up, he recognises the dream-cognitions as his own, the idea in his mind being 'this is what I saw in my dream.' And it is only in relation to (and in comparison with) the said waking cognition that we come to the conclusion that the Dream-cognition is unreal. That is to say, when on waking one recognises the Dream-cognition—as 'this is what I saw in my dream'—it is the recognition that leads him to the conclusion —'my cognition of things in the dream is unreal.' If there be no difference between the two, the proof becomes meaningless; that is, he for whom there is no difference (on the point of reality) between the waking and the dream-cognition, for him the proof or reason,—that 'the notion of Instruments and Objects of Cognition is *like the notions of things in a dream*' (Sū. 31)—can have no meaning; for he has denied the very basis of such an allegation; the idea of a thing as what it is not (*i. e.* a wrong notion)—is always based upon a real original (counterpart); *e. g.* the conception of the pillar, which is not man, as 'man' is always based upon a real original; *i. e.* until the original, the real *man*, has been perceived, one can have no conception of 'man' in regard to what is not man. Similarly the conception of things in a dream,—such as 'I have seen an elephant,' 'I have seen a mountain,'—can only rest on the basis of some real counterpart (the cognition of real elephants and mountains).*

Bhā. P. 236.

Vārṭika on Sū. (34).

[P 527, L. 11 to P. 529, L. 13.]

The dream-cognitions that rest upon such diverse things as 'city' 'chariot' and so forth, are unreal; and as such they can appear only on the basis of their similarity to certain cognitions during the waking state. When the Opponent asserts—" for me all cognitions would be unreal,"—

* Unless one has had a previous cognition of the real object, he can have no wrong conceptions in regard to it.

he should be questioned in regard to the original counterpart (of the unreal cognitions); for we never find any wrong notions without a real counterpart.

The man who does not admit the existence of anything except Consciousness should be asked to explain the real character of Demonstration and Refutation. If these are held to be something external, then it involves self-contradiction on the part of the Opponent; if on the other hand, they are held to be of the same nature as Consciousness, then, since the Consciousness of one man is never apprehended by another, no conclusion could be proved (for the benefit of another person, by such demonstration and refutation); as a matter of fact, one man does not know the dream dreamt by another person, until it is described to him. If (with a view to escape from this difficulty) Consciousness itself be regarded as having the form of words,—

Vār. P. 528.

then the upholder of this view should be asked to explain the exact signification of the term 'form' as occurring in the expression, 'Consciousness has the form of words'; as a matter of fact, when, by reason of similarity to a counterpart, one thing is conceived of as that (counterpart) which it is not then alone is that thing said to have the 'form' of the other thing; and since under your theory, there is no such real entity as 'word,' the expression 'Consciousness has the form of words' can have no meaning.

Further, he who does not admit of things besides Consciousness, should be asked to explain the difference between the waking and dreaming conditions:—as for him, just as there are no real objects of dream-cognitions, so also there are no real objects of waking cognitions; so that to what is due the notion that 'this is the *dreaming* and that the *waking* condition'? And the result of this non-distinction between

the waking and dreaming cognitions would be that thère would be no distinction between Merit and Demerit (Virtue and Sin); for just as no demerit or sin attaches to incest committed in a dream, so would there be none attaching to that act committed during the waking state! "Difference between the waking and dreaming conditions is due to the fact that while in one the man is beset with sleep, in the other he is not so." Even if the Opponent admits this, the difficulty still remains,—how does he know that the influence of sleep causes derangement in Consciousness? If again, he should admit this difference (between the waking and dreaming conditions) that in one the cognitions are distinct, while in the other they are indistinct,—then, he should explain what sort of *distinctness* or *indistinctness* there can be in 'cognitions' when there are no real objects.* "But even in the absence of real objects we find diversity in the cognitions." You mean by this as follows:—"From among persons born under the influence of similar destinies, while some (on death) have sight of a river full of pus—though in reality neither the river nor the pus is there; and though one and the same thing cannot have several forms, yet in regard to the same *river* we find diversity in the cognitions: Some other persons see that same river as full of water, others again as full of blood, and so forth; from all which it follows that in each case the Cognition appears in that particular form in accordance with the inner consciousness of each person, and it has no external basis in the shape of an object." But this view is not tenable; as it involves self-contradiction. When you say—"there being no external object, the Cognition itself appears *in that particular form*,"—you render yourself open to the question as to what is meant by the Cognition appearing *in that form*. If (it is meant that) the Cognition has the form of the 'blood,' then

* Throughout this passage सिद्ध is a mis-reading for भिन्ना and तुच्छता for स्वच्छता.

you should explain 'blood',—what is 'blood'? Similarly you should explain the forms of 'water' and 'river.' Further, in the sentence 'they see the river full of pus,' when we come to examine the words one by one, we find that they can have no meaning; as (according to the doctrine that nothing but Consciousness exists) there are no such things as 'Colour' and the other phases of Consciousness. Further, (under the Opponent's doctrine) there can be no restriction as to place &c.; that is, when no object exists, what would be the reason for the fact that persons see the river of pus in one place, and not another? He for whom there is something really existing in a definite form,—for him it is quite possible that all cognition in any other form should be wrong; and wrong cognitions, if they appear, never completely discard (do away with) their (real) counterpart; so that it behoves the Opponent to explain what is the counterpart of the cognitions of 'pus' and the rest; and just as in the case of the cognition of 'pus' so also in the case of the cognitions of magical phenomena, imaginary cities, miragic water and so forth (it would be necessary to point to real counterparts).

Vār. P. 529.

The Bauḍḍha Idealist brings up the following further argument:—"[Under the theory of the Siḍḍhānṭin] the 'impression' is left by the deeds of the man in one place, while its result appears in an entirely different place. That is to say, the result of an act should appear in the same place where the act is done; but for him who admits of things other than Consciousness, the act is done in one place, while its result appears in another place; so that the action and its result are not co-substrate."*

* For example, the man performs the *Putrêṣṭi* in the present body, while he gets the son after several months and appears elsewhere than in the Body of the performer. According to the Idealist, the act of performance and the birth of the son, both appear in the same 'Series of Consciousness' that constitutes the entire personality of the man.

There is no force in this argument; as we do not admit any such thing; we do not admit that the act and its result are *not* co-substrate; the act and the result both accruing to the *Soul*; so that our theory is not open to the objection urged.*

[The *Vārṭika* formulates arguments in support of the reality of external things]—Objects are something different from my Consciousness,—(*a*) because they are possessed of generic and specific properties,—like the Consciousness appearing in another 'series';—(*b*) because they are cognisable by the Instruments of Right Cognition;—(*c*) because they are preceded (brought about) by Merit.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (35).
[P. 236, L. 7 to L. 22].

Such being the case,—

THE DESTRUCTION OF WRONG APPREHENSION FOLLOWS FROM TRUE KNOWLEDGE; JUST AS THERE IS DESTRUCTION OF THE CONCEPTION OF THINGS DURING A DREAM, ON WAKING. (Sūṭra 35).

When one has the conception of 'man' in regard to the Pillar, this is 'wrong apprehension,'—being the apprehension of the thing as what it is not; whereas when, in regard to the Pillar one has the conception of 'pillar, this is 'True Knowledge';—and what is set aside by 'True Knowledge' is the wrong *Apprehension*, not the *object*,—the generic character of 'object' being common to the Man and the Pillar.† Just as when the man wakes up, the cognition that he has sets aside the *conception* of things that he had during dream,—and not the 'object' in general. Similarly in the case of magical phenomena, imaginary cities and

* According to us the mere birth of the son is not the result, but the pleasure caused by the birth, and pleasure is in the Soul; similarly the cause of it is not the mere *Act*, but the Merit produced by it.

† When we subsequently come to recognise the pillar as 'pillar,' all that this proves is that our former *cognition* of it was wrong, *not* that the 'man' (as which the pillar had been formerly apprehended) is non-existent, nor that the former cognition had no *objective* at all.

mirage, we have the cognition of things as what they are not; and these wrong apprehensions also are set aside, in the manner described above, by 'True Knowledge,' which does not set aside the fact of the cognitions having some sort of an *object.* As a matter of fact, in the case of magic &c. also, the Wrong Apprehension has always got some basis in reality; for what happens in what is called 'magic' is that the man equipped with the necessary appliances, takes up a real substance similar to that whose illusion he intends to produce, and in regard to this real substance, he brings about the wrong apprehension in another person;—in the case of the 'Imaginary City,' what happens is that either Snow or some such real substance actually comes to assume the shape of a city, and hence, from a distance, people come to conceive of it as 'City'; that this is what really happens is proved by the fact that the illusion does not appear when there is no such substance as the said Snow;—similarly again, when the Sun's rays, coming into contact with the heat radiating from the Earth's surface, begin to flicker, there arises the notion of 'water' in regard to it, by reason of the perception of the common quality of (flickering); that this is so is proved by the fact that when the man draws near, or when the Sun's rays are not there, there is no such illusion. Thus we find that in the case of every Wrong Apprehension there is some sort of real entity at the bottom somewhere, and no Wrong Apprehension is entirely baseless. We also find that there is a distinct difference in the character of the two cognitions,—*viz*: (*a*) that of the magician and his audience (the former regarding the magic phenomenon as *unreal*, and the latter believing it to be *real*); (*b*) that of the man at a distance and of one who is near at hand, the former regarding the 'imaginary city' and the 'miragic water' as *real*, while the latter has no idea of such things at all; and (*c*) that of the sleeping man and of the waking man. All this diversity would be inexplicable if everything were non-existent, and as such entirely without any name or character.

Vārṭika on Sū. (35).

[P. 529, L. 17 to P. 530, 3.]

Such being the case, *the destruction of Wrong Apprehension &c. &c.*—says the Sūṭra. The conception of the pillar

as 'man' is *wrong apprehension*; and this wrong Apprehension is set aside by the True Knowledge (of the Pillar as *pillar*), which latter does not set aside the

Vār : P. 530.

general character of 'object,' which is common to the Pillar and the Man. Just as the conception of things apprehended in a dream are set aside by the waking cognition of things, which latter however, does not set aside the general character of 'object.' The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya.*

Sūtra (36).

[*Having disposed of the Idealist, who, while denying the reality of the External world, admits the Idea,—the Author next takes up the Nihilist, who denies the Idea also*]—IN THE SAME MANNER, THE EXISTENCE OF THE 'APPREHENSION' ALSO (CANNOT BE DENIED); BECAUSE WE ACTUALLY PERCEIVE ITS CAUSE, AS ALSO ITS REAL EXISTENCE.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (36).

[P. 237, Ll. 2-4.]

Just as the existence of the 'object' of Wrong Apprehension cannot be denied, so that of the Apprehension itself cannot be denied;—why?—(a) because we actually perceive its cause, and (b) because we actually perceive its real existence; (a) as a matter of fact, we are actually cognisant of the cause of Wrong Apprehension; and (b) Wrong Apprehension also is found to appear in every person, and is actually cognised as such, being, as it is, distinctly cognisable. From all this it follows that Wrong Apprehension actually exists.

[And when even *Wrong* Apprehension is *real*, *Right* Apprehension is all the more so].

Vārṭika on Sū. (36).

[P. 530, L. 5 to L. 8.]

In the same manner &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. There is always a cause for Wrong Apprehension. "What is that cause?" It consists of (a) the perception of common pro-

perties, (b) the non-perception of specific properties and (c) the imposition of such specific characters as are not actually present (in the thing). When one admits that there are Wrong Apprehensions, it behoves him to point out its cause; and when one admits its cause, he must admit its 'object' also.

Sūṭra (37).

WRONG APPREHENSION HAS A DOUBLE CHARACTER, BASED UPON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE REAL OBJECT AND THE COUNTERPART.* (Sū. 37).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (37).

[P. 237, L. 6 to L. 12.]

The 'real object' is the *Pillar*, and the 'counterpart' is the *Man*; and whenever there is a wrong apprehension of the Pillar as 'Man,' both of these—the real object and the counterpart—are manifested in it quite distinctly, and the misapprehension is due to the preception of their common properties;—similarly there is misapprehension of the *Flag* as a *line of cranes*, of a piece *of stone* as a *pigeon*. In fact, Wrong Apprehensions are possible only in regard to *similar* objects, because they are brought about by the perception of *common* properties (belonging to two or more similar objects).† (For these reasons, he for whom everything is without name and form,—according to such a person there can. be no possibility (of Wrong Apprehension).

As regards Odour and other such objects of Cognition, the notion of 'Odour' &c. (*i.e.* of the things in their own character),—which would be regarded (by the Opponent)

* The Bauddha argues that, since the object of Wrong Apprehension is non-existent, that of Right Apprehension also must be non-existent. This is what the present *Sūṭra* traverses. The idea is that the object of Wrong Apprehension also is not entirely non-existent: What forms the object of Wrong Apprehension has a dual character—that of the real object 'Pillar' and also that of the counterpart 'Man'; and though in the character of 'man' the object is *non-existent*, it is really *existent* in the character of 'Pillar.'

† The reading in the printed text is wrong. The right reading is either—(a) सत्यसमाने···ग्रहणव्यवस्थानात् or (b) तत्र समाने···ग्रहणव्यवस्थानात् as in Puri B. We have adopted the latter.

as Wrong Apprehensions,—must, in fact, be regarded as *True* Apprehension; for the simple reason that in the case of those Cognitions, there are no two things involved—in the shape of the real object and its counterpart,—nor is there the perception of any property common to two or more things.

From all this it follows that the allegation that—"the conceptions of the Instruments and the Objects of Cognition are wrong"—is not right.

Vārṭika on Sū. (37).

Wrong Apprehension &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. The 'real object' is the *Pillar*, the 'counterpart' is the *Man*; and it is only when both of those are manifested that we have Wrong Apprehension. The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya*.

End of Section (4).

Section (5)

[*Sūṭras* 38—49.]

The Development of True Knowledge.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (38).

[P. 237, L. 12 to L. 17.]

It has been said above that when there is True Knowledge of the causes of Defects, there follows the cessation of the notion of 'I.' Now the question arises—How is True Knowledge brought about? *

---

* The reality of the External World and of Cognitions having been stablished, the Author reverts to what was said under Sūṭras 4-2-1 *et seq.* in connection with the causes of Defects, where the process was described. This cannot be regarded as sufficient for the purposes of the enquirer; as the True Knowledge there in described cannot do away with such illusions and wrong apprehensions as are of the nature of Direct Apprehension;—hence it becomes necessary to describe such True Knowledge as may be of the character of Direct Apprehension—*Parishuḍḍhi*.

This is the particular form of 'True Knowledge' that is referred to by the question with which the *Bhāṣya* introduces the Sūṭra.—*Varḍhamāna*.

Vishvanāṭha adds—The Knowledge produced by the Scriptures is momentary, like all cognitions, so that when it ceases to exist, wrong notions would

[TRUE KNOWLEDGE PROCEEDS] FROM THE PRACTICE OF A PARTICULAR FORM OF MEDITATION * (Sū. 38)

When the Mind having been abstracted (withdrawn) from the Sense-organs, is kept steady by an effort tending to concentration,—the contact that takes place between this Mind and the Soul, and which is accompanied by a conscious eagerness to get at the truth, is what is called 'Meditation.' † During this meditation, no cognitions appear in regard to the objects of the senses. From the practice of the said Meditation proceeds True Knowledge.

Vārṭika on Sū. (38).

[P. 530, L. 12 to P. 531, L. 9.]

It has been said above that from the True Knowledge of the cause of Defects follows the cessation of the notion of 'I'; now the question arises—How does True Knowledge come about? It comes, says the *Sūṭra*, *from the practice of a particular form of Meditation.* The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya*.

Objection:—"The Internal Organ (Mind) being all-pervading in its character, no *abstraction* of it is possible." If you mean by this that—"since the Internal Organ is all-pervading, how can there be an abstraction of it?"—then our answer is that there is no force in this; as this has been

---

again continue to appear and entangle the Soul. Hence it becomes necessary to explain the process by which the said True Knowledge may be developed and amplified and rendered capable of putting an end, once for all, to all possibility of wrong notions appearing again.

* The exact reading of this Sūṭra is uncertain. Sū. Ms. D. and Vishvanāṭha read as in the printed text; Puri Sū. Ms. reads समाधिविशेषाभावात् (which is apparently wrong); the *Ṭāṭparya* reads समाधितत्त्वाभ्यासात्; though the *Nyāyasūchinibandha* reads as in the printed text. Sū. Ms. C. however reads—तत्त्वज्ञानविवृद्धिस्तत्त्वज्ञानाभ्यासात् ।? ततश्चात्यन्तिको मिथ्याज्ञाननाशः ।

† 'By concentration' is meant the keeping of the Soul within its own abode in the lotus of the heart. As such concentration is present also during deep sleep, we have the additional qualification 'which is accompanied by &c.'—which excludes Deep Sleep.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

already answered. How the Internal organ is not all-pervading we have explained before (in course of our refutation of the *Sāṅkhya*), by "pointing out that in reality the Internal Organ is atomic. "But in that case the perceiving of the movement of one's own limbs would not be possible."

Vār. P. 531. If you mean by this that—"He whose Internal organ is atomic can never have the perception of the movement of his own limbs; as the atomic Internal organ could not be in contact with the (moving) hand and the eye at one and the same time, *"—then our answer is that this is not right; † because the effort (required for the movement of the hand) and the perception can very well appear at one and the same time, on account of the contact of the Soul, the Mind and the Body being simultaneous; that is, the contact of the Soul with the Body, and that of the Soul with the Mind ‡ come about simultaneously; so that the movement of the limb would be due to the contact of the Soul with the Body, § while the activity of the visual organ (necessary for the perceiving of the said motion) would be due to the contact of the Soul with the Mind;—and while the movement of the man's limb is due to his effort, his perceiving of it is brought about by the contact of the object perceived (*i. e.* the moving limb) with the says of right emanating from the eyes. Further, inasmuch as we do

* The moving of the hand is due to the effort of the Soul operating on that limb, so that when the Hand moves it should be in contact with the Mind; similarly when something would be seen by the Eye, the Eye would have to be in contact with the Mind. Now if the Mind is atomic it cannot be in contact with the hand and the Eye at one and the same time; hence the man could never see his own moving hand.

† Though the तु is not essential, yet it is better to have it.

‡ The right reading is स्वात्मशरीरसम्बन्धश्चात्ममनःसंयोगश्च.

§ The reading in both editions is wrong. The right reading is तत्रात्मशरीरसम्बन्धात् as found in the *Tātparya*.

not postulate any 'parts' for the Soul, the objection can have no force against us. If the Soul had parts, then alone could it be said that the Mind is in contact with one part of it, while the Body is in contact with another part, and then alone would the objection regarding the perceiving of the movements of one's own limbs have some force:—he, however, for whom the Soul has no parts, cannot be affected by the said objection; as (according to him) the Mind could very well be in contact with the Soul which is also in contact with the Body.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (39).

[P. 237, L. 17 to P. 238, L. 3].

[*Objection*]—"It has been said that *during* "*Meditation no cognitions appear in regard to the objects of the senses*; but—

"THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE; (A) BECAUSE CERTAIN OBJECTS ARE EXTREMELY POWERFUL."—(Sūṭra 39).

"In some cases, Cognitions *will* appear, even in the "absence of any wish on the part of the person; so that "what has been asserted cannot be right;—why?—*be-* "*cause certain objects are extremely powerful.* As a matter of "fact, we find that sometimes, even though the man has no "wish for the cognising, the cognition does appear, as we "find in the case of the thundering of the clouds and "such things (which we cannot help hearing, even against "our wish). So that the said *particular kind of meditation* "cannot be possible."

Vārṭika on Sū. (39).

[P. 531, Ll. 11—12.]

"*This is not possible etc. etc.*—says the *Sūṭra*. The said *prac-* "*tice of the particular Mind of Meditation* is not possible; be- "cause in some cases even though the man does not wish it, the the Cognition does appear; as we find in the case of such things as the thundering of the clouds and the like."

Sūṭra (40).

"(B) ALSO BECAUSE COGNITIONS ARE BROUGHT ABOUT BY HUNGER &c." (Sū. 40).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (40).

[P. 238, Ll. 5-6.]

"Such things as Hunger and Thirst, Heat and Cold, and Disease bring "about cognitions even against our wish. Hence no 'concentration (or one-pointedness, of the Mind) is possible."

Vārṭika on Sū. (40).

[P. 531, L. 14-15.]

"*Also because &c. &c.*—says the Sūtra. Cognitions are brought about" by Hunger and Thirst, even against our wish; hence also the said particular kind of Meditation is not possible.'

Bhāṣya on *Sūṭra* (41).

P. 238, L. 6. to L. 11].

It is possible that the man may renounce Meditation and become agitated, and there may also be causes tending to bring about such agitation as constitutes an obstacle to Meditation; but even so,—

MEDITATION WOULD BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE FORCE OF THE FRUIT OF WHAT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY ACCOMPLISHED (Sū. 41).

'*What has been previously accomplished*'—stands for the Merit and Wisdom, acquired in previous lives,—which serve to bring about True Knowledge;—'*Force of the fruit*'—stands for the faculty born of Yogic practices; if there were no fruits of such practices, people would never pay any heed to them; even in the case of ordinary worldly acts, we find that constant practice produces a certain faculty.

Vārṭika on Sū. (41).

[P. 531, L. 17 to P. 532, L. 6.]

Meditation is brought about &c. &c.—says *the Sūṭra*. '*What has been previously accomplished*'—stands for the particular form of Meditation practised in the preceding bodies;—the 'fruit' of that is Merit, and this is what again brings about another particular kind of Meditation; and this particular kind of Meditation leads

Vār. P. 532.

to the suppression of external objects. Even in the case of the ordinary man it is found that when he is rapt in meditation, even though the external objects may gather round him, yet no cognitions appear for him; how much more so then should this be the case with the Yogin? If Cognitions were to appear simply because there are external objects gathering round the man, then such Cognitions would appear also after Final Release; because for the released man also, certain external objects do gather round him, so that cognitions should still go on appearing, (which is absurd).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (42).

[P. 238, L. 11 to L. 16.]

It is for the removal of the obstacles (to Meditation) that—

THERE IS THE ADVICE THAT YOGA SHOULD BE PRACTISED IN FORESTS, CAVES AND RIVER-BANKS. (Sū. 42).

The Merit produced by the practice of Yoga follows the Soul in other births also; and when the Merit that brings about True Knowledge has reached a high stage of development, and the Exercise of Meditation has assumed high proportions,—True Knowledge appears. We have actually found that Meditation serves to suppress the force of even powerful objects; as for example, even the ordinary man says—'My mind was elsewhere, I did not hear this,' or 'I did not know this.'

Vārṭika on Sū. (42).

[The *Vārṭika* has nothing to say on this Sūṭra.]

Bhāṣya on Sū. (43).

[P. 239, L. 17 to L. 19.]

[Says the Opponent]—"But if you admit the fact (urged in Sū. 39) that on account of the force of certain extremely powerful objects, Cognitions appear even against the man's wish,—then,

"THIS CONTINGENCY WOULD ARISE ALSO UPON FINAL RELEASE".—(Su. 43).

"Even when the man has become *released*, it would be possible for Cognitions to appear, by reason of the force of external objects."

Vārṭika on Sū. (43).

[The *Vārṭika* has nothing to say on this Sūtra.]

Sūṭra (44).

NOT SO; FOR COGNITION IS SURE TO APPEAR ONLY IN THE ACCOMPLISHED BODY. (Sū. 44.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (44).

[P. 238, L. 21 to L. 23.]

It is only when the Body,—as the receptacle of Activity, Sense-organs and Objects,—has been accomplished, under the influence of Karma (past deeds) that the presence of this cause makes the appearance of Cognitions sure to come about; so that however powerful the external object may be, it is not able to bring about Cognitions in the Soul; for the external object has been found to have that power (of bringing about Cognitions) only when it is in contact with a Sense-organ. [And no such contact is possible in the case of the person who has attained Final Release].

Vārṭika on Sū. (44).

[P. 532, Ll. 10-11.]

Not so etc. etc.—says the *Sūṭra*. It is only when the Body is there that the external object gives rise to Cognitions, —and not when there is no Body.

Sūṭra (44).

AND THERE IS ABSENCE OF THAT WHEN FINAL RELEASE HAS BEEN ATTAINED. (Sū. 45.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (45).

[P. 239, L. 2 to L. 6.]

'*That*'—stands for the Body and the Sense-organs, which contain the causes of cognition; and of this there is *absence* when Final Release has been attained; for the simple reason that there are no Merit and Demerit left (to bear

fruition). Hence the allegation (in Sū. 43) that "the contingency would arise also upon Final Release"—is not true.

It is for this reason that Final Release consists of freedom from all kinds of pain; inasmuch as the root of all pain, and the receptacle of all pain,—*i.e.*, the Body and the Sense-organs absolutely cease upon the attainment of Final Release, it follows that Final Release consists in absolute freedom from all pain; for without its root, and without its receptacle, no pain can appear.

Vārṭika on Sū. (45).

[P. 532, Ll. 13 15.]

And there is absence &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra.* 'Of that' —*i. e.* of the Body &c., which are the cause of Cognitions, there is absence when Final Release has been attained. It is for this reason that Final Release consists in freedom from all pain; that is, because upon final Release, the root of all pain as well as all pain cease to exist—therefore freedom from pain constitutes Final Release.

Section (46).

FOR THAT PURPOSE (THERE SHOULD BE) EMBELLISHMENT * OF THE SOUL, BY MEANS OF RESTRAINTS AND OBSERVANCES AND SUCH OTHER METHODS OF INTERNAL DISCIPLINE AS MAY BE LEARNT FROM THE SCIENCE OF YOGA.

(Sū. 46.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (46).

[P. 239, L. 9 to L. 13.]

For the purpose of attaining Final Release, there should be '*embellishment of the Soul*'.—'*Restraints*' are the means of acquiring merit, common to men in all conditions of life; while '*Observances*' are peculiar to each condition. '*Embellishment of the Soul*'—consists in the destruction of Demerit and accretion of Merit.—'*Internal discipline*' should be learnt from the science of Yoga; it consists of Penance, Controlling of the Breath, Abstraction of the Mind, Contemplation and Concentration of the Mind; and the practice of the

* Vishvanatha reads, '*āṭmasamskāra*' and explains it as realisation of the Soul.

renouncing of objects of sense serves to remove attachment and hatred. The other '*methods*' consist of the details of conduct laid down for Yoga [such as concentrating of the Mind, eating only particular kinds of food, not staying at one place for any length of time, and so forth].

Vārtika on Sū. (46).

[P. 533, Ll. 16. 1—2.]

For that purpose etc. etc.—says the *Sūtra*. For the purpose of attaining Final Release, there should be 'embellishment of the Soul' by means of Restraints and Observances.

Sūtra (47).

[THERE SHOULD ALSO BE] REPETITION OF THE STUDY OF THE SCIENCE, AS ALSO FRIENDLY DISCUSSION WITH PERSONS LEARNED IN THE SCIENCE. (Sū. 47).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (47).

[P. 239, L. 15 to 18.]

'For that purpose' has to be construed with this *Sūtra* also. The term '*jñāna*' stands for *that by which things are known, jñāyate anena, i. e.* the Science of the Soul;—the '*grahaṇa*', 'study,' of this consists in reading it and retaining it in the mind;—the 'repetition' of such study means the carrying on of it continuously, in the shape of reading it, listening to it (being expounded) and pondering over it.—'*Friendly discussion with persons learned in the Science*'—is meant to bring about consolidation of the knowledge acquired; this 'consolidation' consists in—(1) the removing of doubts, (2) the knowing of things not already known, (3) the confirmation (by the opinions of the learned) of the conclusions already arrived at (by one's self).—the term '*samvāda*' means * '*samāya vādaḥ*', 'discussion for the sake of coming to an agreement'; [*i. e. friendly* discussion.']

Vārtika on Sū. (47).

[P. 533, Ll. 4—5.]

Repetition of the study of the Science, etc., etc.—'*Jñānagrahaṇa*' means 'study of the Science'. '*Persons learned in*

* The reading of the printed text समापवाद gives no sense, the right reading समाय वाद is supplied by the Puri Ms.

the Science' are those who know the means (of acquiring True Knowledge).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (48).

[P. 239, L. 19 to P. 240, L. 1.]

The expression 'friendly discussion with persons learned in the Science' (occurring in the preceding *Sūṭra*) is vague; it is explained in the following Sūṭra.

Sūṭra (48).

THAT (FRIENDLY DISCUSSION) SHOULD BE CARRIED ON WITH THE PUPIL, THE TEACHER, COMPANIONS IN STUDY, AND OTHER WELL-KNOWN LEARNED PERSONS,—WHO WISH WELL (TO THE ENQUIRER) AND WHO ARE NOT JEALOUS OF HIM*.

(Su. 48).

The meaning of the *Sūṭra* is explained by its own words.

Vārṭika on Sū. (48).

[The *Varṭika* has nothing to say on this *Sūṭra*.]

Bhāṣya on Sū. (49).

[P. 240, L. 2 to L. 6.]

It might be thought that—the putting forward of theories and counter-theories would be unpleasant to the other party (the teacher and the rest); [with a view to this we have the following *Sūṭra*.]

Sūṭra (49).

BEING A SEEKER (AFTER TRUTH) [THE MAN SHOULD CARRY IT ON] FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF HIS PURPOSE, EVEN WITHOUT PUTTING FORWARD ANY COUNTER-THEORIES.

---

* The Commentators have explained 'ṭam' as referring to the 'person learned in the Science', and '*abhyupēyāṭ*' as *jānīyāṭ*; by this the Sūṭra would mean that one should know the persons mentioned as 'learned in the Science.—Similarly '*shrēyorthibhiḥ*' they explain as meaning 'those that have faith in Final Release.' We have thought it best to deviate from this explanation. In the case of the former, it is not easy to construe the instrumental in शिष्यगुरुसब्रह्मचारिविशिष्ट श्रेयोर्थिभि : and as regards the latter, it is very much simpler, and more in keeping with the epithet *anasūyibhiḥ*', to take it in its natural sense 'those who wish well'; as it is only such well-wishers whose intercourse can be entirely friendly and conducive to good.

'*He should carry on the discussion*' (of the foregoing *Sūṭra*) has to be construed here also. Inasmuch as the man is desirous of acquiring knowledge from the other person, he should simply express a desire to learn the truth; and thus without trying to establish any theory of his own, he should clarify (correct) his own view of things,—specially by realising the fact that the doctrines of several philosophers are mutually contradictory [and from among these accepting what is right and rejecting what is wrong].

Vārṭika on Sū. (49).

[The *Vārṭika* has nothing to say on this *Sūṭra*.]

End of Section (5).

Section (6).

[Sūṭras 50-51.]

The Defending of True Knowledge.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (50).

[P. 240, L. 7 to L. 10.]

Through excessive partiality to their own theories, some people transgress all bounds of reasoning; in that case—

DISPUTATION AND WRANGLING (SHOULD BE CARRIED ON) FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEFENDING HIS DETERMINATION TO GET AT THE TRUTH, JUST AS THE HEDGE OF THORNY BRANCHES IS PUT UP FOR THE PROTECTION OF SPROUTING SEEDS. (Sū. 50).

This however is meant only for those persons who have not acquired True Knowledge, whose defects have not been removed, and who are still making an attempt for those purposes.

Vārṭika on Sū. (50).

[P. 533, Ll. 14—16.]

Disputation and Wrangling etc. etc.—says the *Sūṭra*. What the *Sūṭra* means is that what is herein said should be done only by such persons in whom True Knowledge has not yet appeared.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (51).

[P. 240, L. 11 to L. 14.]

When one has been rudely addressed by an Opponent, either through vanity (of superior knowledge), or through sheer prejudice (against truth), or through some other similar reason (*i.e.*, desire for wealth, fame &c.),—then he (failing to perceive the right answer to the ill-mannered allegations of the Opponent)—

SHOULD PICK UP A QUARREL WITH HIM AND PROCEED TO DEAL WITH HIM BY DISPUTATION AND BY WRANGLING. (Sū. 51).

'*Pick up a quarrel*'—*i. e.* with a view to defeating the Opponent,—and not with a view to getting at the truth. But this should be done only for the purpose of defending true Science, * and not for the purpose of obtaining wealth, honour or fame.

Thus ends the *Bhāṣya* on the II Daily Lesson *of Discourse* IV.

Vārṭika on Sū. (51).

[P. 533, L. 16 to P. 524, L. 5.]

When one has been rudely addressed by the Opponent etc. etc. he *should pick up etc. etc.*—says the *Sūṭra*. '*Tābhyām*'—*i.e.* by Disputation and by Wrangling. '*Pick up a quarrel*' *etc.*—*with a view to defeating the Opponent, and not with a view to getting at the truth. But this should be done etc. etc.*—says the *Bhāṣya*.

'Rebirth, as related to Activity and Defect, has been fully explained; Fruition, Pain and Release, as also the means of Release, have been described (in the fourth *Aḍhyāya*).'

End of the Vārṭika on Daily Lesson II of Discourse IV.

END OF DISCOURSE IV.

---

* The motive prompting the man should be—If this ill-mannered person is allowed to go undefeated, then ordinary men will accept his conclusions as the right ones, and this would bring about a total confusion relating to Dharma and true Philosophy,—says the *Tāṭparya*.

ADHYĀYA V.

Daily Lesson I.

Section (1).

[*Sūtras* 1—3.]

The Futile Rejoinders consisting in the Unfair Urging of the Fallacy of 'Neutralisation.'

Bhāṣya on Sū. (1).

[P. 241, L. 1, to L. 9.]

Futile Rejoinder having been defined (in Sū. 1-2-18) as 'that objection which is taken on the basis of mere similarity and dissimilarity,' it was described briefly under Sū. 1-2-20, where it was pointed out that 'there is multiplicity of Futile Rejoinders owing to there being several and diverse varieties of it;' this Futile Rejoinder is now described in detail. The Futile Rejoinders herein described consist of arguments urged in confutation of the argument that has been put forward in demonstration of a certain conclusion; and their number is twenty-four; * they are as follows :—

---

* Among commentators there has been a great deal of discussion in regard to the exact character of this Fifth Discourse and its connection with what has gone before. To the end of Adh. IV, we had the *Examination*, 'Parīkṣā,' of what had been *mentioned* in Sū. 1-1-1 and *defined* in the rest of Adh. 1; so that the natural subject-matter of Adh. V should consist in the continuation of the same *Examination* of things; what we find however in this *Adhyāya* are *definitions* of the several varieties of Futile Rejoinders and Clinchers. Hence the difficulty.

The *Tātparya* says—The proper place for the *defining* of the particular kinds of *Futile Rejonder* and *Clinchers* was just after the general definition of these in Adh. I; yet the author of the Sūtra intentionally omitted to do it there, in order not to delay the examination of the 'objects of cognition,' for which the pupils were growing anxious; and having finished all that, he now naturally reverts to the *defining* of the several varieties of the two categories that he had left undefined. Further, the last *part* of the preceding *Adhyāya* having dealt with 'Disputation and Wrangling,' it is in connection with those that the Sage deals with Futile Rejoinder and Clincher, which can occur only in Disputation and Wrangling; so that the sequence of Adh. V is all right; its subject-matter arising directly out of what has occurred towards the end of the preceding *Adhyāya*.

The *Pariśuddhi* enters into a long discussion as to whether Adh. V is meant to be 'Definition' or 'Examination'; and comes to the conclusion that its subject matter consists of *Definition*.

Sūṭra (1).

(1) Parity,* per Similarity, (2) per Dissimilarity, (3) per Augmentation, (4) per Subtraction, (5) per Uncertainty, (6) per Certainty, (7) per Shuffling, (8) per Probandum, (9) per Convergence, (10) per Non-convergence, (11) per Continued Question, (12) per Counter-instance, (13) per Non-generation (14) per Doubt, (15) per Vacillation, (16) per Non-probativeness, † (17) per Presumption, (18) per Non-difference, (19) per Evidence, (20) per Apprehension, (21) per Non-apprehension, (22) per Non-eternality, ‡ (23) per Eternality and (24) per Character of effect.'—(Sū. 1.)

When the argument urged in confutation is through *similarity*, and does not differ in validity from the argument put forward in demonstration, it constitutes 'Parity per Similarity'; the said 'non-difference' we shall exemplify in the particular instances that we shall cite. 'Parity per Dissimilarity' and the other Futile Rejoinders may be similarly described.

(*Vārṭika* on Sū. (1).

[P. 535, Ll. to 535, L. 1.]

Futile Rejoinder having been described only briefly, it had to be described in greater detail; hence is the present

* Uḍayanāchārya in his *Boḍhasiḍḍhi* (*Nyāyaparishiṣṭa*) thus explains the signification of the term '*sama*' occurring at the end of these names.—(1) According to the *Vārṭikā*, it means 'equalising'; *i. e* the Futile Rejoinder is put forward for the purpose of counter-poising or neutralising the effects of the original Reasoning;—(2) according to the *Bhāṣya*, it means that the Futile Rejoinder is put up with a view to show that there is nothing in the original reasoning which differentiates it from what is now put forward; [there is not much difference between these two].—(3) others explain it as meaning that the Futile Rejoinder puts the original *reasoner* on exactly the same footing as his Opponent putting forward the Rejoinder;—(4) the Equality' of the Futile Rejoinder lies in the fact that while demolishing the reasoning of the first party, it demolishes itself also. [Uḍayanāchārya himself accepts this last explanation.]

† प्रकरणाहेत्व is the correct reading.

‡ The printed text reads नुपलब्धिनित्यानित्य, but from the later Sūṭras, it is clear that नित्य comes after अनित्य hence the right reading is नुपलब्ध्यनित्यनित्य

Discourse started; the first *Sūṭra* whereof is—'*Parity per Similarity &c. &c.*' Futile Rejoinder is that reasoning set up in refutation of a reasoning propounded in demonstration, which (in reality) is incapable of refuting the latter.

"Inasmuch as the putting forward of the Futile Rejoinder has been prohibited, and as it consists only of wrong answers, it is not right to set it up at all. The use of the Futile Rejoinder has been prohibited in the following sentence—'Casuistry, Futile Rejoinder and Clinchers should be avoided by one in his own assertions' (*Bhāṣya*, Text, P. 7, L. 2.),; and, further, Futile Rejoinder is not the right answer to an argument; hence it is not right to set up a Futile Rejoinder."

This is not right, for the useful purpose served by the setting up of the Futile Rejoinder has also been pointed out in the passage—'these can be urged with force against others' (*Bhāṣya*, Text, P. 7, L. 3). In fact sometimes the Futile Rejoinder may be set up even in refutation of a valid reasoning; *i. e.* though the first propounder of the thesis may think that the reasoning put forward against him is sound, yet being desirous of obtaining wealth, honour and fame [and being anxious to guard the Truth against attack] he sets up a Futile Rejoinder; his motive in so doing being as follows :—'It may be that being upset by my Futile Rejoinder, the other party may not be able to perceive the right answer to my Rejoinder; so if the other party is really unable to find a suitable answer, he is defeated; while if I do not set up the Rejoinder, the other party would obtain absolute victory over me; and certainly rather than suffer such total defeat, it is better that

Vār. P. 536.

I should render the issue (of the disputation) doubtful, hence it is best that I should set up the Futile Rejoinder.'*

Other people have held that the Futile Rejoinder serves the purpose of rebutting invalid reasonings. Some people hold that the Futile Rejoinder should be set up for the purpose of setting aside unsound arguments. They declare as follows:—'When an unsound argument has been put forward, a Futile Rejoinder may be set up, either (a) by reason of the fact that the person setting it up, is unable to detect the flaw in the argument (and thus to set up the right answer), or (b) on account of the desire on his part to point out the flaw in the argument by placing before him an undesirable contingency (a dilemma).' †

This however is not right; as there would, in such cases, be no need for the Futile Rejoinder: if the first party knows that the argument put forward against him is unsound, then he should naturally proceed to point out the flaw in it that he has actually detected, and there would thus be no need for setting up the Futile Rejoinder. If, on the other hand,

* In sheer opposition to Truth, the Opponent sets up an argument against it;—the expounder of the Truth finds himself unable to meet that argument;—he feels that if he fails to provide an answer, the audience, consisting of men of ordinary capacity, would be misled to believe that the Truth is otherwise than what has been propounded by him;—hence he meets the Opponent's argument by means of a Rejoinder which he knows to be futile, and yet he sets up with the idea that, in case the Opponent fails to detect and expose the fallacy in the Rejoinder, the worst that would happen would be that the audience would be left in doubt as to the issue of the conflict. Even this is better than that the cause of Truth should suffer total defeat. Though as a matter of fact it is not possible that there should be any valid argument against a *true* thesis, yet the expounder of this may not be able to perceive the fallacy in the argument against it, and so may regard it as 'valid'—*Ṭaṭparya.*

† Even though he knows the right answer to the Opponent's argument, yet he elects to meet him with the Futile Rejoinder, for the purpose of convincing him of the fallaciousness of his argument by placing before him the following dilemma:—'I know that my rejoinder is defective; but so is yours; so that if your argument is right, mine also should be so.'—*Ṭāṭparya.*

he does not detect any flaw in the Opponent's argnment, how could he set up any Futile Rejoinder at all? He who does not understand things can not set up any arguments* If he were to set up arguments without understanding things, then he might say anything he liked; and there would be no restriction at all (to his assertions).

What we have just said also sets aside the view that the first five Futile Rejoinders are set up against the 'Indecisive' Reasoning. Some people have said that—"when the other party has put forward an *indecisive* reasoning, then should one set up the first five Futile Rejoinders."—This view also is set aside by what we have just said.—"How?"—If the man knows that the Opponent's reasoning is *indecisive*, it is this defect that he should point out; while if he does not recognise any such defect, he is ignorant (and can say nothing to the point).

What we have said also disposes of the view regarding the sequence of right and wrong arguments;—that is, the view that, "when the Opponent puts forward a right argument, he should be met with a right argument, and when he puts forward a wrong argument, he should be met with a wrong argument [and both these arguments in answer constitute the Futile Rejoinder]."—But the 'right' argument is that which consists in the pointing out of defects in the Proposition and other factors of the reasoning put forward by the Opponent; and such an argument would be a *right* answer, and it would not be a Futile Rejoinder. Thus the view in question cannot be right; as it shows that the persons who hold it are ignorant of the real character of 'Futile Rejoinder'.

*The subject-matter of the disputation is one that the first party has fully studied; and if he is unable to detect flaws in the arguments put forward against what he has fully studied, he cannot have the ready wit necessary for the setting up of the Futile Rejoinder.

'*Parity*,' '*Samā*', consists in the propounding of an argument for the purpose of *equalising* (*counterpoising*, the original argument); and what is meant by the names of the Futile Rejoinders is that *equalisng is done by similarity, Equalising is done by dissimilarity*, and so forth; so that the setting up of these Rejoinders is for the purpose of equalising (the original argument): the 'equalising' may or may not be actually accomplished; but the man who puts forward the Futile Rejoinder does so with the intention of 'equalising'; just as in ordinary life a man makes efforts for the sake of his family [and the efforts may or may not be actually fruitful].

Or, 'Parity' may be taken to imply the absence of any peculiar reason (in favour of the original argument, as against the counter-argument set up in the Futile Rejoinder); the sense of the latter being—'you do not indicate any particular reason in support of your argument'; the idea with which the person puts forward the Futile Rejoinder being—'my reasoning is exactly like yours.'

Vār. P. 537.

The Futile Rejoinders can not all be urged against all reasonings (as some people have held); for the simple reason that they are not equally applicable to all. As a matter of fact, all Futile Rejoinders are not applicable to all reasonings; *e.g.*, when the original argument is based upon 'dissimilarity,' one could not set up those Futile Rejoinders that consist of 'Parity' per 'Superiority', or 'Inferiority', or 'Uncertainty,' or 'Certainty', or 'Shuffling.'

By 'Parity,' 'Equalising,' it is not meant that there is equality between the propounder of the original thesis and the propounder of the Rejoinder; because the *Futile Rejoinder* is always *wrong answer*; so that the propounder of the Futile Rejoinder must be one whose view is *wrong*; while in regard

to the propounder of the original thesis, it is uncertain as to what he says being right or wrong [so that there can be no *equality* between the two protagonists.]*

Bhāṣya on Sū. (2).

[P. 241, L. 10 to P. 242, L. 11.]

The definition (of these Futile Rejoinders) is as follows:—

Sūṭra (2).

(1) and (2)—THE ORIGINAL PROPOSITION HAVING BEEN PROPOUNDED ON THE BASIS OF A SIMILARITY AND DISSIMILARITY, IF THE OPPONENT SEEKS TO PROVE THE CONTRARY OF ITS PREDICATE, ALSO ON THE BASIS OF SIMILARITY AND DISSIMILARITY, WE HAVE INSTANCES OF 'PARITY PER DISSIMILARITY,' AND 'PARITY PER DISSIMILARITY.'† (Sū. 2).

(1) When the original proposition is propounded on the basis of similarity, if the Opposition to it, seeking to establish the contrary of its predicate, is set up also on the basis of similarity,—and this Opposition does not differ from the argument put forward in support of the original proposition,—it is a case of that Opposition which is called 'Parity per Similarity'. E.g. The Proposition having been in the form 'The Soul must be active,—because every Substance is endowed with qualities conducive to activity,—the clod of of earth, which is a substance, is endowed with qualities conducive to activity, and is found to be active,—the Soul also is so,—therefore the Soul must be active;'—the Opponent sets up the following opposition to it, also on the basis of Similarity:—'The Soul must be inactive,—because every all-pervading substance is inactive,—Ākāsha, which is an all-

* The twenty-four Futile Rejoinders have been classified under sixteen heads, described in Sections 2 to 17. I, comprising (1) and (2), is the wrong urging of the fallacy of 'neutralisation'; II, comprising (3) to (8) is in the form of putting forward alternatives regarding the Probandum and the Example; III, comprising (9), and (10), bears upon the convergence and divergence of pairs of things; IV, comprising (11) and (12), also bears upon continued Question and Counter-instance; the rest comprising only one each.

†*Sādharmyavaidharmyābhyām* is to be construed with '*upasamhāre*,' as also with '*taddharmaviparyayopapaṭṭeḥ*,'—according to the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*. Vishvanātha appears to construe it only with the latter term.

pervading substance, is inactive,—the Soul also is so,—therefore the Soul must be inactive.' And there is no special reason why on the ground of its *similarity* to active substances the Soul should regarded as *active*, and it should not be regarded as *inactive*, on the ground of its *similarity* to *inactive substances*;—so that inasmuch as there is no special reason (which makes one or the other more valid), this is an instance of Futile Rejoinder called 'Parity per Similarity.' [This is a case where the original Proposition is based upon Similarity, and the Opposition to it is also based upon Similarity].

(2) An instance of 'Parity per Dissimilarity' (in opposition to the same Proposition) is the following—'the clod of earth which is endowed with qualities conducive to activity, is found to be limited in its extent,—*the Soul is not so limited*—therefore the Soul cannot be active, like the clod of Earth;'—there being no special reason why, on the basis of its *similarity* to an *active* substance, the Soul should be regarded as *active*,—and why, on the basis of its *dissimilarity* to the *active* substance, it should not be regarded as *inactive*; and inasmuch as there is no such special reason, it is a case of 'Parity per Dissimilarity.' [This is case of the Proposition being based on Similarity, and the Opposition on Dissimilarity].

(3) The original Proposition being set up on the basis of *dissimilarity*,—'The Soul must be inactive,—because it is all-pervading,—every *active* substance is found to be not all-pervading, as in the case of the clod of Earth,—the Soul is not so non-all-pervading,—hence it must be inactive';—'the following opposition is set up on the basis of dissimilarity:—'the Ākāsha, which is an inactive substance, is found to be devoid of qualities conducive to activity,—the Soul is not so devoid of such qualities,—hence the Soul cannot be inactive';—and there is no special reason why, on the ground of its *dissimilarity* to the *active* substance the Soul should be regarded as *inactive*, and why, on the ground of its *dissimilarity* to the *inactive* substance, it should not be regarded as *active*; thus there being no such special reason, this is an instance of 'Parity per Dissimilarity'. [This is an instance of the Proposition as well as its Opposition both being based upon Dissimilarity.]

(4) An instance of 'Parity per Similarity' (in opposition to the same Proposition) *—'the clod of Earth which is active, is found to be endowed with qualities conducive to activity,—the Soul also is so endowed,—hence it should be active';—there is no special reason why, on the ground of its *dissimilarity* to the *active* substance, the Soul should be regarded as *inactive*, and why, on the ground of its *similarity* to the *active* substance, it should not be regarded as *active*; and there being no such special reason, this is an instance of 'Parity per Similarity.' [This is an instance of the Proposition being based upon *Dissimilarity* and the Opposition on *Similarity*.

Vārṭika on Sū. (2).

[P. 537, L. 10 to P. 538, L. 9.]

The original proposition having been etc. etc.—says the *Sūṭra*. 'Parity per Similarity' and 'Parity per Dissimilarity'—*are two forms of Opposition*. (1) When the proposition is propounded on the basis of *Similarity*, there is opposition set up against it on the basis of another *Similarity*, which is contrary to the former *Similarity*, (2) and when the Proposition is propounded on the basis of *Dissimilarity*, there is opposition set up against it on the basis of a *Similarity*, contrary to the said *Dissimilarity*;—both these constitute 'Parity per *Similarity*.' E.g. (1) The Proposition being in the form 'Sound must be non-eternal,—because it has the character of being produced, and such things as the Jar and the like, which have the character of being produced, are found to be non-eternal,'—the following opposition is set up against it. 'If Sound is regarded as non-eternal by reason of its *similarity* to the non-eternal Jar, it should have to be regarded as *Eternal* also, because it has *incorporeality*, which forms its *similarity* to *Ākāsha* which is *eternal*.' (2) The same Proposition being put forward

* The words अथ साधर्म्यसम wanting in the printed text is supplied by the Puri Ms. B. and also Mss. C and D.

on the basis of Sound's *dissimilarity* to *Ākāsha* [*i. e.* 'Sound must be non-eternal, because it has the character of being produced,—and *Ākāsha*, which is eternal, is not possessed of that character], the following opposition is set up against it:—'If Sound is to be regarded as non-eternal by reason of its *dissimilarity* to the *eternal Ākāsha*, it should have to be regarded as *eternal*, by reason of its *similarity* to the eternal Ākāsha, in the shape of *incorporeality*;—if you think that even though this *Similarity* is there, Sound cannot be regarded as *eternal*, then it is not right for you to assert that 'Sound should be regarded as non-eternal, by reason of its *similarity* to the Jar, or by reason of its *dissimilarity* to Ākāsha.'

The urging of the Futile Rejoinder serves to point out that there is no special reason (in support of the view propounded in the Proposition); and there being no such special reason, the Futile Rejoinder bears the semblance of the urging of the fallacy of 'Inconclusiveness.'

Vārṭika P. 538.

(3) Similarly when the proposition is propounded on the basis of Dissimilarity and Opposition is set up against it on the basis of Dissimilarity contrary to the former, and (4) when the Proposition is propounded on the basis of Similarity and Opposition is set up against it on the basis of a Dissimilarity contrary to the former—we have 'Parity *per Dissimilarity*.' *E. g.* (3) When the same argument is put in the form 'Sound must be non-eternal, by reason of its *dissimilarity* to *Ākāsha*,' the Opposition is set up that 'it should be regarded as *eternal* by reason of its *dissimilarity* to the Jar, in the shape of *incorporeality*.' (4) The same argument being put forward on the basis of *similarity* to the Jar (in the shape of *having the character of being produced*), Opposition is set up against it that—'If by

reason of its *similarity* to the Jar, Sound is to be regarded as *non-eternal*, then, by reason of its *dissimilarity* to the Jar (in the shape of *incorporeality*), it should have to be regarded as *eternal*;'—if you think that even though there is this *dissimilarity*, Sound cannot be eternal, then, in that case, your reasonings—'Sound must be non-eternal, because of its *similarity* to the non-eternal Jar, and because of its *dissimilarity* to the eternal *Ākāsha*'—are inconclusive (not true). This is what constitutes the 'absence of special reason.'*

Bhāṣya on Sū. (3).

[P. 242, L. 12 to P. 243, L. 6.]

The answer to the above two Futile Rejoinders is as follows:—

Sūtra (3).

THE PROPOSITION WOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE FACT OF A CERTAIN ANIMAL BEING THE 'COW' IS ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESENCE IN IT OF THE CLASS-CHARACTER OF THE 'COW.'—(Sū. 5).

If one were to seek to establish his proposition by means of mere 'similarity,' or by means of mere 'dissimilarity,'—then there would certainly be the uncertainty (inconclusiveness, urged in the Futile Rejoinder). There is however no such uncertainty when the conclusion is based upon a particular property [such as is invariably concomitant with what is sought to be proved]; *e. g.* that a certain animal is the

---

* *Udayanachārya* in his *Bodha-siddhi* says—Each of these two Futile Rejoinders is threefold: (1) Bearing upon a true subject (2) bearing upon an untrue subject, and (3) consisting of wrong expression. The examples cited in the Vārtika belong to the first kind (Sound being really non-eternal). Following is the example of the second kind:—The Proposition being propounded in the form 'Sound must be *eternal*, because it is intangible, like Ākāsha,' the Opposition is set up against it that 'Sound being cognisable, and as such similar to *non-eternal* things, it should be regarded as *non-eternal*'. 'The examples cited in the *Bhāṣya* belong to the third kind; as the subject thereof is true, it is only the verbal expression that is defective. A Rejoinder, even though quite right in matter, if it is put up in wrong form, becomes Futile.

cow is proved by reason only of that 'similarity of it to the cow' which consists in *the presence of the particular class-character* '*cow*' (which is invariably concomitant with, inseparable from, all cows),—and not by reason of the presence of such other properties as are different from the *presence of the dewlap* * [which *other properties* are not invariably concomitant with all cows]. Similarly the proposition that a certain animal is the cow is proved † by reason only of that 'dissimilarity of it to the Horse' which consists in *the presence of the class-character* '*cow*,'—and not that dissimilarity which might consist in a mere diversity of qualities &c. All this has been explained in the section on 'Factors of Reasoning' (in *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 1-1-39), where it has been pointed out that in the sentence (formulating the inferential argument), several Instruments of Cognition combine together and conjointly accomplish the common purpose (of proving the conclusion), —and that the *uncertainty* (that the Futile Rejoinders point out) can apply only to Fallacious Reasonings (and not to valid reasonings).

Vārṭika on Sū. (3).

[P. 538, L. 10 to L. 18.]

The answer to the above two Futile Rejoinders is as follows :—The proposition would be established etc. etc.—says the *Sūṭra*. Even though between the Horse and the Cow, there is *similarity* consisting of the *character of being* and so forth, and there is also *dissimilarity*, consisting in the (fact of one of them, the Horse, having) uncleft hoofs,

---

* The word '*sāsnādisambanḍhāṭ*' as it stands, would mean that the said conclusion cannot be proved by *the presence of the dewlap &c*. This however would be wrong ; as the *presence of the dewlap* &c. is as peculiar to, and invariably concomitant with, all cows, as the class-character 'cow' itself. In view of this, the *Ṭāṭparya* has explained the compound '*sāsnādi*' as meaning properties *other than the presence of the dewlap*.

† तथ गौः सिध्यति is wrong. Read च in place of थ as found in Puri B, also in Ç and D.

—yet, on the mere ground of the said *similarity* in the form of the character of 'being' the Cow cannot become the *Horse*; nor on the mere ground of the *dissimilarity* in the form of *uncleft hoofs*, the *non-Cow* can become the *Cow*. And what is the reason for this?—The reason lies in the fact that one (the *similarity*) is not invariably concomitant (with the 'Cow), and the other (the *dissimilarity*) is not exclusively precluded (from the 'Cow' only).* It is only that 'similarity' which is invariably concomitant, relatively as well as positively, with a certain property, that can serve as the ground for attributing that property to a certain object; and it is only the class-character 'Cow' that is so concomitant (with the character of *being the Cow*); hence it is only the presence of this class-character 'Cow' that can prove the fact of a certain object being the *Cow*. In the case in question, 'incorporeality' is a quality that is positively concomitant, as well as negatively concomitant, with both 'eternality' and 'non-eternality'; hence the presence of that quality can be a ground for regarding Sound either as 'eternal' or as 'non-eternal.' On the other hand, on the ground of the presence of *the character of being produced*, which is positively and negatively concomitant (with 'non-eternality' only,) we shall be justified in regarding Sound as 'non-eternal only.' Thus then, to your assertion—that there is no special reason (in support of the original proposition as against the Futile Rejoinders)—our answer is that what we have just pointed out (*i. e.*, the necessity of invariable concomitance) forms the 'special reason' (in support of the original proposition that 'sound is non-eternal, *because it is endowed with the character of being produced*.')

End of Section (1).

---

* The *character of 'being'* is present not only in the Cow, but in all things; *uncleft hoof* is absent not only in the cow, but in several other animals also, *e. g.*, the buffalo.

Section (2).

[Sūtras 4-6.]

Dealing with the six Futile Rejoinders—(3) 'Parity per Augmentation' (4) 'Parity per Subtraction,' (5) 'Parity per Uncertainty', (6) 'Parity per Certainty,') (7) 'Parity per Shuffling,' and (8) 'Parity per Probandum,'—which are based upon the diversity of the character of the Subject and that of the Instance.

Sūtra (4).

BASED UPON THE DIFFERENCE IN THE PROPERTIES OF THE 'SUBJECT'* AND OF THE 'EXAMPLE' ARE THE FUTILE REJOINDERS NAMED (3) 'PARITY PER AUGMENTATION,' (4) 'PARITY PER SUBTRACTION', (5) 'PARITY PER UNCERTAINTY,' (6) 'PARITY PER CERTAINTY,' (7) 'PARITY PER SHUFFLING;' AND BASED UPON THE FACT OF BOTH (SUBJECT AND EXAMPLE) BEING 'OBJECTS TO BE PROVED' (BY INFERENCE) IS THE FUTILE REJOINDER NAMED (8) 'PARITY PER PROBANDUM.'—(Sū. 4.)

Bhaṣya on Su. (4).

[P. 243, L. 9 to P. 244, L. 2.]

(3) When the Opposer puts forward the contingency of an additional property of the 'Example' subsisting in the 'Subject', it is 'Parity *per Augmentation*'† *E. g.* [against the Proposition that 'the Soul must be active, because it is endowed with properties conducive to action, like the Clod of Earth'] the

---

* '*Sāḍhya*', says Vishvanatha, stands here for '*pakṣa*', 'Subject'. 'The diverse character' referred to are *existence* and *non-existence*.

† The property in question does not really belong to the 'Subject,' and the Rejoinder attributes that property to it; thus there is an accession to, an union of, the properties of the 'Subject.' Hence the name 'Parity per Augmentation.'

Opposition is set up—"if by reason of the presence of qualities conducive to action, the Soul should, like the Clod of Earth, be regarded as active, then, like the Clod of Earth, it has to be regarded as tangible also; if it is not tangible, like the Clod of Earth, then it should not be active either; or you should point out some special reason (why it should be regarded as *active*, and not as *tangible*)." [Here the *additional* quality of *tangibility*, which is not existent in the Soul, is attributed to it]."*

(4) When the Opposer urges the contingency of the *absence of a certain property* in the Subject, on the analogy of the 'Example',—it is 'Parity *per subtraction*; *e.g.*, (against the same Proposition) the Opposition is set up—"inasmuch as the Clod of Earth is found to be *active* and *not all-pervading*, the Soul also, if active, should be regarded as *not all-pervading*; or you should point out some special reason (why it should be regarded as *active* and not as *not all-pervading*) [Here the property of *all-pervadingness* is subtracted from the Soul].†

(5) and (6) '*Varṇya*' means '*khyāpanīya*,' '*that which is yet to be known*', hence '*uncertain*'; and '*avarṇya*,' '*certain*,' is the reverse of that; these two properties, 'uncertainty' and 'certainty', belong respectively to the 'Subject' and the 'Example' [the presence of the Probandum in the Example being known for *certain*, while its presence in the Subject is still *uncertain*]; and when, in opposition, the opposer reverses these qualities (by attributing *uncertainty* to the 'Example,' and *certainty* to the 'Subject'], we have the Futile Rejoinders, 'Parity *per Uncertainty*' and 'Parity *per Certainty*.'‡

* This Futile Rejoinder is intended to urge the Fallacy of 'Contradiction'—says Uḍayana.

† This is intended to urge the Fallacy of the 'Unknown'.

‡ 'Parity per Uncertainty', by reducing the Example to Uncertainty, makes it *equal* to the 'Subject'; and 'Parity per Certainty,' by removing *uncertainty* from the Subject', makes it equal to the 'Example'. The 'Subject' is that in which the presence of the Probandum is *doubtful* and is sought to be confirmed by the argument in question; while the 'Example' is that wherein the presence of the Probandum is known for certain.

As an example of 'Parity per Uncertainty' in the generalised form, Vishvanātha puts forward the following:—Against any argument that the First Party might put up in support of his Proposition, the Opponent will set up the following Opposi-

(7) The 'Example' being endowed with the property that constitutes the Probans (proving the desired Proposition,)—if the Opponent attributes to it some other property, and then urges the fact of this other property being such as is not invariably concomitant with the properties of the Probandum,—it is a case of 'Parity *per Shuffling*.' E.g. (against the same Proposition) we have the Opposition—"One thing endowed with qualties conducive to action is found to be *possessed of Gravity*, as we find in the Clod of Earth (Example),—while another thing similarly endowed is found to be *devoid of Gravity*, as we find in the case of Air;—similarly it is possible that while one thing, the Clod of Earth, which is endowed with qualities conducive to action, is *active*, another thing, the Soul, which is similarly endowed, may be *without action*;—or you should show some special reason (against this)."*

---

tion—"What can prove the Proposition is only that Property which, as Probans, subsists in the Subject of that Proposition;—this Probans must, in order to be effective, subsist in the Example also;—now the principal property that subsists in the 'Subject' is *the character of having the presence of the probandum doubtful*;—and this same character should reside in the Example; hence the Example also should be one in which *the presence of the Probandum is doubtful*."—And the following is the example of 'Parity per Certainty:—"The Example must be one in which the presence of the Probandum is known for certain, the property in the Example must also reside in the Subject,—hence the Subject also must be one in which the presence of the Probandum is known for certain,—and if the Subject is so, then it loses the very character of the 'Subject', which must be one in which the presence of the Probandum is only *doubtful*."

The 'Parity per Uncertainty" is intended to urge the Fallacy of 'contradiction' and 'Parity per Certainty' is intended to urge the Fallacy of the 'unknown'—says Uḍayana.

*Here the Opponent attributes to the Example, Clod of Earth, the quality of 'gravity,' and then shows that *gravity*, one quality of the Example, is not invariably concomitant with the *qualities conducive to action* (as in Air, we find these latter, but not the former),—and analogously it may be possible that *qualities conducive to action*, which also belong to the Example, may not be invariably concomitant with *activity*. Here we have a case of a property (gravity) being found in the Example which is not invariably concomitant with the Probans, 'qualities conducive to action.' This also includes case (i) where the property found in the Example is one with which the Probans is not invariably concomitant. This Futile Rejoinder is intended to urge the Fallacy of Inconclusiveness,—says Uḍayana.

(8) That character is called 'Probàndum' which is found to be one upon which the whole force of the Probans and the other Factors of the Reasoning is operative; and when such character is attributed to the 'Example', *it* is 'Parity *per Probandum*.' E.g., "If the Soul is to be regarded as active, in the same manner as the Clod of Earth is active, then it comes to this that the Clod of Earth is like the Soul,—and the Soul is the Subject in regard to which the presence of Activity is still to be proved,—hence the Clod of Earth also should be one in regard to which the presence of Activity is still to be proved;—if this is not so, then it is not* true that the Soul is like the Clod of Earth (which means that the Example cited is not right]."†

Vārṭika on Sū. (4).

[P. 539, L. 3 to L. 13.]

'Augmentation' consists in imposing a property that does not exist;—and 'Subtraction' is the withdrawing of the property that is already present;—'Uncertain' is that which is yet to be proved; and 'Certain' is that which has not got to be proved.—'Shuffling' consists in a peculiarity. The Opposition that makes use of these constitutes the five Futile Rejoinders, 'Parity per Augmentation', and the rest. And when the Opposition shows that the character to be proved, and that which has been put forward to prove it, stand on the same footing, it is a case of 'Parity per Probandum.'

For example, in the Proposition already referred to, it having been asserted that the conclusion must be true, because such is found to be the case with the Jar,—the opposition is set up that,—"if Sound is like the Jar, then, since the Jar has Colour, Sound also should be regarded as colour-

*This न is wanting in the printed text; it is found in the Puri Mss. also in C. and D.

† The Subject, the Probans and the Example must be such as are definitely known from other sources of knowledge, and are not dependent upon the reasoning of which they themselves form parts. That which is to be proved, the Probandum is one that is not so known. If the Example is shown to be one which also is still to be proved, this vitiates the entire reasoning.

This is meant to urge the Fallacy of the 'Unknown'.

ed;—this is a case of 'Parity per Augmentation.' If the Opposition is set up in the form—"since Sound is colourless, the Jar also should have to be regarded as colourless,"—it is a case of 'Parity per Subtraction.' If the Opposition is in the form—"That the Jar is non-eternal is *certain*, then the non-eternality of Sound also should be certain', or 'the fact of Sound being eternal being *uncertain*, that of the Jar being so should also be uncertain',—these two are instances of 'Parity per Uncertainty' and 'Parity per Certainty.' If the Opposition set up is—"Sound may be capable of being produced (like the Jar),—but Sound is produced by Disjunction, while the Jar is not produced by Disjunction, so that the diversity between the two, in the form of one being *eternal* and the other *non-eternal*, should be as possible as that in the form of one being *produced by disjunction* while the other is *not produced by Disjunction*;"—this is an instance of 'Parity per Shuffling.' Lastly, when the Opposition is set up in the form—"What is the reason for asserting that the Jar is *non-eternal*; this reason is as much to be *made known* as the Probandum of the original Proposition,"—since such an opposition consists in the setting up of the fact of the Reason being *like the Probandum*, it is called 'Parity per Probandum.'

Bhāṣya on Sū. (5).

[P. 244, L. 2 to L. 7.]

The answer to the above six Futile Rejoinders is as follows:—

Sūtra (5).

INASMUCH AS THE 'REAFFIRMATION' (LEADING TO THE CONCLUSION) IS ONLY SECURED ON THE BASIS OF A PARTICULAR SIMILARITY (BETWEEN THE 'SUBJECT' AND THE 'EXAMPLE)', THERE CAN BE NO DENIAL OF IT ON THE BASIS OF ANY MERE DISSIMILARITY*.—(Sū. 5).

*Invariable concomitance is the essential element, and when we have even one point of similarity which is invariably concomitant with the Probandum,

It is not possible to hide away (*i.e.* deny) what has been duly established;—and the 'analogy' (between the Subject and the Example) is duly established, if there is some point of similarity between them: as we find in the case of the well-known analogy 'as the Cow so the Gavaya'; this being so, in regard to the cow and the *Gavaya*, it is not possible to urge that "there is some difference (of character) between the two (and hence the analogy is not right)";—similarly (in the case in question) when on the point of that character which is meant to establish the conclusion, it is found that it is present in the Example (and in the Subject),—it cannot be possible to deny the conclusiveness of the said character merely by pointing out that there is some difference between the two, consisting in a diversity in their properties.

Vārṭika on Sū. (5).

[P. 553, L. 15 to P. 540, L. 6.]

What the Sūṭra means is that all that has been urged above cannot be accepted; as it shows that the real meaning (character) of the Probans has not been grasped We do not mean to say that in Sound (the Subject) there are found *all* the properties of the Jar (the Example); all that we say is that, that property which proves the Probandum, and which therefore is the (Probans), resides in both. In the *Reaffirmation* (which is the fourth factor in our reasoning process) we use the expression 'so is (the Subject, Sound)'; and what this expression means is that the character of *being capable of being produced* is re-affirmed of *Sound*. Such being the case, what has been urged under Sū. 4) can have no meaning at all. When it is said 'As the Cow so the *Gavaya*,' it is not meant that all properties of the Cow reside in the *Gavaya*, or that all properties of the *Gavaya* reside in the Cow; all that is meant by the statement is that it *affirms* in regard to the two animals just that property which is common to them. If it meant

Vār. P. 540.

that is enough to prove our conclusion. It is not possible for the 'Subject' and the 'Example' to have no dissimilarity at all; that would mean identity. All that is necessary is that they should resemble on certain such points as are invariably concomitant with the Probandum.

the affirmation of *all* properties, then, there should not have been used the expression 'as—so'; the right expression, in that case, would be 'this is the same as that'. Exactly the same is the case with the case in question (Sound and Jar).

It has been urged (*Vārtika*, Text, P. 539, L. 11 &c.) that—"since between Sound and Jar there is this difference, that while one is produced by Disjunction, the other is not so produced, it follows from this that there should be this difference also between them, that while one is non-eternal, the other is eternal."—But as a matter of fact, *the character of being capable of being produced* is invariably concomitant, negatively as well as positively (with *Non-eternality*); and such is not the case with *the character of being produced by Disjunction.* Further, as a matter of fact, no object, either eternal or non-eternal, (with the sole of exception of Sound) is ever found such as is *produced by Disjunction* in the same manner as Sound is produced.* [So that *being produced by Disjunction in this manner* would reside in Sound only, and as such being *too specific*, could not prove anything at all.] So that the contention of the Opponent (putting up the Futile Rejoinder) has no force at all.

Sūtra (6).

FURTHER, INASMUCH AS THE 'EXAMPLE' BECOMES AN 'EXAMPLE' ONLY BY REASON OF THE INDICATION OF THE ACTUAL PRESENCE, IN IT, OF THE PROBANDUM [IT CAN NEVER BE SAID TO STAND ON THE SAME FOOTING AS THE PROBANDUM, WHAT IS STILL TO BE PROVED]. *Sūtra* (6).

---

* This has been added with a view to exclude the case of 'Disjunction born of Disjunction,' as this is not 'produced in the same way as Sound'; Sound being produced by the Disjunction of its cause or source only, while the other Disjunction is produced by the disjunction of the cause and the non-cause.—*Tātparya.*

Bhāṣya on Sū. (6).

[244, Ll. 9—10.]

What is indicated (in the Example) is only such a fact as is not incompatible with what is agreed upon by all men, ordinary as well as learned; and since it is only when the presence of the Probandum is so indicated that the Example becomes a true 'Example',—there can be no ground for saying that the Example stands on the same footing as the Probandum.*

Vārtika on Sū. (6).

[P. 540, L. 8 to P. 541, L. 3.]

When you said that "the Example is the Probandum, *what is to be proved*", you did not understand the true character of the 'Example'. The 'Example' is that which forms the subject of the undisputed cognitions (of both parties); and as such it can never be the Probandum, *what is to be proved* (which is always *doubtful*). If the cognition (involved in the Example) were disputed, it would not be a true Example,—being devoid of the characteristics of the 'Example'.

[In connection with Futile Rejoinders some people have held that—"their number should be *fourteen* only, not twenty-four, for if they are *twenty-four*, then] there is needless repetition of certain Futile Rejoinders." There is however no repetition; (*a*) because their meanings are distinct; it has been explained how the meanings of 'Parity per Augmentation' and the rest are different from one another;—(*b*) because we find a distinct difference in the manner in which each of them is put forward; as a matter of fact, the way in which 'Parity per Augmentation' and the

---

* The answer given in Sū. 5, applies to all the six Futile Rejoinders described in Sū. 4. What is said in Sū. 6, is the answer that is applicable to only three of them—'Parity per Uncertainty,' 'Parity per Certainty' and 'Parity per Probandum'.—*Tātparya*.

other Futile Rejoinders are put forward is entirely different. "In this manner there should be an endless number." If you mean by this that—"if the Futile Rejoinders are to be regarded as distinct simply by reason of difference in the way in which they are put forward, then their number cannot be *twenty-four* only (but endless),"—this has no force; as no limit is intended; it is not meant to limit the number of individual Futile Rejoinders to *twenty-four* only; but this endless variety is due to the variety of examples (all which fall within the twenty-four well-defined groups). "How do you know that this is what is meant?" Well, the single Fallacy of 'Neutralisation' has been divided into four kinds. If, in answer to this, the Opponent should say that, since all Futile Rejoinders have a certain common characteristic, they must be regarded as one and the same,—this would militate against his own assertion that the number of Futile Rejoinders is *fourteen*. If this diversity (into fourteen kinds) be held to be based upon some sort of difference among them, —then it cannot be rightly asserted that "Parity per Augmentation' and the rest do not differ from 'Parity per Shuffling;' for, just as on the basis of some difference among them, there would be *fourteen*
Var. P. 541.
Futile Rejoinders,—in the same manner, on the basis of some difference, the number would be twenty-four. In fact the argument that, "by reason of some sort of similarity among 'Parity per Augmentation' and the other Futile Rejoinders, they should be regarded *as one*", is itself of the nature of a Futile Rejoinder, called 'Parity per Non-difference.' And the answer to this Futile Rejoinder is mentioned elsewhere (under Sū. 5-1-24).

End of Section (2).

Section (8).

[Sūṭras 7-8.]

Dealing with (9) '*Parity per Convergence*' *and* (10)' *Parity per Non-convergence.*'

Sūṭra (7).

"THE PROBANS (COULD ESTABLISH THE PROBANDUM) EITHER BY UNITING, OR NOT-UNITING, WITH THE PROBANDUM,—IF IT UNITES WITH IT, THEN IT BECOMES NON-DIFFERENT FROM IT; WHILE IF IT DOES NOT UNITE WITH IT, IT CANNOT PROVE IT"—THESE ARGUMENTS CONSTITUTE (9) 'PARITY PER CONVERGENCE', AND (10) 'PARITY PER NON-CONVERGENCE.'

Sū. (7).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (7).

[P. 244, L. 13 to L. 16.]

"Is it by uniting with the Probandum that the Probans would establish it? Or by not uniting with it? It cannot establish it by uniting with it; because by uniting with it, it would become non-different from it, and as such could not establish it. When of two things both are existent, and are united,—which could be the 'probans,' the 'establisher,' and which the 'probandum' * the 'established'? If, on the other hand, the Probans does not unite with the Probandum,—then (on that very account) it could not establish it; for example, the Lamp does not illumine an object unless it is united with it." When the Opposition is urged on the basis of 'uniting' (Converging), it is 'Parity per Convergence'; and when it is urged on the basis of 'non-uniting' (non-converging), it is 'Parity per Non-convergence.'

---

* It is only what is not already accomplished that can be established; what is united with anything must be an accomplished entity; hence no such thing can be what is *to be established*, the 'probandum'; and when two things unite, they become identified; hence if the Probans and the Probandum become united, there can be no relation of cause and effect between them.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

Vārṭika on Su. (7).

[P. 541, L. 6 to L. 18.]

In the same argument when it is urged that 'Sound must be non-eternal *because of its similarity to the Jar*,' the following opposition is set up against it:—'If this *probans* becomes united with the *probandum*, then, having become united with it, it becomes non-different from it. 'What is the meaning of this *non-difference*?'. It means that both are *existent*; and since what is non-existent cannot be united with it, the 'probans' ceases to be the *means of establishing* (that Probandum with which it unites). If, on the other hand, the probans does not unite with the probandum, then the probans becomes non-different from the *non-united* (hence non-existent) probans; and as such ceases to be a probans; the Fire that is not united with an object never burns it.

When the Opposition is urged on the basis of 'Uniting,' it is 'Parity per convergence,' and when it is urged on the basis of 'not-Uniting,' it is 'Parity per Non-convergence.'

[Even though both those Futile Rejoinders represent a single Opposition to the same argument, yet] they are mentioned separately, in view of the two different ways in which one may look upon these: If one comes to speak of the two as different, then the two may be regarded as two distinct Futile Rejoinders—'Parity per Convergence' and 'Parity per Non-Convergence;' but when they are spoken of as one and the same, they may be regarded as one only; just as in the case of the 'forest' and the 'trees' constituting it [If we wish to lay stress upon the diversity of trees, we regard them as *many trees*; but if we lay stress upon them as forming a single entity, we speak of them as the *Forest*.]

"What has been described cannot be regarded as a Futile Rejoinder, as it does not possess the characteristics of the Futile Rejoinder."

If you mean by this, that—"What form the characteristics of the Futile Rejoinder are not present in what has been just described, for the Futile Rejoinder consists in 'Opposition on the basis of Similarity and Dissimilarity' (Sū. 5-1-1); and that which does not fulfil this condition cannot be a 'Futile Rejoinder; *e.g.*, the Horse, which does not possess the characteristics of the Cow, is not regarded as *Cow*,"—then our answer is that this contention is not right; for it shows that the meaning of the Sūṭra has not been grasped; it is clear that the objector has not understood the meaning of the Sūṭra 'Futile Rejoinder consists in Opposition on the basis of Similarity and Dissimilarity'; hence the objection has no force at all.

This also serves to dispose of '*Ṭraikālya-Sama*' and other such Futile Rejoinders (that have been propounded); as all this shows that the meaning of the *Sūṭra* has not been understood.*

Bhāṣya on Sū. (8).

[P. 244. L. 16 to P. 245, L. 2.]

The answer to the above two Futile Rejoinders is as follows:—

Sūṭra (8).

THE DENIALS (EMBODIED IN THE REJOINDERS) ARE NOT EFFECTIVE; (*a*) BECAUSE WE FIND THE JAR AND SUCH OTHER OBJECTS ACCOMPLISHED (WHEN THEIR CAUSES ARE IN CONTACT WITH THEM), AND (*b*) BECAUSE KILLING BY MAGIC (IS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT THE KILLER COMING INTO CONTACT WITH THE KILLED PERSON).† (Sū. 8).

The denial is not right, in either of the two forms: (*a*) Such effects as the Jar and the like are brought about by the Agent, the Instruments, and the Receptacle only when

* When it is said that Futile Rejoinder consists in 'opposition on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity'; it is not meant that these—Similarity and Dissimilarity—should be with properties *of the Example only*; they may be with any property, other than that which forms the Probandum of the original Proposition.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

† The printed *Nyāyasūchinibandha* reads व्यभिचार for अभिचार

these are in contact with the Clay (out of which the Jar is made) [So that 'Parity per Convergence' can have no force];—and (*b*) when trouble (killing) is brought on a person by means of magical spells, we find that the cause brings about its effect without coming into contact with it. [So that 'Parity per Non-Convergence' also can have no force.]

Vārṭika on Sū. (8).

[P. 542, L. 1. to L. 13.]

As a matter of fact, when the potter's stick and the other things (that are employed in the making of the Jar) unite with (come into contact with) the Lump of Clay (out of which the Jar is made), they do not become *non-different* from their effect, (Jar); nor does the relation of cause and effect cease (between them and the Jar); *i.e.*, when the potter's stick comes into contact with tha Clay, it does not cease to be the 'cause' (of the Jar), nor does the other (*i.e.*, the Jar) cease to be its 'effect.' If you think that—"The Jar is the effect, and at the time that it is not in existence (as it is bound to be before it is made), what could any 'cause' do to it?",—our answer is that we do not mean that the cause operates upon what is non-existent; what is meant is that it tends to turn the Clay into the Jar [so that the cause operates upon the Clay, which is existent]. "What is the meaning of the Clay being *turned into the Jar*?"

What is meant is that the component particles of the Clay-lump renounce their former composition and take up a new composition, and out of this new composition arises the Jar.

In the case of killing by magic, we find the cause bringing about its effect without coming into contact with it. "What is the meaning of *not coming into contact*?"

What it means is that the Effect is brought about by the cause without the two coming together. [It must mean this, as] otherwise, if it meant merely *being arrived at*, then

such *arriving* is present in the case in question (when the Killer does aim at the killing), as is shown by the fact that the operation (of the killing) is restricted in its scope (to the single person whose death is compassed by the Agent).

This Futile Rejoinder is an attempt at discarding all kinds of Probans. [The Probans can only be either an *indicator* or *a maker*, and] if the Probans is regarded as an *indicator*, as also if it is regarded as *a maker*, in either case it becomes subject to the attack embodied in the Rejoinder. It stands self-condemned, however, by the very fact that it is based upon the total rejection of the entire fabric of the relation of 'Cause and Effect'. "What is the *self-condemnation* in it?" If what is urged in the Futile Rejoinder is true, then the Rejoinder itself cannot come up;—why?—because the question would remain—does the Rejoinder accomplish its purpose (by denying the causal relation) without getting at it? Or by getting at it? And does it come into contact with what it denies? or does it not come into contact with it?—So that the objections urged by the Rejoinder would apply to itself with equal force.

End of Section (3).

Section (4).

[Sūtra (9).

Dealing with—(11) '*Parity per Continued Question*' *and* (12) '*Parity per Counter-instance.*'

Sūtra (9).

(*a*) WHEN THE BASIS OF THE 'EXAMPLE' IS NOT MENTIONED, IT IS (11) 'PARITY PER CONTINUED QUESTION' AND (*b*) WHEN THE OPPOSITION IS SET UP THROUGH A 'COUNTER-INSTANCE, IT IS (12) 'PARITY PER COUNTER-INSTANCE.' Sū. (9.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (9).

[P. 245, L. 5 to L. 10.]

(*a*) When the Opposition is set up in the form of the 'Continued Questioning' that "it is necessary (for the propounder of the original Proposition) to point out the proof for the Probans also"—it is Opposition called 'Parity per Continued Question'. *E.g.*, "You do not mention the reason (basis) for asserting that the Clod of Earth, which is endowed with qualities conducive to action, must be active; and until the reason is mentioned, nothing can be accepted as true."*

(*b*) When the Opposition is based upon a counter-instance, it is 'Parity per Counter-instance.' *E. g.* The original proposition having been put forward in the form -'The Soul must be active,—because it is endowed with qualities conducive to action,—like the Clod of Earth,'—the Opponent sets up a counter-instance—"*Akāsha*, which is endowed with qualities conducive to action, is found to be *without action* [and hence why cannot the Soul be regarded as *inactive*, like *Akāsha*?]". But what is that quality in *Akāsha* which is conducive to action? "It consists of contact with Air, which aided by Faculty or momentum (leads to action), as is found in the case of the contact of Air with the Tree."†

Vārṭika on Sū. (9).

[P. 542, L. 16 to P. 543, L. 13.]

For example, in connection with the same argument, when it is based upon the similarity (of Sound) to such things as the Jar and the like, the Opponent sets up the following opposition—"What is the proof that the Jar itself is non-eternal?"; and this constitutes 'Parity per Continued Ques-

---

* The *Ṭāṭparya* thus explains the difference between 'Parity per Continued Question' and 'Parity per Probandum.'—In 'Parity per Probandum' the Opponent urges the necessity of the Probans and all other Factors of Reasoning being provided in support of the Example, exactly in the same manner as is done in support of the Probandum; while in 'Parity per Continued Question,' he only wants to know by what means of cognition the Example is known.

† Contact of Air with the Tree leads to the action of moving in the Tree; hence the contact of Air in Ākāsha also should be conducive to action.

tion.' Of 'Parity per Counter-instance,' the example cited in the *Bhāṣya* should be regarded as sufficient.

[In the *Bhāṣya*, the contact of the Air with *Ākāsha* has been cited as the quality conducive to activity; this is objected to]—"Inasmuch as the contact of Air and Ākāsha does not act as the cause (of any action), what has been said is not right."

If you mean by this that—"The contact of Air and Ākāsha is never found to be the cause of any action; it cannot bring about any action at any of the three points of time; *i. e.* the contact of Air and Ākāsha has never produced, does not produce, and will not produce, action in Ākāsha;* and that which is not found to act like a cause at any of the three points of time cannot be regarded as a cause at all;
Vār. P. 543. just as one Jar can never be regarded as the cause of another Jar,"—this cannot be right; for what is said is found possible in things resembling that Contact; we do not mean that it is the *contact of Air and Ākāsha* itself which is the cause of action; all that we mean is that similar contact is found to be the cause of action in other things,—as for instance, the contact of the Air and Tree; and the fact that the contact of Air, though of the same kind, does not bring about action in *Ākāsha*, is due, not to the fact of that (contact) not being a cause of action, but to the presence of obstacles (to such action). "By what is the action obstructed?" By the vast dimension of *Ākāsha*; just as there is no action produced in the Clods of Earth, when they are struck by mild blasts of Air. If you were to regard a thing as the cause of action only after you have seen the Action (produced by it), then, for you, all kinds of causes would be reduced to this condition that their

* The right reading is वाय्वाकाशसंयोगेनाकाशे

causal character could be accepted only when it could be inferred from the actual appearance of their effect; and in that case it would not be possible for you to take up the material cause of an object (for the making out of it of the desired object), as it would be doubtful (until the Effect is actually produced) whether or not the Cause will produce the necessary Effect. For him however who would take up the cause, on the strength of its resembling another cause (which has been found to be productive of the object), the taking up of the cause would be quite reasonable. If you do not accept the view that what resembles a cause is itself a cause,—then it would be impossible for you to urge against anyone the 'Fallacy of Inconclusiveness'; for the 'incorporeality' that is in Sound is not *the same* as (but only *similar to*) that in *Ākāsha* &c. (on the strength of which the Fallacy could be urged). As a matter of fact, every Inference proceeds on the analogy of what is seen in one case to things in another case; certainly the properties in one *smoke* are not precisely the same individual properties as those in another *smoke*.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (10).

[P. 245, L. 10 to L. 18.]

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinders is as follows:—

Sūṭra (10).

THE CONTINUED QUESTION COULD COME TO AN END JUST AS IT DOES IN THE CASE OF THE FETCHING OF THE LAMP. (Sū. 10.)

The first party, on being questioned by the Opponent in the manner described in the preceding *Sūṭra*, can say (in reply)—Who are the persons that fetch the lamp? and why do they fetch it? [The Opponent will say]—"It is fetched by persons desiring to see, and they fetch it for the purpose of seeing the things to be seen." But

[the first party will ask again] Why do not people, desiring to see the Lamp (which is a thing to be seen) fetch another lamp ?—" They do not do so, because they can see the lamp even without the second lamp." From this, it follows that for the seeing of the Lamp itself, the fetching of another lamp is useless. [Now turning to the case in question]—For what purpose is the Example put forward ?—It is put forward for the purpose of making known some thing not already known. Why then is the *mention of the basis of the Example* sought for* (by the Opponent setting up the Futile Rejoinder) ? If it is sought for the purpose of making the Example *known*,—then our contention is that the Example is already known [as, if it were not known, it would not be put forward as *Example*]; for the Example is that in regard to which there is a consensus of opinion among all men, learned and unlearned; so that any *mention of basis* for the purpose of making the Example known would be absolutely useless. This is the answer to 'Parity per Continued Question.'

Vārṭika on Su. (10).

[P. 243, L. 15 to L. 20.]

The Opponent should be asked—who are the persons that fetch the lamp and why do they fetch it ?—" It is fetched by persons desiring to see, and they fetch it for the purpose of seeing the things to be seen.' Why do not they bring up another lamp for the seeing of the former lamp ?—" Simply because the lamp is seen without the other lamp."—Well then, for what purpose is the Example put up ?—For the purpose of making known what is not known.—Why then do you seek for another Example for the sake of the former Example ? If for the purpose of making it known,— then our answer is that it is already known.†

---

* The correct reading is देश्यते as found in Mss. B., C., and D.

† The clause यत्पुराकाशवदन्तवदिति appears to be superfluous. It might be construed with the next Sūṭra. But the phrase आकाशवदन्तवत् is nowhere found in the Pūrvapakṣa—of which this could be an अनुवाद here. We have therefore dropped it.

Bhāṣya on Su. (11).

[P. 245, L. 19 to P. 246, L. 2.]

The answer to 'Parity per Counter-instance' is as follows:—

Sūṭra (11).

IF THE COUNTER-INSTANCE IS AN EFFECTIVE REASON, THE EXAMPLE ALSO CANNOT BUT BE AN EFFECTIVE REASON. (Sū. 11).

When the Opponent puts forward the Counter-instance, he does not cite any special reason in support thereof—to show that for such and such a reason the Counter-instance is an effective reason, and the Example is not so. So that, when the Counter-instance is recognised as an effective reason, there can be no ground for saying that the Example is not an effective reason;—and when can it not fail to be effective reason? Only when it is itself not capable of being denied and is capable of proving the conclusion. [So that if it is effective reason, it must prove the conclusion.]

Vārṭika on Sū. (11).

[P. 544, L. 2 to L. 8.]

The Example cannot but be an effective reason—(says the Sūṭra)—(*A*) Because of its being admitted: one who admits the fact of the Counter-instance being an effective reason, must also admit the fact of the Example being an effective reason; and *being an effective reason* consists in being able to prove the desired conclusion.—*When can it not fail to be an effective reason?—When it is itself not capable of being denied and is capable of proving the desired conclusion*—says the *Bhāṣya*; and the Example is capable of proving the desired conclusion and is not denied.—(*B*) Also because the Opponent cannot formulate his argument: If he formulates it in the form—"As your Example so mine also,"—then, we readily admit this; so that what you urge is not a *counter-instance* against us. If, on the other hand, he formulates it -"Just as my Example is not the right Example, so is

yours also not the right example,"—then, inasmuch as this would involve self-condemnation, there would be no (correct) Counter-instance.

End of Section (4).

Section (5).

[Sūṭras 12—13.]

Dealing with (13) '*Parity per Non-generation.*'

Sūṭra (12).

"BEFORE THE BIRTH (OF THE SUBJECT), SINCE [WHAT IS URGED AS] THE GROUND [FOR THE PROBANDUM BEING PREDICATED OF IT] CANNOT SUBSIST, [THE ARGUMENT CAN PROVE NOTHING],"—THIS IS 'PARITY PER NON-GENERATION.' (Sū 12).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (12).

[P. 246, L 4 to L. 7.]

The proposition being stated in the form—'Sound must be non-eternal, *because it comes after effort*, like the Jar,' the Opponent sets up the following Opposition :—"Before it is produced, the Sound has not appeared, hence (at that time) the *character of coming after effort*, which is the ground urged for its non-eternality, does not subsist in Sound; and since this character does not subsist in Sound, it follows that Sound is *eternal*; and that which is eternal is *never produced.*' —This opposition, based upon 'non-generation' (or non-production), is 'Parity per Non-generation.'

Vārṭika on Sū. (12).

[P. 544, Ll. 10—13.]

The proposition having been put forward that, 'Sound is non-eternal' because it is capable of being produced, like the Jar,'—the Opponent might set up the following Opposition —"Before Sound is produced, *the capability of being produced* does not subsist in it; and this character being absent,

Sound must be *incapable of being produced*; and being incapable of being produced, it must be eternal";—this Opposition based upon 'non-generation' is 'Parity per Non-generation.'

Bhāṣya on Sū. (13).

[P. 246, L. 7 to L. 12.]

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows :—

Sūṭra (13).

SINCE IT IS ONLY WHEN IT HAS BEEN PRODUCED THAT THE THING IS WHAT IT IS, AND SINCE WHAT IS URGED AS THE GROUND (FOR THE PROPOSITION) DOES THEN SUBSIST IN IT,—THE PRESENCE OF THE GROUND CANNOT BE DENIED. (Sū. 13).

(*A*) *Since it is only when it has been produced that the thing is what it is*—*i.e.*, it is only when it has been produced that the Sound becomes 'Sound'; before it is produced, it is not even 'Sound;' and as it is 'Sound' only after it has been produced, and when the Sound has been produced, *the character of coming after effort*, which is the ground for non-eternality, is actually present in it; and *since the ground does then subsist in it*, there is no force in the objection that 'before the birth of the Subject, the ground does not subsist in it" (urged in the Futile Rejoinder).

Vārṭika on Sū. (13).

[P. 544, L. 16 to P, 545, L. 21.]

Just as before Sound is produced, the *character of being produced* is not there, so is the Sound itself not there; it is only when it has been produced that Sound becomes 'Sound'; and when it is produced, it comes to have *the character of being produced* also; and thence it becomes 'non-eternal; and inasmuch as on Sound being produced, the *character of being produced* does subsist in it, the presence of the ground (of non-eternality) cannot be denied. While it is not produced, Sound is not what it is; *i.e.*, before it is produced, it cannot be

spoken of either as 'Sound,' or as 'having the character of being produced,' or as 'non-eternal.'

Further, the *probans* put forward in support of the Proposition (*i.e.*, the character of being produced) is an *indicator*, not a *maker*; and to urge, against the indicator, objections that are applicable to the *maker*, can have no sense at all.* "But both being efficient operators, there can be no difference between the 'indicator' and the 'maker.'" This is not right; as the 'maker' is the author (agent) of the *making*, while the 'indicator' is the author of the *indicating*. "That which is the Indicator may also *make some* thing, and it may thus be spoken of as 'Indicator' as well as 'maker." That does not affect our position; because (the fact remains that) while the 'maker' is the cause of *making*, the 'indicator' is the cause *of indicating*; one of them (the former) brings things into existence, while the other brings about the cognition of the thing already existing.

Vār. P. 545.

When the Opponent says—"Before Sound is produced, *the character of being produced* being absent, Sound comes to be that which is *not capable of being produced*,"—he admits the existence of Sound; for a non-existent thing could not have the property of *being not capable of being produced*; so that the qualification 'before it is produced' becomes meaningless.

Others have offered the following objection to the Futile Rejoinder in question :—"When it is said that 'before Sound is produced, the ground is not there (Sū. 12), this becomes

* This is an answer to what has been said under Sū. 12 to the effect that "there the ground for non-eternality being absent, the non-eternality cannot be there, hence Sound must be eternal." The sense of the answer offered is that it is only the *maker*, which on ceasing to exist, puts an end to the existence of the effect; such is not the case with the *Indicator*, whose presence or absence does not affect the presence of what it indicates. So that even though the character of being produced may not be present when the Sound is not produced, that cannot vitiate the proving efficiency of that character.

a case of 'Parity per Presumption.' And if the Rejoinder is put up in the form—'since before Sound is produced, the character of coming after Effort cannot belong to it, it follows, by implication, that it is *not endowed with* the *character of coming after effort*; and not having this latter character, it must be eternal'—the answer to this is as follows:—It is by no means necessary that what does not possess the character of coming after effort must be *eternal*; in fact a thing not possessed of the character of coming after effort can be of three kinds—(1) some are eternal, *e. g.* *Ākāsha* and the like, (2) some are non-eternal, *e. g.* the lightning-flash and such things, and (3) some are absolute non-entities, *e. g.* the 'sky-flower' and the like."

This however we do not find to be quite right.—Why?—Because, in the first place, it is not right to say that 'some things, that are not possessed of the character of coming after effort, are absolute non-entities'; because 'coming after effort' really qualifies the *birth* (production, coming into existence) of the thing; that thing is regarded as *not having the character of coming after effort* whose birth or production does not follow from effort;—and as the absolute non-entity never exists, it can have no *birth*; and that which is a non-entity, how can anything be qualified by it? This same reasoning disposes also of the assertion that 'some things not possessed of the character of coming after effort are *eternal*'; because what is 'eternal' cannot be spoken of as 'not coming after effort' [as this latter implies *birth*, which is not possible in the case of eternal things].

"This Futile Rejoinder (Parity per Non-generation) is not possessed of the characteristics of the 'Futile Rejoinder,' hence it cannot be regarded as a Futile Rejoinder."

This is not right; in what is urged in opposition, it is shown that there is *similarity* between the grounds put

forward in support of the original proposition, and such other grounds as have not been produced (come into existence) at all; that which has not come into existence can never be the reason or ground for anything; *e. g.* the yarns that have not themselves come into existence cannot be the cause of the Cloth. *

End of Section (5).

Section (6).

[Sūtras 14—15.]

Dealing with ' Parity per Doubt.'

Sūtra (14).

THE ' COMMUNITY ' AND THE ' EXAMPLE,' BOTH BEING EQUALLY PERCEPTIBLE BY THE SENSES, [THE OPPOSITION] BASED UPON SIMILARITY TO ' ETERNAL ' AS WELL AS ' NON-ETERNAL ' THINGS CONSTITUTES ' PARITY PER DOUBT.' (Sū. 14).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (14).

[P. 246, L. 15 to P. 247, L. 2.]

The Proposition being put forward in the form—' Sound must be non-eternal, because it comes after effort, like the Jar,'—the Opponent opposes it by casting doubt over it: " Even though Sound comes after effort, it has this *similarity*

* The objection is that Futile Rejoinder should consist in Opposition on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity (as declared in Sū. 5-1-1); and as the opposition in ' Parity per Non-generation ' does not proceed on any such basis, it cannot be regarded as a true ' Futile Rejoinder.' The reply is that the Opposition in this also does involve some notion of similarity : ' just as the non produced yarn cannot be the cause of the Cloth, so *the character of coming after effort*, which is *not produced* before the production of Sound, cannot be the cause of the proving of non-eternality in Sound.' This also shows that the difference of this Futile Rejoinder from ' Parity per Presumption ' lies in the fact that, while in the present Rejoinder, the *similarity* urged is that to such causes as are *not produced*,—in ' Parity per Presumption, ' the Opposition is based upon the imposing of a meaning contrary to the meaning of the sentence.

to the *eternal* 'Community' that both are *perceptible by the senses*;—and the same also constitutes its *similarity* to the *non-eternal* 'Jar';—thus, by reason of its *similarity* to both 'eternal' and 'non-eternal' things, there must be doubt (as to the real character of Sound)."

Vārṭika on Sū. (14).

[P. 546, L. 3 to L. 6.]

The example of this Futile Rejoinder has been given in the *Bhāṣya*. It might be argued that—"*Parity per Probandum* does not, in any way, differ from *Parity per Doubt.*" If you mean by this that—"Just as the example of 'Parity per Probandum' is based upon *similarity*, so is the 'Parity per Doubt' also, and hence there being no difference between the two, the latter should not be regarded as a distinct kind of Futile Rejoinder,"—this is not right; because in 'Parity per Doubt' there is similarity (of the Subject, Sound) to two things (eternal and non-eternal), while 'Parity per Probandum' is based upon its similarity to a single thing; this constitutes the difference between the two.

Bhāsya on Sū. (15).

[P. 247, L. 2. to L. 11.]

The answer to the above is as follows:—

Sūṭra (15).

(*a*) As regards the doubt being raised on the basis of (mere) 'similarity,' [our answer is that] there can be no such doubt when the 'dissimilarity' (to that same thing) has been duly recognised; (*b*) if, even on both (similarity and dissimilarity) being recognised, doubts were to arise, then there would be no end to such doubts,—(*c*) and since mere 'similarity' is not accepted as an everlasting source of doubt,—the opposition set up cannot be right. Sū. (15).

(*a*) When, on perceiving the distinguishing feature of 'Man'—which constitutes its 'dissimilarity' (to the Pillar)—it has been duly ascertained that the object perceived is a

'Man,'—there is no room for any doubt arising in regard to it on the basis of some 'similarity' between Man and Pillar. Thus, in the case of Sound, *the character of coming after effort*, which forms its distinguishing feature and dissimilarity (to *eternal* things), having been recognised, its 'non-eternality' becomes duly ascertained; and there can be no room for any further doubt arising on the mere ground of its similarity to eternal and non-eternal things. (*b*) If such a Doubt were to arise, then, inasmuch as the 'similarity' between the Man and the Pillar would never cease, the Doubt would never come to an end. (*c*) Lastly, *we do not admit that 'similarity' is an everlasting source of Doubt*, even when the distinctive feature of the thing has been duly recognised; *e. g.* when the distinctive feature of Man has been recognised, a mere similarity between 'Man' and 'Pillar' does not become a source of doubt.

Vārṭika on Sū. (15).

[P. 546, L. 10 to L. 13.]

From 'similarity'—*i. e.* from perception of similarity—there arises doubt; but when 'dissimilarity'—*i. e.* the distinctive feature—has been perceived, doubt does not arise. If, on both—similarity and dissimilarity—being recognised, Doubt were to arise, then there would be no end to Doubt. We do not admit that 'Similarity' *always* gives rise to doubt; because even when there is 'Similarity' between two things, Doubt is set aside when the distinguishing feature of one of them is recognised.

End of Section (6).

Section (7).

[Sūtras 16—17.]

Dealing with (15) '*Parity per Neutralisation.*'

Sūṭra (16).

"BY REASON OF SIMILARITY TO BOTH, THERE ARISES VACILLATION",—(OPPOSITION) BASED UPON THIS REASONING IS 'PARITY PER NEUTRALISTION.'—(Sū. 16).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (16).

[P. 247, L. 13 to L. 18.]

By reason of the similarity (of Sound) to both, eternal and non-eternal things, there is likelihood of the two contrary views [*i. e.* the original Proposition as well as its contrary];—this is what is meant by the term '*prakriyā*,' or 'vacillation' in the *Sūṭra*: One view being—'Sound must be non-eternal, because it comes after effort, like the Jar,'—the other view is propounded on the basis of the similarity (of Sound) to *Eternal* things ['Sound must be eternal, because it is perceptible by the Auditory Organ, like the *class-character Sound*']. Thus then, it is found that when the Probans—'because it comes after effort'—is put forward as constituting the similarity (of Sound) to *non-eternal* things, it is not free from the possibility of the contrary view being set up; and in the face of this possibility, the conclusion sought to be based upon that Probans cannot be established. The same holds good in regard to a Probans that would be put forward as constituting the 'similarity' (of Sound to *eternal* things *. The Opposition put forward on the basis of this 'vacillation' constitutes 'Parity per Neutralisation.'

What has been said in this Sūṭra applies also to the case of *Dissimilarity*; and 'by reason of Dissimilarity to both, there arises Vacillation,—and Opposition based upon this reasoning constitutes *Parity per Neutralisation*.'

Vārṭka on Sū. (16).

[P. 536, L. 15 to L. 18.]

The example of this Futile Rejoinder in given in the *Bhāṣya*. *Objection*—"Parity per Vacillation or 'Neutralisation does not differ from Parity per Doubt and from Parity per Similarity—Why ?—because here as well as in the other two the Opposition is based upon *similarity*."

Answer :—This is not right; the difference of Parity per Neutralisation from the other two is clearly shown by the fact

---

* The printed text is corrupt. The right reading is found in Puri B, and Ms. C., as follows—त्यसाधर्म्येणोच्यमानो न प्रकरणमतिवर्तते प्रकरणानतिवृत्तेस्तन्निर्णय-निर्वर्तकत्वसमानं चैतन्नित्यसाधर्म्येणोच्यमाने हेतौ । तदिदं This same reading is accepted by the *Ṭāṭparya*.

that in the former there is 'similarity' in support of both the contrary views; both disputants seek to establish their views in regard to 'eternality' and 'non-eternality' of Sound (on the basis of 'Similarity'), and this is not the case in 'Parity per Similarity' or in 'Parity per Doubt.'

Bhāṣya on Su. (17).

[P. 247, L. 18 to P. 248, L. 3.]

The answer to the above is as follows:—

Sūṭra (17).

INASMUCH AS THE SAID 'VACILLATION' CAN FOLLOW ONLY FROM THE COUNTER-VIEW, THERE CAN BE NO DENIAL OF IT; SPECIALLY AS THAT CONTRARY VIEW MUST BE REGARDED AS ESTABLISHED (BEFORE THE 'VACILLATION' CAN BE PUT FORWARD) *—Sū. (17).

When the Opponent says that—"by reason of similarity to both there arises vacillation"—his assertion comes to this that there is 'vacillation,' because the *counter-view* is there; it is only when there is (real) similarity to both that one of them can be called the 'counter-view'; hence it follows from the statement that the 'counter-view' is an established fact; and the 'counter-view' being regarded as established, its denial cannot be right. If the 'counter-view' is *established*, its denial cannot be right; and if its denial is right, the 'counter-view' cannot be regarded as *established*; † for 'the establishment of the counter-view' and 'the right denial of the counter-view' are contradictory terms.

When however [as in the case of the Fallacy of Neutralisation, which also is based upon vacillation] the 'vacillation' is due to the absence of definite knowledge (in regard to the subject in question) [and to the mere existence of the counter-view], the 'vacillation' comes to an end, as soon

* The term '*pratipakṣa*' 'counter-view, stands for the view of the First Party; it is called 'counter-view' from the Opponent's point of view.—*Uḍayana* and *Vishvanāṭha*.

† The right reading is supplied by C.—प्रतिपक्षोपपत्तेरनुपपन्नः प्रतिषेधः यदि प्रतिपक्षोपपत्तिः प्रतिषेधो नोपपद्यते। अथ प्रतिषेधोपपत्तिः प्रतिपक्षो नोपपद्यते। प्रतिपक्षोपपत्तिश्च प्रतिषेधोपपत्तिश्चेति विप्रतिषिद्धमिति।

as that definite right knowledge is attained; *i.e.*, as soon as definite right knowledge has been attained the vacillation ceases.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (17).

[P. 547, Ll. 3—5.]

The Futile Rejoinder is one that is not incompatible with its own contradictory. As regards the Fallacy of Neutralisation, the vacillation arises, not from the presence of a 'counter-view', but from absence of right knowledge; as we have already explained under the 'Fallacy of Neutralisation.' (Sū. 1-2-7.)

End of Section (7).

Section (8).

[*Sūṭras* 18—20].

Dealing with (16) '*Parity per Non-probativeness.*'

Sūṭra (18).

'PARITY PER NON-PROBATIVENESS' IS BASED UPON THE CONTENTION THAT "THE PROBANS AS SUCH CANNOT EXIST AT ANY OF THE THREE POINTS OF TIME." (Sū. 18).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (18).

[P. 248, L. 5 to L. 9.]

"† 'Probans' is *that which proves*; and this could exist only either (*a*) before, or (*b*) after or (*c*) together with, the

---

* When the Opponent puts up the Futile Rejoinder based upon the vacillation in regard to the exact character of Sound, on account of its being similar to eternal as well as non-eternal things;—he admits that the proposition that 'Sound is non-eternal' is as admissible as that 'Sound is eternal;' that both possess an equal degree of truth; otherwise, if one were more reasonable, that would be definitely accepted and there would be no vacillation. And when he accepts the admissibility of the view that 'Sound is non-eternal', he cannot, consistently with himself, deny it.

The position of the person urging the Fallacy of 'Neutralisation' is different; he bases his denial of the conclusion of the first party, not upon any vacillation, but upon absence of true knowledge.

† The words अहेतुसमः हेतुः is not found in Mss. C. and D. They are superfluous.

probandum (that which it is intended prove). Now, (*a*) if the Probans is held to exist before the Probandum,—at the time that the Probandum is not there, of what could it be the 'probans,' 'means of proving'? (*b*) If it is held to exist after the Probandum,— in the absence of the Probans, of what could there be the 'Probandum' (to be proved)? (*c*) If the Probans and the Probandum are held to exist (simultaneously),—since both would be equally existent, which could be the 'probans' (means of proving) of what? From all this it follows that the 'probans' does not differ from what is *non-probative.*"

This contention, thus based upon similarity to what is non-probative, constitutes 'Parity per Non-probativeness.'*

Vārṭika on Sū. (18).

[P. 547, L. 7.]

Opposition based upon similarity to what is non-probative, is 'Parity per Non-probativeness.'

Bhāṣya on Sū. 19.

[P. 248, L. 9 to L. 14.]

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows:—

Sūṭra (19).

IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "THE PROBANS CANNOT EXIST AT ANY OF THE THREE POINTS OF TIME," BECAUSE IT IS BY THE PROBANS THAT THE PROBANDUM CAN BE PROVED. (Sū. 19).

It is not true that " the Probans cannot exist at any of the three points of time";—why?—*because it is by the Probans that the Probandum is proved.* As a matter of fact, we find that the *accomplishing* of *what is to be accomplished*, as also the

* This Futile Rejoinder differs from 'Parity per Convergence' and 'Parity per Non-convergence' on the following points:—(1) In these latter, the question raised was in regard to the form of the Probans, while in the present case, it is raised in regard to its causal efficiency; (2) in the latter two the convergence or otherwise was in regard to the thing denoted by the words of the probans, while here it is the verbal expression that is taken up for enquiry; (3) there were only two alternatives, while here we have *three*; (4) those two had the semblance of the contention urging the fact of the qualification of the Probans being untrue, while here the contention urges a reasoning to the contrary.—*Boḍhasiḍḍhi* (Uḍayana).

knowing of *what is to be known*, is brought about by a cause; and this patent fact of ordinary perception is an instance in point.* As regards the question—"at the time that the Probandum is non-existent, of what could the Probans be the *means of proving*?"—our answer is that [it is the means of proving of *what is to be proved*; just as in the cases cited] the cause is the means of accomplishing what is to be accomplished, and of the knowing of what is to be made known.

Vārṭika on Sū. (19).

[P. 547, Ll. 9-10.]

'Contradiction' is the defect in this Futile Rejoinder. As a matter of fact, a thing that is produced is never produced without a cause; and a thing that is made known, is never made known without a cause.

Sū. (20).

FURTHER, [ACCORDING TO THE OPPONENT'S REASONING] THERE CAN BE NO DENIAL; FROM WHICH IT FOLLOWS THAT WHAT HAS BEEN DENIED CANNOT BE DENIED. (*Sū.* 20).

Bhāṣya.

[P. 248, Ll. 16-17.]

[Exactly what you have urged against our Probans, we can urge, with equal force, against the Opponent]—The denial cannot exist, either before, or after, or together with what is denied);—and since there can be no 'Denial' at all (of the Probans urged by the first party), it follows that the Probans (being undeniable) is firmly established.

Vārṭika on Sū. (20).

[P. 547, Ll. 12-14.]

Contradiction is the defect of this Futile Rejoinder. That which does not *prove* a thing at any of the three points of time cannot serve as the means of *denying*; so that what

* Just as the *accomplishing* of *what is to be accomplished* is brought about by a cause, in the same manner the *proving* of *what is to be proved* (*i.e.*, the Probandum) must be brought about by a cause; and this cause is the *Probans*.

has been urged against our probans applies with equal force to the Opponent's reasoning also. This argument has also been answered above; in connection with the contention—"Perception and the rest cannot be the means of right cognition, because they cannot exist at any of the three points of time" (Sū. 2-1-8), we have answered the argument put forth in the Futile Rejoinder in question.

End of Section (8).

Secton (9).

[*Sūṭras* 21—22.]

Dealing with (17) '*Parity per Presumption.*'

Sūṭra (21).

WHEN THE CONTRARY CONCLUSION IS PROVED BY MEANS OF PRESUMPTION, IT IS 'PARITY PER PRESUMPTION.' (Sū. 21.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (21).

[P. 248, L. 19 to P. to P. 249, L. 2].

The proposition having been sought to be established by the reasoning 'Sound is non-eternal, because it comes after effort, like the Jar,'—if the Opponent seeks to establish the contrary conclusion by means of Presumption,—this is a case of 'Parity per Presumption;' it is as follows:—'If Sound is held to be non-eternal, on the ground of its coming after effort, which constitutes its similarity to non-eternal things,—then it follows by implication, that Sound must be regarded as eternal, on the ground of its *similarity to eternal things*, consisting in the fact that it is *intangible*, like eternal things.'

Vārṭika on Sū. (21).

[P. 547, L. 16.]

The Example of this Futile Rejoinder is given in the *Bhāṣya*.

Bhāṣya on Sū (22).

[P. 249, L. 2 to L. 10].

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows—

Sūṭra (22).

(A) IF WHAT IS NOT EXPRESSLY STATED CAN BE TAKEN AS FOLLOWING BY IMPLICATION, THEN THE RENOUNCING WOULD BE TAKEN AS FOLLOWING BY IMPLICATION, FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT SUCH RENOUNCING IS NOT EXPRESSLY STATED; —(B) AND FURTHER, 'PRESUMPTION' WOULD BE INDECISIVE. (Sū. 22.)

(A) Without showing the capacity (of the words to afford the idea of what is presumed), if what is not expressly stated is held (by the Opponent) to be taken as implied,—then the renouncing by such an arguer of his own view may also be taken as implied, for the simple reason that it is not expressly stated; and thus inasmuch as the view that 'Sound is non-eternal' would be regarded as established (by reason of its being taken as implied by reason of its not being expressly stated by you), this would mean that your own view that 'Sound is eternal' has been renounced.

(B) *Further, Presumption would be indecisive*; that is, Presumption would apply equally to both views; for 'if on the ground of its similarity to eternal things consisting of *intangibility*, Sound were to be regarded as *eternal*, like *Ākāsha*,—it would be taken as following by implication that, on account of its similarity to *non-eternal* things, consisting in *its coming after effort*, Sound is *non-eternal*.'*

Then again, conclusive Presumption does not necessarily follow from mere negation; for instance, because the *solid* gravel falls, it does not necessarily follow by presumption that there can be no falling of Water, which is liquid (not solid).

Vārṭika on Su. (22).

[P. 548, L. 3 to P. 9].

Without proving the capacity of the word (to yield the the desired meaning), if one says that such and such a thing is *implied*, he renders himself liable to renouncing his own view.

* This is the reverse of the argument put forward in the Futile Rejoinder.

—Why?—Because, he does not explain how the words used have the power (of implying what is said to be implied). In this manner, the renouncing of his own view becomes possible.

Further, Presumption would be indecisive.

Objection:—"But all this contradicts the Sūṭras that have gone before. It has been asserted (under Sū. 2-2, 3 and 4) that—'Presumption is not indecisive, because what is regarded as indecisive is not real Presumption, it is only mistaken for Presumption;'—and this is contradicted by what you say now (that Presumption is indecisive)."

Answer:—There is no contradiction at all; for what is said to be 'indecisive' is what occurs in close proximity to the present Sūṭra; what we mean is that the Presumption that has been put forward in the Sūṭra (21) is indecisive and not that every Presumption is so. Just as it is only that Inference which is based upon wrong premises, that is not valid, and not any other inference, similarly here also (the untrue Presumption would be indecisive, not all Presumption).

End of Section (9).

Section (10).

[Sūṭras 23—24.]

Dealing with (18) '*Parity per Non-difference.*'

Sūṭra (23).

"IF THE PRESENCE OF A SINGLE (COMMON) PROPERTY WERE TO MAKE THE TWO THINGS NON-DIFFERENT,—THEN ALL THINGS WOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS NON-DIFFERENT, BECAUSE THE PROPERTY OF 'EXISTENCE' IS PRESENT IN ALL";—THIS CONTENTION CONSTITUTES 'PARITY PER NON-DIFFERENCE.'—SŪ. (23).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (23).
[P. 249, Ll. 13—15.]

The single (common) property, in the case in question, is that of *coming after effort*; and because this single property is present in Sound and in the Jar, if these two things be regarded as non-different,—*i. e.* both be regarded as 'non-eternal';—then all things should have to be regarded as non-different—Why?—*Because the property of 'existence' is present in all*; the one property of 'existence' is present in all things; and since 'Existence' is present in all things, all things should be regarded as non-different. Such contention constitutes 'Parity per Non-difference.'*

Vārṭika on Sū. (23).
[P. 548, L. 12 to L. 15.]

The example of this Futile Rejoinder is given in the *Bhāṣya*.

Objection—"*Parity per Non-difference* does not differ from *Parity per Similarity*—why?—because both equally proceed on the basis of mere similarity."

Answer:—This is not right; as there is difference between the two, based upon the similarity being on one point and on all points; that is, 'Parity per Similarity' is based upon only *one similarity*, while 'Parity per Non-difference' is based upon *similarity on all points*. †

Bhāṣya on Sū. (24).
[P. 249, L. 15 to P. 250, L. 10.]

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows:—

---

* Uḍayana, in his *Boḍhasiḍḍhi*, notices a different interpretation of this Sūṭra by which the meaning is as follows:—'The single property that constitutes the Probans is really effective; so that if the Subject and the Example were taken as possessed of the unqualified probandum, then *they would be non-different in every way, Sarvāvishēṣaḥ*; because their co-existence is well known.'

† The right reading is समस्तसाधर्म्यादविशेषसमा ।

Sūṭra (24).

THE ABOVE DENIAL DOES NOT HOLD; BECAUSE IN THE CASE OF SOME (COMMON PROPERTY) THE PRESENCE OF CERTAIN OTHER PROPERTIES OF THE SIMILAR THING IS POSSIBLE, WHILE IN THE CASE OF OTHERS SUCH PRESENCE IS NOT POSSIBLE.*—Sū. (24).

*Bhā. P. 250. For instance, in the case where the one common property between the 'Subject' and the 'Example' consists of 'coming after effort,' the presence of another property—which constitutes a further 'non-difference' or 'similarity' between them—is found possible; while in the case of the common property among *all things* consisting of 'existence,' the presence of no other common property is found possible; which could constitute a further 'non-difference' among them.

The following might be urged (by the Nihilist, who holds that 'existence' is invariably concomitant with 'Non-eternality'):—"Non-eternality would be the other property common to 'all things,' the presence whereof would be indicated by the presence (in them) of the property of *existence.*"

(A) Under this assumption, the Proposition would come to be of the following form: 'All entities are non-eternal, because they have the property of *Existence*'; and in that case, no 'Example' would be available, apart from what is already included in the Proposition (which includes '*all* things'); and there can be no valid reasoning without an Example; nor would it be right to put up as 'Example' something that is already included under the Proposition; for what is itself yet to be proved cannot serve as an 'Example.' (B) Then again, inasmuch as *existent* things are † actually found to be both *eternal* and *non-eternal*, they can not all be regarded as *non-eternal* (on the ground of *existence*). From all this it follows that the sentence—"all things would have to be regarded as non-different, because the property of 'existence' is present in all" (Sū. 23) is meaningless.

---

* The right reading of the Sūṭras is क्वचित्तद्धर्मोपपत्तेः क्वचिच्चानुपपत्तेः प्रति षेधाभावः।

† For ततश्च read सतश्च as in Mss. C. and D. and in *Tāṭparya.*

(C) Lastly, when the Opponent alleges, that "because *existence* is present in all things, they should be regarded as non-eternal,"—he admits that 'Sound is non-eternal'; so that opposition to this last Proposition is not quite consistent.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (24).

[P. 549. L. 1. to L. 4].

Vār: P. 549. What the *Sūṭra* means is that in some cases we do find a further common property, while in the others we do not. Further, the admission made is self-nugatory; *i. e.* by urging the 'non-eternality of *all things*' the Opponent admits the 'non-eternality of Sound.' If this is not so, then the mention of 'all things' has no meaning. It has been explained by us (in Adh. III) that the difference is that what is a *valid Probans* is only that which is equipped with invariable concomitance, positive and negative;—and not any other kind of Probans.†

End of Section (10).

Section (11).

[Sūṭras 25—26.]

Dealing with (19) '*Parity per Evidence.*'

Sūṭra (25).

'PARITY PER EVIDENCE' IS BASED UPON THE PRESENCE OF GROUNDS FOR BOTH (VIEWS)—(Sū. 25).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (25).

[P. 250, Ll. 12—14.]

"If Sound is held to be non-eternal, because there is present ground (or evidence) for its non-eternality—there is present evidence for eternality also, in the shape of

* The Futile Rejoinder was urged against the Proposition 'Sound is non-eternal'; and yet this is admitted by the Opponent in setting forth the Rejoinder.

† नेत्तर: is the right reading in the place of नोत्तर:

Intangibility; so that it may be regarded as eternal also." This, being an opposition based upon *the presence of grounds for both*, 'Eternality' and 'Non-eternality,' is 'Parity for Evidence.'

Vārṭika on Sū. (25).

[P. 549, L. 6 to L. 10.]

The example of this Futile Rejoinder is given in the *Bhāṣya*.

[*Objection*:—" 'Parity per Evidence' does not differ from 'Parity per Neutralisation;' in the latter, as here, there are *eternality* and *non-eternality*."

Answer—Not so; because (in 'Parity per Evidence') grounds for 'eternality' and 'non-eternality' are simply indicated as present in the same thing; in 'Parity per Evidence' all that is urged is that grounds for 'eternality' and of 'non-eternality' exist; while in 'Parity per Neutraliation' the opposition consists in the setting up of the two contrary views in detail;—this constitutes a difference between the two.*

Bhāṣya on Sū. (26).

[P. 250, L. 14 to L. 21.]

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows:—

Sūṭra (26).

THIS DENIAL HAS NO FORCE; BECAUSE THE PRESENCE OF GROUNDS IN SUPPORT (OF THE ORIGINAL PROPOSITION) IS ADMITTED. (Sū. 26.)

When the Opponent alleges 'the presence of grounds for both views' (Sū. 25), he cannot deny that 'Sound is non-eternal, *because there are grounds for non-eternality*.'

* When the First Party has put forward his arguments, the Opponent puts forward his own arguments in support of a conclusion contrary to that of the First Party; this is 'Parity per Evidence;' the grounds for the two conclusions are merely indicated; and the full reasoning is not stated in detail.—While in 'Parity per Neutralisation,' the two views are set forth fully.—*Uḍayana* (*Boḍhasiḍḍhi*.)

If this could be denied, then it would not be true that 'grounds for both views are present.' When he speaks of 'the presence of grounds for both views,' he admits that there are grounds for 'non-eternality;' and having been admitted, it cannot be denied. "The denial is due to incongruity." But 'incongruity' applies equally (to both views). "When we pointed out the incongruity consisting of the possibility of both eternality and non-eternality, we put forth the denial." But the 'incongruity' applies equally to your own view as well as to that of the other party; and it cannot establish any one of the two views.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (26).

[P. 549, Ll. 12—14.]

The *Sūṭra* is intended to point out incongruity:—When the Opponent says—"there are grounds for *Eternality also* of Sound,"—it admits the existence of grounds for *non-eternality*; and thus on account of this contradiction, there remains no room for the putting up of the Rejoinder.

End of Section (11).

Section (12).

[*Sūṭras* 27—28].

Dealing with (20) '*Parity per Apprehension.*'

Sūṭra (27).

'PARITY PER APPREHENSION' IS BASED UPON THE FACT THAT WHAT IS PUT FORWARD IS FOUND TO EXIST EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF THE CAUSE MENTIONED. Sū. (27).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (27).

[P. 250. L. 23 to P. 251, L. 2].

Even in the absence of *the character of coming after effort,* which is mentioned as the cause (ground) of 'non-

* If you admit the presence of grounds for both views, you admit the truth of the other view also; while if you deny the presence of the said grounds, you deny those for your own view also. So that the Futile Rejoinder you urge stultifies itself.—*Uḍayana.*

eternality,'—this 'non-eternality' is found in that Sound which proceeds from the breaking of the branches of the tree shaken by the wind [this Sound not being the Product of the Effort of any person];—and the Opposition, based upon this fact of the Probandum being found to exist even in the absence of the Probans, constitutes 'Parity per Apprehension.'*

Vārṭika on Sū. (27).

[P. 549, L. 16 to P. 550, L. 3.]

The example of this Futile Rejoinder is given in the *Bhāṣya*. What 'Parity per Apprehension' does is to attribute to the Opponent the view that what he asserts applies to all kinds of the 'Subject' (to *all* Sounds, and not only to a particular kind of Sound), and then to show that the Probans is not invariably concomitant (with the Probandum).†

[The Vārṭika cites another Example]—For instance, when the *character of belonging to a certain Community and being perceptible by our external Sense-organs* is put forward by the First Party as proving the eternality of a *particular thing*,—the Opponent attributes to him the proposition '*all things* are non-eternal,' and then proceeds to urge that the said Probans is not invariably concomitant with the Probandum; as the said Probans does not subsist

* The *Boḍhasiḍḍhi* mentions five kinds of this Futile Rejoinder: (1) The Subject existing in the absence of the Probandum, which makes it a case of the Fallacy of 'Contradiction;'—(2) the Subject existing without the Probans,—this being a case of the Fallacy of the 'Unknown;'—(3) the Subject existing without both Probans and Probandum,—when there are both fallacies;—(4) the Probandum existing without the Probans—this being a case of untrue premiss, the probans not being invariably concomitant with the Probandum;—(5) the Probans existing without the Probandum, in which case also the necessary invariable concomitance between the two would be wanting. It goes to cite examples of the Futile Rejoinder based upon each of these five.

† Though the Proposition of the first party 'Sound is non-eternal &c. &c.' is meant to refer to the *letter-Sounds* only, yet the Opponent attributes to him the proposition in the form 'all Sounds are non-eternal, because they come after effort,' and then goes on to show that it is not concomitant with the probandum.

in *all non-eternal things*, being, as it is, absent in the *Diad* and such other things. The Probans may also be shown to be not invariably concomitant with what is expressed by the terms of the Proposition, as it is propounded [*i.e.*, with the *Subject*]; *e.g.* the Proposition being put forward in the form, 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is productive of another Sound,'—it is pointed out that 'being productive of another Sound' is not invariably concomitant with *all Sounds*,—the *last Sound* of a series not being productive of another Sound.

Vār. P. 550.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (28).

[P. 251, L. 2. to L. 6.]

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows :—

Sūṭra (28).

INASMUCH AS THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION MAY BE DUE TO SOMEOTHER CAUSE,—THE DENIAL HAS NO FORCE AT ALL.

When the First Party says—'[Sound must be non-eternal] *because it is the outcome of effort*,' what is meant is that *it is produced from some cause*; and it is not meant to restrict the particular product (Sound) to one particular cause only;—so that if the property in question, 'Non-eternality,' is found in Sound produced from some other cause,—in what way does that militate against our view?

Vārṭika on Sū. (28).

[P. 550, L. 5 to L. 10.]

When we say that 'Sound is non-eternal' (in regard to letter-sounds, proceeding from the speaker's effort), we do not deny that other kinds of the 'Subject' (Sound) can be due to any other cause (but *Effort*); we do not mean that the Subject can have no other cause.

Others have offered the following answer (to the 'Parity per Apprehension')—"What is meant by the original proposition is that the Sound which is the outcome of effort is, on that account, non-eternal."

This however is not right, as there is no difference of opinion; the argument in support of the Proposition in question is not addressed to a person who admits the fact of Sound being an outcome of effort; for if the character of *being an outcome of effort* forms a qualification of the thing in question (and is admitted as such by both parties),—then some other Probans would have to be propounded (by the first Party, in support of the Non-eternality of Sound).*

"Not having the characteristics of the 'Futile Rejoinder,' 'Parity per Apprehension' cannot be a Futile Rejoinder."

This is not right; as it is a Futile Rejoinder, inasmuch as what it urges is the 'similarity' (of the Probans put forward) to what is *not a probans.*

End of section (12).

Section (13).

[Sūtras 29—31].

Dealing with 'Parity per Non-apprehension.'

Bhāṣya on Sū. (29).

[P. 251, L. 6 to L. 17].

[The First Party puts forward the Proposition in the following form]—'It is not true that even before it is uttered, Sound exists and (if it is not heard) it is simply that there is non-apprehension of it'; —this is not true—why?—because we do not perceive any covering or obstruction; that is, in the case of such things as Water (underground) and the like, we find that when they are existent, if there is *non-apprehension* of them, it is due to the presence of obstruction (in the shape of the surface of the ground under which the water lies); in the case of Sound however, we do not find its non-apprehension to be due to the presence of obstruction or any such causes of non-apprehension; and such cause of

---

* The exact meaning of these two sentences is not very clear. The passage —'*yaḥ prayatnānantarīyakatvam &c.*,' the *Tātparya* explains as follows :—'He who admits without any reasons, that Sound is the outcome of effort,—for him nothing need be proved. In this passage the author shows his disapprobation.'

of its non-apprehension would certainly have been perceived (if it existed), just as it is perceived in the case of Water &c;—as a matter of fact however, no such cause is perceived (in the case of Sound); hence it follows that when Sound is not apprehended (heard), its condition is contrary (not analogous) to that of the Water &c. [*i. e.* while Water &c. are *existent*, Sound is *non-existent*].' [And against this the Opponent sets up the following Futile Rejoinder]—

Sūṭra (29).

"INASMUCH AS NON-APPREHENSION OF THE OBSTRUCTION IS ALSO NOT APPREHENDED,—IT FOLLOWS THAT THIS NON-APPREHENSION IS NON-EXISTENT; AND THIS PROVES THE CONTRARY CONCLUSION [*i. e.* EXISTENCE OF THE OBSTRUCTION] "—THE OPPOSITION BASED UPON THIS CONTENTION IS 'PARITY PER NON-APPREHENSION.' (Sū. 29).

"The 'Non-apprehension' of Obstruction &c. is not apprehended;—and from this 'non-apprehension of the Non-apprehension,' it follows that the latter does not exist; and this 'Non-apprehension' being non-existent, what has been urged by the First Party as the 'Probans' of his reasoning is found to be non-existent; all which leads to the conclusion that Obstruction &c. are *existent.* And since the contrary conclusion is thus proved, the original proposition—'it is not true that even before it is uttered, Sound exists, and it is simply that there is non-apprehension of it'—is *not* proved.

Thus it is found that the probans, 'because Obstruction is not apprehended', is equally applicable to the *Obstruction*, and to the *Non-apprehension* of the Obstruction."

This opposition, based upon Non-apprehension, constitutes 'Parity per Non-apprehension'.

Vārṭika on Sū. (29).

[P. 550, Ll. 13-18.]

The example of this Futile Rejoinder is given in the *Bhāṣya.*

What has been urged in the Futile Rejoinder is not right; it has already been answered by us in Aḍhyāya II.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (30).

[P. 251, L. 18 to P. 252, L. 11.]

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows:—

Sūtra (30).

SINCE 'NON-APPREHENSION' IS OF THE NATURE OF NEGATION OF APPREHENSION,* THE REASON URGED IS NO REASON AT ALL. (Sū. 30.)

The reasoning—"There can be no non-apprehension of Obstruction, because no such Non-apprehension is apprehended†"—is no reasoning as all—*why?*—*because Non-apprehension is of the nature of the negation of apprehension*'; that is because Non-apprehension' is nothing more than mere *negation of apprehension.* As a matter of fact, what *exists* forms the object of 'apprehension,' and this, by reason of its being apprehended, is asserted *to be existent*; while of 'Non-apprehension' the object is that which *does not exist*; and this, by reason of its being not apprehended is declared to be *non-existent.* The 'non-apprehension of the non-apprehension of the obstruction' cannot negate the 'non-apprehension; operating as it does upon its own objective, which is Non-apprehension', it cannot negate that same objective';‡—and

---

* It is of the nature of 'Negation of Apprehension'—i.e. mere 'Negation of Apprehension, without any further qualifications—*Bodhasiddhi* (Udayana).

†The right reading found in C and D is आवरणाद्यनुपलब्धिर्नास्ति ।

‡ This passage is rather obscure. In the first place, the reading of the printed text is incorrect. The right reading, supplied by Mss. B, C and D is सोऽयमावरणाद्यनुपलम्भोऽनुपलम्भो स्वविषये प्रवर्तमानो etc.

We have adopted the explanation given by the *Tātparya*:—What the Opponent, in putting forward the Futile Rejoinder, does, is to urge that there must be obstruction and the apprehension of this obstruction, because we fail to apprehend the non-apprehension of these. But it is far more reasonable to regard the latter absence of apprehension (of the non-apprehension of obstruction) as bearing upon the obstruction and its apprehension, than upon Non-apprehension. Because as the *Nyāyamañjarī* points out, what is negated by a negation must be something *positive*; apprehension proves the *existence*, and 'non-apprehension' the *non-existence*, of only positive entities; hence even the 'non-apprehension', even though of the 'non-apprehension of obstruction', can prove the *non-existence* only of the *obstruction and apprehensions*, which are positive entities, and not of the non-apprehension itself.

The *Bodhasiddhi* also explains similarly.

when the 'non-apprehension of obstruction' *is not negated*, it becomes capable of serving as an effective Probans (for proving the non-existence of the obstruction). 'Obstruction' can be the object of apprehension when it exists; and if it exists, there should be *apprehension* of it;—so that when it is not apprehended,—there being an absence of the 'apprehension' that would indicate the existence of its own objective,—from this 'non-apprehension' (serving as the means of cognition) it is understood that the object in question (which would have been apprehended if it existed) is the object of 'Non-apprehension'; i.e., it is *non-existent*;* the resultant conclusion being 'the Obstruction and such other things, which would have been the cause of (which could have accounted for) the non-apprehension of Sound (before its utterance), are *non-existent*.' And the reason for this lies in the fact that what 'Non-apprehension' (as a means of cognition) indicates is that there is no apprehension,—this fact of there being non-apprehension forming the subject of the said 'Non-apprehension.'

Vārṭika on Sū. (30).

[P. 550, Ll. 16-18.]

The argument (proving the non-existence of Sound before utterance) should be stated in the following form—'There being no possibility of Obstruction, and Sound being regarded as an entity,—since Sound is not apprehended [before utterance, it must be regarded as *non-existent*].' Stated in this form, the reasoning escapes from the *Clincher* of 'Shifting the Reason', as also from the *Fallacy* of 'Inconclusiveness.' Nor is it open to the *Futile Rejoinder* of 'Parity per Presumption'; because the indecisive character, that would have otherwise applied to the reasoning, is avoided by the qualifying phrases 'There being no possiblity of obstruction' and 'Sound being regarded as an entity', which serve to indicate the contrary [i.e., the qualifying phrase 'Sound being

*The *viṣaya*, object, the cognition of which is brought about by 'Non apprehension', is *the non-existence of the object that would have been apprehended.*

an entity' indicates the reasoning 'if Sound were an entity, it would be perceived', which is perfectly true and conclusive, and not open to 'Parity per Presumption', that might otherwise be urged against the reasoning, without the said qualifying phrases].

Sūṭra (31).

FURTHER BECAUSE THE PRESENCE AND ABSENCE OF ONE'S SEVERAL COGNITIONS ARE CLEARLY PERCEPTIBLE TO EVERY PERSON*;

Bhāṣya on Sū. (31).

[P. 252, L. 13-L. 17.]

—'therefore the reasoning put forward in the Futile Rejoinder is no reasoning at all'—this has to be brought in from the preceding *Sūṭra*. The presence and absence of the several cognitions that living beings have in the body, are clearly discernible by them; as is clear from such conceptions as 'My doubtful cognition *exists*' and 'My doubtful cognition *does not exist*'; similarly in connection with perceptional, inferential, verbal and reminiscential cognitions. So that in the case in question, when there is 'non-apprehension of the obstruction,'—*i.e.* the *non-existence* of its apprehension—it is clearly discernible by the person himself, and he has the conception, 'My apprehension of the obstruction is not present,' or 'Obstruction, or any such thing as would be the cause of the non-perception of Sound, is not apprehended'; from which it follows that what was alleged (in Sū. 29.)—"inasmuch as the non-apprehension of the obstruction is also not apprehended it follows that this Non-apprehension also is non-existent"—is not right.

Vārṭika on Sū. (31).

[The *Vārṭika* has nothing to say on this Sūṭra].

End of Section (31).

* According to *Ṭātparyā* and *Bodhasiddhi* the Sūṭra would mean—'it is clearly perceptible to every person whether a certain cognition apprehends the Existence or Non-existence of a thing.' The translation adopts the interpretation of the *Nyayamañjarī* which is more in keeping with the Bhāṣya.

Section 14.

[Sūṭras 32—34.]

Dealing with (22) '*Parity per Non-eternality*'.

Sūṭra (32).

"IF BY REASON OF 'SIMILARITY' TWO THINGS BE REGARDED AS HAVING ANALOGOUS PROPERTIES, THEN ALL THINGS SHOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS 'NON-ETERNAL,"—THIS CONTENTION CONSTITUTES 'PARITY PER NON-ETERNALITY'. (Su. 32).

Bhāṣya on Su. (32).

[P. 252, Ll. 20-22.]

"When the First Party says that—'Sound should be regarded as *non-eternal*, by reason of its similarity to the Jar, which is *non-eternal*,'—he becomes faced with the undesirable contingency of having to regard *all* things as *non-eternal*, by reason of their similarity (consisting of *existence*) to the Jar, which is non-eternal."—This opposition based upon 'non-eternality' constitutes 'Parity per Non-eternality.'*

Vārṭika on Sū. (32).

[P. 551, Ll. 5—7.]

Everything would come to be regarded as *non-eternal*.—The example is given in the *Bhāṣya*.

Objection.—"*Parity per Non-eternality* does not differ from *Parity per Non-difference*; there, as here, what is urged is the contingency of all things being of the same kind."

* This Futile Rejoinder is described as based upon 'similarity'; it includes also a similar rejoinder based upon 'dissimilarity'—says the *Boḍhasiḍḍhi*.

There *is* a difference between the two; what is urged in 'Parity per Non-difference' is the *non-difference* of all things, while in 'Parity per Non-eternality' what is urged is only the *non-eternality* of all things.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (33).
[P 252, L. 22 to P. 253, L. 4.]

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows:—

Sūṭra (33).

IF REJECTION CAN BE BASED UPON 'SIMILARITY,' THERE SHOULD BE REJECTION ALSO OF THE DENIAL (SET UP BY THE OPPONENT), AS THERE IS A SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE DENIAL AND THAT WHICH IT IS SOUGHT TO DENY.* (Sū. 33).

The 'Denial' is that allegation which is fully equipped with the Proposition and the other Factors of Reasoning, and which, while representing the counter-view, sets aside the original view;†—and the said 'Denial' has this similarity to the *original view* that both are equipped with the factors of Reasoning, Proposition and the rest. Now, if there is to be a rejection of *non-eternality* of Sound) on the ground of the 'similarity' (of all things) with the non-eternal (Jar), —then, inasmuch as this would mean that 'similarity' leads to rejection, it would follow that there should be rejection of the *Denial* also, on the ground of its similarity to *what is sought to be denied* (*i. e.* the original view).‡

Vārṭika on Sū. (33).
[P. 551, Ll. 12—14.]

The presence of the Proposition and other Factors of Reasoning constitutes the similarity between the Denial and

---

* The right reading of the Sūṭra, as shown by the *Nyāyasūchinibandha*, the *Bhāṣya, the Vārṭika*, the *Ṭāṭparya* and *Bodhasiddhi*, is साधर्म्यादसिद्धेः प्रतिषेधासिद्धिः प्रतिषेधसाधर्म्यात्.

†The correct reading is पक्षनिवर्तकम्; with the reading पक्षनिर्वर्तकं, the meaning would be—'which is meant to establish a counter-view.'

‡ The *Ṭāṭparya* remarks that the answer contained in this *Sūṭra* only puts the Opponent on the same footing as the First Party. The real answer comes in the next Sūtra.

the Original View that it seeks to deny. So that if what is sought to be denied by the 'non-eternality' in the reasoning set up by the Frst Party, has to be rejected on account of the similarity to the Jar,—then it follows that the Denial (by the Opponent) also has to be rejected, on account of its *similarity to what is sought to be denied*, consisting in the presence of the Proposition and other Factors of Reasoning.

Sūṭra (34).

WHAT SERVES AS THE PROBANS IS THAT PROPERTY WHICH IS DEFINITELY KNOWN TO SUBSIST IN THE EXAMPLE, AS BEING AN INFALLIBLE INDICATOR OF THE PROBANDUM; AND SINCE SUCH A PROBANS CAN BE OF BOTH KINDS, THERE CAN BE NO NON-DIFFERENCE (AMONG ALL THINGS). (Sū. 34).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (34).

[P. 253, L. 7 to L. 12.]

That property, which is found in the 'Example' to be an infallible indicator of the Probandum, is what is put forward as the *Probans*. *This Probans can be of both kinds*,—*i.e.* it may be similar to certain things, and dissimilar to certain other things; when it is similar, it constitutes the 'similarity' (among those things); and when it is dissimilar, it constitutes the 'dissimilarity' (among those things). Now, it is only a particular form of 'similarity' that constitutes the real 'Probans,'—and not either mere 'similarity' without any qualification, or mere 'dissimilarity.' What you have urged (under Sū. 32)—that, "If by reason of similarity two things are to be regarded as having analogous properties, then all things should have to be regarded as non-eternal, and this constitutes Parity 'per Non-eternality,"—is based upon *mere* 'similarity' and *mere* 'dissimilarity'; and as such cannot be right.*

---

*What can rightly prove a conclusion is only such 'similarity' or 'dissimilarity as is invariably concomitant with the Probandum. While the 'similarity' that has been put forward by the Opponent as his 'probans' in the proving of the 'non-eternality' of all things, is '*Existence*'; and there is no invariable concomitance between 'Existence' and 'Non-eternality'; there being several things that are *existent* and yet *eternal*, *not* non-eternal.

[In addition to what has been said here] all that was said (in Sū. 5-1. -24) in answer to 'Parity per Non-difference' should be taken as applying with equal force to the present Futile Rejoinder also.

Vārṭika on Sū. (34).

[P. 551, L. 14 to P. 552, L. 7.]

As a matter of fact, the argument put forward in support of the original view that 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is the outcome of Effort, like the Jar' is not based upon mere similarity'; it is based upon the force of a particular property [*viz*: 'being the outcome of effort'] which has been found, in the Example, to be invariably concomitant, negatively as well as positively (with the Probandum 'Non-eternality'). There is no such property possible, in support of the counter-view set up by the Opponent. Hence the Denial cannot be right. In this connection it has already been explained that—'the denial cannot hold, because in the case of some common property, the presence of certain other properties of the similar thing is possible, while in the others such presence is not possible' (Su. 5-1-24); so that the answer that has been given to 'Parity per Non-difference' is applicable to the present case also.

Vār: P. 552. "The answer does not hold; because our argument is not intended to prove any conclusion."

If you mean by this that—"By pointing out the contingency of all things having to be regarded as *non-eternal* we do not mean to prove the *non-eternality of all things*; all that we mean is to show to the person propounding the original proposition, that in so doing he is faced with the undesirable contingency of having to regard all things as non-eternal",—then our answer is that even so your allegation cannot stand; because the probans put forward (by the

first party) is of a particular kind: The Probans or Reason that I put forward is not mere similarity (to a non-eternal thing), but such similarity as is invariably concomitant with the probandum); hence the contingency of all things having to be regarded as *non-eternal* does not arise at all. Further, there can be no reasons in support of the view that 'all things are non-eternal.' If the Opponent were to seek to prove it by the reasoning—'all things must be non-eternal, because they are existent',—then (we would point out that) there is no sort of invariable concomitance, either negative or positive (between 'existence and 'non-eternality').

End of Section 14.

Section (15).

[*Sutras* 35-36.]

Dealing with (23) '*Parity per Eternality.*'

Sūṭra (35).

"THE CHARACTER OF 'NON-ETERNALITY' BEING ETERNAL, IT FOLLOWS THAT THE 'NON-ETERNAL THING' IS ITSELF ETERNAL",—BASED UPON THIS CONTENTION IS 'PARITY PER ETERNALITY.' (Sū. 35.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (35).

[P. 253, L. 14 to L. 17.]

"The proposition is put forward in the form—'Sound is non-eternal'; now, is this 'non-eternality' of Sound *eternal*, everlasting, or *non-eternal*, evanescent? If it is present in Sound at all times, then, since the property (non-eternality) is everlasting, the thing to which that property belongs '(Sound)' must also be everlasting, so that Sound should be *eternal.* If on the other hand, the said property ('Non-eternality') is not present in Sound at all times,—then since (at some time or other) 'Non-eternality' would be absent in Sound, Sound would be 'eternal'.

This opposition, based upon 'Eternality', constitutes 'Parity per Eternality.' *

Vārṭika on Sū. (35).

[P. 552, L. 9 to L. 13.]

This Futile Rejoinder is intended to point out defects in the factors of the Proposition 'Sound is non-eternal;'—the sense being as follows:—"In asserting that Sound is non-eternal, you admit the *eternality* of Sound,—how?—because the 'non-eternality' that you predicate of Sound, is it always present in the Sound? or does it come into it only occasionally? If it is ever present in it, then, the property (of Non-eternality) being everlasting, it follows that the thing to which that property belongs must also be everlasting. If, on the other hand, the 'non-eternality' in Sound is not everlasting,—then on account of the absence (at certain times) of *non-eternality* in it, Sound must be 'eternal'.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (36).

[P 253, L. 17 to P. 254, L. 9.]

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows:—

Sūtra (36).

INASMUCH AS THE EVERLASTING CHARACTER OF THE 'NON-ETERNALITY' IN THE SUBJECT OF DENIAL (SOUND) [IS ADMITTED BY THE OPPONENT], THE 'NON-ETERNALITY' OF THE NON-ETERNAL THING (SOUND) BECOMES ESTABLISHED; SO THAT THERE CAN BE NO BASIS FOR THE DENIAL.† (Sū. 36).

---

*In this Sutra, the mention of 'non-eternality' is meant to include all those specific reasons that may be adduced in support of the non-eternality of Sound. The sense of the definition of 'Parity per Eternality' is as follows—When the Opponent puts forward certain exhaustive alternatives in regard to the property put forward by the First Party, and shows that none of these is admissible, and then proceeds to urge that the Subject cannot, on that account, be accepted as having that property;—this form of Opposition constitutes 'Parity per Eternality.—*Bodhasiddhi* (Udayana).

†The *Nāyayamañjari* reads the Sūṭra without अनित्ये and with अनित्यत्वोपपत्तेः

When the Opponent speaks of the character of *Non-eternality* being 'everlasting' in Sound, which is the object whose non-eternality he seeks to deny,—he admits the *non-eternality* of Sound;—and when this 'non-eternality of Sound' has been thus admitted, there is no room for the Denial If on the other hand, he does not admit the 'everlasting' character of the 'non-eternality in Sound,' then for him, the expression,—'because non-eternality in Sound is eternal,'—cannot serve as the probans (of his reasoning);—and in the absence of the Probans, the Denial cannot be proved.

In fact, what is meant by Sound being 'non-eternal is that it is *produced and ceases to exist on being destroyed;* and there can be no question against this; hence there is no room for any such question as—"does the non-eternality subsist in Sound at all times or not?"—Why?—Because the non-eternality of Sound consists in its being produced and ceasing to exist on being destroyed,—it is not right to regard 'Sound' as the *container* (the receptacle) and 'non-eternality' as the *contained;* for such a conception would involve a self-contradiction in terms.* Further, 'eternality' and 'non-eternality' are contradictory terms (hence also the Denial cannot be maintained); that 'non-eternality' and 'eternality' —which are mutual contradictories—should belong to the same Object (Sound) is an impossibility. For these reasons we conclude that what has been alleged by the Opponent—that "Non-eternality being eternal, Sound must be eternal" —has absolutely no sense.

Vārtika on Sū. (36).

[P. 552, L. 16 to P. 553, L. 10.]

When the Opponent says that "non-eternality in the Subject of Denial is eternal," he admits its *non-eternality*; and

---

The presence or absence of अनित्ये does not make any difference in the meaning. But from the explanation provided in the Bhāṣya, the Boḍhasiḍḍhi and the Nyāyamañjarī, अनित्यत्वोपपत्तेः is the right reading for नित्यत्वोपपत्तेः

* If 'non-eternality' is contained in 'Sound', then alone can there be any force in the contention that if the former is eternal, the latter also should be so; as in that case could the former not subsist without the latter. As a matter of fact, the relation of 'container and contained' does not subsist between *Sound* and Non-eternality. For such relationship belongs only to *positive* entities, and Non-entity is purely *negative*; and this only *qualifies* Sound, it does not *subsist in it*;—says the *Nyāyamañjarī*.

on account of this admission, the Denial has no force at all. If it is not admitted, then the reasoning—"because non-eternality is everlasting, Sound should be eternal"—becomes baseless. Thus then, the very probans of the Opponent being an impossible one, the Denial becomes meaningless. Further,

Var: P. 553. there is no room for the question also; for the simple reason that 'non-eternality' is not held to be a distinct property. That is to say, when 'Non-eternality' is explained as consisting in the fact of the thing *being endowed with an existence which is not absolute* (or everlasting),—there can be no occasion for the question—"is non-eternality an absolute (eternal) entity or not?" For one and the same thing (Non-eternality) cannot be endowed with both *absolute* and *non-absolute* existence [and 'non-eternality' has been explained as *non-absolute* existence]; but when you say that "non-eternality is eternal", you attribute to one and the same thing 'non-eternality' the character of *non-absolute* existence which constitutes 'non-eternality,' as also *absolute existence* (which constitutes 'eternality'); and since these are mutual contradictories, such an assertion cannot be right.

"What we assert is all right, since it is only meant to point out a defect in what is sought to be denied [*e. g*, 'the non-eternality of Sound']." If you mean by this that—"*we* do not admit one and the same thing to be both *eternal* and *non-eternal*; all that we mean is that when you say that Sound is *non-eternal*, you render yourself open to the said absurd contingency,"—then [our answer is that] this cannot be right; because the criticism you urge is not found true in any alternative form: That is, what you urge is not a defect, either in our conclusion, or in our 'Reasoning'; it cannot be a defect in (*i. e.* it cannot vitiate) our conclusion, because, in the first place you do not point out any flaw in

our Proposition or in any other Factor of our Reasoning; and in the second place, we have already answered the charge of '*self-contradiction.*'

END OF SECTION (15).

Section (16).

[Sūṭras 37—38.]

Dealing with (24) '*Parity per character of Effect.*'

Sūṭra (37).

'PARITY PER CHARACTER OF EFFECT' IS BASED ON THE DIVERSE CHARACTER OF THE PRODUCTS OF EFFORT. (Sū. 37).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (37).

[P. 254, L. 11 to L. 16.]

The original proposition is put up in the form—'Sound is non-eternal, *because it is the outcome of effort*'; now that which is 'the outcome of effort' is such as, *not having previous existence comes into existence*; as is found to be the case with such *products* as the Jar and the like; that which is 'non-eternal,' on the other hand, is such as, *having come into existence, ceases to exist.* Such being the condition of things, the Opposition is set up on the basis of *the diverse character of the products of effort.* 'Coming into existence after effort' we find in the case of the jar, etc., and we also find the 'manifestation' of things concealed under some obstruction, by the removal of the obstruction [and this also is the *outcome of effort*]; and there is no special reason to show whether Sound *comes into existence after Effort*, or there is only *manifestation* of it (after effort); and the Opposition set up on the basis of this fact of both these production and manifestation) being equally the 'products of effort,'* is 'Parity per Character of Effect.'

Vārṭika on Sū. (37).

[P. 553, L 12 to L. 17.]

The proposition being put forward—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is the outcome of effort,'—the following

*The mere fact of Sound being the 'outcome of Effort' does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is non-eternal, it comes into existence, or is destroyed; for even if it were only *manifested*, it could be regarded as the 'outcome of effort.'

Futile Rejoinder, called 'Parity per character of Effect' is set up against it :—The 'product of effort' has been found to be of several kinds: *E. g.* Some things are merely *manifested* after Effort, while others are *produced* after Effort [and both of these are called 'product of Effort']. What 'Parity per character of Effect' does is attribute (to the First Party) the idea that what proves the 'Non-eternality of Sound' is the fact of its being *perceived* after Effort, and then to urge that this fact is not a conclusive reason; *i. e.* it urges that the reasoning—'Sound is a product, *because it is perceived after effort*'—is *not conclusive* (indecisive), on the ground that *things perceived after Effort* are found be of the nature of 'product', as also of 'non-product.' If the reason means 'being *born* of Effort,' then the rejoinder would be that the reason is *not true* (it being not admitted by all that Sound is born of Effort).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (38).

[P. 254, L. 16 to P. 255, L. 6].

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows :—

Sūtra (38).

EVEN THOUGH THERE ARE SEVERAL KINDS OF PRODUCTS,—INASMUCH AS [IN THE OTHER KIND OF PRODUCT] CAUSES OF NON-APPREHENSION ARE PRESENT, EFFORT COULD NOT BE THE CAUSE (OF MERE 'MANIFESTATION' OF SOUND, IN WHOSE CASES THERE IS NO CAUSE OF NON-APPREHENSION). (Sū. 38).*

---

* We have translated the Sūtra as it is explained in the Bhāṣya and read in all manuscripts. The interpretation however is far-fetched; hence the *Nyāyamañjarī* has read the Sūtra with the last term as अनुपलब्धिकारणानुपपत्तेः; and explains it to mean as follows :—'*Even though there are various kinds of Products,—Effort cannot be regarded as the cause (of the manifestation of Sound), as there is not present (in the case of Sound) any cause of its non-apprehension.*' This is much simpler.

Vār. P. 255. *Even though there are several kinds of Products, there are present causes of non-apprehension,—hence Effort could not be the cause,* of the manifestation of Sound. In a case where there is *manifestation* as the *outcome of effort,* it is possible that there may have been some cause, in the shape of obstruction, to which its non-apprehension (before manifestation) was due, so that when, as a result of effort, there is a removal of the obstruction, there comes about the *apprehension* of the thing, which constitutes its 'manifestation.' In the case of Sound however, no such cause of Non-apprehension is possible, by the removal whereof, as following from Effort, there could come about the 'manifestation' of the Sound consisting of its *apprehension.* From this it follows that Sound is *produced,* not *manifested* (by Effort.)*

Vārṭika on Sū. (38).

[P. 553, L. 19 to P. 554, L. 4.]

In the case of the thing that is *manifested* by effort, causes of non-apprehension are possible; in the case of Sound however, there can be no cause to which its non-apprehension (if it existed) would be due. Hence we conclude that Sound is not *manifested.*

Vār. P. 554. *Objection*—"This Futile Rejoinder does not differ from 'Parity per Doubt'!"

As a matter of fact, 'Parity per Doubt' is based upon similarity to both kinds of things; which is not the case with the present Futile Rejoinder, and as such it is different from the former.

"It does not differ from *Parity per Similarity.*"

That also is not true; as there is assumption of a different 'Probans.' 'Parity per Similarity' does *not* proceed on the

*The *Nyāyamañjarī* remarks that by having selected the 'non-eternality of Sound' as the Example, dealt with under all the twenty-four *Futile Rejoinders,* the author of the *Bhāṣya* has accomplished two purposes: he provides examples of the Rejoinders and also sets aside all possible objections against the Nyāya doctrine of the *Non-eternality of Sound.*

basis of an assumed *probans*; while in the present Futile Rejoinder, the Probans, which has been stated (by the propounder of the original proposition) in one form, [*i. e.* 'because it is an outcome of Effort'] is altered into a totally different form ['because it is *perceived* after Effort'].

End of Section 16.

Section (17).

[Sūṭras 39—43.]

Dealing with the 'Ṣaṭpakṣī'—the six steps of a Futile Discussion.*

Bhāṣya on Sū. (39).

[P. 255, L. 6. to L. 13.]

[The *first* step consisting of the Proposition, 'Sound must be non-eternal, because it is the outcome of effort, like the Jar'] it is urged against this that the Probans is 'inconclusive,' and being 'inconclusive,' it cannot prove the conclusion' (this represents the *second* step);—[to this the First Party, offers the following *wrong answer*, which represents the *third* step]—If my Probans cannot prove the conclusion because it is inconclusive, then—

THE SAME FAULT LIES WITH THE DENIAL (BY THE OPPONENT) ALSO.—(Sūṭra 39).

That is, the Denial also is 'inconclusive'; it denies something, and does not deny other things; and being 'inconclusive,' it cannot prove the desired conclusion.

Or, the Opponent having said—"If Sound be held to be *non-eternal*, there is no special reason why what happens to

---

* Says the *Ṭāṭparya*—It has been shown up to the last Section that when the Opponent sets up a Futile Rejoinder he is met by the First Party with a suitable answer; and in every such case, the disputants come to an understanding as to the true conclusion. But there are cases where the First Party also meets the Opponent with a wrong answer; in that case no right conclusion is arrived at; and an entirely futile discussion is carried on, to six steps. This is what the author of the Sūṭra proceeds to show, for the benefit of his pupils.

Sound, after Effort, is its *production*, and not *manifestation*," —[he is met by the First Party with the following wrong answer]—if Sound be held to be *eternal*, then also there is no special reason why what happens to Sound is *manifestation*, not *production*. Thus special reasons being equally wanting in both views, both are equally *inconclusive*.

Vārṭika on Sū. (39).

[P. 554, L. 5. to L. 10.]

The Futile Rejoinders have been thus described. With a view to show the six steps of a Futile Discussion, the Author says—*the same fault lies with the Denial also* (says the Sūṭra). The propounder of the original proposition offers the following answer to the Opponent who has urged against him the Futile Rejoinder—If my reasoning cannot be true, because it is inconclusive, then your Denial also is inconclusive; as it denies something and does not deny other things. Or, special corroborative reasons may be urged as being equally wanting in both views. The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya*.

Sūṭra (40).

THE SAME MAY BE SAID BY THE FIRST PARTY IN ANSWER TO ALL (FUTILE REJOINEDRS)—(Sū. (40).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (40).

[P. 255, Ll. 15—16.]

In connection with all that may be taken as the basis of the Futile Rejoinders—*e.g.* 'Similarity' and the rest—whenever no special corroborative reason may be found,—the contention may be put forward (by the First Party) that both views stand on the same footing.

Vārṭika on Sū. (40).

[P. 554, L. 12.]

What the Sūṭra means is that the argument put forward (by the First Party, in the preceding Sūṭra) can be urged in answer to all Futile Rejoinders.*

*Examples of these are given by Udayana in the *Boḍhasiḍḍhi*.

Sūṭra (41).

[*Fourth Step*] "WITH THE CONTRAVENTION OF THE DENIAL ALSO WOULD LIE THE SAME FAULT AS THAT WHICH LIES AGAINST THE DENIAL ITSELF.—(SU. 41.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (41.)

[P. 255, L. 18 to P. 256, L. 3.]

It has been urged by the First Party that the fault of *Inconclusivness* that had been urged (in the *Second Step*) as lying in the original Proposition, lies also in the Denial (set up by the Opponent). But the same fault lies with this contravention of the Denial. Thus then, the First *Step* in this Futile Discussion consists in the propounding of the original proposition by the First Party—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is the outcome of Effort;'—the *Second Step* consists of the denial or negating argument set up by the Opponent Critic, in the form—" Since the products of Effort are of several kinds there is Parity per Character of Effect"; this is what is called the 'Denial';—then comes the *Third Step*,—in which the First Party urges that the same fault lies with the Denial also; this is what is called (in the *Sūṭra*) *Vipraṭiṣēḍha*' (Contravention) ;—then comes the Fourth *Step* (urged by the Opponent)—" the same fault of Inconclusiveness lies also with the Contravention of the Denial."

Vārṭika on Sū. (41).

[P. 554, Ll. 14—15.]

The *Third Step* consists of the *Vipraṭiṣēḍha* (Contravention). The *Fourth Step* is that " with the 'Further Denial' also lies the same fault of *Inconclusiveness*."

Sutra (42).

[*Fifth Step*]—THE CONTINGENCY OF THE SAME FAULT LYING WITH THE CONTRAVENTION OF THE DENIAL IS URGED (BY THE OPPONENT), AFTER ADMITTING THE PRESENCE OF THE FAULT IN HIS OWN CONTENTION ;—AND THIS INVOLVES 'CONFESSION OF THE CONTRARY OPINION'.—(Su. 42.)

Bhaṣya on Su. (42).

[P. 256, Ll. 6—9.]

What the Opponent has done (in the *Fourth Step*) is to confess that the view he had expressed in the *Second Step* is faulty, and, without freeing his view from that defect, he has admitted it, and then has urged that the same fault of 'Inconclusiveness' lies also with the Contravention of the Denial in the *Third Step* ;—and on the part of the Opponent this involves a 'Confession of the Contrary Opinion'. This is the *Fifth Step* [in the Futile Discussion].

Vārṭika Su. (42).

[P. 555, Ll. 1—3.]

Having admitted the *Second Step*, the Denial, to be faulty, the Opponent urges that the same fault also lies with the *Third Step*, by saying that "the same fault lies with Contravention also"; and this constitutes on his part a 'Confession of the Contrary Opinion.'—This represents the *Fifth Step* in the Futile Discussion.

Sūṭra (43).

[*Sixth Step*]—"IT IS AFTER HAVING ADMITTED WHAT HAS BEEN URGED AGAINST HIS OWN VIEW, THAT THE FIRST PARTY HAS URGED THE PRESENCE OF THE SAME FAULT (IN THE OPPONENT'S VIEW), AND HAS PUT FORWARD REASONS FOR THE SAME ;—IN SO DOING HE HAS ADMITTED THE PRESENCE (IN HIS OWN VIEW) OF THE FAULT URGED AGAINST THE OPPONENT'S VIEW ;—SO THAT THE FAULT OF 'CONFESSING THE CONTRARY OPINION' IS EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO HIM ALSO". Sū. (43).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (43).

[P. 256, L. 11 to P. 257, L. 11.]

The fault urged against the original Proposition of the First Party was that 'there are several kinds of products of effort' (Sū. 37); and this is what, for the First Party who is propounding reasons in support of that proposition, consti-

tutes '*Svapakṣalakṣaṇa*,' '*fault urged against his own view*';—how?—because it arises out of his own view;—now what he has done (in course of the present Futile Discussion) is to admit this fault that has been urged against his view, and without refuting it, he has admitted it and urged the presence of the same fault in the Opponent's view,—in the words 'the same fault lies with the Denial also' (Sū. 39); and he has put forward reasons in support of the same,—in the words 'the denial is inconclusive'. Thus it being a case where *he has admitted what has been urged against his view and urged the presence of the same fault in the Opponent's view, and has put forward reasons for the same*,—this means that he has admitted the presence in his own view of the fault he had urged against the Opponent's view.* 'How so?' The Opponent had argued that 'there are several kinds of products of Effort' by which he meant to indicate the fault of 'inconclusiveness' (as lying against the original proposition);—without refuting this the First Party has said—'the same fault lies with the Denial also';—thus he has admitted that the arguments in support of the original proposition are faulty, and then urged the same against the Denial also; by doing so he admits the view of the Opponent, and becomes open to the same charge (of 'Confessing the Contrary Opinion'). Just as the Opponent, having admitted the faultiness of the Denial of the First Party, and having urged the presence of the same fault in the Contravention of the Denial also, has been charged (in the *Fifth Step*) with 'Confession of the Contrary Opinion',—exactly in the same manner, the First Party also, having admitted the faultiness of the affirmation of the original Proposition, and having urged the presence of the same fault against the Denial, becomes open to the same charge of 'Confessing the Contrary Opinion'.

This represents the *Sixth Step* in the Futile Discussion. Among the six steps, the *first, third and fifth* steps represent the assertions of the Propounder of the Original Proposition, and the *second, fourth* and *sixth* represent those of the Opponent denying that Proposition. When we come to consider the validity and invalidity of these assertions, we find as follows:—(*a*) Since there is no difference in

*The right reading is परपक्षदोषोऽभ्युपगतो भवति as found in C.

the meanings of the *fourth* and the *sixth*, they are open to the charge of needless repetition; for what the *fourth* says is that 'with the Contravention of the Denial also would lie the same fault as that which lies with the Denial itself' (Su. 41), which means that the other party is subject to the same fault;—and again in the *sixth* we have the assertion that by admitting the Opponent's view the First Party becomes open to the same charge; and this also means that the other party is open to the same fault; thus there is no difference in the meanings of these two.—(*b*) The same charge of needless repetition lies also against the *third* and *fifth* steps; in the *third* what is alleged is that the same fault lies with the Denial also, which admits the equality of both views, and again in the *fifth* it is admitted that the denial of the Denial is subject to the same fault;—so that the *fifth* says nothing new.—(*c*) Again the *fifth* and *sixth* also are mere repetitions, there being no difference in what they allege.—(*d*) The *third* and the *fourth* involve the 'Confession of the Contrary Opinion.'—(*e*) In the *first* and the *second*, no special reasons have been adduced (in support of either view). Thus it is found that in the Futile Discussion consisting of the said six steps, neither of the two views becomes established. Whenever * this form of Futile Discussion with the six steps, takes place,—*i. e.*, whenever the First Party begins the discussion with the contention that the same fault lies with the denial also, neither of the two views becomes demonstrated. When, however, the third step (in answer to the Opponent's denial which is the second step) is put forward by the First Party in the form—'Even though there are several kinds of Products, inasmuch as in the other kinds of Product causes of non-apprehension are present, Effort could not be the cause of the manifestation of Sound' (Sū. 38),—then the original view does become demonstrated, that 'What happens to Sound after Effort is that it comes into existence, and not that it becomes manifested'; and in this case there is no room for the six steps of the Futile Discussion.

THUS ENDS THE FIRST DAILY LESSON OF THE FIFTH ADHYAYA OF THE *Bhāṣya*.

* Read for कदा, 'यदा' as in C.

Vartika on Sū. (43).

[P. 555, L. 6 to L. 16.]

When the First Party admits the faults arising against his own view and urges the same against the Opponent's view,—he admits the faultiness of his own view; so that he is equally open to the charge of 'confessing the contrary opinion.' The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya*.

Among the six steps, the *first*, *third* and *fifth* represent the view of the propounder of the original proposition; and the *second*, *fourth* and *sixth* that of the Opposer of that proposition. When we come to consider the validity and invalidity of these assertions, we find—(*a*) that there is no difference of meaning between the *fourth* and the *sixth*, and there is needless repetition,*—(*b*) that the same charge of needless repetition lies also against the *third* and the *fifth*,—(*c*) that between the *fifth* and *sixth* also there is needless repetition,—(*d*) that in the *third* and *fourth* there is 'confessing of the contrary opinion,'—and (*e*) in the *first* and *second*, there is no mention of any special reason (in support of either view).

In this Futile Discussion consisting of the six steps, neither of the two views is established,—and this is due to both parties making improper allegations. When, on the other hand, special reasons in support of one view *are* adduced,—*e. g.*, 'because there being no cause of non-apprehension, Sound is apprehended only after the Effort (that brings it into existence)'—then there is no room for the propounding of the *six steps*.

The Futile Rejoinders do not help in the discerning of truth; we have merely described the several forms of them.

THUS ENDS THE FIRST DAILY LESSON OF ADHYAYA V OF THE VARTIKA.

---

* The न found in both editions is superfluous.

Adhyāya V.

Daily Lesson II.

Section (1).

[Sūtras 1—6.]

Dealing with the Five Clinchers or Grounds of Defeat that bear upon the Proposition and the Statement of the Probans.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (1).

[P. 257, L. 13 to L. 23.]

Under Sū. 1-2-19 and 20 it has been briefly stated that—'It is a case of Clincher when there is misapprehension, as also when there is non-apprehension; and there is a multiplicity of Clinchers owing to there being several varieties of both'; the same has now got to be described in detail. The Clinchers are actual occasions of defeat, the receptacles of faults; and they mostly bear upon the Proposition and other Factors of Reasoning, and they may affect the propounder of the true, as also that of the false, doctrine [but only so long as perfect wisdom has not been attained]. They are divided as follows:—

Sūtra (1).

(1) Violating the Proposition, (2) Shifting the Proposition, (3) Contradicting the Proposition, (4) Renouncing the Proposition, (5) Shifting the Probans, (6) Irrelevancy, (7) Meaningless Jargon, (8) Unintelligibility, (9) Incoherence, (10) Inconsequentiality, (11) Incompleteness, (12) Redundance, (13) Repetition, (14) Non-reproduction, (15) Incomprehension, (16) Embarrassment, (17) Evasion, (18) Confession of a Contrary Opinion, (19) Overlooking the Censurable, (20) Censuring of the non-censurable, (21) Inconsistency, and (22) Fallacious Probans are the Clinchers.—Sū. (1).

All these, divided into twenty-two kinds, are defined one by one, in the following Sūtras.*

*These twenty-two Clinchers have been grouped under seven heads, each of which is dealt with in the seven *sections* of this *Daily Lesson*.

Vārṭika on Sū. (1).

[P. 556, L. 1 to P. 558, L. 14.]

Under 1-2-19 and 20, it has been briefly stated that 'it is a case of Clincher when there is misapprehension, as also when there is non-apprehension; and there is a multiplicity of Clinchers owing to there being several varieties of both; and the same has now got to be described in detail;—The Clinchers are actual occasions of defeat, the receptacles of faults—says the *Bhāṣya*.

In a general way there are two Clinchers; [and the question arises]—from among the *Agent* (the propounder of the View), the *objective* (the View itself), and the *instrument* (the argument whereby the View is sought to be established),—whose are the Clinchers [*i.e.* on which do the Clinchers bear]?*

Some people declare that the Clinchers bear upon the *view* propounded; they explain as follows:—"Defects consist in Incompleteness, Flaws in the Reasoning Factors, Flaws in the Answer, and Bewilderment; and by all these it is the View of the other Party that is vitiated."

This however is not right; since the View remains in the same condition; the mention of the defect does not alter the *view*; when the *view* is criticised, it remains just the same as it was when not criticised.

Vār. P. 55-7.

Nor could the Clinchers bear upon the *instrument* (the argument); because nothing can be effective upon other objectives; the instrument, consisting of the Proposition and other Factors of Reasoning, cannot be affected by the Clinchers; for the simple reason that no Instrument can be effective upon objectives other than its own; every Instrument is effective only upon its own objective [and hence if

*कस्य, not तस्य, is the right reading.

the argument is a true argument it must be effective; it will not be effective only if it is made to bear upon things other than its own objective, in that case it is not a true 'Instrument' at all].

The fact of the matter is that it is the *Agent* (the Propounder of the argument) who is affected by the Clincher, by reason of propounding inefficient (improbable) Objectives (propositions) and Instruments (arguments). The *Objective* is regarded as 'inefficient' when it does not accomplish the desired purpose for the accomplishing of which it has been put up; *e.g.*, the *Sand* in the making of the Jar; and the Instrument is regarded as 'inefficient' when it does not accomplish the act for the accomplishment of which it was set up; *e.g.* the Shuttle &c. in the making of the Jar; in regard to their own true objectives both of these are *efficient.* Thus then, when an *Object* is employed in regard to an objective other than its own, or when an *Instrument* is employed in connection with an objective other than its own, this only indicates the ignorance of the Propounder of the argument; and since Ignorance consists either in 'misapprehension or non-apprehension,' it is the Propounder who becomes *defeated*,—and not either the *Object or the Instrument*,—both of these being dependent on something else (and as such not to be blamed). For this reason the *defeat* must be of the Propounding Agent, who is not dependent upon anything else; specially as 'misapprehension' and 'non-apprehension' are properties of the person, 'defeat' which consists of these, must also belong to the person. Since however that the man has *misapprehension* or *non-apprehension*, is known from the words he uses, the defects (constituting the Clinchers) are figuratively spoken of as 'defects *of the Proposition and other factors of reasoning*'; while a few of the Clinchers, such as 'Incomprehension' and so forth, affect the man himself directly.

An objection is raised—" It is not right to say that there are *two* kinds of Clinchers; since several Clinchers are found mentioned in the *Sūtra*, it is not right to say that *there are two kinds of Clinchers* (as the *Vārṭika* has said on P. 556, L. 13)."

This is not right; whether they are called 'two' or 'of several kinds' depends upon whether we take them under groups or in detail: If we take them in groups then they are *two*, while if we take them in detail, they are *twenty-two*. Even the number 'twenty-two' is mentioned only by way of illustration; the actual number of individual Clinchers is endless.

Objection:—"The *Bhāṣya* has said that *the Clinchers mostly bear upon the Proposition and other Factors of Reasoning*;—but since they really appertain to the Propounder of the Argument, it is not right to say that they bear upon the Proposition and other Factors of Reasoning."

Vār. P. 558. If you mean by this that—"it having been asserted that Clinchers consist in *misapprehension and non-apprehension*, what connection could there be between them and the Factors of Reasoning, Proposition &c.?"—there is no force in this, because the *speaker* can be regarded as *ignorant* only when his speech is found defective; just as the actor is regarded as ignorant only when his action is defective; it is through the *action* that the *actor* is found fault with; and it is through the *speech* that the *speaker* becomes found fault with; and it is in this way that the Clinchers (though really affecting the speaker) are said to bear upon the Proposition &c. When it is said that *Clinchers bear upon the Proposition &c.*, it does not mean that they are contained in these [that there is the relation between them of the container and the contained]; what is meant is that the Clinchers are urged on the basis of the Proposition &c.

Objection—"*They may affect the Propounder of the true, as also that of the false, doctrine,*—says the *Bhāṣya.* But as a matter of fact, no Clincher can affect the propounder of the *true* doctrine; because he actually gives expression to it; when the man propounds the true doctrine, he actually gives expression to it; and when he does so, it cannot be said that he is *defeated.*"

There is no force in this; it is quite possible for him to be defeated, by reason of being unable to detect flaws in the objections urged against him by the Opponent. The man who propounds the true doctrine even though he expresses the right view,—is *defeated* when he fails to comprehend the true character of the wrong objections that are urged against his view by the upholder of the contrary view. As a matter of fact, the true doctrine is fully established; what happens is that even in regard to the established doctrine, the man fails to recognise the true character of the wrong objection urged against his doctrine, and thus becomes *defeated.*

The first Sūṭra is meant to illustrate the various kinds of Clinchers that may be possible.

Sūṭra (2).

WHEN THE PROPERTY OF THE 'COUNTER-INSTANCE' (URGED BY THE OPPONENT) IS ADMITTED BY ONE TO BE PRESENT IN THE EXAMPLE CITED BY HIMSELF,—IT IS A CASE OF (1) 'VIOLATING THE PROPOSITION.' (Sū. 2).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (2).

[P. 258, L. 2 to L. 8.]

The Opposition having been set up on the basis of a certain property which is contrary to the Probandum,—if the first Party admits that that contrary property, which belongs to the Counter-instance cited by the Opponent, is present in the Example cited by himself, he violates his original Proposition; hence this becomes a case of 'Violating the Proposition.' *Example*—The Proposition having been

put forward in the form—'Sound must be non-eternal because it is perceptible by the senses, like the Jar,'—the Opponent says—"But we find that Community, which is *eternal*, is also perceptible by the senses; and why cannot Sound also be the same?"—Being met with this Opposition, the First Party may say—'if Community, which is perceptible by the senses, is eternal, the Jar also may be eternal'; and in this the First Party attributes 'eternality' to the Example that he had cited in support of his proposition; and in so doing he violates his entire thesis up to the 'Final Conclusion'; and violating his entire thesis, he is said to violate his Proposition,—since the Thesis rests in the Proposition.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (2).

[P. 558, L. 15 to P. 560, L. 7.]

The definition of the Clinchers is as follows:—When the First Party admits that the property of the Counter-instance subsists in the Example cited by himself,—he should be regarded as 'defeated.' *E. g.*, Step I consists of the statement of the First Party—'Sound must be non-eternal, because it is perceptible by the senses, like the Jar';—on this comes Step II, which consists of the following statement of the Second Party—"Community, which is eternal, is also perceptible by the Senses; why cannot Sound be the same?";—then comes Step III, in the form of the following from the First Party—'If Community, which is perceptible by the senses, is eternal, the Jar also may be eternal.' In this statement the First Party admits the presence of the property of the Counter-instance in the

* The *Boḍhasiḍḍhi* remarks that the Sūṭra describes two kinds of 'Violating the Proposition'—the first is described by the very name 'Violating the Proposition,' and another by the rest of the Sūṭra. The example of the former kind would be that case when, on finding that he cannot bring forward arguments to sustain his position, the first Party entirely surrenders his point.—'All right, I give up my point; *Sound is not non-eternal.*' What is cited in the *Bhāṣya* is the example of the second kind.

Example cited by himself, and by this admission he renounces the Example, and by so doing he gives up his whole thesis, down to the Final Conclusion; and this is what is called 'Violating the Proposition.'

Vār P. 559.

We do not understand how, in the example cited by the Bhāṣya, the *Proposition* becomes 'violated.' What the Opponent does is to urge, on the basis of the Counter-instance, the 'inconclusive' character of the Probans [by showing that the Probans, *perceptibility by the senses*, is not invariably concomitant with the Probandum, *non-eternality*],—and what the First Party does is to admit the presence of 'eternality' in his own Example, and does not try to show that his Probans is not beset with the defect of 'inconclusiveness'; and by this admission of 'eternality' in his Example, it is the Example that becomes vitiated with the defect of being 'untrue' [since not serving to show the concomitance of *non-eternality* with *perceptibility by the senses*]. Consequently it is either by the deficiency of the 'Example,' or by that of the 'Probans,' that the First Party becomes 'defeated'; and there is no 'Violation of the Proposition.' It may be that by renouncing the 'Example' the Party renounces the 'Proposition' also; hence the Clincher of 'Violating the Proposition' is applied to him secondarily (indirectly). But unless there is an original *primary* there can be no *secondary* application; so that it has still to be pointed out what is that to which the name 'Violating the Proposition' applies *primarily* or *directly*.

"How, then, are we to explain the Sūṭra which distinctly says—'When the property of the Counter-instance is admitted to be present in the Example cited by himself, *it is a case of Violating the Proposition*'?"

The term '*ḍriṣṭānṭa*' is to be taken in its literal sense of 'established,' 'demonstrated'; so that the term '*svadriṣṭānṭē*'

means 'in one's own thesis'; similarly the term '*praṭidrisṭānta*' means the 'counter-thesis.' Thus the meaning of the Sūṭra comes to be—'When one admits the presence of the property of the counter-thesis in his own thesis'; *e. g.*, the original thesis being 'Sound must be non-eternal, because it is perceptible by the Senses', the Opponent urges against it the case of 'Community', and then the First Party says—'if Community, which is perceptible by the Senses, is eternal, then *Sound* also may be eternal' [and here the property 'Eternality,' which has been urged by the Opponent in the counter-thesis, has been admitted by the First Party in his own thesis];—in this way does this become a case of 'Violating the Proposition'; for the former proposition set up by the man was 'Sound is *non-eternal*', and when faced with the case of 'Community,' which shows that his premiss is not true and the reasoning is inconclusive, he says 'Sound is *eternal*'; and since in doing so he gives up a fact that had been definitely known by him to be true, and thereby shows his misapprehension of things, it becomes a 'case of defeat', 'Clincher.'

"But it is only the accepting of a possible contingency." If you mean by this that—"in the latter proposition also the man does not quite affirm the Eternality of Sound; all that he does is to admit a possible contingency—'if, as you urge, Community, which is perceptible by the senses, is eternal, then *Sound also may be so*,'"—this does not change the situation; as even so the Clincher becomes applicable; since, instead of defending his thesis against the charge of inconclusiveness, he goes and admits the possibility (of the Opponent's contention); thus he becomes 'defeated.'

Vār. P. 560.

Others have argued that what is urged in the 'Violating of the Proposition' is already included under the *Fallacy* (of Inconclusiveness) attaching to the Probans, hence it need not be regarded as a *Clincher*. They contend as follows:—"It is

not right to regard this as a *Clincher*, as it is found included under *Fallacious Reason*; since what the man is 'defeated' by is the fact of his Probans' because it is perceptible by the senses' being inconclusive."

This is not right; because what brings about his defeat is the fact of his not answering the charge of 'inconclusiveness' and thus showing his ignorance.* That this is so is shown by the fact that if he does answer that charge of 'inconclusiveness', he is not defeated. Hence mere 'inconclusiveness' does not constitute a Clincher or ground of defeat.

Sūtra (3).

THE SUBJECT OF THE (ORIGINAL) PROPOSITION HAVING BEEN DENIED, IF THE FIRST PARTY FINDS A DIVERSITY IN THE PROPERTIES (OF THE EXAMPLE AND THE COUNTER-INSTANCE), AND PUTS IT FORWARD WITH A VIEW TO ESTABLISH THE FORMER PROPOSITION,—THIS IS (2) 'SHIFTING THE PROPOSITION.' (Sū. 3.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (3).

[P. 258, L. 11 to P. 259, L. 2.]

The '*subject of the original Proposition*' is—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceptible by the Senses, like the Jar'; this Proposition having been propounded (by the First Party) there comes its 'denial' (by the Second Party), which consists in showing, by means of a counter-instance, that the Probans (of the original Proposition) is not truly concomitant (with the Probandum),—'Community, which is perceptible by the senses, being *eternal*';—and *the subject of the original Proposition being thus denied*, the First Party finds, a '*diversity in the properties of the Example and the Counter-instance*', —*i. e.*, he finds that while both (Jar and Community) have a certain property, *being perceptible by the senses*, in common, there are others in which they differ; *e. g.*, Community is perceptible by the senses and *all-pervading*, while the Jar is perceptible by the senses and *not-all-pervading*; and perceiving this diversity of properties he puts it forward with a view to establish his former Proposition,—how?—[in this way]—'just as the Jar is *not-all-pervading*, so is Sound

* The right reading is दोषापरिहारेणविप्रति.........परिहारं कुर्वाणोऽयं न निगृह्यते

also *not-all-pervading*, and hence like the Jar it should be *non-eternal* also';—now here the former Proposition was 'Sound is non-eternal', and 'Sound is not-all-pervading' is a totally different Proposition,—this is thus an instance of 'Shifting the Proposition'.

"In what way does this become a *Ground of Defeat*, a Clincher?"

Well, as a matter of fact, one Proposition does not prove another Proposition; what prove a Proposition are the Probans and the Example; hence the putting forward (as proof) of what cannot prove the Proposition is entirely Futile; and being futile, it becomes a 'Ground of Defeat.' *

Vārṭika on Sū. (3).

[P. 560, L. 10 to L. 17.]

The example is the same as before. What the man does is to set up on the basis of the diversity of properties, consisting in 'being all-pervading' and 'being not-all-pervading'; another Proposition, in the form,—'Sound is not-all-pervading.'

"The original Proposition was—'Sound is non-eternal' and this being attacked† (by the Opponent) on the basis of 'Community, which is perceptible by the senses,—the 'First Party puts forward another Proposition in the form 'Sound, being not-all-pervading, must be non-eternal.' In what way does this become a 'ground of Defeat?'"

It becomes a 'ground of defeat' by reason of the man not knowing the real character of the Probans; without knowing

---

* Though when the First Party puts forward the fact of Sound being *not-all-pervading*, the *idea* in his mind is that, after having brought this home to the other party, he would add that as a qualifying clause to his original premiss—stating it in the form 'because Sound, *while being not-all-pervading*, is perceptible by the senses (it must be non-eternal)';—yet until he actually does so, his position is clearly subject to the said Clincher.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

† The Benares Edition reads प्रतिहता. We have adopted the reading and explanation of the Tāṭparya which reads प्रतिहत: and takes it as qualifying वादी, understood, which has for its verb करोति also understood.

the real character of the probans, the man puts up the Proposition—'being not-all-pervading, Sound must be non-eternal.' And one Proposition cannot prove another proposition;—hence on account of the man not knowing and putting forward the real Probans, this becomes a case of 'shifting the Proposition'; and this becomes a 'Ground of Defeat' either by reason of 'misapprehension' or by that of 'non-apprehension.'

Sūṭra (4).

WHEN THERE IS CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE PROPOSITION AND THE PROBANS, IT IS (3) 'CONTRADICTION OF THE PROPOSITION.' (Sū. 6.)

Bhāṣya Sū. on (4).

[P. 259, L. 4 to L. 8.]

The Proposition is stated in the form,—'Substance must be something different from Quality', and the Statement of the Probans is in the form—'because no objects are ever perceived, except Colour &c.';— and there is a contradiction (conflict) between these, Proposition and Statement of the Probans.—How?—If Substance is something different from Quality, then it is not possible that nothing except Colour &c. should be perceived—while if nothing except Colour &c., is perceived, then it is not possible that Substance should be something different from Quality; thus there is a conflict between the two statements—(a) 'Substance must be different from Quality' and (b) 'Nothing except Colour &c. is perceived'; i.e., the two are mutually Nugatory, and are impossible.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (4).

[P. 506, L. 19 to P. 561, L. 12.]

(a) When the Proposition is contradicted by the Statement of the Probans, and (b) the latter by the former,—it is a

---

* The Boḍhasiḍḍhi remarks that the contradiction between the 'Proposition' and the 'Statement of the Probans' has been mentioned only by way of illustration; as a matter of fact, there is contradiction of the Proposition whenever there is any inconsistency between any two factors of reasoning, and also when the Proposition is inconsistent with a well-ascertained fact.

case of 'Contradiction of the Proposition.' E. g., (a) 'Substance is different from Quality, because it is not perceived as different from it.'*

The same explanation applies also to the 'contradiction by the Proposition'—i.e., the case where the words of the Proposition itself are self-contradictory; e.g. the proposition 'the female ascetic is with child.'

It also applies to 'Contradiction by the Statement of the Probans',—where the Proposition is contradicted by the Statement of the Probans (the latter being more in keeping with actual experience); *e.g.*, 'all things are diverse [*i.e.* there is no unity] because positive terms are always applied to an aggregate of things;' [to say that there is no *unity* is contradicted by the statement that terms are applied to an aggregate, which must be *one*.]

A similar explanation is applicable also to (1) the Contradiction of the Proposition† by the Example [e.g. 'Sound is non-eternal because it is knowable, like *Akāsha*],—(2) to the Contradiction of the Statement of the Probans by the Example &c. (E.g. 'Sound is eternal, because it is perceptible by the Senses, like the Diad',)—and (3) also to the contradiction of the Proposition and the Statement of the Probans by well-known facts.

Similarly, when the Opponent urges (against the First Party) the fallacy of 'inconclusiveness'; on the basis of something that is possible only under the theory of the First Party, he incurs the Clincher of 'Contradiction.' That is, when the Opponent (the Bauḍḍha who does not admit of any class or class-character) tries to show the inconclusiveness

*This is an instance of the Proposition contradicting the Statement of the Probans, because the former is the stronger of the two, being more in keeping with actual experience.

†The Ṭāṭparya reads मतिज्ञाया.

of the Probans by citing the case of the *class-character* 'Cow,' which is possible only under the theory of his disputant,—such an answer should be regarded as 'Contradictory.' 'Contradictory' also is the Probans when it is one that is put forward without taking into account one's own main doctrine; i.e., when a man puts forward a Probans without regard to his main doctrine;—e.g., the First Party having put forward his proposition in the form, 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceptible by the Senses', if the Opponent (Bauddha) sets up his opposition on the basis of the eternality of the class-character 'Cow', which is possible only if there is an aggregate consisting of several individuals [and is as such incompatible with the Opponent's main doctrine that there is no 'aggregate' and there is nothing 'eternal']—this becomes 'contradictory.' It is only when the counter-instance urged is such as is compatible with the doctrines of both parties that it can be a case of real 'Inconclusiveness;' it is only when some such thing is found as is admitted by both parties—and inconclusiveness is urged on the basis of that thing,—that the opposition can be right, and not 'contradictory.'

"How is it that the *citing of the Wrong Example* has not been mentioned among *Clinchers*?"

The reason for this lies in the fact that *Wrong Examples* are always preceded by (and based upon) Fallacious Probans and as such should be regarded as mentioned by the mention of these latter.*

Sūtra (5).

THE ORIGINAL THESIS HAVING BEEN OPPOSED, IF WHAT WAS FORMERLY AFFIRMED HAPPENS TO BE RETRACTED,—IT IS (4) 'RENOUNCING THE PROPOSITION.' (Sū. 5).

*The Example forms a part of the Probans, since the Probans not supported by the Examples is not convincing. Hence if the Example is wrong, the Probans becomes invalidated.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (5).

[P. 259, Ll. 10—3.]

The original thesis having been put forward in the form, 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceptible by the senses,' the other party says—"Community is perceptible by the senses and is yet eternal, and similarly Sound also, which is perceptible by the senses, may be eternal";—and the original thesis being thus opposed, if the First Party happens, to say—'Who says that Sound is *non-eternal*?' This retraction of what had been affirmed in the Proposition is what is called 'Renouncing the Proposition.'*

Vārṭika on Sū. (5).

[P. 561, L. 14 to L. 17.]

When one abandons what he had before affirmed,—on its being opposed—it should be regarded as a case of 'Renouncing the Proposition.' The Example is as that shown before. The Probans having been shown to be inconclusive, on the basis of 'Community,' the First Party might say—'Who says that Sound is non-eternal?' This also shows that the man is ignorant of the strength of his own reason, and thus it is a 'ground of defeat' based upon 'mis-apprehension.'

Sūṭra (6).

THE PROBANS IN THE UNQUALIFIED FORM HAVING BEEN OPPOSED, IF THE FIRST PARTY DESIRES TO QUALIFY IT, IT IS A CASE OF (5) 'SHIFTING THE PROBANS.'—(Sū. 6).

*The Bauḍḍha Logician Ḍharmakīrti has objected to this Clincher of 'Renouncing the Proposition,' on the ground that the First Party having been already 'defeated' by the pointing out of the inconclusiveness of his Probans, there can be no need for any further 'ground of defeat.' The *Ṭāṭparya* has answered this by saying that, as soon as the person finds that unless he renounces his proposition he shall be faced with the Fallacy of Inconclusiveness; hence with a view to save himself from that he retracts the Proposition; so that this Retraction comes in before the charge of Inconclusiveness is brought home to him, and until this is brought home to him, he cannot be 'defeated.'

Bhāṣya on Sū. (6).

[P. 259, 16 to P. 260, L. 10.]

Example:—The Proposition is set up in the form, 'everything that is manifested has a single origin';—why?—'*because products emanating from a single origin have a definite magnitude*,—in the Cup and other products of Clay we find a definite magnitude, the product being of the same magnitude as the composition of the original substance—and such magnitude is found in every product;—and every manifested thing is found to have a definite magnitude;—hence from the fact that every product emanating from a single origin has a definite magnitude, we conclude that everything that is manifested emanates from a single origin.' * Against this argument of the First Party, the following Opposition is set up with a view to show that the Probans is not invariably concomitant with the Probandum:—

'As a matter of fact, magnitude is found present in products emanating from the same origin, as also in those emanating from several origins." This opposition having been put forward, the First Party says—' [My reasoning would then be] 'because a definite magnitude is found in the Cup and other products, *in all which there subsists the same original substance*;—every manifested thing, *while having subsisting in it Pleasure, Pain and Delusion* (*the constituent attributes of Primordial Matter*), is found to have definite magnitude †;—and from this it follows that no other original substance being found subsisting in all manifested things, they must all have a single origin (in the form of Primordial Matter).'

Now here it is found that in the first instance the First Party stated the Probans in an unqualified form ['because they have a definite magnitude,'],—and when this was objected to—he added a qualification to it [in the form 'while having the same original substance subsisting in them']; and this thus becomes a case of 'Shifting the Probans.'

[The reason why this is a 'ground for defeat,' is as follows]—The second (qualified) probans having been put forward, if the party mentions an Example in corroboration

* The right reading, as found in B.C. and D. is व्यक्तमिदमेकप्रकृतीति

† The right reading is परिमितं as read by *Tātparya*, and in C. and D.

of what is stated in the Probans, then that *manifested thing*, which is cited as 'Example' (which, as example, cannot be included in the Proposition) ceases to be the emanation from a single origin, because, by its very nature (of Example), it must be the emanation from some other origin* ;—if, on the other hand, no Example is cited, then the Probans, not having its truth corroborated by a suitable Example, cannot prove the desired conclusion; so that the Probans turning out to be futile, the 'ground of defeat' remains in force.

Vārṭika on Sū. (6).

[P. 562, Ll. 1—2.]

The Example is given in the *Bhāṣya*. By setting up another Probans, the first Party shows the weakness of the Probans put forward before;—this is what makes this a 'Ground of Defeat.' If the former Probans is efficient, then *the setting* up of another is absolutely useless.

End of Section (1).

Section (2).

[Sūṭras 7—10.]

Dealing with the four Clinchers—(6), (7), (8) *and* (9)—*which consist in the non-apprehension of what is needed for the desired purpose.*

Sūṭra (7).

THE PUTTING FORWARD OF STATEMENTS BEARING NO CONNECTION WITH THE PURPOSE IN HAND CONSTITUTES (6) 'IRRELEVANCY.' (Sū. 7).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (7).

[P 260, L. 12 to L. 18.]

The thesis and counter-thesis having been set up in the manner described above, the 'purpose in hand' being the

* The proposition is in the form—'all manifested things are &c.'; if the example is not included in this 'all,' then what is predicated of the 'all' will not be true of the Example; if the Example is also included in it, then no Example can be possible.

proving of the Probandum by a proper Probans,—the First Party might make the following statement:—'That Sound is eternal is proved by the Probans, *Hēṭu, because it is intangible*' [having said so far he finds that his Probans is not valid, hence he goes on]—'the term *heṭu* is a verbal noun derived from the root *hi* and affix *ṭun*,—a term is either a *Noun* or a *Verb*, or a *Preposition*, or Indeclinable Particle;—the *noun* is that word which has its form qualified by the fact of the thing denoted by it having a distinct action,—the verb is either (a) an aggregate of the action and the active agencies, or (b) that which denotes the presence in the active agent, of a certain action qualified by a definite time and number,* or (c) that which is simply expressed by the root and is qualified by a particular time,—the Indeclinables are those that, in actual usage, have no denotation entirely apart from what is expressed by the noun or the verb,—the Prepositions are used as prefixes and serve to qualify the action denoted by the Verb';—and so forth, [all which has nothing to do with the proving of his Proposition]; and this constitutes 'Irrelevancy.'

Vārṭika on Sū. (7).

[P. 562, LL. 4-5.]

The Example is given in the *Bhāṣya*. This is a 'Ground of Defeat,' because what is put forward has no connection with the Proposition affirmed; what is relevant is only that which has been affirmed; all else is *Irrelevant.*

Sūṭra (8).

THAT WHICH IS LIKE THE MERE REPEATING OF THE LETTERS OF THE ALPHABET IS (7) 'MEANINGLESS JARGON' (Sū. 8).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (8).

[P. 261, Ll. 2-4.]

E. g., 'Sound is eternal, because *ka-cha-ṭa-ṭa-pa* are *ja-ba-ga-da-ḍa-sha*† like *jha-bha-ñ-gha-dha-ḍha-ṣa*';—such state-

* The right reading in all Mss. is कारकसंख्याविशिष्ट

† The right reading in supplied by B and D—कचटतपानां जबगडदशत्वात्

ments are absolutely meaningless. Since the mere letters of the alphabet can have no denotation, they cannot express anything; hence it is the mere letters that are repeated in a certain order *.

Vārṭika on Sū. (8).

[P. 562, Ll. 7-9.]

The example is cited in the *Bhāṣya*. This proves the man's ignorance, since he does not put forward what could prove his proposition; the man that puts forward such arguments is ignorant of what he has got to prove and what can prove it,—nor does he put forward (rightly) what he has to prove and what can prove it; hence this constitutes a 'Ground of Defeat.'

Sūtra (9).

IF THE ASSERTION MADE IS SUCH THAT, THOUGH STATED THREE TIMES, IT FAILS TO BE UNDERSTOOD BY THE AUDIENCE AND THE SECOND PARTY, IT IS A CASE OF (8) 'UN-INTELLIGIBILITY.'—(Sū. 8.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (9).

[P. 261, Ll. 7-9.]

If the assertion is made and is not understood by the audience and the Second Party, even though stated three times,—and this happens when the assertion consists of words with double meanings, or of such words as are not met with in ordinary usage, or when the words are uttered too hurriedly and so forth;—this constitutes 'Unintelligibility'; since the man makes use of unintelligible expressions intentionally, with a view to cover the weakness of his reasonings,—this constitutes a 'Ground of Defeat.'

---

* No such argument is found in actual usage. The *Tātparya* points out that we have an example of this when the Ḍrāvida puts forward his argument, for the convincing of an Arya, in his own Vernacular, which conveys no idea to the latter, who is ignorant of the Dravidian tongue; and for whom the words of that language are only so many letter-sounds.

Vartika on Sū. (9).

[P. 562, Ll. 12-13.]

The example is cited in the *Bhāṣya*. This is a 'Ground of Defeat', since it indicates the weakness of the speaker,—this weakness being a form of 'ignorance.'

Sūṭra (10).

IN A CASE WHERE, THERE BEING NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THE EXPRESSIONS FOLLOWING ONE ANOTHER, THEY ARE FOUND TO AFFORD NO CONNECTED MEANING, IT IS A CASE OF (9) 'INCOHERENCE.' (Sū. 10).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (10).

[P. 261, L. 11 to L. 14.]

In a case where, either among several words or several sentences, there is no possibility of proper sequence and connection,—and hence the whole is found to be disconnected,—since there is no meaning obtained from the words or sentences taken collectively, it is a case of 'Incoherence.' *E.g.* (*a*) 'Ten pomegranates, six cakes' (where there is no connection between the two sentences); (*b*) 'Cup—goatskin—flesh—lump—deer-skin*—of the Virgin—to be drunk—her father—devoid of character' † Where the words have no connection among themselves.

Vārṭikā on Sū. (10).

[P. 562, L. 15 to P. 563, L. 3.]

E.g., such sentences as 'ten pomegranates', etc.

"There is no difference between 'Meaningless' and 'Incoherent.'" If you mean by this that—"The *Incoherent* does not differ from the *Meaningless Jargon*, because in the latter, as in the former, the meaning is not grasped,"—then our answer is that the two do differ between themselves;—how?—In the case of 'Meaningless Jargon' we have mere letters, while

Vār. P. 563.

* C and B and D read रौरवम्

† C and D read अप्रतिशीत

in the 'Incoherent' we have unconnected *words.*—"In what way is this a Ground of Defeat?" No idea of anything can be derived except from a sentence (in which the words are connected with one another); and hence when the Party propounds an Incoherent argument, it shows that he does not know the character of the true Probans; and hence it becomes a 'Ground of Defeat.'

End of Section (2).

Section (3).

[*Sūṭras* 11—13.]

Dealing with the (10), (11) and (12) *Clinchers—which consist in the wrong presentment of one's case.*

Sūṭra (11).

WHEN THE FACTORS OF REASONING ARE STATED IN THE REVERSED ORDER, IT IS A CASE OF (10) 'INCONSEQUENTIALITY.' (Sū. 11).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (11).

[P. 261, Ll. 16—17.]

Among the several Factors of Reasoning, Proposition and the rest, there is a definite natural order, in which they are stated,—which is based upon the nature of what is expressed by each of them; and when a statement is made in which this natural order is reversed,—it becomes a case of that 'Ground of Defeat,' which is called 'Inconsequentiality;' which means that what is expressed by the several Factors is not found to form a connected whole.

Vārṭika or Sū. (11).

[P. 563, L. 5 to L. 20.]

When the Factors of Reasoning are stated in the reversed order, it is a 'Ground of Defeat.'

Some people assert that this cannot be a 'Ground of Defeat,' as even so the proposition is proved. These people

argue as follows :—" Inconsequentiality cannot be a Ground of Defeat ; (*a*) as even so the Proposition is proved ; (*b*) because there is no fixed convention on the matter ; we do not admit of any fixed convention as to the order in which the Factors should be stated ;—(*c*) and because of actual usage ; as a matter of fact, reversing of the order of the Factors is met with in all treatises. Under the circumstances, whose convention is it (that fixes the order in question) ? "

(*a*) As regards * the first argument—" Even so the Proposition is proved, "—this might be analogous to the using of words in their incorrect forms : Even when such corrupt forms of words as '*gāvī*' and the like are used in the sense of the 'Bull,' they do afford the idea of the *animal with the hump* ; and yet it is not useless to lay down the rule that the correct form of the word is '*go*' ; because what happens in the said case is that the corrupt form '*gāvī*' brings to the mind the correct form of the word '*go*,' which latter provides the idea of the Bull with the hump ; in the same manner, when the Factors are stated in a wrong order, they bring to our mind the Statement in the natural order, and this latter brings the idea of what is expressed by it [It is for this reason that the Proposition is found to be proved even when the Factors are stated in the wrong order]. " How does this come about ? " That there is a natural order of things, such as the *objective* is taken up first, then the *instrument*—is shown by several instances in ordinary experience; *e. g.* the *clay-lump* (is taken up first, then the *wheel* and other instruments needed in the making of the Jar out of the clay) [similarly in the case in question, the Proposition, which is the *objective*, should be stated first, then the 'instruments' consisting of the Probans, the Example, and so forth].

*यत्तावत् is the right reading.

(b) As regards the second argument—" we do not admit of any convention in the matter, "—our answer is that there is no convention in the matter; it is the mere natural order of things (spoken of by the several Factors); and when a person lays stress upon this natural order of things, he does not deserve to be censured.

(c) As regards the third argument—" because of actual usage, "—this is has no force; as it shows that the Objector does not understand what actually forms the 'Ground of Defeat.' [It is true that in Scientific treatises, the Factors of Reasoning are not always stated in their natural order; but] this is due to the fact that these treatises are written for the purpose of providing a comprehensive account of things [so that the writers have their eye on terseness,]; but when one has to explain or expound what has been once stated in the comprehensive (terse) form, he always does it by stating the argument in a form in which the Factors of Reasoning—Proposition and the rest—are stated in their natural order.*

Sūtra (12).

THAT WHICH IS WANTING IN ANY ONE OF THE FACTORS OF REASONING IS (1) THE 'INCOMPLETE.'—(Sū. (12).

Bhāṣya on Su. (12).

[P. 262, Ll. 1-2.]

When the statement is wanting in any one of the Factors of Reasoning—Proposition and the rest—it is a case of the

*Such terse statement of argument, though permissible in scientific treatises, is not permissible in discussion, where every step in the reasoning should be stated clearly. It is in this connection that the *Tātparya* has quoted (apparently from a Scientific Treatise), the passage शून्यासदिवासद्भूतवदिव ; which contains in a very condensed form, two arguments in favour of Idealism: (1) The Idealist says that he can prove the non-existence of all things except Idea, in the same manner as the Nihilist (शून्यवत्) proves the non-existence of all things; and (2) he can prove the existence of the Idea in the same manner as the Realist (सद्भूतवत्) proves the existence of *all things*.

'Ground of Defeat' called 'Incompleteness'; for in the absence of a complete statement of the reasoning, the desired conclusion cannot be established.

Vārṭika on Su. (12).

[P. 564, L. 2 to L. 12.]

That statement in which one of the Factors—Proposition and the rest—is wanting, is to be regarded as 'incomplete'.

"In what way does this become a 'Ground of Defeat'?"

It becomes so by reason of the fact that in the absence of the well-equipped reasoning, the conclusion is not proved.

Some people argue that there can be no such 'Ground of Defeat' as 'wanting in the Proposition (the First Factor).'

But this is not right; these people should be met with the following alternative questions in regard to such statements as do not state the Proposition:—If a man propounds a statement without the Proposition,—is he, or is he not, *defeated*? If he is, which 'Ground of Defeat' is there? For none of the other Factors is wanting; nor are there any defects of the Probans etc.; and yet the man is 'defeated'; and the only 'Ground of Defeat' possible is that his statement is 'wanting in the Proposition'.—If, on the other hand, he is not *defeated*—this would mean that even an incomplete argument proves the conclusion; that is, the Result is accomplished without the Means. If you say that—"The Proposition consists in the accepting of a certain doctrine",—this also we do not understand. As a matter of fact, 'Proposition' consists in the mentioning of the object (to be proved), while 'the acceptance of a doctrine' consists in the accepting of a certain fact which has been fully understood in all its general and special aspects.

Sūṭra (13).

THAT WHICH CONTAINS SUPERFLUOUS 'PROBANS' AND 'EXAMPLE' IS THE (12) 'REDUNDANT'—(Su. 13).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (13).

[P. 262, Ll. 4-5.]

One alone being sufficient for the purpose in view, (when more than one Probans or Example are put forward), one or the other must be superfluous. This, however, is to be regarded as a 'Ground of Defeat' only when there is a restriction (placed upon the speaker, in regard to stating *only* what is actually necessary for the proving of his proposition).

Vārṭika on Su. (13).

[P. 564, L. 14 to P. 565, L. 2.]

That statement in which there are two 'probans' or two 'examples' is redundant; and it constitutes 'Redundance' as a 'Ground of Defeat.'

"This is not a Ground of Defeat, because it serves to add further strength"—say some people. These people argue as follows:—"This cannot be a Ground of Defeat, as it serves to strengthen the reasoning; we find that when several means of knowledge are available they bring about a strengthened (confirmed) knowledge of the thing; *e.g.*, when *smoke* and *light* both help us to obtain the cognition of the presence of Fire."

This is not right; as the exact meaning of 'strengthening' is not explained; when you assert that several means of knowledge strengthen the knowledge, you do not explain what is meant by 'strengthening'—you do not explain what precisely you mean by saying that 'it serves to strengthen'?

"The *strength* of the cognition consists in *easier conviction*."

This also remains as before; what is meant by 'easier'? If what you mean is that—"both (probans) help to bring about the necessary cognition",—it is true that both help to bring about the cognition; but when cognition has already been brought about by means of one, the mention of the second is entirely useless; it being like the

bringing in of another light when the object has already been illumined by one.

Further, there would be an infinite series (of Probans and Examples) if more than one were permitted; for in that case one could go on adding proof after proof, even after the desired conclusion had been already established.

END OF SECTION (3).

Section (4).

[*Sūṭras* 14-15.]

Dealing with the Clincher (13) *Repetition.*

Sūṭra (14).

THE RE-STATEMENT OF WORDS AND IDEAS CONSTITUTES 'REPETITION'—EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF REPRODUCTION. (SU. 14.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (14).

[P. 262, L. 1 to L. 10.]

Except in the case of Reproduction, (*a*) Repetition' of Words and (*b*) Repetition of Ideas (constitute 'grounds of defeat') e.g. (*a*) 'Sound is eternal, Sound is eternal,' here we have 'repetition of words'; and (*b*) 'Sound is *non-eternal*, Intonation is *liable to destruction*', here we have the 'repetition of the 'Idea' (of Sound being not everlasting). In the case of Reproduction, it is not 'Repetition' (a Ground of Defeat); because in that case the re-statement serves an additional purpose; when for instance, 'the re-statement of the Proposition on the basis of the Statement of the the Probans constitutes the Final Conclusion' (Sū. 1-1-39).

Vārtika on Sū. (14).

[P. 565, Ll. 4-5.]

(*a*) We have 'Repetition of Words' in the statement 'Sound is non-eternal—Sound is non-eternal'; and (*b*) we have 'Repetition of Idea' in the statement 'Sound is non-eternal—Intonation is liable to destruction.'

In the case of Reproduction, it is not 'Repetition' because in that case the re-statement serves an additional purpose.

Some people hold that 'Repetition' is not a 'Ground of Defeat,' because there is no harm. These people argue thus:—"'Repetition is not a Ground of Defeat, because there is no harm done by it; when the man repeats things there is no harm done to the process of investigation. In fact the use of words is for the purpose of bringing conviction to other persons; and when statements are repeated, the ear comprehends the meaning more easily; so that being a means of bringing about conviction, repetition cannot be a 'Ground of Defeat.'"

It is true that it brings conviction to other persons; but in expressing what has already been expressed, there is an element of superfluity, and by reason of this superfluity it becomes a Ground of Defeat; as it shows that the man does not fully understand the real nature of the means that he has toadopt for the accomplishment of his purpose (of proving the Conclusion). The man is neither the pupil nor the teacher; hence there is no point in expressing the same idea again and again.

Sūtra (15).

THE ACTUAL STATEMENT BY MEANS OF DIRECTLY EXPRESSIVE WORDS OF WHAT IS ALREADY IMPLIED—

Bhāṣya on Sū. (15).

[P. 262, L. 12 to L. 15.]

is Repetition,*—this term coming in from the preceding Sūtra.

Example [of this second form of Repetition]—Having asserted that 'Sound is non-eternal, because it has the character of being produced,' if the man goes on to add 'only that which does not have the character of being produced can be eternal,' which words are expressive of the idea

* The Nyāyasūchīnibandha, the Tāṭparya and Sū. Ms. D. makes 'पुनरुक्तम्' part of the Sūṭra 15, itself, but this is not in keeping with the Bhāṣya.

that is already got by 'implication'—this should be regarded as 'Repetition'; because words are used only for the purpose of conveying a meaning, and when this has already been done by implication [the actual using of words to the same effect is superfluous].

Vārtika on Sū. (15).

[P. 565, L. 14.]

This is a 'Ground of Defeat' for the same reasons as the former kind of 'Repetition.

End of Section (4).

Section (5).

[Sūtras 16-19.]

Dealing with the four Clinchers—(14), (15), (16) and (17)—which denote incompatibility with the right method of Answer.

Sūtra (16).

IF THE FIRST PARTY FAILS TO RE-STATE WHAT HAS BEEN STATED (BY THE SECOND PARTY) THREE TIMES, AND DULY UNDERSTOOD BY THE AUDIENCE, IT IS A CASE OF (14) 'NON-REPRODUCTION.' (Sū. 16).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (16).

[P. 262, Ll. 18-20.]

When the meaning of the sentence has been duly understood by the audience, and it has been stated by the Opponent three times,—if the First Party fails to re-state it, it is a 'Ground of Defeat' named 'Non-reproduction.' Because, unless he re-states the position of the Opponent, on the basis of what would he put forward his arguments against that position?*

Vartika on Sū. (16).

[P. 567, L. 17 to P. 566, L. 8.]

The point is clear in the *Bhaṣya*.

[The Bauddha raises an objection]—"Since the business of the First Party is to answer arguments, this cannot be a

---

*Though the man does not understand it, he does not say so;—if he did, it would be a case of 'Incomprehension.' Nor does he desist from the discussion—if he did, it would be a case of 'Evasion.'—*Bodhasiddhi.*

'Ground of Defeat.' As a matter of fact, the business of the First Party consists in answering arguments; whether he is bewildered or not can be determined only by the efficiency or otherwise of the answer he propounds;—what then would be the use of his re-stating what the Opponent has said?

Var. P. 566. It may be that the man is perfectly able to answer the arguments, and not able to reproduce them; and certainly he does not, on that account, deserve to be regarded as defeated. In fact when the man, having propounded his thesis, is unable to maintain it (in debate), all that we can say is that he is inefficient (and not sufficiently clever) [and it does not prove that his view is wrong]*."

There is no force in this; it shows that the Objector does not understand what the exact object of the Answer is. In fact if the man does not *re-state* the Opponent's arguments, his answer becomes *objectless*. If the man does offer the right answer, why does he not re-state the arguments he traverses? In fact it is a contradiction in terms to say that—'the man does *not re-state* the arguments, and yet he *answers* them.' Further, the objection is baseless, as we do not assert (what the objector denies); we do not lay it down as a rule that the man must first re-state the arguments he traverses and then answer them; in fact the arguments may be answered in any way possible;—what we do mean however is that unless the man re-produces the Opponent's arguments, his answer in the absence of its right objective, would be an improper one; it is for this reason that *reproduction* is thought necessary, and 'non-reproduction' forms a 'Ground of Defeat.'

---

*If a man propounds a thesis, but is unable to maintain it in debate, though he is able to supply suitable answers to the Opponent's strictures,—all that this can show is that the man is not strong enough to carry on debate in the right form, which consists in re-stating the Opponent's arguments and then confuting them; it does not prove that the view propounded by the man was *wrong*, so that mere 'non-reproduction' should not be regarded as a Ground of Defeat'.—*Tātparya.*

Sutra (17).

WHEN THE STATEMENT IS NOT COMPREHENDED, IT IS A CASE OF '(15) INCOMPREHENSION'—(Sū. 17.)

Bhasya on Sū. (17).

[P. 262, Ll. 21-22.]

When the statement (of the Opponent) has been understood by the Audience, and has been repeated, by the Opponent, three times, if the First Party still fails to comprehend it, this is the 'Ground of Defeat' named 'Incomprehension.' Without understanding what the Opponent has said, whose refutation would be set forth?

Vartika on Sū. (21).

[P. 566, L. 10.]

The Bhāṣya is quite clear. This become a 'Ground of Defeat' by reason of *non-apprehension*.

Sutra (18).

IT IS (16) 'EMBARASSMENT' WHEN THE PARTY DOES NOT KNOW THE ANSWER. (Sū. 18).

Bhasya on Sū. (18).

[P. 263, Ll. 2-3.]

The 'answer' consists in the confutation of the Opponent's view*; when the Party does not know this, he is 'Defeated.''

Vartika on Sū. (18).

[P. 566, Ll. 12-18.]

When the Party proceeds to recite stray verses, and shows that he pays no attention to what the Opponent has said, and that he does not know what to say in answer to him—this is the 'Ground of Defeat' named 'Embarassment'; it shows that the man is confused.

Sutra (19).

WHEN THE PARTY BREAKS OFF THE DISCUSSION UNDER THE PRETEXT OF BUSINESS, IT IS A CASE OF (17) 'EVASION.' Sū. (19).

* पक्षप्रतिषेध : is the right reading as in C. and D.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (19).

[P. 263, Ll. 4-6.]

When the Party puts forward the pretext of having to do something else, and breaks off the discussion, saying—'I have got to do such and such a work, I shall resume the discussion after having finished that work,'—this the 'Ground of Defeat' named 'Evasion.' In such a case, since every discussion ends with a single 'Clincher,' the man, by breaking off in the said manner, concludes the discussion into which he had entered, and turns the discussion taken up, after the lapse of some time, into a new discussion.

Vārṭika on Sū. (19).

[P. 566, L. 15 to L. 18.]

When the man sets up the pretext of having some business to perform, and breaks off the discussion,—it should be regarded as 'Evasion.' E.g. the man may say—'I have eaten a large quantity of *Rasālā*, flakes of phlegm are obstructing my throat,' and so forth.

"Why should this be regarded as a 'Ground of Defeat'?"

Because such assertions are made for the purpose of concealing one's ignorance; so that by avoiding further discussion the man clearly shows his ignorance.

End of Section (5).

Section (6).

[Sūṭras 20—22.]

Dealing with the three Clinchers—(18), (19) *and* (20)—*which bear upon flaws in the Statements.*

Sūṭra (20).

IF THE PARTY ADMITS THE FLAW IN HIS OWN THESIS, AND THEN URGES THE SAME IN THAT OF THE OPPONENT,—THIS IS A CASE OF (18) 'CONFESSING THE CONTRARY OPINION.'—Sū. (20).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (20).

[P. 263, L. 9 to L. 11.]

When the Party admits that defect in his thesis which has been urged against it by the Opponent,—and without trying to show that his statement is free from that defect, he simply says—'the same defect is found in your statement also,'—he admits the defect in his own thesis, and then tries to apply the same to that of the Opponent; and in doing this he confesses the opinion of the other party regarding his own thesis, and as such becomes subject to the 'ground of defeat' called 'Confessing the Contrary Opinion.'

Vārṭika on Sū. (20).

[P. 567, L. 1 to L. 11.]

When the Party, without trying to remove the charge from his own statement, simply says—'the same defect is present in your statement also,'—this constitutes 'confessing the contrary opinion;' *i.e.*, he admits, against his own thesis, what has been urged by the other party.

Example.—Being charged as—'you are a thief, because you are a man'—the man simply says—'then you also are the same.' Here he admits the defect in himself and then urges it against the other party; and as such he is to be regarded as 'defeated.' The man who does not admit the charge would say in reply—'*Being a man* cannot be a reason for *being a thief*; what makes one a thief is the connection with (possession of) something belonging to another person, and not given away by him.' And since in the former case the man shows that he does not know this right answer, he becomes 'defeated.'

"Since the man urges an undesirable contingency arising out of the Opponent's statement, this cannot be a 'Ground of Defeat'"—so argue some people. These persons argue as follows:—"This cannot be a 'Ground of Defeat,' because the man urges an undesirable contingency (against the

Opponent). As a matter of fact, he does not continue to admit the presence of the said flaw in his own statement, all that he does is to point out that the same contingency arises out of the Opponent's statement—'if *being a man* is a ground for *being a thief*, then, since you also are a man, you also are a thief.'"

This however is not right, for the very reason that you put forward. It is just because he urges an *undesirable contingency*, when he ought to have given an *answer*, that it is clear that he is *ignorant* of the right answer, and is, on that account, 'defeated.'

Sūṭra (21).

WHEN ONE PARTY HAS RENDERED HIMSELF SUBJECT TO A 'CLINCHER,' IF THE OTHER PARTY FAILS TO BRING IT HOME TO HIM (BY DIRECTLY CHARGING HIM WITH IT),—THE LATTER HIMSELF BECOMES SUBJECT TO THE CLINCHER OF (19) 'OVERLOOKING THE CENSURABLE.'—(Sū. 21).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (21).

[P. 263, Ll. 13—14.]

What is meant by the man being 'Censurable' is that he becomes open to the contingency of the application of the 'Clincher' being brought home to him; the 'overlooking' of this means that he is *not* directly charged with the words —'you have become subject to a Clincher or Ground of Defeat."

This 'Ground of Defeat' however can be pointed out only by the audience, when directly appealed to with the question—'Who is defeated?' The man himself, who had rendered himself open to a Clincher, could not very well show his own cloven feet (by saying 'I had rendered myself to subject to a Clincher, and you failed to urge it against me').

Vārṭika on Sū. (21).

[P. 567, L. 14 to L. 19.]

When one does not bring home the Clincher to the person that has incurred that Clincher, he himself becomes *defeated*;

as he shows his *ignorance* of the fact of the other man having become subject to a Clincher.

Some people say that this is not a 'Ground of Defeat,' as the man goes on to say other things (in answer to the Opponent). These people argue as follows:—"This cannot be a 'Ground of Defeat,' as the man offers other answers; it is true that he does not bring home the Clincher to the party that has incurred it,—but he still speaks on, and offers some other answer."

This however is not right, for the very same reason that has been put forward. Just because, when he should have urged the 'Clincher,' he says something else,—he becomes *defeated*; if he really knew (that the other party had already incurred a 'Clincher'), for what purpose should he say anything else?

Sūṭra (21).

WHEN ONE PARTY URGES A 'CLINCHER' WHEN THERE IS NO 'CLINCHER' (INCURRED BY THE OTHER PARTY),—IT IS A CASE OF (20) 'CENSURING THE UN-CENSURABLE.'—(Sū. 22).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (22).

[P. 263, Ll. 18—19.]

It is only when the man has a wrong conception of the true character of the 'Clincher' that he can urge—'You are defeated'—against the other Party who, in fact, has *not* rendered himself subject to a 'Clincher;' and in doing so, since he would be censuring one who does not deserve to be censured, he should be regarded as 'defeated.'*

* This is not the same as 'Embarassment,' as in this latter the man does not know what to say in answer, while in 'Censuring the Un-censurable' he says something, as the *answer*, which is not an answer at all. It is for this reason that this 'Clincher' includes all *Futile Rejoinders*. The difference between this and 'Fallacious Probans' lies in this that the 'Fallacious Probans' when pointed out, tends to the 'defeat' of the propounder of the argument, while 'Censuring the Un-censurable' is urged against the person who is answering an argument.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

Vārṭika on Sū. (22).

[P. 558, Ll. 1—2.]

Even when there is no 'Clincher' incurred, the man says 'You are defeated.' The saying of this becomes a 'ground of defeat,' since it shows that the man is ignorant of what a 'Clincher' really is.

Sūṭra (23).

HAVING TAKEN UP ONE STANDPOINT, IF THE PARTY CARRIES ON THE DISCUSSION WITHOUT RESTRICTION,—IT IS A CASE OF (21) 'INCONSISTENCY.'—(*Sū.* 23).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (23).

[P. 264, L. 1 to L. 15.]

Having affirmed a certain character in regard to a thing, if the party carries on further discussion *without restriction* —*i.e.*, even contrary to the view taken up before—it should be regarded as a case of 'Inconsistency.' E.g. 'An entity never renounces itself,—there can be no distinction of what exists—that which is non-existent can never come into existence,—no non-existent thing is ever produced;' having taken up this standpoint, the *Sāṅkhya* goes on to establish this thesis in the following manner:—'All that is manifested must be regarded as emanating from a single origin, because there is a common substratum running through all emanations, —and in the case of the Earthen Cup and such things it is found that they have the substratum of *Clay* running through them all, and are the emanations from a single origin,—and all manifested things are found to have Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion running through them all,—and from seeing the subsistence of this common substratum in these—Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion,—we conclude that the whole of this Universe must be the emanation from a single origin.'*—When he has said this, he is met (by the Logician) with the following question—'How is it to be determined that a certain thing is the *origin*, and another the *emanation*?'—Thus questioned, the *Sāṅkhya* answers—'That which itself remains constant while one character of it ceases to exist and another comes

* The right reading is एकप्रकृतीदंविश्वमिति, as found in D.

into existence is the *origin*; and the character that ceases to exist and comes into existence is the *emanation*.'*

Now here we find that the Sāṅkhya has carried on discussion without any restriction, without regard to the view taken up by him before, in fact even contrary to the opinion accepted before. For the opinion accepted by him at the outset was—'the non-existent can never come into existence—the existent cannot cease to exist;' and it is a well-known fact that unless there is 'cessation of existence' of what has been *existent*, or 'coming into existence' of what has been *non-existent*, there can be no *disappearance* or *appearance*; e.g. when, the Clay remaining constant, its own character, in the shape of the *Cup*, comes into existence, it is said to *appear*, and when it has ceased to exist, it is said to *disappear*;—all this should not be possible (according to the Sāṅkhya standpoint) even in connection with the character of the Clay. Having all this urged against himself, if the *Sāṅkhya* comes to admit that what is *existent* does *cease to exist*, and what *is non-existent does comes into existence*,—then he becomes subject to the Clincher of 'Inconsistence;' while if he does not admit the said facts, his thesis fails to be established.†

Vārṭika on Sū. (23).

[P. 568, Ll. 5—6.]

The example is clearly explained in the *Bhāṣya*. The man becomes *defeated*, by abandoning the position taken up, as apart from his original Proposition.‡

Sūṭra (24).

(22) THE 'FALLACIOUS PROBANS' ALSO, (ARE CLINCHERS) AS THEY HAVE BEEN ALREADY DESCRIBED. (Sū. 24).

---

* The best reading of this passage is found in the *Tāṭparya* and D— वस्त्ववस्थितस्य धर्मान्तरनिवृत्तौ यद्धर्मान्तरं प्रवर्तते नाम इति: यद्धर्मान्तरमप्रवर्ततो निवर्तते वा सविकार इति. In the case of the Jar, the Clay is the constant factor; while the varying shapes of the Jar, Cup &c., are the *emanations*.

† Without the said fact, no distinction is possible between 'Origin' and 'Emanation;' and without this distinction, the original Proposition of the Sāṅkhya can have no meaning.

‡ If he contradicts his Proposition, he is open to the charge of 'Contradiction.' In the present case what the man says, in the course of discussion is not the contrary of his Proposition itself, but of something else, which he may have accepted in course of the discussion.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (24).

[P. 264, L. 17 to L. 22.]

The 'Fallacious Probans' also are 'Grounds of Defeat.' *Question*—"Is it on account of the presence of some other character that the Fallacious Probans come to be regarded as *Clinchers*,—just in the same way as the 'Instruments of of Cognition' come to be regarded as 'Objects of Cognition'?"

In answer to this the *Sūṭra* says—*as they have been described*; *i.e.*, it is in the character of the 'Fallacious Probans' itself that they become 'Grounds of Defeat' (Clinchers) also.

Thus have the Instruments of Right Cognition and other categories been duly *mentioned*, *defined* and *examined*.

'The Science of Reasoning that revealed itself to the Sage Akṣapāḍa, the chief of exponents,—of that Vāṭsyāyaṇa has propounded the Commentary.'

Thus ends the Second Daily Lesson of the Fifth Discourse in the *Bhāṣya* of Vāṭsyāyana.

Vārṭika on Sū. (24).

[P. 568, L. 8 to L. 14.]

The Fallacious Probans are to be regarded as 'Grounds of Defeat' exactly in the same forms in which they have been classified according to their characteristics.

Thus have the 'Instruments of Right Cognition' and the other categories been duly *mentioned* in the first Sūṭra, *defined*, in the First Aḍhyāya, and *examined*, in the rest of the work; and thus the exposition of the whole Truth should be regarded as having been fulfilled.

'The Futile Rejoinders with all their details, the definition of the Clinchers,—and the conclusion of the Science —these have been expounded in the Fifth Discourse.'

'The *Bhāṣya*, which Vāṭsyāyana, the very picture of Akṣapāḍa, wrote,—of that great *Bhāṣya*, this Commentary has been written by the descendant of Bharadvāja.'

Thus ends the Fifth Discourse in the *Vārṭika* of Uddyoṭakara.